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By F. E. Chadwick

THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN:

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THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

BY

FRENCH ENSOR CHADWICK

REAR-ADMIRAL U. S. NAVY (RETIRED)

AUTHOR OF "CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR"

VOL. I

WITH MAPS

NEW YORK

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1911

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Published September, 1911

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TO THE MEMORY OF

WILLIAM THOMAS SAMPSON

1840–1902

REAR-ADMIRAL UNITED STATES NAVY
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC FLEET
DURING THE WAR WITH SPAIN

PREFACE

THIS work is intended in the main as a documentary history. An endeavor has been made to give all important orders, telegrams, and reports. It is not to be understood that these, or any considerable portion of them, are for the first time before the public. All of any real importance have already appeared in government publications or with governmental approval. The interior history of no war or other great event has ever before been so fully exposed as in the many volumes published by the American government and in the documents set forth with the authority of the government of Spain. These are given in detail in the bibliography.

Using the words of the Messenger in *Antigone*, the writer can say, in part, "I saw"; and in whole:

> . . . I will speak and hold back
> No syllable of the truth. Why should we soothe
> Your ears with stories, only to appear
> Liars thereafter? Truth is always right.

This is the writer's view of history: neither to magnify our own exploits nor to depreciate those of the foe. We were comparatively strong in the material of war; he was weak; we had the initiative of the Anglo-Saxon, he the spirit of passive sacrifice which, as shown through history, has made the Spaniard strong in defence. Spain defeated was not Spain dishonored. The sortie of Cervera at Santiago, the action of Montojo at Cavite, and the defence of El Caney must ever stand as notable examples

of the high spirit and sacrificing courage which are such great qualities of the Spanish race. The days of May 1, July 1, and July 3, in 1898, are dates of honor which both nations may well hold in lasting and proud remembrance.

NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND,
17 *January*, 1911.

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TABLE OF DISTANCES

ATLANTIC	NAUTICAL MILES	STATUTE MILES
Key West to Havana	90	104
Key West to Cienfuegos	520	598
Key West to Tampa	220	253
Key West to Santiago de Cuba *via* Cape Maysi	610	702
via Cape Antonio	790	910
Key West to San Juan, P. R.	972	1,119
Cape Verde Islands to Martinique	2,070	2,385
Cape Verde Islands to San Juan, P. R.	2,350	2,707
Martinique to San Juan	380	438
Martinique to Curaçao	500	576
Curaçao to Santiago de Cuba	625	720
Curaçao to Cienfuegos	900	1,036
Cienfuegos to Santiago de Cuba	315	364
Santiago de Cuba to Guantánamo	40	46
Santiago to Mole S. Nicolas, Haiti	122	140
Santiago to Gonaives, Haiti	185	213
Santiago to San Juan, P. R.	580	668
Windward Passage to San Juan	450	519
New York to Cape Verde Islands	2,919	3,361
New York to Havana	1,215	1,398
New York to San Juan, P. R.	1,411	1,626
Sandy Hook to Capes of Virginia	240	276
Capes of Virginia to Havana	938	1,078
Santiago to El Caney	....	4
Siboney to Las Guasimas	....	$2\frac{3}{4}$
Siboney to El Pozo	....	7
Siboney to San Juan Hill	....	$8\frac{1}{2}$
Siboney to Santiago	....	$9\frac{3}{4}$
Guantánamo to Santiago by land (about)	....	75

PACIFIC	NAUTICAL MILES	STATUTE MILES
Hong-Kong to Manila	628	723
Subig Bay to Manila	55	63
Manila to Sangley Point	$6\frac{1}{2}$	$7\frac{1}{2}$
San Francisco to Honolulu	2,110	2,325
Honolulu to Guam	3,337	3,842
Guam to Manila	1,742	2,006
San Francisco to Manila *via* Honolulu and Guam	7,189	8,275
Suez to Manila *via* Singapore	6,358	7,321

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

CHAPTER I

NAVAL MOVEMENTS AND PREPARATION

THE middle of January, 1898, found four of the armored ships of the North Atlantic squadron in Hampton Roads, and a fifth, the *Texas*, expected from New York. All had undergone the usual autumn overhauling, and had been collected at Hampton Roads with a view to going south to the winter drill-grounds off the west coast of Florida, a region selected for its genial winter climate, facility of supply, and a general shoalness of water, which, while having sufficient depth close to the land, was such as enabled ships to anchor as much, at some points, as a hundred miles from shore.

The recognition by the American government of the seriousness of the situation in Cuba is shown by the telegrams of the navy department at this time to the commanders-in-chief abroad. These telegrams directed the retention, as the law allowed, of men whose enlistment had expired; that to Admiral Selfridge, commander-in-chief in Europe, being dated January 11, and to Commodore Dewey, then at Yokohama, January 27. A telegram sent January 17 to Captain C. M. Chester, in command of the ships in the South Atlantic, announced that "affairs are very disturbed in Cuba; it is considered advisable to change the disposition of ships; announce unofficially your intention to proceed with the *Cincinnati* and *Castine* on cruise to northward for exercise and drill and to visit the most northern part of the South Atlantic station; as soon after as possible, without thereby causing comment, proceed to Pará, Brazil, at discretion, and there await further orders."

A telegram of the same date stopped the *Wilmington*, Commander C. C. Todd, on her way to the South Atlantic, and ordered her "about February 14 to proceed to La Guayra and await further orders." On the same day the *Helena*, Commander W. T. Swinburne, was stopped on her way to China and ordered to Lisbon.

On January 26 Rear-Admiral Thomas Selfridge, in command of the small force in the Mediterranean, the flag-ship of which was the *San Francisco*, was ordered to go to Lisbon after February 2, and remain there.[1]

But these facts should not fix sinister design upon those charged with the movement of the North Atlantic squadron to Florida waters. It was to a great degree a squadron of exercise; it had been held north already two winters in a bleak winter climate to the detriment of its morale and efficiency, though the drill-ground, to which throughout this period it was desired to send these ships, was in our own waters, eminently suited for the purposes, and, indeed, the only place available so long as a West Indian cruise appeared undesirable on account of the Cuban situation. The fact that for two years the United States government had been willing at a marked sacrifice to its naval well-being and efficiency to forego the advantages offered by the waters of Florida is in itself proof of its general good intentions. In any case the difference in distance between Hampton Roads and the Florida Gulf from Havana is a negligible quantity. It is but two and a half days at twelve knots. It was thus thought that the much-desired change to our Southern waters could be made without trespassing too much upon the good understanding existing between the Spanish and United States governments. The former had, in December, expressed some concern on account of the proposed movement, but Señor Dupuy de Lome, the Spanish minister, was assured that there was no unfriendly intent.[2]

The four armored ships of the squadron then together (the armored cruiser *New York*, Captain Chadwick, in which was the flag of Rear-Admiral Montgomery Sicard, commander-in-chief, and the first-class battle-ships *Iowa*, Captain Sampson, *Massa-*

[1] Shortly after his arrival there the services of this valuable and experienced officer were lost to the service through his retirement under the law which retires all officers of sixty-two years who have not received the thanks of Congress. Admiral Selfridge was relieved by Commodore John C. Howell. The presence of the few ships of this command in peninsular waters gave great concern to the Spanish government, notwithstanding the fact that it was not a serious fighting force. (See *Spanish Diplom., Cor. and Docs.*, 1896–1900, 80.)

[2] Chadwick, *Rel. of United States and Spain. Diplomacy*, 532.

chusetts, Captain Higginson, and *Indiana*, Captain Taylor [1]), left Hampton Roads for Key West, January 16, 1898. The second-class battle-ship *Texas*, Captain Philip, left New York the day before and joined the flag just before the arrival of the squadron, after a slow passage, at Key West, Sunday, January 23. Ships of such deep draft must anchor outside the coral reef, which skirts the shore at this point at a distance of about five miles. This anchorage is thus in the open sea, in a depth of from sixteen to twenty fathoms, exposed to such seas as may be raised by the usual trade winds, but protected from the effects of the northers, the only gales which blow in winter, from the fact that the trend of the coast and reef is here in an east-and-west direction.

The admiral was at once joined on his arrival at the outside anchorage by the second-class battle-ship *Maine* and the cruisers *Montgomery*, Commander Converse, and *Detroit*, Commander Dayton, which were then lying at Key West, which had been used as head-quarters while these ships were employed in the suppression of filibustering.[2] The torpedo-boats *Cushing*, Lieutenant Gleaves, *Dupont*, Lieutenant S. S. Wood, and *Ericsson*, Lieutenant Usher, which had been employed on the same service, were in the harbor, six miles distant.

It had been the intention of the admiral to leave the next day with the whole of the eight ships with the flag for the harbor of Dry Tortugas, sixty miles west of Key West, and which from its situation with reference to the drill-ground, had been selected as the base for coal supply. The small steamer *Fern*, Lieutenant-Commander W. S. Cowles, was to be used as a general supply-vessel between Key West and Tortugas.

While there was grave concern as to the Cuban situation, and while it was the duty of the American government to be prepared for the worst, the fact that no immediate danger was feared is shown by the fact that the admiral's orders directed him to be in Hampton Roads again not later than April 1.

[1] Lieutenant-Commander John A. Rodgers (now rear-admiral) was in temporary command during Captain Taylor's absence through illness.

[2] The *Maine* had, on request of Consul-General Lee, been assigned to this duty in order to have a ship of force at hand in case of an outbreak in Havana, which might render the presence of a ship necessary.

The *Maine* had been held at Key West since December 15 in telegraphic communication with the consul-general at Havana, and with orders to go there should he so request. The very serious disturbances of the 12th of January, when both officers and soldiers of the Spanish army joined in attacking the offices of the autonomist newspapers, the *Diario de la Marina*, *Discusion*, and the *Reconcentrado*, had produced such a state of alarm among the foreign residents that the consul-general telegraphed the next day to the department of state at Washington:

> Uncertainty exists whether he (Blanco) can control situation. If demonstrated he cannot maintain order, preserve life, and keep the peace, or if Americans and their interests are in danger, ships must be sent, and to that end should be prepared to move promptly.

This dispatch was, of course, merely anticipatory, and there was nothing in the situation to prevent the *Maine* accompanying the squadron the 24th of January to the harbor of the Dry Tortugas, where the squadron anchored the afternoon of that day. At 9 o'clock in the evening the torpedo-boat *Dupont* arrived from Key West, directing the *Maine* to proceed to Havana. The consul-general had telegraphed Washington the same day: "Advise visit to be postponed six or seven days to give last excitement more time to disappear," but the secretary of state answered that the *Maine* had been ordered, and at 11 P. M. she proceeded upon her fateful visit, which, however it may have been regarded by the Spanish, whether in Havana or in Madrid, had nothing in it of an unfriendly character. The United States government would have been remiss in its duty to its many citizens then resident in Havana had it not given them some refuge such as the *Maine* afforded against the violence which seemed at the time so imminent.

That the United States government did not desire to be offensive in action is shown by the proposed withdrawal of the *Maine* but a few days after her arrival at Havana on the score of health. A telegram was sent February 4 from the department of state to General Lee:

> Secretary of the navy thinks not prudent for a vessel to remain long in Havana; sanitary reasons. Should some vessel be kept there all the time? If another sent what have you to suggest as to kind of ship? Telegraph your views.

General Lee answered the same day:

Do not think slightest sanitary danger to officers or crew until April or even May. Ship or ships should be kept here all the time now. We should not relinquish position of peaceful control of situation, or conditions would be worse than if vessel had never been sent. Americans would depart with their families if no vessel in harbor on account of distrust of preservation of order by authorities. If another riot occurs will be against governor-general and autonomy, but might include anti-American demonstration also. First-class battle-ship should replace one if relieved as object-lesson, and to counteract Spanish opinion of our navy, and should have a torpedo-boat with it to preserve communication with admiral.

The torpedo-boat *Cushing* was then at Key West, and Lieutenant Gleaves, the excellent and capable young officer in command, was ordered to take over the duty (previously the *Maine's*) of keeping open the telegraphic communication between Havana and Key West. Says Lieutenant (now Captain) Gleaves:

It was arranged that telegrams should be exchanged daily between Consul-General Lee and myself, and in case of any serious outbreak in Havana, or any other occasion arising demanding the presence of a war-ship, a preconcerted cipher was to be sent by the consul-general to the *Cushing*, and in the event of anything of great importance I was to inform the senior officer afloat, and also Admiral Sicard, the commander-in-chief, who was with the fleet at Dry Tortugas.

After the departure of the *Maine* this programme was carried out for a few days, when I received a letter from General Lee, expressing the opinion that further communication of this kind would be unnecessary, as everything was quiet in Havana.

On February 11 the department ordered the *Cushing* to Havana on special duty to communicate with Captain Sigsbee, of the *Maine*, and then to return immediately to Key West. . . .

The *Cushing* sailed at 7.30 A. M., February 11, and did not arrive at Havana until 3 P. M., having encountered a severe gale in the straits and a heavy sea. It was on this passage that Ensign Joseph Cabell Breckinridge [a valuable young officer whose loss was much regretted] was washed overboard and drowned. He was the first victim of our trouble with Spain.

The detachment of the *Maine* interfered, of course, in no wise with the works of the squadron except that it removed one of the units of a force already smaller than wished for the evolutionary

drills which it was desired to carry out, and which were at once begun. These drills, the coaling in Tortugas harbor, and the general duties of the squadron were soon fairly in train.

Excepting for the presence of the squadron, nothing could be less warlike than the appearance of the harbor, which was formed by a series of low-lying sand keys and by coral banks lying just short of the water surface. On the largest of the keys is Fort Jefferson, an extensive casemated fortification of granite and brick of the same general character as were many constructed from 1840 to 1860, and of which the better-known Fort Sumter, at Charleston, was a type. The fort, however, was entirely dismantled, the wooden portions of the gun-carriages rotten and the guns on the parapet sunk in the uncut grass, the whole the picture of a peace apparently not to be broken. The only application of the fort at the period was as a quarantine station for yellow-fever patients from ships bound to United States ports in the Gulf of Mexico.

Squadron drills and exercises had at once begun, the squadron leaving Tortugas harbor and occasionally anchoring elsewhere, the whole of the waters on the west coast of Florida being, as mentioned, one vast anchoring ground rarely disturbed in winter by rough weather. These exercises were somewhat broken in upon by coaling and the grounding, though happily without injury, of two of the battle-ships on coral lumps in the harbor, which had not been found by any of the surveys. The admiral, who had been ill from a long-standing malarial trouble, had left on a short leave, intending to be absent at Tampa for a couple of weeks, but finding a hotel less comfortable than his ship's quarters, returned after a few days. When he left it was thought scarcely possible that he could return, and the writer, in command of the *New York*, finds himself stating in a letter home that "Sampson of course will be in command while the admiral is away. If there is to be a change, I wish it would be he who would be appointed." This, it may be mentioned, was the general feeling of the squadron.

The *Marblehead*, Commander McCalla, joined February 7, only to be sent to New Orleans to lend éclat to the Mardi Gras festivities, and the *Nashville*, Commander Maynard, also newly arrived, was ordered with the *Texas* to Galveston for a like purpose. The *Montgomery* on January 31 was ordered on a cruise to the eastward,

taking in Matanzas and Santiago de Cuba, with a special view to inquire into the suffering reported to exist.

About 4 A. M. of the 16th of February the torpedo-boat *Ericsson* arrived from Key West with a despatch from the commandant of that station, enclosing a telegram which he had received from Havana, stating that the *Maine* had been destroyed by an explosion in Havana harbor.[1] The admiral, shortly after 7 o'clock, called a council of the captains, the consensus of which was that the flag-ship should return at once to Key West, to be in direct telegraphic communication with Washington. The *New York* thus found herself on the afternoon of the 16th again at anchor off the reef. The *Massachusetts* and *Indiana* were left for the time at Dry Tortugas, but the *Iowa* was ordered to Key West on the 19th, her captain, Sampson, being ordered as senior member of a court of inquiry upon the destruction of the *Maine*, of which the other members were Captain Chadwick and Lieutenant-

[1] The reception of this telegram is described by Captain Gleaves:

"On the night of the 15th of February, about 10 P. M., the quartermaster informed me that there was a gentleman on deck who wished to see me on a very important matter. I went on deck immediately, and found our secret agent. He told me that he had just received a telegram from his representative in Havana stating, 'that the *Maine* had been blown up by her powder magazine,' and adding, 'that it was a curious sight to see a man-of-war sinking in the harbor.' I expressed doubt as to the truth of this report, as rumors were circulated in Key West every day of either the destruction of the consulate in Havana or the assassination of General Lee. The agent, however, was so thoroughly satisfied himself, that I decided, in accordance with my orders, to confer with the senior officer afloat, Lieut.-Commander W. S. Cowles, commanding the *Fern*. I suggested to Captain Cowles that we three go to the cable office, and there await further news, which would be sure to come by the preconcerted message if the report was true. In the cable office at the time Captain Sigsbee's despatch was received were the operator, Captain Cowles, the secret agent of the government, and myself. We sat in silence in the operating-room and waited for some time. Finally, about 11 o'clock, the instruments began to click, and the operator wrote out the message as it came in. When it was about half through, the operator exchanged a glance with the secret agent, who himself was an operator, and had been reading the message. It was quite evident to me then that the report was true. When the message was finished, the operator handed it to the agent, and after reading it he passed it to Captain Cowles, who handed it to me. It was the telegram addressed to the secretary of the navy by Captain Sigsbee announcing the destruction of the *Maine*, and suggesting that public opinion be suspended until further reports. There was no one else present when this telegram was received." (Notes of Captain Gleaves to author.)

Commander Potter, with Lieutenant-Commander Marix, ordered from Washington, as judge-advocate.

This court left for Havana on the evening of February 20, in the light-house tender *Mangrove*, aboard which, while at Havana, the court remained and had its sittings. The tender *Fern*, the coast-survey steamer *Bache*, and, on March 8, the cruiser *Montgomery*, were ordered to Havana to assist the court in various ways, more particularly in looking after the personnel sent from the squadron to aid in examining the wreck.[1] The sittings of the court, which were carried on with great deliberation and with no hint of direction or hurry from any one, were not completed until March 21, 1898.

The most elementary sense of precaution had now demanded an extension of the cautionary orders already given to our naval commanders. The loss of the *Maine* had, of course, already greatly added to the tension in the United States, already sufficiently great over the situation in Cuba, where Spanish effort to establish autonomy now seemed completely unsuccessful, and the suffering and terrible mortality of the people on the increase.[2] Thus on February 17 the *Cincinnati*, Captain Chester, and *Castine*, Commander R. M. Berry, were directed to such port north of Pará as the senior officer might select. On the 25th the ships at Lisbon were ordered to keep full of coal, and on the same date Commodore Dewey was telegraphed:

> Secret and confidential. Order the squadron, except *Monocacy*, to Hong-Kong. Keep full of coal. In the event of declaration of war [with] Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands. Keep *Olympia*[3] until further orders.

On February 26 the *Wilmington* was ordered to report to Captain

[1] For the personal views of the writer in the subject of the destruction of the *Maine*, see the previous volume, *Diplomacy*, 559–563 (note).

[2] See Consul-General Lee's testimony in regard to Cuban conditions. Sen. Doc., 230, 55 Cong., 2 Sess., 534 *et seq.*; also his report of December 13, 1897. (*Ibid.*, 544), giving the opinion that there was no possibility of terminating the war by *arms*, *autonomy* or "by *purchasing the insurgent leaders* as recently attempted or, as far as I can see, in any other way." Also the consular reports. (*Ibid.*, 552–563.)

[3] The *Olympia* had orders to return to the United States.

Chester, who had gone from Pará to Barbados. On the same day telegrams were sent to all commanders-in-chief to "keep full of coal the best that can be had."

On March 3 the *Columbia* and *Minneapolis*, laid up at Philadelphia, were ordered to be got ready for sea, and enlistments ordered for them which were in excess of quota authorized by law, and on the same day the old wooden corvette *Mohican* was ordered to take on board the ammunition at the Mare Island Navy Yard which had been sent there for the ships in Asia, and to go at once to Honolulu, two thousand miles distant, and transfer it to the *Baltimore*, Captain Dyer, the flag-ship of the Pacific station. Rear-Admiral J. N. Miller, who was in command of that station, was ordered, as soon as the ammunition should be shifted, to send the *Baltimore* to Hong-Kong to report to Commodore Dewey. He himself was directed to proceed with his staff to San Francisco. The *Mohican* arrived at Honolulu March 19, and the *Baltimore* left Honolulu the 25th, carrying what was, in the conditions, a priceless cargo, Commodore Dewey being telegraphed on March 21 of her expected departure.

On March 7, in contemplation of the organization of the flying squadron, to the command of which Commodore W. S. Schley was ordered, the *Brooklyn*, Captain F. A. Cook, then at La Guayra, Venezuela, was telegraphed:

> The situation is getting worse. Proceed without delay to Hampton Roads.

At this time there was evidently some anxiety as to the ammunition supply, for on March 9 Admiral Sicard was directed not to expend any until further orders.

On March 12 Commodore Howell, at Lisbon, was directed to send at once the *Bancroft* to Norfolk and the *Helena* to Key West. Two days later he was telegraphed:

> Proceed at once to Newcastle-upon-the-Tyne. Upon arrival communicate immediately with the United States naval attaché at London. Hoist United States flag upon *Amazonas* and *Abreu*. Appoint to the command of former Lieutenant-Commander A. P. Nazro and sufficient

officers and crew of the *San Francisco*. Proceed to New York. *San Francisco* to convoy. Utilize your staff watch duty.[1]

On March 15, Captain Chester, at Barbados, with what had been the South Atlantic squadron, was ordered to Port Antonio, Jamaica. He was informed that the *Annapolis*, Commander Hunker, on a practice cruise with a crew of apprentices, had left Curaçao the day before, to arrive at Key West not later than March 31. Trouble must at the moment have appeared imminent, as the telegram added, "He does not know the altered situation. Try to intercept and direct to proceed to Hampton Roads," the purpose being to give her a crew of men and otherwise prepare her for active service.

On March 1 the *Oregon*, which had been docked at Bremerton, in the state of Washington, was directed to go to San Francisco as soon as possible and fill with ammunition. She arrived March 9, and on the 12th was ordered to proceed and reach Callao as soon as practicable. Captain Charles E. Clark took command March 17, relieving Captain McCormick, who had been condemned by medical survey. The ship left San Francisco March 19, and arrived at Callao April 4, making on the passage an average speed of 10.7 knots. The gun-boat *Marietta*, Commander Symonds, then at Panama, had been ordered, March 22, to Callao, to arrange for coaling the *Oregon* at once on her arrival, and then proceed to Valparaiso with a view of taking charge, in case the negotiations for purchase from Chile of the armored cruiser *O'Higgins* should be successful.

[1] Commander Brownson had been sent to England on the passage, March 9, of the appropriation of $50,000,000 for national defence with reference to the purchase of ships, but the purchase of these two had already been arranged by Lieutenant Colwell, then naval attaché at London. The only other vessels purchased were a small torpedo-boat in Germany (renamed the *Somers*), the *Diogenes*, a gun-boat (renamed the *Topeka*), and, in Brazil, the *Nictheroy*, a sister ship to the *Yankee* (renamed the *Buffalo*). The *San Francisco* anchored at Gravesend on March 18 and reached New York with the *Amazonas* (renamed the *New Orleans*) on April 13. Captain W. M. Folger was ordered to command the latter, and in seventeen days she was ready for sea. She arrived at Newport May 2, for her torpedo outfit, and joined the flying squadron at Hampton Roads on May 8. The *Abreu* (renamed the *Albany*) was far from completion, and thus could not be delivered until after the war.

The *Marietta* contracted for the *Oregon's* coal and had it ready for her in lighters; she then left, March 31, for Valparaiso. The *Oregon* arrived at Callao April 4, took on board eleven hundred tons of coal, of which one hundred tons were in bags on deck, and left the evening of April 7 for the Straits of Magellan.

Before leaving Callao Captain Clark telegraphed the navy department April 6:

On account of navigation of Magellan Strait, and reported movements Spanish torpedo-vessel near Montevideo, I should recommend *Marietta* to accompany this vessel. If required, I could touch Talcahuano, Chile, for orders six days after my sailing.

The department replied the same date:

Proceed at once to Montevideo or Rio Janeiro. The Spanish torpedo-boat *Temerario* is in Montevideo. *Marietta* has been ordered to proceed to Sandy Point, Patagonia, to arrange for coal. How many tons of coal will you require? The *Marietta* and *Oregon* to proceed together. Keep secret your destination. Keep secret this message.

and telegraphed the *Marietta:*

Oregon leaves to-day from Callao for Sandy Point, Patagonia. Go ahead and secure 600 tons of coal for her and accompany her to the north. The United States consulates in Cuba have closed. United States consul-general is coming home.

The *Oregon* reached the entrance to the Straits at 3.30 P. M., April 16, a severe gale of wind breaking before an anchorage could be reached. Only seamen who have experienced such conditions in the western entrance of the Straits of Magellan can understand the trying situation of the ship. A gale with rain so dense that the great cliffs bordering the narrow and tortuous channel way could not be seen, night falling with pitchy darkness, no soundings obtainable, fierce gusts beating down the glacial openings of the mountainous shore, make a trying moment for a captain, and particularly for one who so fully appreciated the momentous nature of his charge. Captain Clark reports that "just before dark the anchors were let go on a rocky shelf fringed by islets and reefs in thirty-eight and fifty-two fathoms of water, and they fortunately

held through some of the most violent gusts I have ever experienced." The writer can well believe, from a like experience, though he has never known Captain Clark to so express himself, that the war, which was about to begin, held for him no more anxious moments than those he passed during the night in these narrow passes of gloomy and Dantesque grandeur.

The ship arrived at Sandy Point the next evening (April 17), having made an average speed from Callao of 11.75 knots. The *Marietta* arrived a few hours later. The hulk from which was to be taken the coal contracted for by Captain Symonds, of the *Marietta*, was loaded with wool over the coal, a condition which would have given much labor and a delay had not the Chilean officials kindly permitted government coal to be taken. Both ships left Sandy Point April 21, and on account of the *Marietta's* low speed, made still lower by the head winds and sea north of La Plata River, did not reach Rio de Janeiro until April 30. A cautious, though needless, watch was kept for the torpedo-boat destroyer *Temerario*, which, as it turned out, was in no condition to move.

On his arrival at Rio, Captain Clark received a telegram from the navy department, dated April 30:

> War has been declared between the United States and Spain from April 21. *Temerario* has left Montevideo, probably for Rio Janeiro. Await orders.

and on the next day (May 1):

> Four Spanish armored cruisers, heavy and fast, three torpedo-boat destroyers, sailed April 29 from Cape Verdes to the west, destination unknown. Beware of and study carefully the situation. Must be left to your discretion entirely to avoid this fleet and to reach the United States by West Indies. You can go when and where you desire. *Nictheroy*[1] and the *Marietta* subject to the orders of yourself.

On May 2:

> Do not sail from Rio Janeiro until further orders.

This last was, however, countermanded the same day, and the *Oregon* was directed to carry out the instructions sent May 1.

[1] Purchased in Brazil.

On May 3 Captain Clark was informed by the navy department of Dewey's victory at Manila, and next day he left for Bahia. During his stay in Rio precautions were taken in case of the arrival of the expected *Temerario*. The Brazilian authorities were informed that if she entered the harbor and approached the *Oregon* she would be destroyed. Word was sent, however, that the *Temerario* in case of her appearance would be escorted by a man-of-war to an anchorage well up the bay, and a cruiser was stationed, which, with her search-lights aiding those of Fort Santa Cruz, effectively watched the harbor entrance, thus giving concrete evidence of Brazilian good-will.

The *Oregon* and *Marietta* left Rio de Janeiro the morning of May 4, followed in the evening by the *Nictheroy*, which, however, did not join until the evening of May 5, off Cape Frio. It was so evident that the *Oregon* would be greatly hampered by the two smaller vessels, that Captain Clark ordered Captain Symonds to proceed home independently with the *Marietta* and *Nictheroy*, running ashore if necessary to avoid capture, in case he should encounter the Spanish squadron. The *Oregon* arrived at Bahia May 8; communicated with the navy department; was ordered to proceed to the West Indies without further stop in Brazil, and left the next evening for Barbados, being informed that there was no authentic news of the Spanish fleet.[1] She arrived at Barbados at

[1] Naval War Board, Washington, *May* 12, 1898.

"The board discussed fully the question of the advisability of despatching assistance to the *Oregon*, in view of the possibility of that vessel being waylaid by the Cape de Verde squadron. After fully considering the matter it was concluded that, under conditions as they now exist, it was inexpedient to detail either the flying squadron or vessels from Admiral Sampson's fleet to assist her, as the danger of her meeting the Spanish squadron was now thought to be less than formerly, and it was undesirable to disturb Admiral Sampson's operation around Puerto Rico, or to leave the northern coast without its chief defence."

The able authority, Mr. H. W. Wilson, regards an attack upon the *Oregon* as the wisest thing to have done. The writer cannot agree with him. The chances, with a small number of ships, of discovering a single ship at sea are almost infinitesimal. Discovery at night, with no lights showing, is practically impossible. Even if the Spanish squadron and the *Oregon* had come in contact, the advantage in a running fight would have been with the latter on account of her much longer range and heavier (13-inch) guns, and her very complete heavy gun protection. She was, in fact, capable of meeting the whole of Cervera's squadron in such a chase. It would have been a

3.20 A. M., May 18, after a run from Bahia of 2,500 miles, at an average speed of 11.73 knots, but was not permitted to telegraph her arrival to the navy department. She was allowed to take on board four hundred tons of coal, left the same evening, and going well to the eastward of all the West India islands and to the east and north of the Bahamas, arrived at Jupiter Inlet, Florida, on May 24.

After communicating her arrival and readiness for service to the navy department, she left for Key West, where she arrived May 26, sixty-eight days from San Francisco, having performed a journey from the navy yard in Puget Sound, which she left March 7, of 14,700 knots. Her average speed was 11.6 knots, her highest 14.6, the lowest 10.1. She burned 4,100 tons of coal, and arrived at Key West in a thoroughly efficient condition. Her performance was one unprecedented in battle-ship history, and was one which will probably long preserve its unique distinction.

The *Marietta* convoyed the *Nictheroy* to the Pará River, where the latter had to be left to repair her machinery. The *Marietta* took from her one hundred and seventeen tons of coal, and directed her captain to proceed alone to the United States. Commander Symonds parted company with her May 21, and reached Key West June 4. The *Nictheroy* arrived some time after at Newport News, where as the *Buffalo* she was fitted for service.[1]

The *Texas* and *Massachusetts* had been ordered, March 17, to Hampton Roads as part of the proposed flying squadron, the

futile effort with no result but an expenditure of coal which would probably have left the squadron practically helpless.

Cervera was, however, in total ignorance of the departure of the *Oregon* from the Pacific. (See Concas, p. 49.)

[1] Prayers had been said for the *Oregon's* safe journey in many of the churches, so intense were the excitement and interest in her cruise, and the rejoicing was great throughout the country on her reaching Key West. The little *Marietta* seems to have been omitted from these, though needing them in a much greater degree. Her performance which, as a voyage, was equally meritorious with that of the *Oregon*, naturally did not loom so high in the mind of the frightened public.

Mention may be made here also of the very slight recognition of the voyage of the monitors *Monterey* and *Monadnock* across the Pacific, which, as well said by a distinguished ex-naval officer, Professor Hollis, of Harvard, were equally notable performances under more difficult conditions.

Texas leaving the harbor of Dry Tortugas March 21, the *Massachusetts* the next day. These two ships had remained with the *Indiana* and *Iowa* at Tortugas since the departure of the commander-in-chief in the *New York*, February 16, for Key West. They, as also the *New York*, had since the destruction of the *Maine* kept steam ready for movement at a moment's notice, not with the view to any military movement on the part of our government, but as precautionary against any attempts against the ships by sudden attack of any kind; the destruction of the *Maine* justifying, in the mind of the admiral, this apprehension. Sub-calibre practice was begun and thenceforward until hostilities began (with a short interval due to the telegram of March 9, mentioned above, which was soon revoked), was kept up the greater part of each day. Almost every one aboard ship took his turn at firing, and a vast amount of ammunition was thus expended, but to good purpose.[1]

All our ships within call were gradually brought together at Key West, and the place itself began to assume the character of a war base. Coal was forwarded in large quantities, and the small naval depot was taxed beyond its capacity in the reception and distribution of stores and ammunition. The machine shop, long almost disused, was enlarged to a fair working capacity, and a distilling plant of large capacity for the supply of fresh water for ship's boilers was laid down.

The place was in no sense a stronghold except from the fact of the difficulty of navigation from the reef to the town. Its distance from the sea precluded any danger from attack from outside the reef by such a fleet as that of Spain, and the mere removal of the buoys would have made the port perfectly secure from the entrance of even the lighter of the heavy ships. A raid by lighter vessels other than torpedo-boats would have been perfectly ineffective in

[1] Sub-calibre. This term is applied to an arrangement by which a musket or other barrel of small calibre is fixed in the axis of the larger guns so that these can be used in aiming and firing while only expending the small calibre ammunition. In eight-inch guns and above, a one-pounder barrel is generally used; it would be impossible to carry on such continuous practice with full-sized ammunition, not only on account of the tremendous expense, but of the deterioration which would result to the guns. As an example of the quantity of ammunition expended, the following is noted in the *New York's* log: Expended 2,840 rounds, .45 calibre, using three targets, February 23; 2,200, February 24; 3,160, February 25.

face of the presence of a number of our own ships, and even of the moderate preparations made for defence ashore. Fort Taylor, a smaller work of the same character as Fort Jefferson at Tortugas, was practically dismantled. It was not until the beginning of May, 1898, that two 4.7-inch guns were mounted, and about May 18 one 8-inch B. L.[1] rifle; a number of mines were, however, laid by the army engineers, and a powerful search-light and an Ardois signal apparatus installed in the fort. Notwithstanding the meagre defence ashore, there never was a time, to the mind of the writer, when we needed to have felt the slightest anxiety regarding the safety of this port. It is true that the Spanish minister of marine had his views about it, as will be mentioned later, but they were as vague and valueless as the rest of his schemes of naval campaign.

Admiral Sicard, on account of the distance of the flag-ship from Key West harbor and the consequent difficulty of communication, had transferred his head-quarters to the town. His health, however, as previously mentioned, had been for some time unequal to the strain of command, and as the much greater strain of war preparation came, he was obliged to yield to the *force majeure* of serious illness. He was examined by a board of medical survey, and upon its decision gave up the command. However much he desired to retain it (and the wrench to leave under the circumstances was such as can come to but few), he felt that patriotic duty demanded the sacrifice, and at 3.10 P. M., March 26, his flag was hauled down, and he left the fleet with the warmest good wishes of officers and men, who honored and esteemed his ability and upright character.

Captain Sampson, of the *Iowa*, was ordered by telegram of the same date to the post vacated by Admiral Sicard. His promotion to the grade of commodore was soon due, when in any case he would, by the practice which had long obtained in our service, be eligible for such command, nearly all our squadrons for some years having gone to officers of this rank. Looking to the eventuality of war, it was the strong desire of the officers present that he should be selected, and when the appointment came to him there was general congratulation in the fleet. On March 26, he

[1] Breech-loading.

took over the command,[1] being relieved in command of the *Iowa* by Captain Robley D. Evans.

As forcibly said by a distinguished writer on naval affairs, "the selection of the admiral to command in war is a matter of the extremest moment." [2] The president was thus, in appointing Sampson to this most important command in anticipation of war, and in making him a rear-admiral on its outbreak, not only acting within the strict letter of the law, but under the burden of the duty of selecting for such a post the officer he regarded as best fitted. Under such a responsibility questions of mere hierarchical status are naught. The law wisely enables the president, in time of war, to select any one of or above the rank of commander to command a squadron or fleet, so that Sampson's appointment as rear-admiral on April 21 and Dewey's, which came May 7, were as sound and valid as that of any officer in the service. That of Admiral Porter in the civil war was of like character; he was junior to several, who served under him loyally and made no objection to his advancement over them to the highest grade of the navy when awards came to be made. The president in such case was much in the position of Lord St. Vincent, when he chose for the leader of the force which was charged with the pursuit of the great expedition fitted out at Toulon, and destined for Egypt, the youngest flag-officer of his command. "Bitter reclamations were made by the admirals senior to Nelson, but St. Vincent had one simple sufficient reply: 'Those who are responsible for measures must have the choice of the men to execute them.'" [3]

This subject is dealt with at this length on account of the great misconception in the minds of many regarding the president's action, but it has been the misconception of ignorance both of the

[1] The following officers were appointed on his staff, Captain Chadwick retaining also command of the flag-ship: *Personal staff.*—Captain F. E. Chadwick, chief of staff; Lieutenant Sydney A. Staunton, assistant chief of staff; Lieutenant Charles C. Marsh, flag secretary; Ensign E. L. Bennett, flag lieutenant. *Fleet staff.*—Chief Engineer Charles J. McConnell, engineer of the fleet; Pay Inspector Arthur Burtis, paymaster of the fleet; Medical Inspector Michael C. Drennan, surgeon of the fleet.

[2] H. W. Wilson, *Downfall of Spain*, 98.

[3] Mahan, *Types of Naval Officers*, 380.

law and of the high duty which the executive owes the country of selecting the best instruments to meet a great emergency. The law was made to meet a situation precisely of this sort, and it would have been stultification in the president not to have applied it. He is placed where he is to administer the government, and there is no conceivable responsibility greater than the handling of fleets and armies in war. To hamper his action by confining him in his choice of commander would be a policy of national suicide; he must act upon his judgment or fail in his duty.

This is not to say that there were none among the officers higher on the list who would probably not have done well the duty performed by Admirals Dewey and Sampson; Dewey was ranked by seven other officers, Sampson by seventeen; both were given the rank of rear-admiral under the same law. Only one could be chosen for the supreme command in each case; both were present with their squadrons when war became imminent, Dewey having relieved Commodore McNair as commander-in-chief so late as the preceding January (the 3d), and Sampson ordered to the like duty in the North Atlantic upon the withdrawal through ill health of Rear-Admiral Sicard. The choice fell upon these officers in the natural course of events, and it was justified to the full in both cases. However much some outside the navy may criticise passing over the higher in grade to select a lower (the criticism is not within the service), they should understand that the navy fully appreciates that it does not exist for its individual members, but for the country, and no individual in it, however sorely he may feel being passed over and however highly he may put his own merits, has a right to complain of the lawful action of the chief executive when the latter is faced by such a duty.

The writer knows of his own knowledge how great a surprise to Sampson the appointment was. He had no elation in it; he felt too deeply the great responsibility to which he had been elected. Says Mr. John D. Long, at this time secretary of the navy:

> The moment required a man of splendid judgment, quick decision, possessing intimate knowledge of the characteristics of the vessels he would have to use, and the officers and men manning them, and enjoying the esteem and confidence of his subordinates. The consensus of naval opinion was that Sampson had these qualifications. He had

graduated number one in his class at the Naval Academy, and this without social prestige. He had maintained this superiority throughout his naval career. He had been a dominant voice in important boards which had considered the development of the *matériel* and *personnel* of the new navy. He was the senior captain of the North Atlantic squadron, and in command of it during Sicard's incapacity. He enjoyed the full confidence not only of the officers and men of his own ship, but of the officers and men of the entire navy.

There was no political demand for Sampson. He had no friends in Congress to speak for him, nor did he directly or indirectly indicate to the department that he desired to succeed Rear-Admiral Sicard. For his selection the department is alone responsible; and it was made advisable by the interests of the country, to which the eye of the department was single. The president gave his cordial approval to the choice, and Sampson, though there were worthy and efficient officers his seniors, was to give ample evidence that the assignment was right.[1]

In these fine and appreciative words, Mr. Long does but justice to one of the greatest characters of our navy, and one of the finest of our country. Sampson was the hero by nature, for nature made him great. Without thought of self; of incomparable simplicity and truthfulness; quiet and reserved, though most kindly; with never a harsh word; with absolute courage both physical and moral; with unbending purpose when once his decision was made, and with a judgment which seemed unswerving, he was fitly the hero to officers and men, and to none more than to those who were closest to him.

Both of the new commanders-in-chief, convinced of the early advent of war, as was also the government, as will now appear, proceeded with preparations with the utmost energy.

On March 27 the following Squadron General Order No. 2 was issued by Sampson:

1. The attention of commanding officers is called to the department's letter of March 24, 1898, and memorandum for the commander-in-chief, which are issued for their information and guidance.
2. Attention is particularly called to that part of the memorandum which states what the department expects of the officers in command of the scouts, picket-boats, and torpedo-boats.

[1] Long, *The New American Navy*, 1, 211.

The forwarding letter and the memorandum were both embodied in the order.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, *March* 24, 1898.

SIR: There is forwarded herewith a memorandum containing certain suggestions, in regard to the manner of carrying on a blockade of the island of Cuba, should one be established. This memorandum is based largely on certain suggestions made by Captain Mahan. In case of a blockade, the department expects you to follow out only such details as in your judgment you deem proper.

The department desires that you make public in the squadron the tenor of that part of the memorandum which refers to what the department expects of the officers in command of the scouts, picket-boats, and torpedo-boats.

Very respectfully,
JOHN D. LONG, *Secretary.*

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE,
North Atlantic Station.

In time of war the commander-in-chief must, to a very great extent, control his own vessels and act on his own responsibility; but the department deems it worth while to lay before him certain suggestions for his consideration in connection with the probable uses to which the fleet will be put in the event of war with Spain.

Until it is possible to concentrate the fleet and strike a telling blow at the Spanish fleet, it is probable that much of its work will be in blockading Cuba. The department will endeavor to furnish the commander-in-chief with a sufficient number of vessels to establish a strict blockade, particularly of the western half of the island, and of the ports of Havana and Matanzas in especial. Off much of the coast, and off the small harbors, a single vessel cruising to and fro may be all that is needed; this vessel of course keeping touch with the rest of the fleet when possible. Off an important port, and notably off the port of Havana, in the event of torpedo-vessels being within it, there should probably be three lines of blockade. The inner line should consist of small, fast vessels, either torpedo-boats or revenue cutters, tugs, and the like, improvised to act as torpedo-boat destroyers and scouts, whose station shall be close to the mouth of the harbor. These vessels would of course stop blockade-runners; but the prime object of their being would be to prevent the egress of torpedo-boats. They should not only watch the latter, but should unhesitatingly attack them, no matter what the odds may be at the moment. Even if sunk they will have achieved a most useful end if they cripple a torpedo-boat. They should fire upon and chase any hostile craft leaving

port, and the vessels not engaged should at once steam to the firing. The department will give ample recognition to gallantry and efficiency displayed by the commanders of these craft, and the men in command of them will be expected to run risks and take chances. Their duty is at all hazards to prevent the possibility of an attack by the enemy's torpedo-boats upon the battle-ships and squadron.

The second line will be placed two or three miles outside of this inner one, and will consist, so far as is possible, of vessels like the *Cincinnati* or *Detroit*, which in case of need could promptly go to the first line of blockade. Outside of this second line will cruise the squadron of battle-ships, which in the discretion of the commander-in-chief may lie at a considerable distance from the port, and may change position after nightfall. Of course, no definite rule can be laid down as to the position of this squadron, for the commander-in-chief must be guided by circumstances as they arise; but it is worth calling his attention to the fact that the battle fleet must keep the sea, so as to make the blockade technically valid. The efficiency of the blockade does not depend upon the immediate presence of the fleet itself, but upon the fact that its support is always at hand, to support the inshore squadron, and prevent the latter from being driven off by the enemy in port. A distance of twenty-five miles may be near enough, and if the position of the battle fleet can always be changed after nightfall, the chance of successful assault by the enemy's torpedo-boats will be minimized. The department would again repeat, however, that the captains in the inshore squadrons must understand that their duty is, at any hazard, to prevent hostile torpedo-boats getting by them, to detect, and, more than that, to immediately grapple with and fight them under any circumstances. The torpedo-boats, and even the torpedo-boat destroyers, lose nine-tenths of their menace when detected; and, moreover, they are fragile and easily destroyed.

Each man engaged in the work of the inshore squadron should have in him the stuff out of which to make a possible Cushing; and if the man wins, the recognition given him shall be as great as that given to Cushing, so far as the department can bring this about.

Ships were ordered the same day to exchange their brilliant white for the lead-color used during the civil war, so much less visible at sea, and now, at all times, in general use.

On March 28 the fleet had still further intimation of the imminency of war by orders to land at Key West all skylights and all movable articles, including boats, which could be dispensed with and which might be a hindrance in action. An order of the same character was telegraphed on April 7 by the navy department to Commodore Dewey at Hong-Kong.

The following telegram from the navy department was received by Sampson on April 1:

Authorized to waive age limits on enlistments for all ratings at discretion, but use careful judgment in so doing. Authorized to enlist well-qualified men for one year, unless sooner discharged, noting on enlistment records department will grant discharge, if requested, before expiration of enlistment, provided exigencies of service permit. What progress have you made in enlistments ?

On the same day the following order was issued in the fleet at Key West:

A cruiser and two torpedo-boats will be detailed nightly to proceed on picket duty, about ten miles to the southward of the flag-ship.

The torpedo-boats will be assigned stations, one to the eastward and one to the westward of the cruiser, at a distance of about five miles from her. The boats will move to and fro from the cruiser toward the reef, covering a distance of about ten miles from her and sighting her frequently.

The cruiser will keep her running lights, but the torpedo-boats will mask theirs.

In case a suspicious vessel is seen standing northward, a torpedo-boat will approach the flag-ship sufficiently to enable rockets to be seen, and two will be fired simultaneously. The boat will then run in for the squadron at full speed and communicate, using her private signal as she approaches the squadron.

All will return to their anchorage in the inner harbor at early daylight.

The *Cincinnati* will take this duty April 1, her commanding officer arranging with the commanding officer of the torpedo-boat flotilla as to the detail of torpedo-boats.

This duty will, in general, be taken successively by the cruisers in the order of the rank of their commanding officers.

The senior officer at the inner anchorage is hereby charged with the execution of this order.

The order shows the apprehension existing three weeks before actual hostilities, of covert attack by the Spanish from Havana, where were several small vessels carrying torpedoes. It is almost needless to say that in reality the apprehension was groundless. The anxiety of Spain to avoid a war is now well known, nor, indeed, is it in accord with the Spanish character to have given official countenance to any effort of the sort, apart from bringing on a con-

flict necessarily so detrimental to their cause in Cuba. One can see this in the cooler light of to-day; at the moment no precaution was thought excessive. Night exercises were also carried out by simulated attacks of torpedo-boats, of which by the end of March there were six in Key West harbor. In each case the attack was ruled to have failed.[1]

Everything now seemed tending to war. The Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers *Terror*, *Furor*, and *Pluton*, and the torpedo-boats *Rayo*, *Ariete*, and *Azor*, had left Cadiz on March 13, under convoy of the Transatlantic Company's steamer the *Ciudad de Cadiz*, for the Canaries, where they arrived on the 17th. At Havana were the *Vizcaya* and *Almirante Oquendo*. The former had come by way of New York, where she had arrived February 20. Her visit there was intended as an evidence of the acceptance by the Spanish government of the declared good intent of the American government in the sending of the *Maine* to Havana. She left New York on the 25th, taking only sufficient coal supply to reach Havana, the captain having a strong fear of explosives in the coal. She arrived at Havana March 1, and was joined there a few days later by the *Almirante Oquendo*. Both ships left April 1 for a rendezvous with this flotilla in latitude 18° 30′ N., and longitude 59° 42′ W. (Spanish 53° 30′), a point about 300 miles east of St. Thomas.

The object of the ships' departure and the rendezvous were known by Sampson. He was of the opinion that if the torpedo-boats should continue their journey to this side of the Atlantic, it would justify immediate warlike action, and he urged this view upon the navy department. As affairs turned, however, the torpedo-boats did not come. They had left the Canaries for the rendezvous on March 22, but, following many break-downs and difficulties in

[1] The question of information as to what was doing in Havana was an important one, and in this connection should be mentioned the names of four men, Mr. Sylvester Scovel, the correspondent of the *New York World*, Mr. Charles H. Thrall, Mr. George H. Hyatt (the last a Cuban born of an American father and Cuban mother), and Mr. Joseph H. Hare, a photographer for *Collier's Weekly*. Information of a varied and valuable character was obtained by these with not inconsiderable risk and with much exposure. Among other things Mr. Scovel assisted in the observation of the Spanish target-practice which occurred twice at Havana, and with Mr. Hare in the *World* tug *Triton* verified the supposition that none of the Spanish guns bore upon the coast-line to the south-west in the direction of Marianao.

supplying coal from the larger ships, the flotilla, after four days, turned and went to the nearest harbor, the Cape Verdes. Informed of this, the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* left San Juan, Puerto Rico, on April 8, and arrived eleven days later at St. Vincent (Cape Verdes), where they found Admiral Cervera, who, leaving Cadiz on April 8, had reached the same point with the *Infanta Maria Teresa* and *Cristóbal Colón*, on the 14th.

On April 4 the navy department telegraphed Sampson:

> Be ready on receipt of order to take possession of Key West cable and telegraph office, and to place an officer in charge. He will not permit the transmission to Cuba of any telegram relating to the action of the president or Congress. Will be further instructed. The business of the company not to be interfered with any more than is necessary. The officer assigned upon this duty must be one discreet and judicious.

On the same day Dewey, anticipating a telegram of inquiry from the navy department of the same date, telegraphed:

> I have chartered the British steamer *Nanshan*, having over three thousand tons of coal now on board. Before the outbreak of hostilities can and would purchase this steamer. I request the earliest information in order to conclude arrangements. Cannot be made after outbreak of hostilities.

A prompt reply was sent, April 6, approving the purchase and directing the vessel to be armed if possible. There was added in this telegram: "War may be declared; situation very critical," and in another of the same day: "Expedite delivery. April 6 may be the last opportunity." On this last date Dewey telegraphed that he had purchased the *Nanshan* and engaged her crew; also that he had ordered three officers and fifty men from the *Monocacy* to fill vacancies. He hoped to get another steamer, which he confirmed April 9 with the news that he had purchased the British steamer *Zafiro* for £18,000, which he would immediately man, arm, and equip.

On April 7 Sampson was informed by telegram from Washington that a double row of torpedoes had been placed across the entrance to Havana. On the 9th the *Fern*, Lieutenant-Commander W. S. Cowles, was informed that all United States vessels were to leave

Havana when the consul-general should leave. Cowles replied the same day, that all vessels had sailed but two schooners; one could leave Monday noon; for the other, still unloading, he hoped satisfactory arrangements could be made. He sent a second telegram the same date:

Fern, the consul-general, and *Bache* [coast-survey vessel] leave to-day for Key West.

The remaining twelve days of peace were passed by the squadrons, both at Key West and at Hong-Kong, in energetic preparations of the ships for what was now regarded as an inevitable struggle. Among these preparations at Key West was the fitting of the light-house steamer *Mangrove* with such apparatus as was available at Key West for lifting and cutting cables, and requesting that additional material, to make good the existing shortage, be sent from New York. If any cables were to be cut, and Sampson favored and looked forward to isolating Cuba telegraphically, much more complete arrangements were necessary than any he was ever able to command. The vast depths to be met at Santiago particularly, almost at once on leaving the shore line, made such work one of immense difficulty. There was no thought of disturbing the Havana cable, as its only sea connection was with American lines. All others were on the south coast, Santiago, Guantánamo, and Cienfuegos being the chief points of departure, the two first being the only ones connected with points exterior to Cuba. It was Sampson's intention, if the government would agree, to send the *Mangrove* thither for this purpose. He thus detailed the *Indiana*, *Marblehead*, and *Detroit* as a covering squadron. Little or nothing was known of the state of the Santiago defences, and a battle-ship was thought necessary for eventualities. In Captain Taylor of the *Indiana*, who, as senior officer, would command the proposed expedition, was one in whose discretion and ability the commander-in-chief had fullest confidence.

CHAPTER II

THE FORCES

NEITHER Spain nor the United States had a fleet fitted, as far as material strength was concerned, to meet that of even a second-class naval power. The United States had only just put afloat the nucleus of its splendid fleet of to-day. It had in commission what were, for the period, four first-class battle-ships, heavily armored, of fair speed and excellent armament, the *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, *Oregon*, and *Iowa*. There was one second-class battle-ship, the *Texas*, of about equal speed with the others, but with little more than half their power in gun-fire. The highest sustained speed of these ships may be taken as 14 knots, but the *Indiana* during the war fell far below this on account of the failure of the navy department to keep the machinery at the high-water mark of repair [1]—an evidence not so much that this department had no great belief in the imminency of war, as of its defective system of departmental administration.

The *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, and *Oregon*, sister ships, had 18-inch steel belts for about three-fifths their length, a two and three-quarter inch flat protective deck, four 13-inch guns in two 15-inch turrets, and eight 8-inch in four 6-inch turrets. Each carried, also, four 6-inch, twenty 6-pounders, six 1-pounders, two Colt machine-guns, and three Whitehead torpedo-tubes. They were of 10,288 tons displacement, and could carry 1,600 tons of coal.

The *Iowa* had a 14-inch belt, four 12-inch guns in 15-inch turrets, and eight 8-inch in 8-inch turrets. She carried besides six

[1] The *Indiana* had to have her boilers retubed at Key West; this being done shortly after the destruction of the *Maine*.

For full details of all the American ships of the period, see tabulations, *Annual Reports of the Navy Department*, 1898, Report of the Bureau of Construction and Repair.

4-inch, twenty 6-pounders, four 1-pounders, four Colts, and four Howell torpedoes. Her displacement was 11,340 tons, her coal capacity 1,795 tons.

The *Texas* had a 12-inch belt, two 12-inch guns in two 12-inch turrets, six 6-inch, twelve 6-pounders, six 1-pounders, four 37-mm. Hotchkiss revolvers, two Colts, and two Whitehead torpedo-tubes. She displaced 6,315 tons and could carry 850 tons of coal.

The remaining armored vessels fit for sea service were six double-turreted monitors, the *Amphitrite, Miantonomoh, Monadnock,*[1] *Monterey,*[1] *Puritan,* and *Terror.* They were all powerful ships, but of doubtful value except in smooth water on account of their rapid oscillation in a rough sea. The *Monterey* carried two 12-inch and two 10-inch and the *Puritan* four 12-inch guns: each of the other four carried four 10-inch with (except the *Terror* and *Miantonomoh*) two 4-inch (the *Puritan* six 4-inch), and from ten to twelve 6-pounders and smaller rapid-fire guns. All but the *Puritan* (of 6,090) displaced about 4,000 tons. Each carried 250 tons of coal except the *Puritan,* which carried 317.

Thirteen ancient single-turret monitors of the civil-war period were brought into service as part of the auxiliary fleet, to do duty at various ports. All but the *Comanche* (at Mare Island) were in the Atlantic. They carried only muzzle-loading, smooth-bore guns, and were worthless except for protection of harbors.

The armored cruisers *New York* and *Brooklyn,* the former of 8,200 tons displacement and 21 knots trial speed, the other 9,215 tons and 21.9 knots, were, for the time, particularly fine ships of their class. The *New York* had a water-line belt of 4 inches; the *Brooklyn* of 3; but both ships had protective decks of 6 inches on the slope and 3 inches on the flat, a powerful protection for ships of the type. The *New York* carried four 8-inch guns in a turret of 5.5 inches armor with a barbette of 10 inches. She also carried two 8-inch in broadside protected by heavy shields. Besides these she had twelve 4-inch rapid-fire, eight 6-pounders, two 1-pounders, two Colts, and two Whitehead torpedo-tubes. The *Brooklyn* carried eight 8-inch in 5.5-inch turrets with barbettes of 8 and 4 inches. She had, besides, twelve 6-pounders, four

[1] In the Pacific.

1-pounders, four Colts, and four Whitehead torpedo-tubes. The bunker capacity of the *New York* was 1,290 tons; that of the *Brooklyn*, 1,461.

The *Olympia*, of 5,870 tons and 21.68 knots trial speed, was the best of the protected cruisers. She carried four 8-inch guns in 3.5-inch turrets, ten 5-inch rapid-fire, fourteen 6-pounders, seven 1-pounders, two Colts, and six Whitehead torpedo-tubes. She had a protective deck of 4.75 inches on the slope and 2 inches on the flat. Her coal capacity was 1,169 tons. The *Baltimore*, of 4,413 tons and 20 knots trial speed and 490 tons coal capacity, carried four 8-inch, six 6-inch, six 6-pounders, four 1-pounders, and two Colts. She had a protective deck of 4 inches on the slope and 2½ on the flat. The *Philadelphia* may be classed with the *Baltimore* in size, speed, and protection; she carried only 6-inch guns in her main battery, of which there were twelve, eight 6-pounders, four 1-pounders, and two Colts; she had no torpedoes. She had the large coal capacity, for her class, of 1,085 tons. The *San Francisco* and *Newark* were alike. They were of 4,098 tons, 19.5 and 19 knots trial speed, and 628 and 809 tons coal capacity, respectively. Each had a 3-inch protective deck. Their armament was practically the same as that of the *Philadelphia*, except that each carried three Whitehead torpedo-tubes. The *Charleston*, of 3,730 tons, 18 knots, 757 tons coal supply, and a 3-inch protective deck, had two 8-inch and six 6-inch guns in the main battery; the *Cincinnati* and *Raleigh*, each of 3,213 tons, supposedly of 19 knots (but very much lower) with but 460 tons coal and a 2.5-inch protective deck, had ten 5-inch rapid-fire, one 6-inch, and two Whitehead torpedo-tubes. The *Charleston* had twelve rapid-fire guns from 6- to 1-pounders, and two Colts.

The *Columbia* and *Minneapolis* were of a special class, of 7,375 tons, of about 23 knots trial speed, the one of 1,670, the other 1,891 tons coal capacity.[1] They had protective decks of 4 inches on the slope and 2.5 on the flat. They were built as "commerce-destroyers," and had, for their size, the light armament of one 8-inch, two 6-inch, and eight 4-inch guns, with twelve 6-pound-

[1] The *Columbia* had crossed the Atlantic from Plymouth to New York at an average speed of 18.5 knots, the best showing of the kind by a man-of-war at this period.

ers, two 1-pounders, two Colts, and four Whitehead torpedo-tubes each. They were admirably fitted for scouts.[1]

The *Detroit*, *Marblehead*, and *Montgomery*, of 2,089 tons, of from 18.44 to 19.05 knots trial speed (which fell to very much less in practice), carried but 340 tons of coal, and, as were the *Raleigh* and *Cincinnati*, for the same reason, unfitted to be at any considerable distance from a collier. They carried ten 5-inch rapid-fire guns, with six 6-pounders, two 1-pounders, two Colts, and two Whitehead torpedo-tubes.

Added to these, by purchase, as mentioned, from Brazil, was the *New Orleans*, of 3,427 tons, 21 knots trial speed, and 800 tons coal capacity. She was admirably armed with six 6-inch rapid-fire, four 4.7-inch, ten 6-pounders, 8 machine-guns of smaller calibre, and three Whitehead torpedo-tubes. She had a protective deck 3 inches on the slope and 1.5 on the flat. She and her sister ship, the *Albany*, not, as already stated, sufficiently advanced to leave Elswick before the war began, were excellent ships of their type.

None of the protected cruisers were in any sense fitted to take part in action against battle-ships. They are now a disappearing type, as, excepting scouts, no navy should be cumbered with ships not built to meet the demands of actual conflict. They served a good purpose in 1898 only because of Spain's want of a real navy.

There were eighteen small vessels of from 839 to 1,710 tons, rated as gun-boats, but actually small cruisers, the *Bancroft*, *Bennington*,[2] *Castine*, *Concord*,[2] *Machias*, *Petrel*,[2] *Topeka*,[3] *Yorktown*,[2] *Helena*, *Nashville*, *Wilmington*, *Annapolis*, *Marietta*, *Newport*, *Princeton*, *Vicksburg*, *Wheeling*, and *Dolphin*. These were, of course, only of value against vessels of their own class, or as taking part in the blockade of ports which required nothing more than the presence of armed vessels of any class whatever to preserve the efficiency of the blockade.

The dynamite cruiser *Vesuvius* and ten torpedo-boats, the *Cushing*, *Dupont*, *Ericsson*, *Foote*, *Gwin*,[4] *McKee*,[4] *Porter*, *Rodgers*,

[1] The machinery of the *Minneapolis* was in bad condition, and though she did good service at the beginning of the war, had to spend from June 11 to August 17 under repair at Newport News.

[2] In the Pacific.

[3] Purchased in England from the Thames Shipbuilding Company.

[4] Of no actual value.

Talbot, and *Winslow*, completed the list of strictly naval vessels available for war service.

Thirteen revenue cutters with officers and crews were transferred temporarily to the navy department for naval duty. Eight of these, carrying forty-three light guns, were assigned to the North Atlantic command: the *Manning*, *Morrill*, *Hamilton*, *Windom*, *Woodbury*, *Hudson*, *Calumet*, and *McLane*. The *McCulloch* was assigned to the Asiatic squadron. Four, the *Rush*, *Grant*, *Corwin*, and *Perry*, were on the Pacific coast.

Under the act of March 9, 1899, appropriating $50,000,000 for the national defence, a number of vessels were bought or chartered. The *St. Paul*, *St. Louis*, *New York*, and *Paris*, of the American line between Southampton and New York, were chartered under the terms of their subsidy, which made them subject to government use in case of war. For the period of their naval service the *New York* became the *Harvard* and the *Paris* the *Yale*. They were ships of from 13,000 to 15,000 tons displacement, 22 knots speed, and 2,700 tons coal capacity. At more moderate speed they could easily keep the sea three weeks. They were armed at first only with 6- and 3-pounders, but an effective armament of from four to eight 5-inch guns was later given them, sufficient to meet light cruisers or torpedo-vessels. They were in no wise, however, fitted for fighting, as they were a mass of combustible material, the bursting of a heavy shell in which would probably have assured their destruction. They were admirably fitted for the rôle of scouts and for that of transports, to which latter, later in the war, they were applied.

Seven merchant-ships of from about 4,000 to 7,000 tons and from 13 to 16 knots speed, with the service names of *Badger*, *Buffalo*, *Dixie*, *Panther*, *Prairie*, *Yankee*, and *Yosemite*, were bought and armed with 5-inch and 6-inch guns, as auxiliary cruisers.

Twenty-eight yachts were armed,[1] of which the *Mayflower*, of 2,690 tons and 16 knots, the *Gloucester*, *Scorpion*, *Eagle*, *Hawk*, *Wasp*, and *Vixen*, were the most notable.

In all 123 vessels which had not belonged to the navy were used

[1] One, the *Free Lance*, was given by Mr. Augustus Schermerhorn, of New York.

during the war, 9 of which were revenue cutters, 11 fast auxiliary cruisers, 28 armed yachts, 27 armed tugs, 19 colliers, 1 hospital ship, 5 supply and 1 repair ship, 4 light-house tenders, and 2 steamers of the Fish Commission.[1]

The armored Spanish ships supposedly ready were the battleship *Pelayo*, the armored cruisers *Infanta Maria Teresa, Almirante Oquendo, Vizcaya, Cristóbal Colón, Carlos V*, and *Numancia*. Both the *Pelayo* and *Carlos V* appeared in the Spanish navy list as "armored ships of the first class" (*Acorazados de I^a*), a species of self-deception which ran throughout the list, the others just mentioned being "armored ships of the second class." Small ships of 1,000 tons were in the navy list as second-class cruisers, and craft of 550 tons as cruisers of the third class.

The *Pelayo* had been built at La Seyne, near Toulon, in 1885. She was of 9,917 tons, 16.2 knots trial speed, and carried 630 tons of coal. She was undergoing refitting at La Seyne at the outbreak of the war, and was not ready until the middle of May, and then not completely so. She had an armor belt of 16.5 inches, and carried two 12.5-inch guns in two 18-inch barbettes, two 11-inch (one on each beam), with similar protection, nine 5.5-inch rapid-fire, twenty smaller guns of 57 mm. and less, and seven torpedo tubes. "She was," says Wilson, "as a unit decidedly superior to the *Texas*, and as decidedly inferior to the *Indiana* class, which was just about as fast and infinitely better armed and protected," [2] and, he might have added, able, through much greater coal capacity, to keep the sea much longer.

The *Carlos V* was of 9,215 tons, of 20 knots speed, and could carry 1,800 tons of coal. She had but 2 inches of side armor with a protective deck of from 6 to 2 inches. She carried two 11-inch guns in 10-inch barbettes, eight 5.5-inch rapid-fire, four 3.9-inch, twelve smaller guns of from 57 to 11 mm., and six torpedo tubes. To call her a first-class armored ship was a travesty of nomenclature. She was a fair offset to the *New York* or *Brooklyn*. Though declared by the minister of marine in his correspondence with Admiral Cervera as ready, with the *Pelayo*, to form part of

[1] For full lists of vessels commissioned (with names of commanding officers), also of those purchased or chartered, see Appendix A.

[2] Wilson, *The Downfall of Spain*, 59.

the latter's squadron, she also was not so until the middle of May.

The *Maria Teresa, Oquendo,* and *Vizcaya* were patterned after five British ships of the period, known as the *Aurora* class. They were of 7,000 tons, 20.25 knots speed, and carried 1,050 tons of coal. They had armor belts for 216 feet of their length, 12 to 10 inches in thickness and 5.5 feet broad. Each carried two 11-inch guns, one in each of their 10-inch barbettes, which had domed hoods, covering the whole turret, 3 inches thick. On the same deck were ten 5.5-inch rapid-fire, protected by shields. Each carried also twenty-two smaller guns of from 57 (2.25-inch) to 7 mm. (.27-inch), and eight torpedo-tubes. The protective deck was of 3 and 2 inches steel. "These three vessels differed little from protected cruisers; their big guns were too heavy for use against anything but a hostile battle-ship, yet their want [small width] of side armor rendered them incapable of encountering such an enemy."[1]

The *Princesa de Asturias,* a ship of the same type as the *Maria Teresa,* had been launched in 1896, but was still far from completion. Two others of the class, the *Cardinal Cisneros* and *Cataluña,* had not yet been launched.

In the *Cristóbal Colón,* however, Spain had an armored cruiser of very exceptional quality. She had just been built at Sestri Ponente (a suburb of Genoa), and had, on nearing completion, been purchased by the Spanish government. She was of 6,840 tons, 20.25 knots speed on trial, and carried 1,200 tons of coal. She had a complete nickel steel belt 8.25 feet broad and 6 inches thick amidships, tapering to 2 inches at the ends. Amidships was a citadel of 6-inch steel, 150 feet long with bulkheads of the same thickness which protected the bases of the two 5-inch turrets, intended to carry 10-inch Armstrong guns. In this citadel was a battery of ten 5.2-inch rapid-fire guns, the ports of which had an admirable shield protection. On the upper deck were six 4.7-inch rapid-fire, protected by shields only. She carried twenty machine-guns, of which ten were 57-mm. (2.25-inch) Nordenfelt, the others of 37 mm. (1.46 inch), and had five torpedo-tubes.

"The Americans had no cruiser to compare with the *Colón.* By the admission of American officers themselves, the *Brooklyn,* though

[1] Wilson, 63.

more than 2,000 tons larger, was no match for her, and it is difficult to say what she might not have accomplished with competent seamen and good gunners. Virtually she was a small battleship of exceptionally powerful type."[1] The author from whom we quote should have added, "had she had her heavy guns."

The *Numancia* was an ancient iron-clad, launched in 1863, but refitted and rearmed. She was of 7,035 tons, nominally of 12 knots speed, and carried 1,050 tons of coal. She was plated with iron 4.7 inches thick, and carried four 6.3-inch, eight 5.5-inch rapid-fire, three 4.7-inch rapid-fire, and thirteen machine-guns. She was of no use except for coast service.

There appeared upon the Spanish navy list two "first-class protected cruisers," the *Alfonso XIII* and the *Lepanto*, of 4,820 tons, 20.5 knots and 1,285 (!) tons coal capacity. They appeared in the navy list as having 4½ inches of deck protection, with batteries of four 7.9-inch guns, six 4.7-inch rapid-fire, and thirteen machine-guns. Altogether in speed, coal capacity and armament, they combined on paper qualities which were very improbable on such a displacement. Though the former was launched in 1891 and the latter in 1893, neither was completed.

Four non-protected cruisers appeared, the *Alfonso XII*, the *Reina Cristina*, the *Reina Mercedes*, and the *Aragon*, of 3,900, 3,520, 3,090, and 3,342 tons displacement, respectively. Each carried six 6.3-inch guns and some fifteen machine-guns, but all were useless as cruisers. The *Alfonso XII* was the flag-ship at Havana, but could not move; the *Reina Mercedes* in like condition at Santiago de Cuba; the *Reina Cristina* was flag-ship in the Philippines, and the *Aragon* laid up at Carraca, the ship-building yard on Cadiz bay.

There were three small cruisers, the *Marques de la Ensenada*, the *Isla de Cuba*,[2] and the *Isla de Luzon*,[2] of about 1,050 tons, 14 knots, and with 200 tons coal capacity. They had protective decks of 2.4 inches, carried four 4.7-inch rapid-fire, two 57-mm. (2.25-inch), three 37-mm. (1.46-inch, one 11-mm., and three torpedo-tubes. Within their limited radius they were good ships of such type, but, as were those about to be mentioned, of small fighting power.

There were nine small vessels of from 823 to 1,196 tons, carrying

[1] Wilson, 62.

[2] In the Philippines.

four 4.7-inch, some ten machine-guns, and with two torpedo-tubes, which could only rank as gun-boats in American designation. The *Don Juan de Austria* and *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, both in the Philippines, were among the larger of these. There were five small vessels of 560 tons and less, of which the *Marques del Duero*, of 500 tons, with 10 knots speed and carrying 90 tons of coal, may be taken as a type. She carried one 6.3-inch and two 4.7-inch guns, and one machine-gun. Thirty small craft from 100 to 300 tons, and forty still smaller, which could not rank as more than armed launches, were (as were nearly all the smaller ships mentioned) scattered about Cuba and in the Philippines.

Spain had, however, in her torpedo gun-boats and torpedo-boat destroyers, nominally thirteen in number, a force of which the United States had none afloat, though there were sixteen building. In addition Spain had four torpedo-boats of some 120 tons each.

The ships of the Compania Trasatlantica were largely taken over as cruisers and transports. The total ships available were the following:

	TONS	KNOTS
Magallanes	6,932	17
Montserrat	6,932	17
Alfonso XIII	4,831	16
Reina Cristina	4,831	16
Santo Domingo	5,400	14
Alfonso XII	5,063	15
Leon XIII	5,186	15
Principe de Satrustegui	4,713	15
Montevideo	5,096	14½
Buenos Aires	5,311	14
Ciudad de Cadiz	3,084	13½
Mindanao	4,195	13½
Isla de Panay	3,636	13½
Isla de Luzon	4,252	13

To these, when the prospect of war became such as to demand the use of every resource by Spain, were added by purchase the large German merchant-steamers *Normannia*, of 10,500 tons, the *Columbia*, of 9,500, and *Havel*, of 6,963, all of 19 knots. These were renamed in their order the *Patriota*, *Rapido*, and *Meteor*, and were fitted each with four 6.4-inch, four 4.7-inch,

two 3.2-inch, and four machine-guns. They were not ready, however, before the middle of May.

The regular naval forces of the two powers actually available may be tabulated as follows:

United States		Spain	
BATTLE-SHIPS			
First Class			
Indiana	10,288 tons	*Pelayo*	9,917 tons
Massachusetts	" "		
Oregon[1]	" "		
Iowa	11,340 "		
Second Class			
Texas	6,315 tons	*Cristóbal Colón*	6,840 tons
ARMORED CRUISERS			
Brooklyn	9,215 tons	*Infanta Maria Teresa*	7,000 tons
New York	8,200 "	*Almirante Oquendo*	" "
		Vizcaya	" "
MONITORS			
Amphitrite	3,990 tons	None	
Monadnock[3]	" "		
Miantonomoh	" "		
Monterey[2]	4,084 "		
Puritan	6,060 "		
Terror	3,990 "		
PROTECTED CRUISERS			
Baltimore[3]	4,313 tons	*Marques de la Ensenada*	1,064 tons
Charleston[3]	3,730 "	*Isla de Cuba*[3]	1,045 "
Columbia	7,375 "	*Isla de Luzon*[3]	" "
Minneapolis	" "		
Olympia[3]	5,870 "		
Newark	4,098 "		
San Francisco	" "		
New Orleans	3,437 "		
Cincinnati	3,213 "		
Raleigh[3]	" "		
Boston[3]	3,000 "		

[1] On her way from the Pacific.
[2] In the Philippines.
[3] In the Pacific.

UNPROTECTED CRUISERS AND GUN-BOATS

Detroit	2,089 tons	*Reina Cristina*[2]	3,520 tons
Marblehead	" "	*Velasco*[2]	1,600 "
Montgomery	" "	*Infanta Isabel*	1,196 "
Bennington[1]	1,710 "	*Isabel II*	1,152 "
Concord[1]	" "	*Conde del Venadito*	1,189 "
Yorktown[1]	" "	*Don Juan de Austria*[2]	1,159 "
Topeka	1,700 "	*Don Antonio de Ulloa*[2]	1,160 "
Dolphin	1,486 "	*Magallanes*	527 "
Wilmington	1,392 "	*General Concha*	548 "
Nashville	1,371 "	*Elcano*[2]	560 "
Castine	1,177 "	*General Lezo*[2]	520 "
Machias	" "	*Marquis del Duero*[2]	500 "
Annapolis	1,000 "		
Vicksburg	" "		
Wheeling	" "		
Marietta	" "		
Newport	" "		
Princeton	" "		
Petrel[1]	892 "		
Bancroft	839 "		

Also thirty small gun-boats from 300 to 100 tons and forty under 100 tons, of which 38 were in Cuba and 21 in the Philippines.

DYNAMITE VESSEL

Vesuvius	929 tons

None

TORPEDO GUN-BOATS

None

Filipinas	750 tons
Nueva España	630 "
Martin Alonso	571 "
Vicente Yañez	571 "
Galicia	541 "
Marques de Molins	571 "

TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS

None

Destructor	368 tons
Terror	380 "
Furor	" "
Pluton	" "
Audaz	" "
Osado	" "
Proserpina	" "

[1] In the Pacific.

[2] In the Philippines.

TORPEDO-BOATS

Cushing	105 tons	*Halcon*	128 tons
Ericsson	120 "	*Azor*	127 "
Foote	142 "	*Ariete*	120 "
Rodgers	" "	*Rayo*	120 "
Winslow	" "		
Porter	165 "		
Dupont	" "		
Morris	103 "		

NOTE.—All the torpedo-vessels were in the Atlantic.

It needs but a short analysis of what precedes to recognize the great superiority of the American force both in gun-fire, armor-protection, and in number of fighting-ships. The fact that on one side there were afloat twelve 13-inch, twelve 12-inch, eighteen 10-inch, and fifty-six 8-inch, and on the other but two 12.5-inch and ten 11-inch guns, or (leaving aside even the 8-inch) a disparity in heavy armament of three to one, was to give food for thought, had the Spanish authorities but thought at all. Spain had nothing to meet such forces. Her only hope was in her small and presumably fast squadron under Admiral Cervera, homogeneous in speed and coal endurance, and in her torpedo-vessels.

Notwithstanding these facts, European opinion, and largely, American, gave the Spanish the superior force. The *London Engineer*, for example, after giving an elaborate analysis of the two fleets said:

It is difficult to see where the usefulness of these heavily-armed floating citadels [the U. S. battle-ships] comes in except to capture and sink the *Pelayo*. . . . There is small chance of them even catching a glimpse of the swift and handy armored cruisers of the *Vizcaya* type, and still less chance of their getting an effective shot at them. . . . We fear that the United States may find that their obstinate determination to arm their new vessels with guns which are the creation of their own genius [as against those of Elswick] has landed them in a dilemma at this juncture. . . . A great deal, too, depends upon the man behind the gun. The 3,000 Swedish sailors [!] who are to form part of the complement of the United States vessels might be excellent material if fighting in defence of their own hearths and homes; but

naval warfare of to-day is no pastime—it is a grim and ghastly reality, swiftly executed, and no hirelings of an alien state are likely to come well out of such a terrible ordeal. In point of fact we do not believe that the Yankees thoroughly understand the spirit of mischief that they seem so determined to evoke.[1]

The French press was even more sure of a Spanish victory. Great stress, in their ignorance of the real conditions, was laid upon the character of the personnel, that of the American navy being spoken of as made up almost altogether of "foreign mercenaries." The mention of "3,000 Swedish sailors" by the sapient writer in the *Engineer*, is an example of the general ignorance in Europe on the subject.[2]

The remarkable illusions as to the character of the American personnel are perhaps best shown by a report April 6, 1898, in the *Heraldo*, a leading paper of Madrid (of which, it may be mentioned in passing, the chief owner was the captain of the *Cristóbal Colón*). It said:

We had an opportunity to-day of talking for a long time with General Beranger, the last secretary of the navy under the conservative cabinet. To the questions which we directed to him concerning the conflict pending with the United States, he was kind enough to inform us that he confided absolutely in the triumph of our naval forces. . . . We shall conquer on the sea and I am now going to give you my reasons. The first is the remarkable discipline that prevails on our warships; the second is, as soon as fire is opened the crews of the American ships will commence to desert, since we all know that among them are people of all nationalities. Ship against ship, therefore, a failure is not to be feared. I believe that the squadron detained at the Cape Verdes, and particularly the destroyers, should have, and could have, continued the voyage to Cuba, since they have nothing to fear from the American fleet.[3]

On June 30, 1898, there were in service in the regular navy of the United States, 1,751 officers of all ranks and professions. Of these 913 were line officers,[4] 209 engineer officers, 161 sur-

[1] *The Engineer*, London, February 15, 1898, p. 359.

[2] The whole was an excellent reminder of Lowell's wise dictum, "Never prophesy unless you know."

[3] *Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix, 27.

[4] Of the line officers 118 were cadets who had not yet completed their course at the Naval Academy, but were sent to do duty in the ships off Cuba instead

geons, 111 pay officers, 72 marine officers, and 198 warrant officers.

Immediately at the outbreak of the war 188 retired officers were placed on active duty; the number rising during the war to 225, and 856 appointments for temporary service were made during the war from civil life, 456 of these were in the line, 205 in the engineer force, and 43 in the marine corps.[1]

The government on the outbreak of war had in service 13,750 enlisted men, including apprentices. This force during the war was practically doubled, there being at its end in August 24,-123. The first immediate resource was in the naval militia of the several states, many officers of which were ex-officers of the navy and who by resignation from the militia became immediately available for duty in the regular service, on acceptance by the navy department of their offers of service. On the rolls of the several states on January 1, 1898, there were 4,445 petty officers and enlisted men, of whom about 2,600 were mustered into the regular service and 1,800 into the auxil-

of to the usual summer practice-ships. All were under orders to return to the Naval Academy not later than September 30, 1898.

[1] The number of officers appointed for temporary service were, in detail, as follows:

Commanders	3	
Lieutenant-commanders	3	
Lieutenants	112	
Lieutenants (junior grade)	114	
Ensigns	209	
Naval cadets (line)	15	
Total line officers		456
Medical officers		64
Pay officers		64
Engineer officers		185
Warrant machinists		20
Chaplains		2
Boatswains		1
Carpenters		3
Mates		18
Marines (second lieutenants)		43
Total		856

One hundred and ninety-four candidates who passed the required examinations were not appointed by reason of their services not being required. They were: Line, 31; engineers, 92; pay officers, 71.

iary coast defence and coast signal service. Says the report of the secretary of the navy:

> Without waiting for special legislation, the department called upon the state naval militias, in the latter part of March, to furnish officers and crews for the single-turret monitors (which had seen service in the war of the rebellion and were then laid up at League Island Navy-Yard), and had arranged with the governors of the various states that either leaves of absence or discharges should be granted to such officers and men as should volunteer for this duty. The responses were prompt and satisfactory, and showed the patriotic spirit of the naval militia, eight monitors being rapidly put in commission, each under command of a naval officer, all the other officers and the entire crews being furnished by the naval militias of the various states.
>
> The department also called upon the states of New York, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Maryland to furnish officers and men for the merchant steamers purchased for the war, and renamed the *Yankee*, *Prairie*, *Yosemite*, and *Dixie*. This was in accordance with the suggestion that some of the older organizations of naval militia were competent to furnish officers and men for sea-going vessels. This call was one which taxed to the utmost the resources of the naval militia organizations, coming closely, as it did, upon that for volunteers to man the monitors, but it was responded to with most gratifying alacrity. To fill the complement of these vessels each organization called upon contributed about 250 men.
>
> As examples of the promptness with which the call was met, the contingent from the First Naval Battalion, New York, reported uniformed, armed, equipped, and ready for duty in six hours after receiving notice; and the contingent from the Massachusetts Naval Brigade, which was notified at 1 o'clock on a Saturday afternoon, arrived at the New York Navy-Yard, fully prepared for service on the *Prairie*, at 9 o'clock the next morning.[1]

The largest number of men from the naval militia of any one state, serving in Cuban waters, was from Illinois, which furnished 19 officers and 709 men, distributed in 58 vessels; of the 34 officers and 373 men from New Jersey, 20 officers and 261 men were in the *Badger* and *Resolute;* 11 officers and 270 men from Michigan were in the *Yosemite*, and of the 38 officers and 384 men from Massachusetts, 7 officers and 138 men were in the *Prairie;* of the 49 officers and 805 men from New York, 8 officers

[1] *Annual Report of Navy Department*, 1898, p. 109.

and 274 men were in the *Yankee*, and of the 24 officers and 425 men from Maryland, 10 officers and 267 men were in the *Dixie*.

Some 1,600 of the naval militia not assigned to the fleet did duty in the old monitors (carrying 15-inch smooth-bores) which were got into efficient condition and stationed at various ports from Maine to the Gulf of Mexico; they manned the forty-one yachts and tugs which patrolled the mine fields, and provided the personnel of the coast signal service, the coast being divided for such purposes into districts practically commensurate with the existing light-house districts.

As early as March 15, 1898, steps were taken to organize a coast signal service by directing Captain Goodrich, then president of the Naval War College, to report a preliminary plan, based upon earlier correspondence looking to such an establishment. The outcome was the immediate manning, upon the outbreak of the war, of thirty-six signal stations officered and manned from the naval militia. At each station quarters were built for the five to six men attached and a ninety-foot flagstaff with a yard put up. In some cases a signal tower was built, and telegraph and telephone apparatus supplied. Before the end of the war the light-house, life-saving, and weather bureau services were brought into use, and the entire coast efficiently guarded. The work reflected great credit upon all concerned.[1]

There was practically no limit to the number of men who might have been supplied. The material, though much of it was raw, was strong in brawn, muscle, zeal, and intelligence. Men of the best classes were ready to take any position, however humble, rather than not to go at all. It came within the writer's own experience to be pulled in the captain's gig by young men whom he met after the war in the New York clubs, and he knew at least one owner of a yacht who enlisted as a coal-passer rather than be left behind. A spirit such as this is of the sort to conquer.

While Spain had a reserve to call upon, in her conscriptive system, it did not compare in effectiveness with the large num-

[1] For full details regarding the service of the naval militia, see the *Annual Report of the Navy Department*, 1898, p. 105 *et seq.*

bers available in the United States due to a population with seagoing tendencies and affiliation.

Before the outbreak of the war the personnel of the Spanish navy was as follows:

Line officers (active list)	830
" " (reserve list)	127
Engineer officers	90
Pay officers	252
Medical officers	127
Warrant officers and seamen nominally	14,000 [1]

There were some 2,200 men in Cuba, and about 1,500 in the Philippines, which would have left available some 10,000 seamen in Spain. "Yet," says Wilson, "we know that Cervera's squadron of four armored cruisers and three destroyers were not properly manned, so far as the engine-room complements were concerned, and that the utmost difficulty was experienced in finding crews for the *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, and the vessels which in June were despatched on the aimless voyage to Manila. It would therefore appear that the effective strength of the Spanish personnel was very much below the proper strength. In the American navy on the other hand the effective strength was considerably above the nominal strength, as at the prospect of war men were recruited vigorously."

Mr. Wilson continues: "In training, discipline, education, and seamanship there was no comparison between the two forces. They were thus contrasted in August, 1898, by a Madrid periodical: 'The Americans have for a year been preparing for war, and for three months there was not a day when they did not fire all their guns. We have had but one target practice and that was over a year ago. This was limited to expending the least possible amount of ammunition. Half our vessels had not cleaned their bottoms for a year, and all had been anchored in Cuban waters for about two months. The Americans are constantly making voyages in all seas with their vessels so that

[1] There was a corps of marine infantry of 451 officers and 8,500 men, but, as with the like body in France, this was for service in the insular possessions and not aboard ship.

they have a trained personnel for the machinery. We have the greatest scarcity of engineers and hardly any stokers at all.'

"The American naval officer has a world-wide reputation for professional knowledge and capacity. The American seaman—though not always recruited on the long-service system as in England—is intelligent, brave, and resourceful. Coming from a nation of engineers, the engineering staff on board the war-ships was of remarkable efficiency, and as a consequence breakdowns were very few and far between, whilst such performances as the fast steaming of the *Oregon* and *Texas* at Santiago indicated the trustworthiness of American machinery in skilled hands." [1]

Mr. Wilson touched accurately the particularly sore spots of the Spanish service: want of practice and want of mechanical efficiency. The latter is not in the blood, and no education could put it there. We cannot educe what is not in us to be drawn out, a natural fact, be it said, which educationists are expending vast sums in vainly attempting to disprove.

The Spanish, in fact, labored under the limitations which nature has herself set; it is not a race which loves the sea. "Essentially," says Wilson, "the Spanish navy in 1898 stood where it had been in 1779, in 1796, and 1804, when British seamen regarded it with humorous contempt." The distinguished author might have gone far back of the dates he quotes to the days of the Armada and of Lepanto; in this great and decisive battle, so often claimed as a Spanish victory, but thirteen of the two hundred and fourteen galleys were from Spain itself and the young commander was very far from being of true Spanish breed. The courage, the self-sacrificing character of the Spanish race are beyond praise, but on the ocean these are largely nullified by an inadaptability to the sea life, shown through all its history, and it has been still further handicapped in later years by the advent of the machinery which took the place of masts and sails as the means of movement, and to which they are as little inclined as to the sea.

As one who saw and appreciates the noble heroism of Cervera's exit from Santiago, the writer would deprecate any false con-

[1] Wilson, 67, 68.

struction being placed upon the words just written. It is but to recognize what is and has been; it is but to read history as set before us through generations. The want of preparation in 1898 was but a repetition of the same failure in 1805, when Spain with a noble array of ships,[1] but with scant and untrained crews, went gallantly to a like sacrifice at Trafalgar. Desperately poor then, she was equally so in 1898. Though she had a fair number of ships in 1898 as in 1805, they were equally unprepared in both crises. As will be seen in the tragic letters of Cervera, Spain was without the primal necessities of a fleet: without guns, without ammunition, without engineers, without coal, and even with the ships short of bread.

THE ARMIES

The strength of the American army on April 1, 1898, distributed from Maine to Alaska, was as follows:

	OFFICERS	MEN
General officers and staff corps	532	2,026
Cavalry	437	6,047
Artillery	288	4,486
Infantry	886	12,828
Miscellaneous	...	653
Total	2,143	26,040

An act of Congress, approved April 22, 1898, constituted the regular army one of the two branches of the army of the United States in time of war, the second branch being designated the volunteer army. On April 26, 1898, Congress prescribed a peace organization of the regular army in which the infantry regiment was to consist of two battalions of four companies each and two unmanned companies, and authorized the president in case of war to establish, in these, a third battalion of four companies each. The enlisted strength of the infantry company was increased to 106; of the cavalry to 100, of the battery of heavy artillery to 200, of the light artillery to 173, and the com-

[1] These were mostly built at Havana; the Spanish flag-ship at Trafalgar, the *Santissima Trinidad*, of four decks, and perhaps the largest of her day, was built there in 1769.

pany of engineers to 150; the signal corps was also to be increased by 150. Under this law the enlisted force of the regular army became in May, 41,934, and by August, 56,365.[1] By reason of the skeleton organization which had obtained, and which was in a way a cadre of officers without an army, the increase of officers was but 180.

Under the act of April 22, the president called next day for 125,000 volunteers, to serve for two years unless sooner discharged. In view of the imminence of war and in anticipation of the action of Congress and of the call of the president for volunteers, regulations governing the distribution of quotas to the states, territories, and District of Columbia, and giving details of organization, had already been prepared. This first apportionment, which under the law was made according to population, was made up of 119 regiments and 10 battalions of infantry, 5 regiments and 17 troops of cavalry, 16 batteries of light artillery, and 1 regiment and 7 battalions of heavy artillery. This first call was followed, on May 25, by another for an additional 75,000 men, comprising 22 regiments, 10 battalions, and 46 companies of infantry, 16 batteries of light and 3 battalions of heavy artillery.[2]

The act of April 22 authorized also the recruiting of 3,000 men possessing special qualifications, and under this were created three cavalry regiments, of which that later known as the Rough Riders was one. An Act of May 11, 1898, authorized the recruitment of a volunteer brigade of engineers of not more than 3,500 men, and the organization of a force, not exceeding 10,000, of men supposed immune from tropical diseases, a faddish experiment which by no means gave the results expected.

The following list gives the totals furnished by the several states under the first and second calls, of whom 136,000 did not leave the United States.

	OFFICERS	MEN
General officers and staff	1,010	1,329
Alabama	141	3,061
Arkansas	91	1,934
California	186	4,441

[1] Report of the adjutant-general, 1898, 5, 6.
[2] *Ibid.*, 10.

	OFFICERS	MEN
Colorado	49	1,076
Connecticut	100	2,436
Delaware	47	969
District of Columbia	49	922
Florida	48	956
Georgia	142	3,389
Idaho	32	644
Illinois	489	10,453
Indiana	260	5,564
Iowa	206	3,354
Kansas	167	3,735
Kentucky	186	4,559
Louisiana	101	2,255
Maine	61	1,444
Maryland	91	1,979
Massachusetts	277	5,515
Michigan	233	5,185
Minnesota	196	4,222
Mississippi	108	2,512
Missouri	271	6,234
Montana	48	976
Nebraska	137	3,232
Nevada	15	481
New Hampshire	47	952
New Jersey	184	4,163
New York	705	15,924
North Carolina	145	2,840
North Dakota	27	658
Ohio	485	9,557
Oregon	56	1,182
Pennsylvania	619	11,696
Rhode Island	54	1,170
South Carolina	90	2,060
South Dakota	46	983
Tennessee	187	4,148
Texas	231	5,054
Utah	15	429
Vermont	48	980
Virginia	164	3,709
Washington	60	1,379
West Virginia	88	2,245
Wisconsin	198	4,293
Wyoming	17	446
United States volunteers	763	16,992
Total	8,970	173,717

Of the 28,000 officers and men of the existing regular army and of the 182,000 volunteers (a total of 210,000), eight corps were ordered to be established; one of these, however (the sixth), was finally not organized. These were localized as follows: The first at Camp Thomas, Georgia (Chickamauga Park), Major-General John R. Brooke; the second at Camp Alger, at Falls Church, Virginia, Major-General William R. Graham; the third at Camp Thomas, Major-General James I. Wade; the fourth at Mobile, Alabama, Major-General John J. Coppinger; the fifth at Tampa, Florida, Major-General William R. Shafter; the sixth (finally not organized) at Camp Thomas, Major-General James H. Wilson; the seventh at Tampa, Major-General Fitzhugh Lee; the eighth at San Francisco and Manila, Major-General Wesley Merritt.

Under the appropriation made on March 9, 1898, of $50,000,000 "for national defence," much had been done in preparation by the ordnance and engineer and signal-service departments, to which ten, five and a half, and one-quarter millions had been allotted, in the order named. The quartermaster, commissary, and medical departments up to April 23, by what would appear a singular interpretation on the part of President McKinley and his advisers, had not been allowed to go outside their ordinary routine. Thus, says Mr. Alger, the secretary of war, "they could not either procure or order anything in the way of equipment—clothing, tentage, harness, commissary stores, medical and hospital supplies, camp furniture, and other material. Because of this absolutely nothing had been added to the ordinary supply as it existed March 9, 1898."[1]

Secretary Alger continued later: "In one respect alone was the war department able to make immediate response to at least a part of the sudden demands made upon it. Including those already in the hands of the regular soldiers, there were 53,508 .30-calibre Krag-Jorgensen rifles and 14,895 Krag-Jorgensen carbines. This supply, however, was barely sufficient to meet the requirements of the increased regular army. Nothing was left for the volunteers except .45-calibre Springfield carbines, also in our arsenal[s], there was no smokeless-powder

[1] R. A. Alger (secretary of war), *The Spanish-American War*, 11.

ammunition, nor was any immediately obtainable. . . . The situation can be summarized in a few words. The war department had, on April 23, accomplished some little extra work on coast defences; it had ready for use enough .30-calibre rifles to arm the 33,000 men added to the regular army and enough .45-calibre Springfields for the volunteers, but that was all. There was in the supply bureaus absolutely nothing for the troops provided for during the last days of April nor for the additional forces created between the 10th and 25th of May, aggregating 249,000 men, exclusive of the regular army in its original status. If the wording of the act of Congress had permitted the war department to make use of some portion of the $50,000,000 for offensive preparations, much could have been accomplished between March 9 and April 23 in the way of getting ready for the impending conflict."[1]

Such, too frequently, is the lawyer in administration. It is difficult to understand an interpretation which could separate shelter, clothing, food, and medicine from the gun as part of the preparation for defence. To this unwise decision which sent troops to the tropics in the heavy clothing worn in Montana and with nothing which could be called shelter, must be laid much of the suffering and death in the Santiago army.

The ordinary mind cannot understand such views. One would have thought that the quibbling of the Buchanan administration in the last few months of its life would have been a lesson against hair-splitting in such circumstances. If anything is clear between the lines of the administration's procedure, it is that war had practically been decided upon. Mr. McKinley's message, read April 11, the sending in of which was in itself a declaration of war, was not the work of a day or a week. The outcome of such a paper could not but have been foreseen, and under the act of March 9 preparation should have been made to meet this to the fullest extent which the terms and spirit of the act could possibly have allowed. Provision for the healthful support of men who might be called into service and who were to use the guns, projectiles and powder which

[1] Alger, 14.

it was ruled could be bought, would seem as vital an element of defence as these latter.

The navy department was much wiser; it read in the act authority to buy cruisers, yachts, and colliers, which was done in large degree before the outbreak of hostilities, besides perfecting its arrangements of every kind as fully as time would allow. It is difficult to mention without some feeling the finding which caused the inaction in his department which Secretary Alger describes.

The concentration of the widely scattered parts of the regular army had begun on April 15, when all troops which could possibly be spared were directed on New Orleans, Tampa, Mobile, and Chickamauga Park, Ga.[1] A great part of the regular army was, therefore, either mobilized or in process of mobilization when on April 21 the American minister at Madrid was given his passport by the Spanish government.[2]

To the American forces must be added the Cuban, numbering probably some 15,000 men, most of whom were in the eastern part of the island. There were some 5,000 of these under General Calixto Garcia in the vicinity of Holguin; 3,000 under General Perez in the region between Santiago and Guantánamo; 1,500 under Generals Rabi and Cebreco to the west of Santiago, with the remainder under Gomez further west or distributed in small detachments in the vicinity of Cienfuegos, in the hills back of Mariel, in the vicinity of Matanzas, Sagua la Grande, Baraçoa, and other points, where were stationed Spanish troops, which were kept under observation.[3]

The Spanish Army List of 1898 showed a total of 492,067 officers and men, distributed as follows:

In Spain and adjacent islands	152,284
In Cuba (regulars and volunteers)	278,447
In the Philippines (regulars and volunteers) . .	51,331
Puerto Rico (regulars and volunteers)	10,005
Total	492,067

[1] For distribution, see Appendix B. [2] Alger, 16.

[3] Cuban official returns give 53,774 as the number of men who, at one time or another, served in the war from its beginning in 1895 to its end. The

The forces in Cuba were given in detail by the *Anuario Militar de España*, 1898, as follows:

Infantry (regular forces)	134,919	
" (volunteers)	63,760	
Total infantry	——	198,679
Cavalry (regular forces)	7,752	
" (volunteers)	14,796	
Total cavalry	——	22,548
Artillery (regular forces)	5,308	
" (volunteers)	4,123	
Total artillery	——	9,431
Engineers (regular forces)	4,905	
" (volunteers)	1,441	
Total engineers	——	6,346
Hospital troops	1,975	
Pack trains	1,930	
Civil Guard	4,456	
Mobilized forces, volunteers and guerillas	30,584	
Marine infantry	2,508	
Total	——	41,453
Grand Total		278,457

This showing of about 243,000 regulars (including therein the marine infantry, hospital troops, and pack-trains) may be taken as the total in Cuba from the outbreak of the insurrection in March, 1895. At the beginning there were but some 18,000 men in the island. By March 1, 1897, there were sent to Cuba 10 generals, 675 superior officers, 6,222 officers, and 180,345 men; in all, in two years, 187,282.[1]

In this period 123 officers and 2,018 men had been killed or had died of wounds; 463 officers and 8,164 men had been wounded. Yellow fever had carried off 31 officers and 13,004 men, and some 40,000 had died from other causes. By returns of February 8, 1897, there were in Cuban hospitals 18,000 officers and men. Well might any country but one moved by oriental fatal-

total number of deaths among those who served was, during the war, 8,617; 1,463 of these occurred in 1898. More than half the deaths were through sickness. (Official returns, Sargent, III, 173.)

[1] In the same period were sent to Puerto Rico 4,827, and to the Philippines 26,222, making the enormous drain upon Spain, in this short time, of 225,637 officers and men.

ism be aghast at the sacrifice. Nevertheless, the sacrifice continued. In each period of 1895, 1896, and 1897, the assembling of the classes for service (some 85,000 in each year) had been advanced and the call in the autumn of the last-named year included an unusual proportion of very young men. However much the uselessness of the additional effort was to be deplored, one cannot but admire the spirit of the nation.[1]

By April, 1898, there were remaining in Cuba, as shown by an official statement in answer to an inquiry made through the American legation at Madrid, at the instance of a historian of the Santiago campaign, 155,302 officers and men of the regular army, a reduction of some 88,000 from the numbers shown by the *Anuario Militar*, through deaths and invalidism. It was, however, still a large army. The return was as follows:

	GENERAL AND FIELD OFFICERS	COMPANY OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN
Infantry	319	4,022	123,308
Marine infantry	13	122	2,895
Cavalry	49	453	8,033
Artillery	14	207	5,398
Engineers	10	160	5,290
Civil Guard	26	214	4,769
Total of regular army	431	5,178	149,693
Irregular infantry	32	1,462	27,637
Mounted volunteers and guerillas	11	180	12,196
Total of irregular forces	43	1,642	39,833

or a total, officers and men, 196,820 regular and irregular organizations.[2]

That this latter number was not far from correct is shown by the reports of the evacuation commission which returned the

[1] The author happened to be in southern Spain, as an ordinary sight-seer, in October, 1897. The train in which he returned from Granada to Algeciras carried a large number of these conscripts. Many touching scenes took place at the stations where they were picked up. A Spanish gentleman in the same compartment with the author murmured, "Pobres madres." The latter felt that sympathy should have had wider scope and that the words should have been "Pobre España."

[2] Sargent, *The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba*, III, 158

Spanish forces as 140,005 regular troops and 80,504 volunteers. Many of these latter were of the character of "Home Guards," and can scarcely be considered as part of the effective force.

Of the regulars, about 31,500 formed the garrison in and about Havana, with some 17,000 at Matanzas and other points of the province; 34,000 were in the province of Santiago, of whom 9,430 were in the city of Santiago de Cuba and vicinity, 8,364 at Holguin, and 8,668 at Manzanillo.

These were formidable numbers, the meeting of which under ordinary conditions of warfare would have been a serious problem. But it was an army already faced by an active enemy, in a devastated country, with scanty supplies of food, and ravaged by tropical fever—conditions which were soon to be accentuated by the effect of the blockade. The question of reinforcement from Spain under such circumstances could not be seriously considered. What troops were in Spain were sure to remain there; the battle was to be met with such forces as happened to be in Cuba. Nor could there be much thought of redistribution. The mastering element in such a question was the food supply. Neither Santiago nor Havana could have supported much larger numbers than were already at these points. There was thus no material change in the situation of troops. There was no plan of action beyond awaiting, *in statu quo*, the coming of the American forces.

CHAPTER III

STRATEGY

THE joint resolution in Congress passed in the early hours of the morning of April 19, 1898, and signed by President McKinley at 11.24 A. M., April 20, declared it "the duty of the United States to demand, and the government of the United States does hereby demand, that the government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters."

The objective was thus clear and definite. Cuba freed from the dominion of Spain, the war, so far as the United States were concerned, was to be ended. Cuba thus by the terms of the resolution itself was made the main battle-ground. That the operations of the war should harass and distress Spain in general as a means of bringing the desired conclusion, was, where it was convenient and possible to do so, a matter of course, but such was an entirely secondary consideration. Thus, whatever might happen on the coast of Spain, in the Canaries, or in the Philippines, could only bear indirectly on the one great purpose. Until Spain should yield Cuba there was to be war; as soon as Cuba should be yielded the United States promised by implication to be ready for peace. It would rest with Spain to continue hostilities.

A blockade of the Cuban coast and military assistance of the insurgents ashore by supplying arms and munitions of war, or by sending armed forces, were thus the first steps to be considered. The Spanish troops efficiently blockaded both by sea and land, and under the ravaged conditions of the island, would succumb finally by mere starvation should not aid come by sea. This last could only be by Spanish naval predominancy. Naval

Island of Cuba, 1898

effort to hold communication with Cuba, if the island was to be preserved, was thus a necessity to Spain; to keep her fleet permanently on her own coasts would have been to throw up the game.

Into the consideration of these first steps mentioned thus came, as a main element, the question of the Spanish fleet, its strength and movements. So long as there was a Spanish squadron within reach of Cuba, so long would there be such uncertainty as to safety of expeditions as to make the sending from the United States of a considerable army a matter of doubtful judgment. There would be, also, a like uncertainty of ability to blockade successfully the Cuban ports, as the great majority of the blockading vessels would have to be of a class weak in fighting qualities.

The following from an American official in Spain, though it did not reach the navy department until about the time that Cervera was to leave the Cape Verdes for the west, probably gives more nearly than anything else the views of the navy department as to the strength of the force to be met. The department had to form its estimate on information from observers, and this official had better means of knowing than most.

MADRID, *April* 16, 1898.

SIR: Yesterday the Spanish government began to take extraordinary precautions to prevent the getting out of news relating to the movements of ships or anything pertaining to war preparations. It is quite probable, therefore, that definite information in regard to these subjects will be difficult, if not impossible, to get. My latest information, which I have telegraphed to date, is to the effect that the torpedo squadron, consisting of three destroyers, three torpedo boats, and the converted cruiser *Ciudad de Cadiz*, with the *Colon* and *Maria Teresa*, are at the Cape de Verdes awaiting instructions. It is said that the *Colon* and *Teresa* left Cadiz in such a hurry that they were not properly provisioned. Provisions and coal have been sent to them. I have no reason to believe that they have not a full supply of ammunition. The *Oquendo* and *Vizcaya* from Porto Rico should arrive at Cape de Verdes to-day. Although I have no definite information, I believe the *Pelayo* arrived at Cadiz yesterday, coming from Cartagena. It was intended that she should go, after a few days' necessary delay in Cartagena, and it is reported that she was sighted

in the Straits of Gibraltar day before yesterday. The *Proserpina, Osadó, Destructor, Barcelo, Retamosa, Habana, Halcon,* torpedo boats and destroyers, and the *Vitoria* are now practically ready in Cadiz, awaiting the arrival of the *Carlos V* and the *Pelayo.* The *Alfonso XIII* is also about ready in Cartagena. The installation for moving the guns by electricity in the *Carlos V* is not completed, and I am unable to get at any estimate of the date when she will be entirely ready for service. It is said on good authority, however, that in an emergency she could be used at once, working such parts as have not power applied by hand. Work is being pushed, also, as rapidly as possible on the *Cisneros,* but she can hardly be ready for many weeks. The trans-Atlantic steamers *Mexico, Panama, Santo Domingo, San Augustin,* and *Villaverde,* now in Cuban waters, are being armed as auxiliary cruisers. Nine trans-Atlantic steamers in Spanish ports at present are also being armed as cruisers. To this number should be added the *Columbia* and *Normannia,* recently purchased in Germany, and the *Giralda,* now being converted in Barcelona. This makes twenty-one auxiliary cruisers concerning which I have quite definite information. The two steamers bought in Germany were strengthened there and are in condition to receive their artillery and crew when they arrive at Cadiz, which is expected to-day. I call your special attention to the newspaper slip which I inclose, entitled, "Fe en la armada." It was published in the *Heraldo* of April 6, the leading and most influential paper of Madrid. The *Imparcial* of the following morning called attention to it and spoke in very severe terms of the impropriety of a former secretary of the navy speaking so unreservedly of such important matters at this very critical time. The following is a translation:

"We had an opportunity to-day to talk for a long time with General Beranger, the last secretary of the navy under the Conservative cabinet. To the questions which we directed to him concerning the conflict pending with the United States he was kind enough to inform us that he confided absolutely in the triumph of our naval forces. The attack on our island ports is not to be feared, he said, by an enemy taking advantage of the darkness of night. The reason of this is that Havana, as well as Cienfuegos, Nuevitas, and Santiago, are defended by electrical and automobile torpedoes, which can work at a great distance (have a large radius of action). Señor Canovas del Castillo, who did not neglect these things, arranged for, in agreement with me, the shipping to Cuba of 190 torpedoes, *which are surely located in these ports at present.* The transportation and installation of these war machines was in the charge of the distinguished torpedoist, Señor Chacon. I have already said that we shall conquer on the sea, and I am now going to give you my reasons. The first of these is the remarkable discipline that prevails on our war ships, and the second, as soon as fire is opened the crews of the American ships will

commence to desert, since we all know that among them are people of all nationalities. Ship against ship, therefore, a failure is not to be feared. I believe that the squadron detained at Cape de Verdes, and particularly the destroyers, should have and could have continued the voyage to Cuba, since they have nothing to fear from the American fleet. In this class of ships we are on a much higher level than the United States." [1]

The company Bandera Española have been ordered to "suspend the voyages of its ships to Havana." Without definite information, I presume the government intends to take these ships into service. Also the Compania Trasatlantica has ordered its ships not to touch at Corunna hereafter, presumably for the same reason as given above.

It is said quite openly here that the intention of the government is to make some kind of an effort on our coasts. This comes to me from so many sources that I am inclined to believe they have this plan in view; but I have been unable to verify the reports or to get at any of the details.

Just at this moment, here in Madrid, everything is very quiet. Considerable turbulence is reported from the provinces. How great this may be we are unable to judge, as the government is keeping a sharp watch on the telegrams and does not permit any very exciting news to be disseminated. There was some excitement, and for two days considerable danger of a mob, here in Madrid, after the announcement of the proclamation of the armistice in Cuba. That crisis is now apparently passed. Everybody here expects war, and the lower classes ardently desire it. The government and the more intelligent classes dread it; are willing to do anything they can to avoid it without revolution, but will accept it if, from their point of view, it is forced upon them. The press has fed the people with all sorts of nonsense about the superior bravery of the Spanish sailor, the superior discipline on board the Spanish ships, and the greater fighting power of the navy. The belief in this superiority of the Spanish navy over that of the United States accounts, in a large measure, in my opinion, for the determination to fight us. This opinion is shared also by many intelligent persons, in fact, I believe, by all Spaniards. They say they have nothing to lose, they could not be worse off with the war than without it, as they are about to lose Cuba anyhow; but they can do incalculable damage to our commerce; seriously injure, if not destroy, our navy, and, although they would probably be beaten in the end, they will have taught us a salutary lesson in the meantime. One of the most intelligent, best-informed Spaniards I have met here, a man who has travelled much, and claims to have a great admiration for the United States, and who knows much about our history and

[1] This opinion has been quoted above, p. 40.

resources, a senator of the kingdom, told me yesterday that the thing that he dreaded most was the long period that the hostilities would last. He was sure that three years would be the very least that the struggle would continue. It may be of interest to you to know that he said he could very well understand and appreciate the feelings and ambitions of a young and powerful nation like the United States for conquest. He could not help having a great deal of sympathy with an avowed proposition on our part to take the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico, the Canaries, the Balearics, the Philippines, and even to come to Madrid itself; but what he could not understand was, that while protesting a desire for peace, a decided disinclination to the annexation of any territory, the people of the United States had done everything in their power to foment the rebellion in Cuba, and to make it impossible for Spain to overcome it, either by peaceable or forcible means.

I give you this as a matter of interest solely, but it represents the attitude of the intelligent, educated, and travelled Spaniard.

The writer, as this shows, had accepted the *Pelayo* and *Carlos V*, as practically already available; had named the ancient iron-clad *Vitoria* (built in 1865) as serviceable, as also four torpedo-boats, the *Barcelo*, *Retamosa*, *Habana*, and *Halcon*, which were of the same class as those which had already failed in an effort to cross the Atlantic.

As will be seen, the Spanish minister of marine himself, who should have known better, expected to add the *Carlos V* and *Pelayo* to Cervera's squadron.[1] With these he proposed to join "the eight larger vessels" in Cuba, ignoring the discouraging account of their condition reported by Admiral Manterola, who was in command of the naval station.[2]

It is needless to deal with "what might have been" had

[1] *Infra.*

[2] Speaking of those in Cuban waters, Manterola said: "Of the fifty-five vessels which compose my squadron, thirty-two are launches and small craft of little use except to police the coast. The two cruisers are completely useless; the *Alfonso XII* unable to move, and the *Reina Mercedes* has, of her ten boilers, seven useless and the other three little less so. Of the three cruisers *Venadito* [1,200 tons], *Isabel II* [1,200 tons], and the *Ensenada* [1,000 tons], only the first can steam; the other two cannot move under a month, that is, the first of July. The gun-boat *Magallanes* cannot light fires; the torpedo gun-boats used as cruisers have lost their speed, their principal characteristic. Of the gun-boats built in England I had better not speak. The torpedo gun-boats *M. Pinzon*, *Nueva España*, *Molins*, and *V. Pinzon* can be utilized; that is to say, can be moved."

Spain been anything but Spain the Unready. The facts are that she could look forward in the near future to adding but two effective ships to Cervera's force besides the four destroyers which were retained at home. Had the *Pelayo* indeed been added, she would, however, have fitted ill in a high-speed squadron such as might have been made (including the *Carlos V*) of the five homogeneous armored cruisers. For she carried but 630 tons of coal, which would have given her an effective radius of action of but about 2,000 miles.

Had Cervera returned from the Cape Verdes to Spain, as he and his captains advised; had he awaited the *Carlos V*, spending the interval in a thorough overhauling of his ships, their guns, machinery, and bottoms, and in placing aboard the *Colón* her 10-inch guns, he would have had a squadron which would have given cause for thought to the American government. In any event, while holding this force for the moment in Spain, there would scarcely have been any large army movement for a time, on the part of the United States, though expeditions in support of the insurgents, such as that first proposed for the south coast under General Shafter, would no doubt have been undertaken, and a rigorous blockade eventually established.

Such suppositions, however interesting, could have had but little bearing upon the actual strategy of the United States, which had to meet probabilities based upon concrete facts. The broad lines of the American strategy had been almost at once prepared by Spain herself in separating Cervera's ships from those in home ports, and advancing them in the direction of the Caribbean by a step of nearly 1,500 miles. That it was intended to send this, the only force ready for service, alone to the West Indies, was almost a necessary corollary of such a situation. That this was to be soon, was clear from the fact that the Cape Verdes [1] were a Portuguese possession at which they could not remain long after the declaration of war.

[1] These desolate volcanic islands are so named from their proximity to Cabo Verde (Green Cape), the most westerly point of Africa, from which they lie to the westward, some 290 nautical miles, between north latitude 15° and 18°. Being directly in the steam route from Europe to Brazil and southern South America, the chief place, Porto Grande, is an important coaling-point. It supplies nothing else.

The presence there of the torpedo-boat squadron, enforced, as mentioned, by the difficulties of the sea, was the cause of the selection of these islands instead of the Canaries as a general rendezvous. No doubt the greater distance to Puerto Rico from the Canaries, of some 500 miles, had some force in such selection, but this should not have weighed against the immensely greater advantages in supply and preparation afforded by the national ports, Palmas and Santa Cruz.

Admiral Cervera at the Cape Verdes was 2,350 miles from San Juan, Puerto Rico, where were large supplies of coal and a small navy yard available for moderate repairs to machinery. It was but 1,250 miles thence to the Chesapeake and 1,400 to New York. The distance to this latter by going first to San Juan would have been increased by 840 miles over the direct course, but to offset this increase was the fact that he would have coaled in a home port and going thence with full bunkers have been within easy reach of the American coast, where he could have arrived with still coal enough to return to Puerto Rico or go to Havana [1] without fear of meeting any American squadron of commensurate force with a speed sufficient to bring him to action.

The formation north of the two American squadrons mentioned is sufficient evidence that a raid upon the coast was feared. It could have been but a raid, but it would have been one in which the Spanish commander could have destroyed coasting vessels, would have terrorized the coast population (already in an unreasoning panic), have caused the withdrawal of the larger part of our effective ships from Cuba, and might have caused the adverse political sentiment of Continental Europe to have crystallized to a dangerous degree of enmity. That he would have had any difficulty in entering Havana had he chosen nighttime in which to make the attempt, the writer cannot believe. The danger was a concrete one. It needed but a stout heart, which Cervera had, and a bold spirit of venture and initiative,

[1] To go off New York and thence to Havana would have been to steam about 2,700 miles, about 600 less than the distance steamed in going from the Cape Verdes to Santiago de Cuba, a voyage performed by most of the large ships without any additional supply of coal.

which he had not. The want of these last could not, in its ignorance of its enemy's race characteristics, be as fully relied upon by the American government in the beginning of the war as it could have been later.

In this situation the flying squadron under Commodore Schley, with the *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Texas*, and, shortly, the *New Orleans*, was early stationed at Hampton Roads, and a patrol squadron of cruisers under Commodore Howell established, on April 20, for the protection of the coast and coastwise trade from the Delaware Capes to eastern Maine.[1] It can scarcely be supposed that such action was taken but in deference to the unreasoning fear of dwellers on the coast, which fear was equally strong and uncontrollable in Spain and the United States. The natural place for all these forces in the circumstances, as they stood, was in the West Indies, and while such concession was made to local fears, it is natural to conclude that Hampton Roads was selected for the flying squadron instead of the more central position of New York on account of its being a day nearer the West Indies, the distance from New York to Havana being 1,227 miles; from Hampton Roads, 270 miles less.

Sampson (the attack on Havana which, as will be seen, he so much desired being denied him) had leaned, on account of the facilities offered the Spanish squadron by San Juan, to the plan of leaving the smaller ships to establish the blockade and of moving eastward with the *New York*, *Indiana*, *Iowa*, *Cincinnati*, and *Marblehead*, to the last easterly point where telegraphic communication could be had by a fast scout, and thence upon declaration of war of proceeding and capturing San Juan, thus

[1] This squadron was composed at first of the *San Francisco*, flag-ship, the *Prairie*, *Dixie*, *Yankee*, and *Yosemite* (auxiliary cruisers of about 6,500 tons). During May the squadron was strengthened by the addition of the *Columbia*, *Badger*, and *Southery*. The *Yankee* was detached on May 29, the *Yosemite* on May 30, and the *Dixie* June 13, for duty in Admiral Sampson's fleet. On June 9 the *Minneapolis* was attached to the patrol squadron, but was stationed at Newport News to guard the battle-ships building there. On June 25, in order to add to the efficiency of the blockade of Cuba, Commodore Howell was ordered to Key West with the *San Francisco*, *Columbia*, *Prairie*, *Badger*, and *Southery*, and assigned by Admiral Sampson to the command of the First Division of the North Atlantic fleet, relieving Commodore Watson, ordered to command the squadron organized to go to the Far East.

depriving the Spanish fleet of a *point d'appui* which they would almost surely occupy and use if left open to them. This action again was not approved, as hazarding ships which should be held to meet the expected Spanish squadron; a perfectly sound reason in general, but which in this case, as shown by the almost scathless result to the squadron in their attack on San Juan of May 12, could have been safely disregarded.

As will be seen later, Cervera was to leave the Cape Verdes with orders to go to San Juan.

If San Juan was not to be used as a stepping-stone for the purposes of a raid upon the American coast, it was difficult, in the writer's opinion, to suppose, in view of the belief in its defensibility held by most,[1] that the Spanish could have any other objective than Havana; for there were supplies, a dockyard, and a dock; the encouragement of the presence of a governor-general, a large army, and the support of fortifications in which Spain naturally had much, but as will be seen, misplaced trust. Had the Havana fortifications really protected the place in anything like the degree supposed, Cervera should have attempted to go there at all hazards. In general estimation, it was a harbor secure from attack by sea. Had it been so, his presence there would have been a very serious matter for the American forces. The batteries so completely commanding the front to the north caused at all times the ships of the blockading fleet to keep a good offing in that direction.[2] Thus, had the Spanish squadron been commanded by an officer of enterprise, one who had in him the spirit of a Paul Jones or a Farragut, he could, with ships coaled, bottoms cleaned, and machinery overhauled, have left the harbor during darkness, appeared upon the American coast,

[1] So late as 1907, a student of strategy wrote: "That the city [Havana] could not have been captured by the combined forces of the army and navy of the United States without furious fighting, great hardships, and great loss of life, admits of little doubt." (Sargent, *The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba*, I, 136.)

[2] These distances were usually during the day from seven to ten miles. There is no reason to doubt the measured distances, shown graphically in *El Bloqueo y la Defensa de las Costas*, Captain Severo Gomez Nuñez, pp. 153–162, and which agree with the writer's own experience.

and by again coming within reach of Havana have re-entered under cover of the night.

It is well known how difficult it is to discover a ship under a high background of land even in broad day; at night, with the Havana lights darkened, ships leaving the port and turning eastward under the high land adjacent to the Morro could not possibly have been seen from ships six or seven miles away. The promenade, close in shore, of two of the torpedo gun-boats, in the evening twilight of April 25, is a case in point. They were entirely unobserved from the American ships so far as the writer knows.[1] Had Cervera been observed in returning, the first shots, with the powder then used by the American ships, would further have so obscured the gloom that search-lights would have been useless and the strong probability is that he would have re-entered safely. Nor were the three torpedo-vessels of Cervera's squadron, added to the four torpedo-cruisers in Havana, to be disregarded under the circumstances of such a blockade.

But, as will be shown, Havana was very open to successful attack by the American fleet, and had Cervera taken refuge there Sampson would then have been at liberty to carry out the views which will be explained a few pages later—action which must have resulted in the destruction or capture of the former's squadron. But as Cervera was ignorant of the ill defence afforded by the fortifications, as in fact were most American officials, the actuality could have no bearing upon any determination he might make.

An Italian writer, who is among those who have dealt most intelligently with the subject of the war, is strongly of the opinion that Cienfuegos should in any case have been selected in preference to Havana and Santiago. He says:

> Two capital reasons, supply and effectiveness of defence, imposed the selection of Cienfuegos. The question of supply is evident, since at Cienfuegos Cervera would have found himself in railway communication with Havana, and with the whole west of the island, whence he would be able to receive coal, than which there could be nothing more important.
>
> The defensive advantages were less evident, and in fact no military writer, not even Wilson or Mahan, lays stress upon this characteristic

[1] See *infra*.

of Cienfuegos, which by itself could not impose its selection. The blockade was sufficiently more difficult and dangerous, the probability of forcing an entrance greater than at Santiago or Havana, the security of the anchorage certainly not less; but that which gave Cienfuegos an absolute superiority over Santiago if not over Havana, was the impossibility of forcing a capitulation by an expeditionary force such as that of the Americans at Santiago. The whole of the military resources could have been concentrated at Cienfuegos with sufficient rapidity, and it can be unhesitatingly affirmed that a force of 50,000 men would have been found insufficient to reduce the place; and since the Union did not have any such force the result for Cervera would have been the security of the squadron, the possibility of holding on until the hurricane season, and for Sampson, the necessity of forcing the port, with gravest dangers, or of bombarding Havana *à outrance*, which would have been impolitic, in order to force the Spanish squadron to battle or to try another solution of the war more odious and less efficacious.

Cienfuegos guaranteed, according to all probability, the safety of the squadron and the prolonging of the conflict to the period of rains and cyclones, with all the consequences which such delay invited; granted, and it is not admitted, that the means of existence and victualling would allow it. The conclusion is therefore that Cervera should have reached Cienfuegos at every cost even to burning all the woodwork of his ships if by such means he could have assured doing so.[1]

Though the advantages thus mentioned by the Italian author were great, the much broader channel leading into Cienfuegos (nearly 600 feet in its narrowest part against the 190 at Santiago), and also the clear field of fire from the inner end of the channel, offered much greater advantages to an attacking squadron than Santiago afforded. Further, though Cienfuegos Bay is greater in extent than Santiago, there was the disadvantage of visibility of the usual anchorage from seaward, and though ships in the north-western part of the bay would be unseen, a removal from the customary anchorage would have so fixed the squadron's position that bombardment from the point of nearest approach (some three miles west of the entrance) would probably have been effective. Thus, had Cervera's colliers been able to reach Santiago, and had proper energy been shown in using the squadron's guns for strengthening the batteries there, and could he have secured food, Santiago would have been his most

[1] Bonamico, *Insegnamenti della Guerra Ispano-Americano*, 74, 75.

secure refuge; and it was refuge only, and not battle, which he sought. The failure of the first of these provisos was a misfortune, the second a direct and concrete fault, the third was a failure of anticipation of its selection and ignorance of the want which prevailed.

Circumstances thus making it so largely a certainty that the Spanish squadron in coming west would first enter the Caribbean, would seem to have demanded the use of every available scout on its eastern border. Of these there were six of real value: the *Columbia*, *Minneapolis*, *Harvard*, *Yale*, *St. Paul*, and *St. Louis*, all of great speed and large coal capacity. The four last, as hereinbefore mentioned, were ships of the American line between Southampton, England, and New York, and among the finest and fastest merchant-ships at this time afloat. All six were commanded by officers of experience and ability, their captains in the order named being Sands, Jewell, Cotton, Wise, Sigsbee, and Goodrich. Instead of all being sent to cover the approaches to the Caribbean, but three, the *Harvard*, *Yale*,[1] and *St. Louis*, were so detailed in the first instance, the others at the critical period of Admiral Cervera's advent in western waters being the *Columbia* on the New England coast, and the *St. Paul* and *Minneapolis* at Hampton Roads—situations in which they were as useless militarily as if non-existent.

It has been held that our two squadrons should have been off Havana and Cienfuegos as the two important ports in Cuba from which the Spanish squadron should be excluded; that if Cervera entered San Juan one or the other squadron could have been sent there on notice of Cervera's arrival. Waiving the present writer's opinion, just expressed, that considered merely from a defensive point of view neither Havana nor Cienfuegos was superior as a harbor of refuge to Santiago, such a disposition of our two squadrons would have produced a situation in no wise different from that which happened and was deplored (viz., the uncovering of one of the two first points), with the drawback that there would have been no squadron within easy reach of San

[1] The names *Harvard* and *Yale*, as before mentioned, were given during the war to the *New York* and *Paris*, respectively.

Juan to meet the Spanish there before they could coal and get away. The time necessary to prepare to go the thousand miles east from Havana or Cienfuegos to San Juan, the filling with coal, the preparations for coaling *en route*, the possible break-downs and the slowness of many of our ships, by both of which latter difficulties Sampson in his movement thither later was hampered in a most disheartening way, cannot be ignored. Much less than a week would have afforded time for an active enemy to coal and get away. That the course of the Spanish squadron could have been followed by even the six scouts available, judging by the experience gained during the war, was very unlikely. The nights were dark, the moon being in its last quarter, and, when the extraordinary difficulty is considered of sighting at night ships carrying no lights, continued contact would have been very improbable, even had the Spanish squadron not been accompanied by torpedo-vessels, the very proper fear of which would have brought such caution to the dogging scouts that such a near approach of the Spanish squadron as would have been necessary for observation and keeping touch with its direction would have been most doubtful.

The positions of the two American squadrons thus should have been, in the writer's opinion, the one at Havana, the other at a point within easy reach of Puerto Rico. Such a point was the vicinity of the island of Tortuga off the north-west point of Hayti, 550 miles east of Havana and 420 from San Juan; or at Monte Cristi bank, a short distance east, where there was anchorage and smooth water for coaling, with Cape Haitien as a telegraph station. San Juan could have been reached from such a point within forty hours. It was also a position commanding the Windward Passage and the approaches to the ports on the south side of Cuba, Santiago being but 100 and Cienfuegos 415 miles west of Cape Maysi (the eastern point of Cuba), or about 215 and 530 miles from Cape Haitien. Thus the one could have been reached in twenty-one and the other in fifty-three hours at the easy gait of ten knots.

The views of the navy department as to action, now that it was clear that Cervera's force was to cross the Atlantic, are best shown by its letter to Sampson of April 29, 1898:

SIR: You are informed that we have telegrams from St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands, stating in effect that the armored cruisers *Infanta Maria Teresa, Cristóbal Colón, Oquendo,* and *Vizcaya,* also the three torpedo-boat destroyers *Pluton, Terror,* and *Furor,* sailed, it is claimed, for Cuba this morning; that at the same time the transports *Ciudad de Cadiz* and *San Francisco* and the three torpedo-boats *Rayo, Ariete,* and *Azor,* left for the Canary Islands. The transports and torpedo-boats returned shortly after leaving port, owing to a slight collision between the *Ariete* and *Rayo* at sea.

There are also reports that the *Pelayo* is in Cadiz, but this has not been confirmed by reliable telegrams, though it is thought to be true. The department does not find any reliable information of her having left Spain for the Atlantic.

In order to obtain information regarding the Spanish fleet above mentioned, in case it should go to the West Indies, the department has sent out two of the American liners, the *St. Louis* and the *Harvard,* to cruise to the eastward of Guadeloupe and Martinique. A copy of the orders to these vessels is appended.

It is also in contemplation to send a third liner to cruise around the island of Puerto Rico for the same object; all three vessels to telegraph to the department and yourself as soon as they obtain reliable information.

Though this Spanish squadron is reported in the telegrams above mentioned as being bound for Cuba, it seems very doubtful whether it would proceed immediately to your neighborhood, but it might, possibly, go into San Juan, Puerto Rico, or to some other port of that island, or to the eastern part of Cuba. It is presumed that if they do take refuge in a port as above mentioned, that movement would be favorable to your operations against them.

It has been frequently suggested that this Spanish squadron, or part of it, might proceed to the vicinity of Cape St. Roque for the purpose of intercepting the *Oregon* and *Marietta,* now known to be on their way to re-enforce you, and which are expected to arrive about the end of this month.

Of course the department need not remind you of the importance of confining the enemy in San Juan, Puerto Rico, in case they go in there for coal or other supplies. It was a matter of common rumor some time ago that the Spanish authorities were preparing an old hulk or hulks, loaded with stone, for the purpose of obstructing the entrance to the harbor. Whether they have been placed is not positively known.

It has, of course, been suspected that the destination of the four Spanish armored cruisers and torpedo destroyers might be on the Atlantic coast of the United States, probably to the northward, for the purpose of inflicting what injury they could upon our coastwise cities and towns, and capturing such of our merchant ships and

smaller men-of-war as they might fall in with. If this proves to be the case, it may be considered necessary to detach one of the battleships of the squadron operating on the coast of Cuba to proceed to the northward and re-enforce the flying squadron and such other vessels as we might have in that region. Therefore, in reflecting upon the situation, you must be prepared to entertain the possibility of such detachment. It would seem that after such a detachment had been made, the squadron on the coast of Cuba would be still strong enough to meet any other Spanish ships that might appear, or to meet the four armored cruisers and the destroyers above mentioned, in case they should leave the northern coast and suddenly appear upon the Cuban coast; but if the four Spanish armored cruisers, after feinting upon the northern coast, proceed to the West Indies for the purpose of there joining the *Pelayo*, *Alfonso XIII*, and *Carlos V*, it would be supposed that our northern squadron would follow them and re-enforce you in operating against them.

Of course the above is mostly speculation, and is given to you for what it may be worth; the matter of the combinations of the Spanish ships being doubtless one that you have reflected upon very much.

Very respectfully,

JOHN D. LONG, *Secretary.*

REAR-ADMIRAL W. T. SAMPSON, U. S. N.,
Commanding U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

As shown by this, the *Pelayo*, *Alfonso XIII*, and *Carlos V* were regarded by our navy department as already available, a marked instance of a failure in the very basis of successful operations—information. It will also be observed that particular stress is laid upon "the importance of confining the enemy at San Juan in case he goes there for coal or other supplies," a view, as mentioned, entirely in accord with Sampson's own. The tenor of the letter, taken with the fact that if a raid upon the coast of the United States were meditated, calling at San Juan to recoal was practically imperative, was that the covering of San Juan was of primary importance.

The foregoing deals with the subject mainly from a general stand-point. It remains to discuss Admiral Sampson's different view to that of the navy department as to the probable success, without loss, of immediate attack by the fleet upon Havana.

While recognizing as well as any one that the Spanish squadron was his main objective, the destruction of which would necessarily cause the yielding by Spain of Cuba, he was con-

vinced that Havana would fall without difficulty and without serious damage to his fleet, and that this in itself would practically end the war. The following is not in criticism of the perfectly sound and safe views of the navy department, which in the long run, in view of our superior force, were apparently sure to be crowned with success, but to show that Sampson would have reduced Havana on April 23, had he been allowed to act, and without any material damage to his ships.

Although the conditions were even more favorable than Sampson knew, he had reasoned largely upon the lines of the conditions about to be shown. One of his earliest acts upon taking command was to call together the captains of the heavier ships present, the *Indiana*, *Iowa*, and *New York*, and lay before them his views favoring an immediate attack, in which all agreed.

His first, and what may be called his tentative, plan of action is shown in the following order of battle drawn in full expectancy of the navy department's concurrence:

In case of war the vessels of this squadron will proceed at once to the coast of Havana. The approach will be made from the northward and to the westward of Havana, about Boques Chorrera Point.

The cruising formation is given below.

Upon approaching the coast, the fighting ships will take the lead, and, upon signal, form column with *Iowa* leading, which will carry the pennant of the commander-in-chief. The column will be so directed as to approach the westernmost battery from the westward. The *Iowa* will lead close in shore and at a distance of 600 or 1,000 yards. Each ship in the line will open fire on the nearest battery as soon as she can bring her guns to bear.

The rapid-fire guns will commence firing as soon as they can fire into the embrasures.

The distance between ships, in order that they may support each other, will be three hundred (300) yards and the speed eight (8) knots, the steam pressure being kept low. Should it be found that the smoke from the ship ahead interferes with the aim of the following ship, the distance may be increased, or, each ship may steer inside the smoke of her leader, bringing each succeeding ship somewhat nearer the batteries than her leader.

If the resistance of the batteries is not great the vessels will go to the eastward until they have passed the Santa Clara battery, when they will turn with starboard helm and return along the battery front. Great care will be exercised by each ship in returning to avoid running

into the smoke of her leader. If the resistance is great for the number of ships available, the leader will turn after passing the battery to the westward of Santa Clara.

If at any time any of the enemy's vessels appear, they will immediately be attacked by the cruisers, and the armored vessels will assist them if thought necessary.

Should the attack on the batteries prove satisfactory, a demand under a flag of truce will be made for the city to surrender or suffer bombardment in twenty-four hours.

Should the attack on the batteries be unsatisfactory, either owing to their power of resistance or to too few ships, it will be temporarily abandoned for a close blockade of Havana, which will be gradually extended both east and west.

ORDER OF CRUISING

1. The armored ships to be designated the first squadron, and the cruisers the second squadron, and to be referred to as such by squadron flags or displays.

2. The signal 231 to designate "form in first order of cruising as designated by the commander-in-chief." The signal 232 to designate "form in second order of cruising as designated by the commander-in-chief."

CRUISING FORMATION

3. At the signal 231 the armored ships will form in double line, same number of ships in each line, flagship (*Iowa*) on the left of the rear division; *Indiana* to be on the left of the van division, and the *New York* on the right of the rear division, so as to give the heaviest possible flank fire in case a torpedo-boat eludes the scouts. It is considered that there is little chance of attack from other classes of vessels. Distance 400 yards. Order, natural.

Cruisers to act as linkers, the *Nashville* ahead of the van division, within easy signal distance, and the *Cincinnati* the same distance ahead of the *Nashville*. The *Marblehead* and the *Detroit* on the flank, within easy signal distance of the flag-ship; the *Castine* and *Newport* astern in similar positions to those ahead. If more cruisers are available they are to be posted on the flank.

Torpedo-boats to act as scouts, and to be stationed as shown, the heaviest [the *Porter*], and the one with the right-ahead fire, being in the van.

4. On approaching the coast, signal 232 (second order of cruising) is to be made, when the force will form in three lines:

(1) The first squadron, or armored ships;

(2) The second squadron, or cruisers, including the *New York*.[1]
(3) The torpedo-boats. (The *New York* is not to be considered as having left the first squadron and joined the second.)

. . . . . .

5. The force will proceed in this order, the interval between the lines being regulated by the limit of visibility of signals. When the first squadron is sufficiently near the coast, the second squadron will be signalled to stop, and it and the torpedo-boats will keep out of range, but within signal distance of the first squadron, and will be manœuvred by the senior officer of the second squadron with that end in view; he will, if necessary, detail a ship to take position between the two squadrons to repeat signals. He will be ready to make such an attack on the batteries as may be designated by the commander-in-chief, together with the commanding officer of the flotilla, will be on the alert to frustrate a torpedo attack by boats attempting to slip out of Havana harbor, or out of the small bay to the westward of the batteries, under cover of the smoke.

The first squadron will execute "vessels left turn," and attack the batteries in column, as already detailed, the squadron regulating course and speed by the flag-ship, with or without signals.

The ships available at this moment were the battle-ships *Iowa* and *Indiana*, the armored cruiser *New York*, the monitor *Terror*, the cruisers *Cincinnati*, *Marblehead*, and *Detroit*, the gun-boats *Castine*, *Nashville*, and *Newport;* the torpedo-boats *Cushing*, *Dupont*, *Ericsson*, *Foote*, *Porter*, and *Winslow*. The monitor *Amphitrite* was added April 8, and the monitor *Puritan* April 9.

This was but an initial plan, subject to modification. The situation at Havana was naturally not as familiar to the navy department as it was to Sampson, whose many days' presence at Havana as senior member of the *Maine* court of inquiry had perforce given him a fuller knowledge of what he had to meet.

The reply of the department to Sampson's telegram was as follows:

[Confidential.]

WASHINGTON, *April* 6, 1898.

SIR: In the event of hostilities with Spain, the department wishes you to do all in your power to capture or destroy the Spanish war-vessels in West Indian waters, including the small gun-boats which are stationed along the coast of Cuba.

[1] It was arranged later that the *New York* should form part of the first squadron.

2. The department does not wish the vessels of your squadron to be exposed to the fire of the batteries at Havana, Santiago de Cuba, or other strongly fortified ports in Cuba, unless the more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within those harbors. Even in this case the department would suggest that a rigid blockade and employment of our torpedo-boats might accomplish the desired object, viz., the destruction of the enemy's vessels, without subjecting unnecessarily our own men-of-war to the fire of the land batteries.

There are two reasons for this:

First. There may be no United States troops to occupy any captured stronghold, or to protect from riot and arson, until after the dry season begins, about the first of October.

Second. The lack of docking facilities makes it particularly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled before the capture or destruction of Spain's most formidable vessels.

3. The department further desires that, in case of war, you will maintain a strict blockade of Cuba, particularly at the ports of Havana, Matanzas, and, if possible, of Santiago de Cuba, Manzanillo, and Cienfuegos. Such a blockade may cause the Spaniards to yield before the rainy season is over.

4. All prizes should be sent to Key West or other available United States ports for adjudication.

5. Should it be decided to furnish the insurgents with arms and ammunition, the department suggests that Nuevitas and Puerto Padre would be the most suitable places to land them and establish communications with the Cuban forces.

6. Should the department learn that the Spanish fleet had gone to Puerto Rico, it is possible that the flying squadron may be sent thither, in which case some of your vessels may be needed to re-enforce that squadron.

7. The department hopes to be able to cut the cable off Santiago de Cuba, even if it has to employ a special cable vessel for this purpose, and it also has under consideration the practicability of cutting the cable near Havana and connecting the end to one of the vessels of your command, so that you can always be in communication with the department. Whether or not this plan is feasible has not yet been determined. Please consider it.

8. The department need not impress upon you the necessity for stringent sanitary regulations. It leaves this matter, as well as the details in regard to conducting operations, to the commander-in-chief, in whose judgment it has the greatest confidence.

Wishing you every success, very respectfully,

JOHN D. LONG, *Secretary.*

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

Sampson answered this in the following letter:

U. S. Flag-ship New York, 1st Rate,
Key West, Fla., *April* 9, 1898.

My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have received your confidential letter of April 6.

I sympathize with all you say about guarding our big ships against a possibly serious loss while the enemy's fleet is still intact. At the same time I regard it as very important to strike quickly and strike hard as soon as hostilities commence. Havana is well defended by three or four batteries to the eastward of the entrance, mounting guns from 6 to 12 inch calibre. On the western side of the entrance there are three batteries, the guns varying in calibre from 8 to 12 inch, and two mortar batteries. All the batteries face seaward, and those to the west of the entrance are quite near the shore. All are open batteries, with heavy traverses between the guns. The guns and people who serve them are quite unprotected.

These batteries are well calculated to keep off a fleet from seaward, which approaches to within a moderate distance of a few thousand yards. I do not think they are well placed to resist an attack (for instance, the western batteries) from the westward and close in shore, where the batteries would be exposed to a flank fire, or to the fire of our big ships at short range, where the secondary batteries would have full effect. Even under these circumstances the ships must have such a heavy fire that the men in the batteries would be overwhelmed by its volume. Before the *Puritan* and *Amphitrite* arrived I was not entirely sanguine of the success of such an attack. Since their arrival yesterday I have little doubt of its success.

Although the monitors are weak in secondary fire I expected to put a cruiser with heavy secondary fire in the interval between each two of them. In this way I do not think the Spaniards would be able to fire. They would be driven away from their guns and kept away, while the fire of the ships would so injure the guns or mounts that they would be unserviceable. Although the defences west of the entrance are stronger than those east, the first has the advantage for us that all the projectiles which miss the batteries will fall in the city and furnish an additional inducement for the surrender of the city.

In the memorandum which I furnished to the commanding officers of ships I provided that if our ships were not numerous enough, or the Spaniards proved better than I expected, we were at once to haul off and substitute for the direct attack a close blockade of the port, which was to be extended east and west to adjoining ports as quickly as possible. Having silenced the western batteries, it would be quite practicable to shell the city, which I would do only after warning given twenty-four hours in advance.

I see the force of your reasoning that we would have no troops to occupy the city if it did surrender, yet, Mr. Secretary, it will be very unfortunate, besides a great loss of time, if we must delay until the rainy season is over. Probably a close blockade would terminate the trouble before October.

I shall do my utmost to carry out your wishes as set forth in your letter. At the same time I hope you will consider the plan I have here outlined. I have discussed the matter freely with Captains Evans, Taylor, and Chadwick, and all unite with me that the direct attack is sufficiently promising to warrant its trial.

I don't think the plan of cutting the cable at Havana and taking the end on board ship would succeed, for a ship could not anchor off Havana. I have already telegraphed you to send means for grappling a cable, with the intention of cutting those at Guantánamo and Santiago.

I will try [to] keep you informed of our doings after leaving here by a cruiser sent here to the telegraph line.

We are working day and night to keep the ships in readiness for service. The *Helena* and *Puritan* are now under repairs, which will occupy several days. There will be no delay in moving when the order comes.

Respectfully,

W. T. Sampson.

The Secretary of the Navy,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

That Sampson's letter gives the impression that a resistance might be expected such as we now know would not have been found, is clear, but the writer knows that the impression given the reader is far stronger than was Sampson's own view as to the probable strength of resistance. He can recall no doubt expressed by the commander-in-chief as to success; the intensity of disappointment brought him by the navy department's disapproval can only be understood by those who are acquainted with Sampson's unbending purpose when his will was once fixed. Further study only intensified his opinion.

Havana was, in fact, always at the mercy of the American fleet, as a study of the conditions will show, the special considerations being the train of the Spanish guns; the want of defence south-west of Chorrera Bay; the great depth of water, which enabled ships to come almost within their length of the shore; and the bight west of the Morro, which not only afforded excel-

lent anchorage, but cut off, completely, the heavy guns of the batteries east of the entrance to the harbor.

A few preliminary words are needed.

The outbreak of 1895 had found Havana defenceless except for six 11-inch Krupp guns of 1876 installed in 1885; three of these were in the Velasco battery at the eastern side of the Morro Castle and three in the Santa Clara. There were some 8.25-inch iron howitzers, "perfectly useless," says Nuñez, the Spanish officer of artillery and author, "for a combat against foreign squadrons."[1]

General Martinez Campos, with the experience of the Ten Years' War (1868–1878), foreseeing trouble with the United States, took steps on his arrival in Cuba in 1895 toward a better defence, with the result that from December of that year to the succeeding March there arrived two 30.5-cm. (12-inch), two 24-cm. (9.5-inch), eight 15-cm. (5.9-inch) Ordoñez rifles; two 30.5-cm. Krupp rifles, and eight 24-cm. (9.5-inch) Ordoñez rifle howitzers.[2]

The mixed artillery and engineer commission charged with the subject included Matanzas, Cienfuegos, Santiago, Guantánamo, and Nipe, in the project of defence, but nothing was done excepting at Havana.

Work was begun and carried steadily forward. The batteries, far from complete when Sampson's fleet was sighted at 5 P. M. of April 22, 1898 (the only guns which had yet been tested by firing being the 12-inch of Santa Clara and a few of the eight 21-cm. [8-inch] howitzers), had a frontage in a straight line between the two extremes of 7.5 kilometres (4.7 miles). They began 2,300 metres east of Morro Castle and ended 5,200 metres west.[3] They were as follows (all guns being *en barbette*):

Battery No. 1 (Cojimar).—A new earthwork revetted with masonry, 2,300 metres east of the Morro; 10.5 metres above the

[1] Severo Gomez Nuñez, *La Habana, Influencia de las Plazas de Guerra*, 29.

[2] The following is the relation between centimetres and inches: 1 cm. = .394 inch; 57 mm. = 2.25 inch; 9 cm. = 3.55 inch; 12 cm. = 4.7 inch; 15 cm. = 5.9 inch; 16 cm. = 6.3 inch; 21 cm. = 8.25 inch; 24 cm. = 9.5 inch; 28 cm. = 11 inch; 30.5 cm. = 12 inch.

[3] 1,000 metres = 1,093.63 yards = $\frac{5}{8}$ of a statute mile.

sea. *Armament.*—Four 15-cm. Ordoñez.[1] The easterly of these guns could train N. E. The westerly W. by S. All through an arc of about 136°.

Battery No. 2 (El Barco Abandonado).—A new earthwork revetted with masonry. 1,530 metres east of the Morro; 18 metres above the sea. (This was the second most powerful of the Havana defences.) *Armament.*—Two 30.5-cm. (12-inch) Krupp rifles (in center of battery); four 21-cm. (8-inch) Ordoñez B. L. howitzers (two on each flank of the 30.5-cm.); two 57-mm. (2.25-inch) Nordenfelts (one at each end of the battery). The extreme range of any of these was N. E. ½ E. and W. S. W. ¾ W.; that of the 12-inch at the moderate elevation which would make them effective near the western shore, was but W. ⅜ S. There would have been no difficulty in keeping south of their train of fire.

San Diego Battery.—On the hill 1,400 metres from the sea and 2,300 metres E. by S. from Morro point, and 50 metres above the sea. *Armament.*—Two 15-cm. (5.9-inch) B. L. siege-guns; four old M. L. bronze guns, rifled. (This battery was of no value except as a support to 1 and 2 in case of land attack.)

Morro Castle.—The Velasco Battery, 15 metres above the sea. *Armament.*—Three 28-cm. (11-inch) short Krupp guns of 1876. The guns bore N. E. by N. and W. It would have been easy to keep south of their line of fire. On the parapets, 17 metres above the sea, were nine 21-cm. (8-inch) rifled cast-iron howitzers. ("In its present condition Morro Castle, including Velasco, need hardly be taken into consideration in the defence of Havana."—*U. S. Army Report,* 1898, Captain John C. W. Brooks.) Lower Battery (del Sol).—*Armament.*—Six 28-cm. (11-inch) cast-iron M. L. smooth-bores; two 21-cm. (8-inch) rifled cast-iron M. L. howitzers. ("I was told that if loaded they could fire one round at a passing vessel. I did not doubt this statement. These guns are entirely exposed to a fire from the sea."—*U. S. Army Report.*)

The shore, beginning with the western angle of the Morro Castle, here made a deep bight, to the southward and westward, the depth of which from the line joining the Morro and the Santa Clara battery (2,400 metres west of the Morro) was 700 metres. It was this bight which Sampson proposed using as an anchorage after reducing the western batteries.

[1] These guns are from designs by Brigadier-General Salvador Ordoñez, and are known by his name. They are of cast-iron hooped with steel and with a partial tube of steel which contained the breech-block. The projectile of the 30.5 cm. Ordoñez rifles in the Santa Clara battery weighed 836 pounds: the powder charge was 264 pounds; the initial velocity 1,706 foot-seconds. The Hontoria (all steel) guns were also named from the designer.

Fort Cabañas.—A large ancient fortification of great extent, about 1,000 metres S. E. of the Morro, 25 metres above the sea. It had no bearing upon sea defence. *Armament.*—Three 16-cm. (6.3-inch) old guns, rifled; four 16-cm. rifled M. L. cast-iron guns.

San Ambrosio Battery. *Armament.*—Six 16-cm. old bronze guns, rifled.

Pastora Alta (high).—*Armament.*—Three 21-cm. (8-inch) Ordoñez M. L. howitzers.

Pastora Baja (low).—*Armament.*—Nine 21-cm. M. L. howitzers. ("None of the armament of this fort is of any value whatever." *U. S. Army Report.*)

La Punta (The Point).—On the south side of the harbor entrance, 300 metres S. from the Morro (this being the width of the entrance). 4 metres above the sea. *Armament.*—Two 25-cm. (9.85-inch) Parrotts; one 28-cm. (11-inch) smooth-bore; three 16-cm. (6.3-inch) old bronze guns, rifled. ("This battery is worthless from an artillery point of view." *U. S. Army Report.*)

The Punta Annex.—*Armament.*—Two 15-cm. (5.9-inch) Ordoñez. These guns could be trained only to N. W. ½ W.

Cuartel de la Fuerza.—At inner end of entrance channel, opposite Cabañas. No fire seaward. *Armament.*—Four 28-cm. (11-inch) M. L. iron guns. ("Guns and defence are of no value." *U. S. Army Report.*)

Reina Battery.—1,800 metres S. W. of the Morro, and 8.5 metres above the sea. *Armament.*—Two 25-cm. (9.85-inch) Parrott M. L. rifles; seven 21-cm. (8-inch) Ordoñez M. L. howitzers. ("The armament is hardly worth noting." *U. S. Army Report.*)

The Santa Clara Battery.—A solidly constructed fort 1,030 metres W. N. W. of La Reina, and 2,400 metres W. S. W. from the Morro. 14.4 metres above the sea. (This was the most powerful of the Havana batteries.) *Armament.*—Two 30.5-cm. (12-inch) Ordoñez rifles; three 28-cm. (11-inch) Krupp rifles (1876); four 21-cm. (8-inch) M. L. howitzers; two 57-mm. (2.25-inch) Nordenfelts; three 16-cm. (6.3-inch) old bronze guns, rifled. The easterly 30.5-cm. could be trained due east; the westerly to W. N. W. ½ W.

Battery No. 3.—A new earthwork, 950 metres W. of Santa Clara; 1.9 metres above the sea. *Armament.*—Four 21-cm. (8-inch) M. L. howitzers.

Battery No. 4.—A new earthwork, 1,200 metres W. by N. of Santa Clara (3,800 from the Morro); 2.1 metres above the sea. *Armament.*—Two 24-cm. (9.5-inch) B. L. Ordoñez rifles; two 15-cm. (5.9-inch) B. L. Ordoñez rifles. These guns trained from N. E. by E. to W. N. W. ¼ W.

Battery No. 5 (Chorrera).—A new earthwork, 1,100 metres W. by S. of No. 4, and 4,900 from the Morro; 2.2 metres above the sea. *Armament.*—Four 15-cm. (5.9-inch) B. L. Ordoñez rifles. The

most easterly gun trained W. by S.; the others gradually more to the southward, the westernmost bearing about S. W. three-quarters W. (S. 54° W.).

West of the city a mile inland, and having no bearing on the seaward defence, was the extensive and ancient Castillo del Principe, occupying the highest land of the neighborhood, 165 feet above the sea. There were in this three 16-cm. old bronze guns, rifled. On the south a little more than two miles from the harbor entrance, was the smaller Castillo de Atares, equally venerable, 104 feet above the sea, with four guns of the like useless character.

Says the talented captain of artillery, Severo Gomez Nuñez:

Finally, General Fuentes had the clever idea of establishing auxiliary and simulated batteries, using some ancient mortars. These batteries we see mentioned in some foreign reviews as contributing to the defence of the ports and made there a great figure.

The bombardment of Puerto Rico furnished the idea; it was observed there that the enemy's ships fired numbers of shots at short ranges, approaching close to the works, which would have caused in an attack at Havana, serious losses in the slightly protected batteries, as the enemy would, from a short range, have directed an accurate fire from his rapid-fire guns from the secondary batteries and tops of his ships. In order to avoid this these auxiliary and simulated batteries were installed in the hope that the fire of the ships would be divided between many objectives. One was thus installed to the right of the Santa Clara battery; another of howitzers to the left of No. 3, another between No. 2 and Velasco; two between Nos. 1 and 2, which dissembled by the lay of the land and the vegetation would appear to contain guns of 9 cm. Bc., of 7.5-cm. Krupp rapid-fire, and of 12 or 15 cm. Verdes; all the elements, in a word, of a gun-fire fitted to contend with the like fire from the American ships, which, it was observed, they used in all cases, approaching closely to the works in order to reap the greatest advantage from their rapid-fire guns.[1]

Three lines of torpedoes were laid near the entrance of the channel leading into the harbor, which has a width varying from 175 to 230 yards, with, for about a mile, a direction southeast by east. The first line, with 12 Bustamante mechanical mines, each carrying 100 pounds of gun-cotton, was placed 217 yards within the entrance, at an angle with the axis of the channel,

[1] Nuñez, *Habana, Influencia de las Plazas de Guerra*, 73, 74.

49 yards apart, and at a depth of 12 feet. The second, of 9 Latimer-Clark observation (electric) mines, with 500 pounds of gun-cotton each, was laid from the point of the Morro to the point of the Castello de la Punta, 65 yards apart. These mines were on the bottom, the depth varying from 30 to 40 feet. The third line of 7 Latimer-Clark observation mines led from the Pescante (midway between the Morro and the Castle of Las Cabañas) to the landing-place at the Punta. Two tubes for firing Whitehead torpedoes were mounted on the mole of the Captain of the Port. A powerful search-light was established on the Pescante mole to illuminate the channel, and two heavy hawsers with floats were stretched, nightly, one from the Morro to La Punta, the other from the Pastora battery to a sunken lighter on the opposite side of the channel. Two Nordenfelt one-pounders were also installed at this battery, near which was also the observation station.

Three other search-lights were installed, all the important stations connected by telegraph and telephone systems, and three telemetric stations established.

The following is a full list of the guns in place:

2	30.5	cm. (12-inch) B. L. Krupp (1890).
2	30.5	cm. (12-inch) B. L. Ordoñez (1894).
6	28	cm. (11-inch) B. L. Krupp, 25 calibres long (1876).
2	24	cm. (9.5-inch) B. L. Ordoñez (1894).
6	16	cm. (6.3-inch) B. L. Hontoria (from the *Alfonso XII*).
14	15	cm. (5.9-inch) B. L. Ordoñez (1890 and later).
4	12	cm. (4.7-inch) R. F.
6	12	cm. (4.7-inch) bronze, B. L.
6	9	cm. (3.55-inch) bronze, B. L.
7	57	mm. (2.25-inch) Maxim-Nordenfelt.
6	16	cm. (6.3-inch) old M. L. bronze guns, rifled, of no value.
6	15	cm. (5.9-inch) old M. L. bronze guns, rifled, of no value.
12	21	cm. (8.25-inch) B. L. Ordoñez mortars.
38	21	cm. (8.25-inch) M. L. rifled mortars (iron), of little value.
7	15	cm. (5.9-inch) smooth-bore mortars (iron), of no value.
6	32	cm. (12.8-inch) old bronze smooth-bore mortars, of no value.
19	28	cm. (11-inch) smooth-bore cannon (old), of no value.
4	25	cm. (9.85) Parrott rifles, of no value.
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

The Havana batteries, showing the extreme train of the guns

An analysis of this list shows thirty-two effective guns (including the Krupp of 1876) bearing seaward.

In advance of the ancient castles del Principe and Atares, and from two to six miles distant from the city, the line of defence against inland attack was formed by a number of well-constructed sunken casemate field-works protected by wire entanglements. The lines were further fortified by a number of block-houses for infantry defence.

The foregoing, let it again be said, were the Havana batteries as they were after three months' work during the war. They were very far from this state of completeness in April.

The extent and strength of the works against land attack were almost entirely neutralized by the fact that they were chiefly west of the Marianao railway, which ran parallel to the coast at a distance from it of less than 3½ kilometres (2.2 miles), and thus were subject at moderate range to the fleet's fire from the south-west, the easy slopes offering an incomparable terrain for such practice. The engineers charged with the preparations for defence, both landward and seaward, apparently overlooked the fact that the modern guns afloat could easily fire from four to six miles, and that they had left the south-west unprotected. A reference to the map showing the extreme train of the guns of each battery is necessary to a complete understanding of what follows.

The shore a little west of Brava Point, where was placed Battery No. 3, trends almost directly south-west. A squadron lying less than a mile south-west of Chorrera Bay was but three and a half miles from the Prado, the centre of the city, and at the same time out of the range of fire from anything in the Havana batteries, except from two 5.9-inch guns in Battery No. 5, and perhaps from the four 8-inch howitzers in Battery No. 2; those in No. 3 would have been too close to be effective and in any case their life would in such an attack as that proposed have been very short.

Neither of the powerful 12-inch guns of Battery No. 2 (a mile east of the Morro) could train farther south, at an elevation of 5°, than about West ½ South (to be accurate S. 84° 24′). This train would not have brought them to bear within a line 500

yards from the extreme northerly point at Punta Brava, which the fleet would have had to round. A close hugging of this point, which could have been safely approached even within 150 yards (the seven-fathom line being scarcely anywhere distant from the shore so much as 100 yards) would have kept the ships clear of the train of these guns. If the ships had kept so far even from shore as the 800 yards proposed in the battle order, they would have been exposed but a short time.

Batteries 5, 4, and 3 (naming them from the westward) were practically at sea-level; they would have been enfiladed without the possibility of return fire except from the 5.9-inch of No. 5 just mentioned. Though all had heavy traverses, fragments of bursting shell do not respect initial direction, and the gun emplacements, all of which were otherwise unprotected, would have been untenable.

The Santa Clara battery, the most powerful of all, and whose heavy guns could only train to W. N. W. ¼ W., could, after the others were silenced, have been deliberately pounded for an indefinite period, at a distance of 2,500 yards, without being able to bring its guns to bear on the ships. After Santa Clara there was nothing to hinder anchoring in the deep bight west of the Morro, entirely free of any annoyance from the eastern batteries, in which at this time the four 8-inch howitzers finally in Battery No. 2 were not yet ready, nor even if ready the anchorage was too close for them to be effective, nor would they have attempted to fire into this bight at such close range for fear of the shell dropping upon the Morro or upon the batteries west of the entrance.

That the city would not have surrendered under such circumstances, had demand been made, with the guns of the fleet but a few hundred yards distant pointing up its streets and also directly into the harbor, is scarcely supposable. So complete a destruction, however, would if necessary have been made at leisure after anchoring, of all the western batteries, that Havana would no longer have been a fortified place. The ships in the harbor were a negligible quantity.[1]

[1] These were the following: *Marques de la Ensenada*, a protected cruiser of 1,064 tons, 2,200 H. P., with four 4.7-inch B. L. and five rapid-fire guns; the

It is possible to suppose that any one of several things, which may be mentioned, might have happened. (1) The Spanish commander might have surrendered both the place and the army, on an understanding that he himself would preserve order pending the arrival of an American force. (2) He might have surrendered the city and have withdrawn his troops to the region outside of Havana, though it is difficult to suppose this on account of a foodless and desolated country. (3) The American fleet could have held its position in the bight west of the Morro, or to the south-west of the city, with threat of bombardment if fired upon, to await the despatch of an expeditionary force sufficient to control affairs, and have then demanded a surrender. This, it may be said, is precisely what Admiral Dewey did at Manila.

It would not have been necessary for this last supposed action to have lasted long. Almost the whole of the regular army was concentrated at Tampa and at other near-by points of the south by the end of April, and could have been quickly transported to Havana by the transports now gathering, and by the unarmored vessels of the navy.

The situation, it must be said, in Havana was essentially different from that of Alexandria, which suffered so greatly from "riot and arson" in 1882, when the batteries were bombarded by the British, and the town left for a time unoccupied through apprehension of possible hostile action by the newly departed French fleet against the British force, which in such an event would have needed all its men. The uncontrolled population of Alexandria was violently disaffected, and opposed *en masse* to the British; the property destroyed was the property of the hated foreigner. The property interests of Havana, however, were chiefly Spanish; and besides the Spanish army there

Infanta Isabel (under repairs) and the *Conde de Venadito*, of about 1,190 tons, 1,500 H. P., and similar batteries to that of the *Marques de la Ensenada;* the cruiser *Alfonso XII* (unable to move under her own steam), of 3,900 tons, 4,400 H. P., with six 16.25-inch B. L. and thirteen rapid-fire guns; four torpedo cruisers, the *Filipinas* (useless), the *Nueva España*, *Martin Alonso*, and *Vicente Yañez Pinzón*, of from 750 to 571 tons, with a nominal speed of from 18.6 to 20 knots and with six rapid-fire guns each; the gun-boat *Magallanes*, of 527 tons; the transport *Legazpé*, of 1,249 tons, and the *Flecha*, of 43 tons. (Nuñez, 118.)

were not less than 20,000 Spanish volunteers in the city, mainly property-owners, who would have prevented destruction even had the Spanish regulars been so inclined. It is inconceivable that these men should not have protected their own. The remainder of the Havana population was Cuban, which looked to the American forces as saviours and not as enemies; certainly they would not have attempted to ruin that which they expected soon to be under the Cuban flag. The interests thus both of Spaniard and Cuban lay in the preservation of property, and it is much more reasonable to suppose that the efforts of both would have been toward safeguarding property rather than toward its destruction.

Nor in such matters can the Spanish sentiment of *pundonor* be put aside. Had the city surrendered (and it is difficult to believe that it would not have done so, with its streets and harbor commanded by the American guns at point-blank range), the Spanish character is such that the capitulations would have been loyally carried out. Turbulence among the Spanish troops, the most orderly and least prone to giving trouble, was not, in fact, to be expected. Havana, in the writer's opinion, would have been ours in peaceful possession.

While thinking thus, the writer, turning to the subject as an abstraction, would express the opinion that the mere preservation of property or of such life as might be lost by "riot and arson" in such a case, cannot be weighed against the much greater loss through the continuance of war. It is the long drawing out of hostilities which is the chief cause of the expenditure of treasure and life. For example, any "riot and arson" which could have occurred would surely have been less damaging to both property and life than the destruction from a siege such as the American government had, at first, confidently expected would have to be undertaken.

Thus, the first reason assigned by the navy department for not pushing a successful attack upon the batteries to the extent of causing an immediate surrender, had military considerations demanded it, cannot, in the writer's view, be considered valid. No commander, in his opinion, can allow himself to forego a great and decisive military success such as the capture of Havana

would have been for fear of "riot and arson" within. War is war. Its results are of such stupendous importance that they take on somewhat the character of the convulsions of Nature, which destroys and constructs without reference, so far as we can see, to questions of humanity. Man is doing in this last what he can, but his efforts must ever be of slight effect in face of the overpowering necessity of success. The rules of war allow the bombardment of fortified places even to their destruction. Only seventeen years before were Strasburg and Paris bombarded until they yielded, without reference to the extent of destruction, whether of life or property. If the rules of war allow this, surely a supposititious danger of riot after surrender should not stand in the way of a decisive victory. A humanitarian feeling which goes to the extent of deprecating a severity in war which has a great and assured end is misplaced, and in the end works a greater inhumanity, for the truly humane thing is to do that, at all risks, which will certainly bring an early end to hostilities.

That Cervera would have returned from the Cape Verdes to Spain had the Havana batteries been destroyed on April 23, would, if Spain were not Spain, be taken as a matter of course. It is impossible to the writer to suppose that in such circumstances, Cervera's views and those of his captains, so opposed to crossing the Atlantic, would not then have been accepted, unless the government had determined in any event to sacrifice the squadron to the god which Spain has worshipped so long and so often under a false guise—Honor. If one may venture to endeavor to read the mind of the Spanish ministry, it would appear that Cuba was regarded as lost before the war began, and that there was no real intention of naval effort to save it. The instructions of April 9, 1898, to Cervera declare that the object of his expedition "will be the defence of the island of Puerto Rico. In this operation you will take charge of the naval part, in co-operation with the army."[1] It is thus possible that his transatlantic voyage would have been made whatever might have happened at Havana, the government holding that there must be a sacrifice; where, was immaterial. All that Sampson proposed would, however,

[1] *Infra*, 111.

have been accomplished long before the Spanish squadron could have crossed the Atlantic.

With Havana occupied it would have remained for the American forces to reduce and occupy the other more important and ill-defended ports of Cuba, and also Puerto Rico, if time had allowed, at leisure. The aim declared by Congress would have been quickly accomplished. That Spain would have chosen to continue the war with the bone of contention in American possession, is scarcely supposable, except under the supposition of sacrifice to honor just advanced. The imminent danger of the loss of the Philippines would almost necessarily have overpowered this sentiment and have driven her quickly to make peace. The war would probably have been one of weeks instead of months.

That Sampson, following the discussions which took place regarding the exposure of Havana to gun-fire from the vicinity of Chorrera, would have renewed his proposal to attack, had circumstances detained him in that vicinity, is not to be doubted. Events, after the navy department had decided that Cervera's arrival must be awaited, followed rapidly; the centre of interest so quickly changed that Havana ceased to be, for the time, an objective.

The obstacles attending the despatch of a Spanish squadron to the East, and the uselessness of so doing, were such that the attempt made later was not to be expected by the American authorities. To divert their fighting force from the Atlantic, whatever was happening in the Philippines, was, if there was to be an effort to save Cuba at all, to violate the fundamental principles of strategy. The effort would be to reach a squadron of unarmored ships 15,000 miles from the true battle-ground, and one which could from a military point have no weight in the final determination of the contest. The ownership of islands is determined by general superiority at sea, not by an incidental contest between ships of moderate fighting capacity. The temporary loss by Great Britain of Malta, for example, would not determine the ownership of Malta. The island would finally fall to that one of the contesting powers which

should show a final naval preponderance, Concentration, therefore, was Spain's only hope if there was to be hope at all. Division of forces which was to end in bringing into the great theatre of action a hopelessly inferior squadron was most inconsiderate and ill-advised. Of course, if Cuba was to be yielded, and the principle of *uti possidetis* to be advanced, as in fact it was at the peace, the driving of the American squadron from the Philippines would have saved these islands to Spain. But of this, with the American force in the Pacific, there could with such a squadron as Camara's be no hope. The former had at command an unlimited coal supply; a temporary withdrawal from Manila until re-enforced by the two powerful monitors, *Monterey* and *Monadnock*, both of which were about the same distance from the Philippines as was the Spanish squadron at Suez, and which would have found in the generally smooth waters of Manila Bay the conditions most suitable for their utilization, would have ensured an American superiority of force and the destruction of the weak Spanish force finally started but stopped by the supposed threat against the Spanish coast.[1]

But, as just said, no such move as later made by Spain in sending Admiral Camara's force could have been anticipated unless it had been clear that Spain intended to yield Cuba and Puerto Rico without a struggle for their possession. It is clear that the full bearing of such action was not realized by the Spanish ministry when the strange orders given in the telegram of the minister of war, June 3, to General Blanco, are considered.[2]

The only other Spanish naval force than Cervera's and the few ships in the peninsular ports, was that in the Philippines under Rear-Admiral Montojo, now assembled in Manila Bay. At Hong-Kong, 628 miles north-north-west, was the American

[1] A despatch received by the Spanish government on July 8, 1898, from General Blanco, insisted that the army, although crippled by the loss of Cervera's squadron, was ready and anxious to continue the war, but both the minister of war and Premier Sagasta replied on July 12 that as the Americans were masters of the sea and were preparing to attack the Balearic Islands and the Spanish coast, which would be certain to produce an uprising in the interior, peace was imperative. Eight days later Spain took steps toward peace.

[2] *Infra*, 352.

squadron of five ships under Commodore Dewey, concentrated, as mentioned, at that point since February, 1898. Both squadrons were the usual forces of unarmored ships then maintained in Asiatic waters; the one for the protection of Spanish rule in the Philippines, the other for the general protection of American commercial interests in the Eastern seas. The latter was soon to be re-enforced by the protected cruiser *Baltimore* (which, detached from her service as flag-ship of the squadron in the eastern Pacific, arrived at Hong-Kong April 22) and by the revenue steamer *McCulloch*, though the latter, weakly armed, was not to serve in the coming fight, but was preserved from possible damage to serve as a despatch-boat.

Of the 37 Spanish vessels distributed through the Philippines, there were but six which could give Commodore Dewey any concern, as all the others were lightly armed vessels under 600 tons (except a transport of 1900) and the greater number not exceeding 200; nine were armed launches of about 40 tons. At Manila were the *Maria Cristina*, flag-ship, of 3,520 tons; the *Castilla*, an old wooden ship used as a receiving ship, of 3,260;[1] two protected cruisers, the *Isla de Cuba* and *Isla de Luzon*, of 1,045 tons each; three small cruisers, the *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, *Don Juan de Austria*, and the *Velasco*, between 1,100 and 1,200 tons; and three between 500 and 600. As the tonnage, speed, armament, protection, and coal capacity of all vessels of the Spanish navy, as well as their stations appeared in the Spanish navy list, there was no indefiniteness as to the character of the ships the Americans might meet. The Spanish authorities had equally full knowledge of the American ships.

The Spanish squadron was an element of disquiet both to American commercial interests in Asia and to the people of the Pacific coast. In any case, however, it was a force to be sought and if possible captured or destroyed on the general principle of reducing the enemy's military power as much as possible. Nor can the fact that the American squadron was soon to be without a harbor in which to anchor, be lost sight of. Had it not fought for one in the Philippines it would have had to return

[1] The *Castilla* appears in the Spanish navy list of 1898 among the "Ships in special service" as *Deposito de Marineria en Manila.*

to United States possessions, the nearest convenient base being the Hawaian Islands, soon to be annexed.

There was no crystallized thought of permanent seizure of Manila or the Philippine Islands, though no doubt the possibility of so doing was in the minds of some; the question which governed was the duty of injuring the influence and power of the enemy. As the dominion of Spain over the Philippines was not a part of the question involved, the result of such action could for the moment be only moral, but in this respect and in later political effect, it was to be very great.

Montojo's squadron, despite the apprehensions mentioned, was not of a character to make it possible to carry on offensive operations against the Pacific coast. For such, ships of large steaming radius are a primal necessity. Of these Spain had none capable of military action excepting those of Cervera's squadron. The difficulties of coaling and repairing in the vast stretches of the Pacific were too great to encounter in the face of an active enemy on its own coast, even had Spain been free to send the greater part or all of her naval force. None of Montojo's ships, however, except the flag-ship *Maria Cristina* and the ancient *Castilla*, were, as already mentioned, of over 1,200 tons displacement or able to carry more than 250 tons of coal. That such a force might attempt operations across 7,000 miles of sea is an inadmissible supposition. A raid upon the Pacific coast to be effective is only possible to a great naval power able, apart from its raiding force, to convoy its colliers and occupy and protect a base. In the old sailing days a fleet was to a great degree its own base; its operations, as to time, were limited only by the amount of provisions it could carry, and this amount was very large. The man-of-war now, however, must have a collier within call; the heart of its action is the coal-pit, and the nation that controls the coal will, in the long run, in a military sense, as in the commercial, control the world.

Montojo, in full expectancy of being sought and, if possible, brought to action by Dewey, had a choice of five courses of action:

1. To give battle at sea. This, of course, would have been to court destruction.

2. To seek shelter in Subig Bay under the defences which it was known the Spanish officials were endeavoring to establish there; action which Commodore Dewey expected would be taken.

3. To anchor under the Manila batteries and accept battle there with their aid; the best solution, if he determined to remain in the bay.

4. To take position at Cavite, where were also some defences—which he finally chose to do.

5. To retire to remote parts of the archipelago, leaving the broken-down *Castilla* and the *Ulloa* and *Velasco*, which were under repair at the Cavite arsenal, and the arsenal itself to the mercy of the American squadron. As events turned, the writer is in agreement with Captain Concas (now rear-admiral and who at the moment was in command of the *Maria Teresa*) in thinking this Montojo's wisest course. Had he adopted this, and had he had sufficient foresight to arrange for provisions and coal from Japan or Australia, he would have drawn the American squadron after him in a search which might have been a long one, and although there was almost the certainty of final destruction, this destruction would not have been in Manila Bay, and this fact might have saved the Philippines to Spain.

But says Montojo: "I could not abandon the bay without putting myself in direct opposition to Lieutenant-General Augustin in the matter, taking into account the manifested repugnance of that general on many occasions to the abandonment of the bay by the squadron." Public opinion was openly adverse to the departure of the squadron.

Says Captain Calkins, who was a lieutenant and navigating officer on board the *Olympia:* "Unless the combined batteries of ships and forts were trusted to beat off our attack on Manila, it was a strategic blunder to concentrate there. The capital was bound to be one of our objectives and the fleet another; and we might have been forced to make scattering reconnoissances involving risky tactics, random pilotage, and unprofitable expenditure of time and coal. Nothing but a superior defensive situation could justify the plan adopted and Manila Bay afforded no such advantage."[1]

[1] *Historical and Professional Notes on the Naval Campaign of Manila Bay. Proceedings, U. S. Naval Institute,* June, 1899.

Failing such action as that just mentioned, Montojo's best post was under the guns of Manila, where, though in the main the existing armament was old and worthless, there were four 9.4-inch rifles which in hands more practiced than those of the Spaniards, would have given him effective support.

These defences could, however, have been supplemented by the guns wasted in the attempted defence of the entrances to the bay and of Cavite, which would have added eleven effective breech-loading guns, of which seven were of 5.9-inch to 6.3-inch, and in addition three 7-inch and three 8-inch muzzle-loading Armstrong guns, which would have been good weapons if well used.

Commodore Dewey's information was sufficiently accurate to convince him that Montojo's squadron would be found in or near Manila Bay. His course was clear: to go there in search.

CHAPTER IV

SPANISH VIEWS

In Spain everything was unready and in the air.[1] As early as January, 1898, Rear-Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete,[2] who had been placed in command of Spain's only effective squadron, in anticipation of war, had laid its shortcomings before the minister of marine, his friend and brother officer, Rear-Admiral Bermejo. His correspondence, pathetic in the light of later events, is given with considerable fulness on account of the vivid light which it throws upon the perplexities and unpreparedness of the Spanish government. Taken with the account of the council of war in Madrid on April 23, it has also much psychologic value.

Cervera begins with a forecast of utter disaster. He writes, January 30, 1898, from Cartagena:

Dear Cousin Juan Spottorno: About two years ago I wrote you a letter concerning our condition to go to war with the United States. I requested you to keep this letter in case some day it should be necessary to bring it to light in defence of my memory or myself, when we had experienced the said disappointment by the stupidity

[1] Fortunately for history we have an almost complete record of the hopes, intentions, vacillations, and orders of the Spanish ministry of marine in the two following works:

Collection of Documents Relative to the Squadron of Operations in the West Indies; arranged by Rear-Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete, published at Madrid, September, 1898; translated and published by the Office of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy Department, 1899; and *The Squadron of Admiral Cervera*, by Captain Victor M. Concas y Palau; translated and published by the Office of Naval Intelligence, 1900. Captain Concas was the captain of Cervera's flag-ship and later in the war also chief-of-staff.

[2] In Spain it is usual among the better classes for men to use the surname of both father and mother. A married woman retains her maiden name, placing after it the name of her husband with the prefix *de*, as Ana Gonzalez married to a Velasquez becomes Ana Gonzalez de Velasquez.

of some, the cupidity of others, and the incapability of all, even of those with the best of intentions. To-day we find ourselves again in one of those critical periods which seem to be the beginning of the end, and I write to you again to express my point of view and to explain my action in this matter, and I beg you to put this letter with the other one, so that the two may be my military testament. The relative military positions of Spain and the United States have grown worse for us, because we are reduced, absolutely penniless, and they are very rich, and also because we have increased our naval power only with the *Colón* and the torpedo-boat destroyers, and they have increased theirs much more. What I have said of our industry is sadly confirmed in everything we look at. There is the *Cataluña*, begun more than eight years ago, and her hull is not yet completed. And this when we are spurred on by danger, which does not wake patriotism in anybody, while jingoism finds numerous victims, perhaps myself to-morrow. . . . If the *Carlos V* is not a dead failure, she is not what she should be; everything has been sacrificed to speed, and she lacks power. And remember that the construction is purely Spanish. The company of La Graña has not completed its ships, as I am told, and only these (*Vizcaya*, *Oquendo*, and *Maria Teresa*) are good ships of their class; but, though constructed at Bilbao, it was by Englishmen. Thus, manifestly, even victory would be a sad thing for us. As for the administration and its intricacies, let us not speak of that; its slow procedure is killing us. The *Vizcaya* carries a 5.5-inch breech plug which was declared useless two months ago, and I did not know it until last night, and that because an official inquiry was made. How many cases I might mention! But my purpose is not to accuse, but to explain why we may and must expect a disaster. But as it is necessary to go to the bitter end, and as it would be a crime to say that publicly to-day, I hold my tongue, and go forth resignedly to face the trials which God may be pleased to send me. I am sure that we will do our duty, for the spirit of the navy is excellent; but I pray God that the troubles may be arranged without coming to a conflict, which, in any way, I believe would be disastrous to us. I intrust to you a most interesting correspondence which I had with General Azcárraga, and which I desire and request you to preserve, together with this letter and the former one. In it you will see the opinion of Azcárraga. Without troubling you further, I remain your most affectionate cousin, who entrusts his honor to your hands,

PASCUAL CERVERA.[1]

[1] *Docs.*, 12. A certificate of the authenticity of this document was signed on July 2, 1898, by two gentlemen who "repaired this day to the residence of Juan Spottorno y Biénert at the request of the latter, who exhibited to them this letter," and other documents, which they mention in detail. foretelling disaster. (*Ibid.*, 13.)

A week later Cervera sends the following to the minister of marine:

General Captaincy of the Squadron, Staff.

Honored Sir: Although I am sure that I am telling your excellency nothing new, I think it is not idle in these critical times to make a study of the condition of this fleet, if only to complete statistical statements of condition and power as to those matters which, for reasons I need not here set forth, do not appear in such statements. We must discount the *Alfonso XIII*, which has been under trials for so many years, and which we shall apparently not have the pleasure of counting among our available ships, which are therefore reduced to the three Bilbao battle-ships,[1] the *Colón*, the *Destructor*,[1] and the torpedo-boat destroyers *Furor* and *Terror*. The three Bilbao battle-ships are apparently complete, but you who have had so much to do with them while in command of the squadron, and since then in your present position, know only too well that the 5.5-inch guns, the main power of these vessels, are practically useless on account of the bad system of their breech mechanism and the poor quality of their cartridge cases, of which there are no more than those now on board.

The *Colón*, which, from a military standpoint, is no doubt the best of all our ships, is still without her heavy guns. In this matter I have, at your instructions, communicated with General Guillén, in order to find a possible remedy, if there is one. The *Destructor* may serve as a scout, although her speed is deficient for that kind of service with this fleet. The torpedo-boat destroyers *Furor* and *Terror* are in good condition, but I doubt if they can make effective use of their 2.95-inch guns. As for the supplies necessary for the fleet, we frequently lack even the most indispensable. In this departamento we have not been able to renew the coal supplies, and at both Barcelona and Cadiz we could only obtain half the amount of biscuit we wanted, including the 17,637 pounds which I had ordered to be made here.

We have no charts of the American seas, and although I suppose they have been ordered, we could not move at present. Apart from this deficient state of material, I have the satisfaction of stating that the spirit of the personnel is excellent, and that the country will find it all that it may choose to demand. It is a pity that we do not have better and more abundant material, better resources, and less hindrances to put this personnel in condition fully to carry out its rôle. I will only add the assurance that whatever may be the contingencies of the future these forces will do their full duty.

Yours, etc., Pascual Cervera.

Cartagena, *February* 6, 1898.

[1] *Maria Teresa, Almirante Oquendo, and Vizcaya.*

There follows in quick succession a series of plain statements showing an almost inconceivable poverty of resources in warlike material and delay in preparation.

On February 12, 1898, Cervera writes to the minister that the *Oquendo* will leave Cadiz for the Canaries that afternoon. He returns to the subject of possible war and asks:

1. The distribution and movement of the United States ships.
2. Where are their bases of supplies?
3. Charts, plans, and routes of what may become the scene of operations.
4. What will be the objective of the operations of this squadron—the defence of the Peninsula and Balearic Islands, that of the Canaries or Cuba, or, finally, could their objective be the coasts of the United States, which would seem possible only if we had some powerful ally?
5. What plans of campaign does the Government have in either event? I should like also to know the points where the squadron will find some resources and the nature of these; for, strange to say, here, for instance, we have not even found 4-inch rope, nor boiler tubes, nor other things equally simple. It would also be well for me to know when the *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, *Vitoria*, and *Numancia* may be expected to be ready, and whether they will be incorporated with the squadron or form an independent division, and in that event what will be its connection with ours? If I had information on these matters I could go ahead and study and see what is best to be done, and if the critical day should arrive we could enter without vacillations upon the course we are to follow. This is the more needful for us, as their squadron is three or four times as strong as ours, and besides they count on the alliance of the insurgents in Cuba, which will put them in possession of the splendid Cuban harbors, with the exception of Havana and one or two others, perhaps. The best thing would be to avoid the war at any price; but, on the other hand, it is necessary to put an end to the present situation, because this nervous strain cannot be borne much longer.

On February 15, 1898, the minister answers Cervera, mentioning the acceptance of the resignation of Señor Dupuy de Lome (minister to the United States), and the rejection of the *Colón's* heavy guns. He announces that the *Carlos V* and *Pelayo* (which are not to be ready for a number of months) are to join the squadron. He then proceeds to give the following extraordinary views, than which none could be more inaccurate and futile:

As to the war with the United States, I will tell you my ideas about it. A division composed of the *Numancia, Vitoria, Alfonso XIII* (or *Lepanto*), the destroyers *Audaz, Osado,* and *Proserpina,* and three torpedo-boats would remain in Spain in the vicinity of Cadiz. In Cuba the *Carlos V, Pelayo, Colón, Vizcaya, Oquendo, Maria Teresa,* three destroyers, and three torpedo-boats, in conjunction with the eight larger vessels of the Havana Navy-Yard, would take up a position to cover the channels between the Gulf of Mexico and the Atlantic and try to destroy Key West, where the United States squadron has established its principal base of provisions, ammunition, and coal.

If we succeed in this, and the season is favorable, the blockade could be extended to the Atlantic coast, so as to cut off communications and commerce with Europe—all this subject to the contingencies which may arise from your becoming engaged in battles in which it will be decided who is to hold empire of the sea. For your guidance in these matters, you are acquainted with the preliminary plans of the staff of this ministry, which I placed at your disposal, including the attack upon Key West. I will advise you as to the location of the United States ships and other data for which you ask.

I will also inform you that twelve or fifteen steamers will be equipped as auxiliaries to our fleet, independent of privateering, and in confidence I will tell you that if any ship of real power can be found, either cruiser or battle-ship, we shall buy it, provided it can be ready by April. My life is getting to be a burden, for to all that is already weighing upon me under the circumstances are now added the elections and candidates for representatives.

I believe, my dear admiral, that all the energy and all the good will of those who are wearing uniforms can do but very little toward preparing for the events which may happen.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

The much wiser and better-informed Cervera replies to this the next day (February 16, 1898):

CARTAGENA, *February* 16, 1898.

His Excellency SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: . . . To the grave Dupuy de Lome affair is added the news of the explosion of the *Maine,* which has just been reported to me, and I am constantly thinking of the *Vizcaya,* which should have arrived in New York to-day. God grant that no attempt is made against her. . . .

It seems to me that there is a mistake in the calculation of the forces we may count upon in the sad event of a war with the United

States. In the *Cadiz* division I believe the *Numancia* will be lacking. I do not think we can count on the *Lepanto*. Of the *Carlos V* and the *Pelayo* I have already spoken [as not being ready]. The *Colón* has not yet received her artillery, and if war comes she will be caught without her heavy guns.

The eight principal vessels of the Havana station, to which you refer, have no military value whatever, and, besides, are badly worn out; therefore they can be of very little use. In saying this I am not moved by a fault-finding spirit, but only by a desire to avoid illusions that may cost us very dear. Taking things as they are, however sad it may be, it is seen that our naval force when compared with that of the United States is approximately in the proportion of 1 to 3. It therefore seems to me a dream, almost a feverish fancy, to think that with this force, attenuated by our long wars, we can establish the blockade of any port of the United States. A campaign against that country will have to be, at least for the present, a defensive or a disastrous one, unless we have some alliances, in which case the tables may be turned.

As for the offensive, all we could do would be to make some raids with our fast vessels, in order to do them as much harm as possible. It is frightful to think of the results of a naval battle, even if it should be a successful one for us, for how and where would we repair our damages? I, however, will not refuse to do what may be judged necessary, but I think it proper to analyze the situation such as it is, without cherishing illusions which may bring about terrible disappointments.

I will leave this painful subject and wait until to-morrow.

The 17th.—Nothing has happened since yesterday and I will trouble you no further. The explosion of the *Maine* seems to have occurred under circumstances which leave no doubts of its being due to the vessel herself; nevertheless, I fear this may cause new complications and a painful position for the *Vizcaya*, which God forbid.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

Cervera is informed by the minister (February 23, 1898):

. . . You will receive a less number of torpedoes than you asked for, because I have to bear in mind Cabrera Island and the Philippines. In reply to your questions relative to studies on the war with the United States, I have sent you information on the location of their ships in commission, bases of supplies, coaling stations, etc. They really only have Key West; the others are at San Luis (Atlantic) [!] and at their navy-yards on the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico. Their ships, as far as the draft is concerned, are calculated for banks

extending a long distance into the sea, as at New Orleans, for instance. . . .

As I have told you before, my idea, though perhaps somewhat optimistic, is to establish two centres of resistance, one in Cuba, the other in the peninsula; and by the end of April our position will probably have changed. We shall have to be very careful, and if possible avoid until then any conflict with the United States; but we have to reckon with the excitable nature of our nation and the evil of a press which it is impossible to control. . . .

I will close this letter and see what I can do toward procuring funds for getting those ships ready—in this poor country which has to send 16,000,000 pesos to Cuba every month.

Yours, etc., SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

I am also looking after provisions, coal, and extra guns.

Cervera's next letter is a careful and thoughtful comparison of Spanish and American forces on the sea. Using certain factors he finds:

The offensive power of the artillery of the United States vessels will be represented by 132,397, and that of ours by 50,622, or a little less than two-fifths of the enemy's. To arrive at this appalling conclusion I have already said that it has been necessary to count the *Pelayo* and *Carlos V*, which probably will not be ready in time; the *Lepanto*, which surely will not be ready, and the *Alfonso XII*, whose speed renders her of a very doubtful utility.

Now, to carry out any serious operations in a maritime war, the first thing necessary is to secure control of the sea, which can only be done by defeating the enemy's fleet, or rendering them powerless by blockading them in their military ports. Can we do this with the United States? It is evident to me that we cannot. And even if God should grant us a great victory, against what may be reasonably expected, where and how would we repair the damages sustained? Undoubtedly the port would be Havana, but with what resources? I am not aware of the resources existing there, but judging by this departamento, where there is absolutely nothing of all that we may need, it is to be assumed that the same condition exists everywhere, and that the immediate consequences of the first great naval battle would be the enforced inaction of the greater part of our fleet for the rest of the campaign, whatever might be the result of that great combat. In the meantime the enemy would repair its damages inside of its fine rivers, aided by its powerful industries and enormous resources.

This lack of industries and stores on our part renders it impossible to carry on an offensive campaign, which has been the subject of the two reports which his excellency the chief of staff has been kind enough

to send me. These two reports constitute, in my judgment, a very thorough study of the operations considered, but the principal foundation is lacking, namely, the control of the sea, a prime necessity to their undertaking. For this reason they do not seem practicable to me, at any rate not unless we may count upon alliances which will make our naval forces at least equal to those of the United States, to attempt by a decisive blow the attainment of such control.

If the control of the sea remains in the hands of our adversaries, they will immediately make themselves masters of any unfortified ports which they may want in the island of Cuba, counting, as they do, on the insurgents, and will use it as a base for their operations against us. The transportation of troops to Cuba would be most difficult, and the success very doubtful, and the insurrection, without the check of our army, which would gradually give way, and with the aid of the Americans, would rapidly increase and become formidable.

These reflections are very sad; but I believe it to be my unavoidable duty to set aside all personal considerations and loyally to represent to my country the resources which I believe to exist, so that, without illusions, it may weigh the considerations for and against, and then, through the government of his Majesty, which is the country's legitimate organ, it may pronounce its decision. I am sure that this decision will find in all of us energetic, loyal, and decided executors, for we have but one motto: "The fulfilment of duty."

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

CARTAGENA, *February* 25, 1898.

Answering (February 25, 1898) a letter from the minister of February 23, Cervera expressed his pleasure in the view held by Bermejo that relations with the United States have not changed, "for I believe a rupture would mean a terrible catastrophe for poor Spain, who has done all she can and is by no means ready for such a blow, which would surely be fatal." Eulate's conduct in the *Vizcaya* at New York "has afforded me much pleasure and I have written to him at Havana congratulating him. Sobral [1] is disgusting. I can hardly believe he could have been guilty of such indiscretion; I should rather believe that our numerous crafty enemies have invented all that." He ends:

I believe you are really optimistic in your views about a rupture with the United States. You think that if we can hold off until April

[1] The Spanish naval attaché in Washington, who indiscreetly criticised the discipline, etc., of the American navy.

our relative positions will be considerably changed. I believe that this is an illusion, for, from what I know, it is my opinion that the *Pelayo* and *Carlos V* will not be ready by that time, and at the rate we are now progressing it is very doubtful whether the *Colón* will be. Nor will the *Lepanto* be ready, and the *Alfonso XIII* will never be anything more than she is now. The *Vitoria* may perhaps be ready for service, but the *Numancia* will not be. The *Colón* can go out for target practice whenever it may be desirable.

February 26 he writes respecting the impossibility of recharging the cartridge cases of the *Colón*, ending:

Do we not owe to our country not only our life, if necessary, but the exposition of our beliefs? I am very uneasy about this. I ask myself if it is right for me to keep silent, and thereby make myself an accomplice in adventures which will surely cause the total ruin of Spain. And for what purpose? To defend an island which was ours, but belongs to us no more, because even if we should not lose it by right in the war we have lost it in fact, and with it all our wealth and an enormous number of young men, victims of the climate and bullets, in the defence of what is now no more than a romantic ideal. Furthermore, I believe that this opinion of mine should be known by the queen and by the whole council of ministers.

Admiral Bermejo, in a short note (February 28), desired to wait before answering until he should have somewhat recovered from the painful impression received from Cervera's last letters. "As to the cartridge cases of the *Colón*, I am trying to find the means I lack for solving the question you suggest."

March 4, 1898, the minister replies to Cervera's estimate of forces. As giving in detail the views of himself and the government, this letter needs to be quoted in full:

[Private and confidential.]

THE MINISTER OF MARINE,
MADRID, *March* 4, 1898.

HIS EXCELLENCY PASCUAL CERVERA.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: I notified you that, when I should have recovered somewhat from the painful impression caused by the reading of your confidential letter, I should answer it, and I now do so, and will first take up the comparative study of the United States naval forces and ours, which, taken absolutely as you have done,

omitting some of our vessels at Havana, which are available for a conflict with the United States, show a difference of tonnage, but not so excessive as would appear from your lines.

In my opinion, the matter should be studied from the standpoint of the present distribution of the United States forces, remembering that it will be to their interest to maintain the ships now in the Pacific for the protection of San Francisco and the San Diego[1] arsenal, as also their costly trans-Pacific liners plying between the former city and Australia and China, and also to protect the Hawaiian Islands, about to be annexed to the United States, for which reason naval forces are being maintained there.

With your good judgment you will understand that the long and difficult voyage which these forces, among them the *Oregon*, would have to make in order to join the Atlantic forces, leaving the Pacific region unprotected, could not be effected without the knowledge of others, and so far all such knowledge is absolutely lacking.[2] I must therefore refer you to the enclosed statement. While it shows deficiencies, which the government is endeavoring to remedy at any cost by the acquisition of new elements, if only in the matter of speed, they do not exist to such an extent as stated in comparison with the United States Atlantic Squadron. There is no doubt that, in order to concentrate our nucleus of forces, we shall require some time—the whole month of April, in my estimation.

Since I have been in charge of this department his Majesty's government has known the situation of the great nucleus of our naval forces, which are being remodelled or repaired abroad, and in conformity with such knowledge the government has endeavored, and is endeavoring by every possible means, with a view also to the general interests of the country, to pursue in its relations with the United States a policy of perfect friendship, although at times points have come up which were not easy of solution.

But with your good judgment you will understand, and I want therefore to remove some misapprehensions regarding the island of Cuba. Our flag is still flying there, and the government, to meet the sentiments of the people, even at the cost of many sacrifices, desires that this Spanish colony should not be separated from our territory, and is trying by every possible means—political, international, and military—to solve satisfactorily the Cuban problem. That is the prevailing opinion of the country, and it conforms its actions thereto. As already stated, the government is acquainted with our situation,

[1] There is no navy yard at San Diego. There could have been none but the vaguest idea in the mind of Admiral Bermejo of a threat against the Pacific coast; it was wholly in his imagination.

[2] The *Oregon* left Bremerton Navy Yard, state of Washington, for San Francisco and the Atlantic three days later.

and for that reason is endeavoring to collect all possible resources at Havana harbor, fortifying it so that it may serve as a base for our naval forces, equipping it with a dock, already in operation, where our ships will be able to repair slight damages, for it is my opinion that it will not be possible, either on our side or the enemy's, to repair those injuries which may be caused by the action of a battle in the short period of time in which international military campaigns are enacted, compared with the material interests they affect.

The other harbors of the island, such as Cienfuegos, Santiago de Cuba, etc., are prepared to be closed by means of torpedoes. In your estimate you do not count for anything the effect of homogeneous troops, well trained and disciplined, as against the United States crews of mercenaries [*mercenarias*], and you might find historical facts, evoking sad memories for us, to confirm what I say. I will close, never doubting for one moment that you and all of us will fulfil the sacred duty which our country imposes upon us, and in giving you my opinions in answer to yours there is nothing that I desire more than peace.

Yours, etc.,

SEGISMUNDO BERMEJO.

He appended a comparison of the available ships, showing an American tonnage of 66,537 against 63,018 Spanish, having included in the latter the *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, the *Alfonso XIII*, the *Alfonso XII*, and the *Reina Mercedes*. The two last had long been practically immovable, facts which must have been known to the ministry of marine.

Cervera in reply, March 9, 1898, still endeavors to disabuse the mind of the minister of his optimistic views. He had visited the *Vitoria*, on which he had counted, and had found himself mistaken. He continues, seeing nothing but disaster even with victory:

The enemy would not declare himself defeated, and it would be foolish for us to pretend to overcome the United States in wealth and production. The latter would recover easily, while we would die of exhaustion, although victorious, and the ultimate result would always be a disaster.

Only in case we could count on some powerful ally could we aspire to obtain a satisfactory result. But, besides having to discount the high price to be paid for such an alliance, even then we would only be postponing the present conflict for a few years, when it would become graver than it is to-day, as is the present insurrection in com-

parison with the last. Even admitting the possibility of retaining Cuba, this island would cost us enormous sacrifices by the necessity of being constantly armed to the teeth. And here the problem, already pointed out by somebody, arises, Is the island worth the ruin of Spain? (Silvela, in Burgos.)

I do not speak on the subject of privateering, because it seems to me that no man acquainted with history can attach any value to privateering enterprises, which nowadays are almost impossible on account of the character of modern vessels. Although I do not attach much importance to certain details which can have but little influence on the general events, I shall nevertheless speak of some upon which you touch, in order to set forth my point of view in answering your letter. The accompanying statement, which appears to me to be more correct than the one enclosed with your letter, shows that our forces in the Atlantic are, approximately, one-half of those of the United States, both as regards tonnage and artillery power. . . .

I have never thought of the forces which the United States have in the Pacific and Asia in connection with the development of events in the West Indies; but I have always considered these forces a great danger for the Philippines, which have not even a shadow of a resistance to oppose them. And as regards the American coasts of the Pacific, the United States has no anxiety about them. I think you are mistaken in believing that during the month of April our situation will change. As I have said above, I am sure that neither the *Carlos V*, the *Pelayo*, the *Vitoria*, nor the *Numancia* will be ready, and nobody knows how we will be as regards 5.5-inch ammunition.

It seems sure that by the end of April the 10-inch guns of the *Colón* will not be mounted. Even if I were mistaken, then our available forces in the West Indies would be 49 per cent of those of the Americans in tonnage and 47 per cent in artillery. Our only superiority would be in torpedo-boats and destroyers provided all of them arrive there in good order. I do not know exactly what are the sentiments of the people concerning Cuba, but I am inclined to believe that the immense majority of Spaniards wish for peace above all things. But those who so think are the ones who suffer and weep inside of their own houses, and do not talk so loud as the minority, who profit by the continuation of this state of affairs. However, this is a subject which is not for me to analyze.

Our want of means is such that some days ago three men went overboard while manning the rail for saluting, through the breaking of an old ridge rope. A new line had been asked for fifty days ago, but it has not yet been replaced. More than one official letter has been written on this interesting subject. In times past, forty-three days after the *Hernán Cortés* was laid down, the vessel was at sea. It is now fifty-one days since I requested the changing of certain tubes in the

boilers of a steam launch of the *Teresa*, and I do not yet know when it will be finished. This will probably be the proportion between us and the United States in the repair of damages, in spite of our having the Havana dock, which is the principal thing, but not all.

As for the crews, I do not know them, but I may say that the crews that defeated our predecessors at Trafalgar had been recruited in the same way. I beg that you will not consider this an argument against yours, for that would be accusing me of great presumption in speaking of what I do not know. It is simply a thought that occurs to me. These are my loyal opinions, and for the sake of the nation I express them to you with the request that you will transmit them to the government. If you should deem it advisable for me to express them personally, I am ready to do so at the first intimation. After I have done this, thus relieving my conscience of a heavy weight, I am quite ready to fulfil the comparatively easy duty of conducting our forces wherever I may be ordered, being sure that all of them will do their duty.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

He enclosed a fairly accurate comparative list of the forces, showing Spain's hopeless inferiority.

The minister replies March 13, that he has informed the government of the deficiencies and "I repeat to you what I have said before, namely, that the government will act prudently in order to maintain friendly relations with the United States, and try by every means to ward off any conflict, since the opinion as to our unfavorable situation is unanimous." Ansaldo,[1] he states, telegraphs that two new 9.84-inch guns for the *Colón* will be furnished this month (March) from Spezia, and that he has applied to the Italian navy for 5.9-inch and 4.7-inch cartridge cases. The *Carlos V*, he is told, will be ready by the middle of April. He is endeavoring to purchase cruisers, torpedo-boats, and steamers of 1,000 tons and 20 knots to serve as despatch-boats; the squadron is kept at Cartagena, as it has not been decided what course it is to follow; the *Colón*, if her armament can be completed, must go to Genoa; arrangements have been made to send the testing and recharging machinery to Cartagena. "I will close now. I leave to you how arduous my work is. To-

[1] The builder of the *Colón*.

day, Sunday, which the Lord set aside as a sacred day of rest, I commenced work at 8 o'clock in the morning and close it at 9 o'clock at night with these lines."

March 19, Cervera writes:

In the way of 5.5-inch ammunition we carry seventy-eight rounds per gun, but of these only thirty cartridges have been pronounced serviceable by Guillén. I saw Pedro Aguirre yesterday and asked him concerning the ships at Havana. He says there is but one ship ready, namely, the *Venadito*. I had him repeat this statement several times. He also told me that the dock did not work. If the defects cannot be remedied we will have to do something about the *Vizcaya*, as she has not had her bottom cleaned for eight months.

On March 21 the minister suggests that the *Colón* may accompany the torpedo-boat flotilla to Puerto Rico, but says: "As this ship cannot enter there, she would have to go to St. Thomas for coal and return to Spain to complete her armament." In view of the later orders given Cervera, this statement of inability to enter a Puerto Rican port (though an error) is very extraordinary.

On March 27 Cervera gives the total number of projectiles available as 1905 (but about a fifth of the number used by Sampson's squadron July 3), and on April 2 writes from Cadiz, where the squadron had gone:

My fears are realized, for the conflict is approaching at a rapid rate, and the *Colón* does not have her heavy guns; the *Carlos V* has not been delivered, and her 3.94-inch armament is not mounted; on the *Pelayo* the redoubt is not completed, and I believe she lacks her secondary battery; the *Vitoria* is without her armament, and of the *Numancia* we had better not speak.

He telegraphs April 4:

I believe it very dangerous for torpedo-boat flotilla to continue voyage. As I have no instructions, deem it expedient to go to Madrid to receive them and form plan of campaign. The Canaries trouble me; they are in dangerous situation. If during my absence it should be necessary for squadron to go out, it could do so under second in command.

To this he received the same day from the minister of marine an extraordinary reply, by telegram and letter, both of the same tenor; the latter is given:

My Dear Admiral and Friend: I am in receipt of your telegram and letter. In these moments of an international crisis, while diplomacy is exerting its influence and while a truce is being discussed, and even the situation of the respective naval forces, nothing can be formulated or decided. Next time I shall write you more fully.

Cervera answered these on April 6, in a letter not only such as any officer of the navy might and should have written, but such as the simplest common-sense, whether found in naval officer or civilian, should have dictated:

His Excellency Segismundo Bermejo.

My Dear Admiral and Friend: In last night's mail I received your letter of the 4th, having previously received your telegram concerning the same matter. It is precisely on account of the general anxiety prevailing that it is very important to think of what is to be done, so that, if the case arises, we may act rapidly and with some chance of efficiency and not be groping about in the dark, or, like Don Quixote, go out to fight windmills and come back with broken heads. If our naval forces were superior to those of the United States the question would be an easy one; all we would have to do would be to bar their way.

But as our forces, on the contrary, are very inferior to theirs, it would be the greatest of follies to attempt to bar their way, which could only be done by giving them a decisive naval battle. That would simply mean a sure defeat, which would leave us at the mercy of the enemy, who could easily take a good position in the Canaries, and by establishing there a base of operations, crush our commerce and safely bombard our maritime cities. It is therefore absolutely necessary to decide what we are going to do, and, without disclosing our proposed movements, be in a position to act when the time comes.

This was the substance of my telegram, and my ideas have not changed since then. If we are caught without a plan of war, there will be vacillations and doubts, and after defeat there may be some humiliation and shame. You will understand these frank and loyal statements of an old friend and comrade, who desires nothing more than to help the government and act with circumspection.

Events now followed rapidly. On April 7 the governor-general at Havana telegraphed to Señor Girón, the minister of the colonies:

Public opinion remains dignified and quiet, though somewhat excited by reports of impending war. Some dissatisfaction expressed over lack of ships in island. Those now here not in condition to render service. Detention of flotilla at Cape Verdes leaves our coasts unprotected. You know international situation better than I under present circumstances, and will realize expediency of sending ships.

This telegram appears to have clinched the question of destination and on the same day the minister of marine telegraphed Cervera:

Squadron must go out to-morrow. Proceed to St. Vincent, Cape Verde. Immediately upon arrival take coal and water. Communicate with semaphore Canaries to notify you of anything new. Instructions, which will be amplified, are in substance to protect torpedo-boat flotilla, which is placed under your orders, *Amazonas*[1] and *San Francisco* being in Europe. These are the only American ships there at present.

Cervera at once replied, under the same date, reiterating his appeal for a plan of campaign:

These battle-ships are ready for any duty. Beg that you will permit me to insist on having general plan of campaign to obviate fatal vacillations. No doubt government has formed its plan; I must know it without fail if I am to co-operate with it intelligently.

And in a second telegram, sent the same day, stated his intention of leaving on the morrow for the Cape Verdes, adding:

Not knowing plan of government, and not having been told what to do next, I shall await instructions, protecting the Canaries.

The minister's response, also of the same day, was a simple evasion:

Hurry of departure prevents for the moment making you acquainted with plan you ask for, but you will receive it in detail a few days after arrival at Cape Verde, as steamer loaded with coal is following in your wake.

On the 8th Cervera informed the Spanish admiralty that he would await instructions at the Cape Verdes, and at 5 P. M. he left Cadiz with the *Maria Teresa* and the *Colón*.

[1] *New Orleans.*

Before leaving Cadiz, however, he sent another note of warning. He writes on April 8:

I regret very much to have to sail without having agreed upon some plan, even on general lines, for which purpose I repeatedly requested permission to go to Madrid. From the bulk of the telegrams received I think I see that the government persists in the idea of sending the flotilla to Cuba. That seems to me a very risky adventure, which may cost us very dear, for the loss of our flotilla and the defeat of our squadron in the Caribbean Sea may entail a great danger for the Canaries and perhaps the bombardment of our coast cities. I do not mention the fate of the island of Cuba, because I have anticipated it long ago.

I believe a naval defeat would only precipitate its ultimate loss, while if left to defend itself with its present means perhaps it would give the Americans some annoyance. We must not deceive ourselves concerning the strength of our fleet. If you will look over our correspondence of the last two months you will see, not that I have been a prophet, but that I have fallen short of the true mark. Let us not have any illusions as to what we can do, which will be in proportion to the means available.

While sending this, the following letter from Bermejo was on its way to Cervera by the collier *San Francisco,* but was not received until he arrived at the Cape Verdes. As will be seen, the two matters which rested most heavily on the minds of the ministry were the defence of the Canaries and of the island of Puerto Rico, which latter throughout was regarded as the objective of the Spanish squadron should it cross the Atlantic.

MADRID, *April* 7, 1898.

MY DEAR ADMIRAL AND FRIEND: We are in the midst of a serious international crisis. While I have not yet lost all hope of a peaceable solution, it being the wish of the government to avoid war at any cost, we have now reached the utmost limits of concessions by using the influence of foreign powers; but the president of the United States is surrounded by the waves which he himself has raised and which he is now trying to appease. It devolves upon you as the admiral of the squadron, and owing to the prestige which you are enjoying in the navy—or God himself has singled you out for that purpose—to carry out the plans which will be formulated and entrusted to your intelligence and valor.

I believe that I have done all that you asked me to do, as far as it was in my power; if I have not done more it is because I have not had

the necessary means at my disposal. In this, as in everything else, my conscience is entirely clear. In the instructions which you will receive a general idea is outlined, which you will work out with your captains. I will close, begging that you will express my regards to the personnel under your orders and confirming the confidence which his Majesty and the government place in your high ability.

The following were the instructions enclosed:

Honored Sir: Although up to date the friendly relations existing between Spain and the United States of North America have not changed, yet, in anticipation of possible complications, and in view of the probable presence in European waters of the United States cruisers *San Francisco* and *Amazonas*, it becomes necessary to protect the first torpedo-boat division, which has recently reached the Cape Verde Islands, whether it be deemed expedient for such division to proceed to the West Indies, or whether it be necessary for it to return to the Canaries.

Immediately upon receipt of this order you will therefore proceed with the flag-ship and the *Cristóbal Colón* to St. Vincent, Cape Verde, where the division referred to is to join your fleet and remain for the present under your orders, together with the transatlantic steamer *Ciudad de Cadiz*, which accompanies it. At St. Vincent you will await instructions, which will be forwarded in good season, and if the exigencies of the service should make it advisable for the squadron and torpedo-boat division to proceed to Puerto Rico you will do so, bearing in mind that if prior to your departure the situation should have become aggravated the battle-ships *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* will join you at Cape Verde or meet you at 18° 30′ north latitude and 53° 30′ west longitude. This point has been determined from the general Spanish chart of the Atlantic Ocean, and you will stand for that point for the purpose indicated.

The protection given the torpedo-boats by you will place the division in much better condition from a military standpoint, as each battle-ship, as well as the transatlantic steamer, can take charge of two of the torpedo-boats for the purpose of provisioning them and lending them such other aid as may be necessary during the voyage, which under these circumstances can be made in less time and with greater safety. As far as the contingencies feared make it possible to determine the objective of the expedition, it will be the defence of the island of Puerto Rico. In this operation you will take charge of the naval part, in co-operation with the army, with the concurrence of the governor-general of the island, without forgetting, however, that the plan rests with you alone, in view of your incontestable ability, in your capacity as admiral, to measure the forces of our probable enemy, estimate the

significance of their movements, as well as the best purposes to which the ships under your command can be put.

If the case in question should arise, you will deploy the squadron so that the different tactical units composing it will sustain each other, supported by the destroyers and torpedo-boats, and not present a compact mass to the enemy, unless the hostile forces should be equal or inferior, in which case it will be expedient for you to take the offensive. It is on these bases that your plan must rest, considering as the principal factor the speed of our ships, which, as a general rule, is superior to that of the enemy's ships, and taking into account that the hostile forces which, if the case should arise, will operate in Puerto Rico will probably not exceed 7 ships, including 3 auxiliary vessels.

As it may become necessary to give you further orders during your voyage from Cadiz to the Cape Verde Islands, you will pass within sight of the semaphore of the Canaries (Punta Anaga). As to the provisioning of your ships at St. Vincent, the necessary instructions have been given to the commander of the torpedo-boat division; and in Puerto Rico, in case it should be necessary to go there, you will find every kind of supplies, including ammunition.

In everything compatible with these instructions you will observe the orders transmitted to the commander of the torpedo-boat division, as far as relates thereto. The foregoing is communicated to you by royal order, and at the same time I beg to tell you that, in view of the grave circumstances through which the nation is passing at present, the government of his Majesty places full confidence in your excellency's zeal, skill, and patriotism, and in the incontestable valor of all who are subject to and will obey your efficient orders.

Cervera arrived at Porto Grande, the principal port of the Cape Verde Islands, at 10 A. M., April 14, having communicated with the semaphore at Teneriffe on the morning of the 11th. He had made the run at a 12-knot speed, excepting at the end, when he reduced to 11 to make port at daylight; he reported the coal consumption of the *Colón* during the passage as "enormous," and that of the *Teresa* as "quite large." During the voyage of 1,570 miles the *Colón* had used about 500 tons, the *Teresa* about 400.[1] The *Colón* had but 550 and the *Teresa* 570 tons

[1] Cervera in his report of April 15 gives the *Colón's* expenditure at 12 knots as 3.74 pounds per horse-power per hour; the *Teresa's* at the same speed as 2.55. The result showed in the *Colón* bad and inexperienced firing. The chief engineer was unwilling to carry above 115 pounds steam pressure on account of leaks, which also showed a bad condition of boilers and connections.

left. He asked for 1,000 tons of coal. While writing the report, April 15, from which the foregoing is taken, he received the following telegrams of April 14 and 15 from the ministry of marine:

Serious news. Transatlantic *San Francisco* leaves for Cape Verdes with instructions and 2,000 tons of coal. But begin coaling anyhow from the coal ordered to be purchased by commander of flotilla. *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* under way since 9th to join you.

Situation continues to be grave. Violent and humiliating speeches against our country in United States Congress. Great powers appear desirous of peace. Confidential information received from Washington that flying squadron, composed of *New York*, *Texas*, *Columbia*, *Minneapolis*, and *Massachusetts*, put to sea the 13th to prevent our battle-ships from joining you. Doubt this to be true, war not having been declared, but you should nevertheless be warned. Provide yourself with everything necessary, and upon arrival of battle-ships refit them immediately.

Even in this there was the same incorrectness as in almost everything else which concerned the administration. Cervera, in his report just quoted, mentioned that the captain of the transport *Ciudad de Cadiz* had received a telegram at 5.05 P. M. of the 15th, dated the day before, stating that the *San Francisco* had sailed from Las Palmas with 1,000 tons (not 2,000 as stated by the minister). Fifty-four shillings were asked for coal at Porto Grande. The admiral wrote: "As it is much needed I have ordered it to be bought."[1]

The report regarding the flying squadron brought the following telegram from Cervera, sent April 16:

Nothing new. Owing to last report of your cipher telegram concerning flying squadron, the torpedo-boat flotilla is fitting for battle, lightening the coal which hampers it.

[1] Says Captain Concas: "The United States consul had bought all the available coal at the Cape Verdes, and only after a thousand difficulties and by paying twice the regular price did we succeed in obtaining seven hundred tons, which was sold us upon orders from England, probably in the firm belief that the ten vessels we had there, counting both large and small ones, would not be able to do anything with that quantity . . . even with the coal bought by the *San Francisco* and *Cadiz*, there was not enough to refill the bunkers." (Concas, 24, Navy Department translation.)

The next day the weather was so heavy that the coal purchased could not be taken and on the 18th the collier *San Francisco* arrived, followed on the 19th, at 11 A. M., by the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo*, which had taken ten days in making the voyage of 2,350 miles from Puerto Rico. The former at once began to coal, working all night; the *Oquendo*, which arrived with but 200 tons remaining, began to coal the next morning.

A letter of April 19, from Cervera to the minister of marine, gives a depressing insight into the troubles with which the admiral was burdened:

The boilers of the *Ariete* are practically unserviceable, so that this vessel, instead of being an element of power, is the nightmare of the fleet. She could only be used for local defence. The boiler of the *Azor* is eleven years old and is of the locomotive type, and that tells the whole story. As for the destroyers *Furor* and *Terror*, their bow plates give as soon as they are in a sea-way, and some of their frames have been broken. Villaamil has had this remedied as far as he has been able. The *Plutón* had an accident of this kind when coming from England, and had her bows strengthened at Ferrol.

I do not know whether the port of San Juan de Puerto Rico affords good protection for the fleet. If it does not, and if the port of Mayaguez cannot be effectively closed, the fleet would be in a most unfavorable position. However, before forming a judgment, I shall await the arrival of the *Vizcaya*, whose captain, Eulate, is thoroughly acquainted with Puerto Rico. I am constantly preoccupied about the Canaries.

It will be necessary to close and fortify the port of Graciosa Island, as well as the small island commanding the port of La Luz in Grand Canary. From your instructions it seems that the idea of sending the fleet to Cuba has been abandoned, I believe very wisely. Concerning Puerto Rico, I have often wondered whether it would be wise to accumulate there all our forces, and I do not think so. If Puerto Rico is loyal, it will not be such an easy task for the Yankees; and if it is not loyal, it will inevitably follow the fate of Cuba, at least as far as we are concerned.

On the other hand, I am very much afraid for the Philippines, and, as I have already said, for the Canaries; and above all I fear the possibility of a bombardment of our coast, which is not unlikely, considering the audacity of the Yankees, and counting, as they do, with four or five vessels of higher speed than our own.

For all these reasons, I am doubtful as to what it would be best for me to do, and I will not make any decision without your opinion and

that of the council of captains, as indicated in your letter. I leave this letter open until to-morrow, in case anything should happen.

I was here interrupted by the information that the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* were in sight, and I have had the pleasure of seeing them come in and of greeting their captains. The crews are in the best of health and spirits, but the *Vizcaya* needs docking badly.

During the trip from Puerto Rico she burned 200 tons more coal than the *Oquendo*, which means a diminution of her speed of from 3 to 5 knots according to my reckoning, and a diminution of her radius of action of from 25 to 30 per cent, thus losing the advantage of speed to which you called special attention in your instructions. Both are now coaling, but it is slow work, for, unfortunately, we do not feel at home here. We are indeed unlucky! Until to-morrow. The mail has come in and will shortly go out again, I will therefore close this.

The governor-general of Puerto Rico was telegraphing on April 20 in the same general tenor to the minister of the colonies (Girón) as Blanco, from Havana on April 7:[1]

Your Excellency and the minister of war know scant resources at my disposal. I should know what our naval forces are doing. Do not know situation of our squadron.

On the same day that this last was despatched, at the suggestion of the minister of marine as precedent to a council to be held at Madrid, there was called on board the *Cristóbal Colón* a council of war, the record of which appears as follows:

The second in command of the naval forces and the captains of the vessels, having met on board the cruiser *Cristóbal Colón*, by order of his Excellency the commander-in-chief of the squadron, and under his presidency, the president submitted for discussion the following question: "Under the present circumstances of the mother country, is it expedient that this fleet should go at once to America, or should it stay to protect our coasts and the Canaries and provide from here for any contingency?" Several opinions were exchanged concerning the probable consequences of our campaign in the West Indies; the great deficiencies of our fleet compared with that of the enemy were made manifest, as well as the very scanty resources which the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico are at present able to offer for the purpose of establishing bases of operations.

In consideration of this and the grave consequences for the nation of a defeat of our fleet in Cuba, thus permitting the enemy to proceed

[1] *Supra*. 109.

with impunity against the Peninsula and adjacent islands, it was unanimously agreed to call the attention of the government to these matters by means of a telegram, as follows:

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SQUADRON TO THE MINISTER OF MARINE:

In agreement with the second in command and the commanders of the vessels, I suggest going to the Canaries. *Ariete* has boilers in bad condition; boiler of *Azor* is very old. *Vizcaya* must be docked and have her bottom painted if she is to preserve her speed. Canaries would be protected from a rapid descent of the enemy, and all the forces would be in a position, if necessary, to hasten to the defence of the mother country.

PASCUAL CERVERA.
JOSÉ DE PAREDES.
JUAN B. LAZAGA.
EMILIO DIAZ MOREU.
VICTOR M. CONCAS.
ANTONIO EULATE.
JOAQUIN BUSTAMANTE.
FERNANDO VILLAAMIL.

Cervera writes to the minister next day, April 21:

HONORED SIR: For lack of time I could not tell you yesterday about the council which met on board the *Colón*, and only sent you a copy of the proceedings. The council lasted nearly four hours. The prevailing spirit was that of purest discipline, characterized by the high spirit which animates the whole fleet, and especially the distinguished commanders, who are an honor to Spain and the navy, and whom it is my good fortune to have for companions in these critical and solemn circumstances.

The first and natural desire expressed by all was to go resolutely in quest of the enemy and surrender their lives on the altar of the mother country; but the vision of the same mother country abandoned, insulted, and trod upon by the enemy, proud of our defeat—for nothing else could be expected by going to meet them on their own ground with our inferior forces—compelled them to see that such sacrifice would not only be useless but harmful, since it would place Spain in the hands of an insolent and proud enemy, and God only knows what the consequences might be. I could see the struggle in their minds between these conflicting considerations. All of them loathe the idea of not going immediately in search of the enemy and finishing once for all.

But, as I said before, the vision of the country trampled upon by the enemy rose above all other considerations, and inspired with that courage which consists in braving criticism and perhaps the sarcasm and accusations of the ignorant masses, which know nothing about war in general and naval warfare in particular and believe that the *Alfonso XII* or the *Cristina* can be pitted against the *Iowa* or *Massachusetts*, they expressly and energetically declare that the interests of the mother country demanded this sacrifice from us.

One of the captains had certain scruples about expressing his opinion, saying that he would do what the government of his Majesty should be pleased to order; but as all of us, absolutely all, shared these sentiments, it is hardly necessary to say his scruples were soon overcome. My only reason for mentioning this is to give you an exact report of everything that happened. Another of the captains, certainly not the most enthusiastic, but who may be said to have represented the average opinion prevailing in the council, has, by my order, written down his ideas, and I send you a copy of his statement which reflects better than I could express them the opinions of all.

This document represents exactly the sentiment which prevailed in the meeting. Believing that I have fulfilled my duty in giving your Excellency an accurate account of all that happened, I reiterate the assurance of the excellent spirit of all.

The following is the document referred to:

CAPT. VICTOR M. CONCAS, *Commander of the Battle-ship Infanta Maria Teresa:*

Concerning the subjects presented for discussion by the admiral of the fleet at the council of war held on board the battle-ship *Cristóbal Colón*, my opinion is as follows:

(1) The naval forces of the United States are so immensely superior to our own in number and class of vessels, armor and armament, and in preparations made, besides the advantage given the enemy by the insurrection in Cuba, the possible one in Puerto Rico, and the latent insurrection in the East, that they have sufficient forces to attack us in the West Indies, in the Peninsula and adjacent islands, and in the Philippines.

Since no attention has been paid to that archipelago, where it was, perhaps, most urgent to reduce our vulnerable points, which could have been done with a single battle-ship, any division of our limited forces at this time and any separation from European waters would involve a strategic mistake which would carry the war to the Peninsula, and that would mean frightful disaster to our coasts, the payment of large ransoms, and, perhaps, the loss of some island.

As soon as this fleet leaves for the West Indies it is evident that the

American flying squadron will sail for Europe, and even if its purpose were only to make a raid or a demonstration against our coasts the just alarm of all Spain would cause the enforced return of this fleet, although too late to prevent the enemy from reaping the fruits of an easy victory. The only three vessels of war remaining for the defense of the Peninsula—the *Carlos V*, the *Pelayo*, whose repairs are not yet finished, and the *Alfonso XIII*, of very little speed, and even that not certain—are not sufficient for the defence of the Spanish coasts, and in no manner for that of the Canaries.

The yacht *Giralda* and the steamers *Germania* and *Normannia*, of the acquisition of which official notice has been received, are not vessels of fighting qualities and add no strength to our navy.

(2) The plan of defending the island of Puerto Rico, abandoning Cuba to its fate, is absolutely impracticable, because, if the American fleet purposely destroys a city of the last-named island, in spite of all the plans of the government on the subject, and even though it would be the maddest thing in the world, the government itself would be forced by public opinion to send this fleet against the Americans, under the conditions and at the point which the latter might choose.

(3) Even deciding upon the defence of Puerto Rico alone, the trip across at this time, after the practical declaration of war, without a military port where the fleet might refit on its arrival, and without an auxiliary fleet to keep the enemy busy—who, I suppose, will make St. Thomas his base of operations—is a strategic error, the more deplorable because there have been months and even years in which to accumulate the necessary forces in the West Indies. It seems probable, judging from the information acquired, that the supplies accumulated at St. Thomas are intended by the enemy to establish a base of operations in the vicinity of our unprotected Vieques (Crab Island). For all these reasons the responsibility of the voyage must remain entirely with the government.

(4) Adding these three battle-ships and the *Cristóbal Colón*, without her big guns, to the two remaining in the Peninsula and to the few old torpedo-boats which we have left, it is possible to defend our coast from the Guadiana to Cape Creus, including the Balearic Islands and the Canaries, thanks to the distance of the enemy from his base of operations. This defence, however, will have to be a very energetic one if the enemy brings his best ships to bear on us, and it will not be possible to save the coasts of Galicia and of the north of Spain from suffering more or less if the enemy should bring along a light division, nor even the protected coasts from an attack here and there, as our ships are too few in number to be divided.

(5) It is very regrettable that there are not enough vessels to cover all points at one time; but duty and patriotism compel us to present clearly the resources which the country gave us, and the needs which present circumstances bring on the country in danger.

(6) Lastly, I believe, with due respect, that the military situation should be laid before the minister of marine, while I reiterate our profoundest subordination to his orders, and our firm purpose most energetically to carry out the plans of operations he may communicate to these forces. But, after pointing out the probable consequences, the responsibility must remain with the government.

VICTOR M. CONCAS.

The whole tenor of this paper marks the hopelessness of Spain's cause. Cuba is left to the mercy of the enemy, and there is no thought but of the defence of the home coast against improbable and, for the moment at least, useless attack. The fact that war had come had been telegraphed by the minister April 20, announcing that both houses of the United States Congress had approved armed intervention, declaring Cuba free and independent. Cervera was urged to complete fitting out. He replied asking that all torpedoes be sent to the Canaries if his going there should be approved. On April 21 the torpedo-boat *Ariete* was ordered to Spain in tow of the *San Francisco*. Cervera begged that the order be recalled, as she could co-operate in the defense of the Canaries, and reiterated his request to be informed of the destination of the squadron. He had telegraphed the same day:

The more I think about it the more I am convinced that to continue voyage to Puerto Rico will be disastrous. I can leave for the Canaries to-morrow. The coaling is proceeding slowly, there being a lack of appliances. The captains of the ships are of same opinion as I, some more emphatically. I need instructions.

But his destination had been fixed; other than the forces of the Peninsula were pressing to send him west across the Atlantic. Blanco was reiterating his fears, telegraphing on April 22:

Public spirit very high; great enthusiasm among all classes. But I must not conceal from your Excellency that if people should become convinced that squadron is not coming, disappointment will be great and an unpleasant reaction is possible. Beg that your Excellency will advise me whether I can give them any hope of more or less immediate arrival of squadron.

Thus the minister replied to Cervera at once, the telegram reaching him on April 22:

As Canaries are perfectly safe, and you are aware of telegrams on impending sailing of flying squadron, you will go out with all the forces to protect Puerto Rico, which is menaced, following the route which your Excellency has traced, bearing in mind the free scope which the instructions give you, and which I hereby renew. The phrase *Am going north* will advise me that you have sailed. Absolute secrecy must be maintained as to your movements. The nation, in these extreme moments of the declaration of war, follows your squadron in its expedition, and sends to it its enthusiastic greetings.

Cervera's request to send the *Ariete* to the Canaries was granted in a telegram of the 22nd. He was informed: "The government is inquiring constantly about your sailing. It is absolutely necessary to go out as soon as possible." He acknowledged the receipt of this the same day, persisting, however, in his opinion, and disclaiming all responsibility for the consequences. He sent telegram after telegram, saying pathetically, "I do not know location of hostile ships nor on what the instructions are based," and begging for "all possible information." He did not know officially whether war had been declared, stating that it was absolutely necessary to know in "order to treat the American flag as an enemy." The minister of marine replied the same day:

If war had been declared I should have advised you; but, as a matter of fact, a state of war exists, since the United States fleet will begin to-morrow the blockade of Cuba. The ships of the flying squadron, which I mentioned to your Excellency, and about which I have had no further information, are to blockade Puerto Rico, but have not yet left Hampton Roads. The foundation of the instructions is to entrust to your Excellency the naval defence of Puerto Rico. I have no special news to communicate to you to-day.

The only answer to this was again a request for precise instructions, to which came the following sage reply, also on April 22:

Have received your second telegram. Cannot give you more definite instructions than you have, leaving you free to choose the route

to be followed, eluding, if possible, an encounter with the hostile fleet, and reaching some point on the coast of Puerto Rico. The *Ciudad de Cadiz* will accompany you with as much coal as possible.

Cervera was still unwilling to yield without further struggle, and telegraphs:

I beg your Excellency to permit me to insist that the result of our voyage to America must be disastrous for the future of our country. That is the opinion of all men of honor. I beg your Excellency to read this telegram and my whole official and confidential correspondence to the president of the council, in order to ease my conscience.

In addition he writes the same day (we are still in this busy April 22) that nothing could be expected of such an expedition "except the total destruction of the fleet or its hasty and demoralized return." He says that Graciosa Island in the Canaries would be a base for American operations against Spain and that thus these islands were not safe, as they surely would be with the squadron there not only defending that point but covering the coast of Spain. He reiterates the defects of the ships adding to all that has gone before, "The *Vizcaya* can no longer steam, she is only a boil in the body of the fleet." He was to have still one more telegram on this day of trouble, the minister telegraphing at 6 P. M.:

As result of heavy seas, *Audaz* had bow bent at right angles to port as far as second bulkhead. I notify you so that you may have bows of destroyers strengthened as much as possible.

Cervera sent three telegrams April 23 asking that arrangements be made for confidential agents at the principal ports where he was likely to touch in the West Indies, and for opening credits. He again asks that he be informed before sailing if war be declared, and reports the torpedo-boats and destroyers ready, except the latter's 2.95-inch guns, which were taken off to allow more coal, but which could be remounted in a few hours.

His protestations, however, had had an effect, and April 23 he was informed that a council of officers had been called in Madrid to consider the course of action. The minister of

marine (himself a rear-admiral), one admiral, four vice-admirals, eight rear-admirals, and five captains were thus hastily called to decide the fate of Spain's only fighting force, being convened, as remarked one of the members, Rear-Admiral Pasquin, without being informed of the object of the meeting and that thus they had not been able to prepare for a judgment upon plans of the importance and gravity of those respecting which they were to consult.[1]

The absence of all crystallized plans of action is painfully set forth in the detailed report of the conference.[2]

The minister explains that the plan of the government was to send the squadron now at Cape Verde, together with the first torpedo-boat division, to Puerto Rico, and entrust to the admiral the defence of that island, which he (the minister) considers in great danger from hostile attacks, being poorly defended, having very open coasts, and inadequate garrisons in case of an uprising; that it was further intended to keep in Spain all other available ships, so as to be able to send them at the proper time wherever it might be necessary; but that the instructions issued to the admiral and received by him at Cape Verde had not yet been carried out, for the reason that the admiral made certain objections to the plan, which he did not consider expedient. . . .

The minister says that he deems it important for the discussion to make the members acquainted with the last telegram received from the governor-general of Cuba, stating that all the Spanish of that island were animated by the very best spirit for resistance; but that this was due to a great extent to the hope they harbored that the fleet would promptly return to Cuban waters, and if the return was delayed, or the hope lost, the Spanish population might at the same time lose the spirit animating it.

With a fine contempt for the actualities, he says:

that he should have preferred the formation of a comparatively numerous squadron, letting the ships go separately or in small divisions, so as to enable them to operate with greater freedom in seeking or refusing

[1] There were present, besides Rear-Admiral Segismundo Bermejo, the minister: Admiral Guillermo Chacón y Maldonado; Vice-Admirals Carlos Valcárcel, José M. Beránger, Eduardo Butler, and Fernando Martínez; Rear-Admirals Manuel Pasquin, José Navarro, Antonio de la Rocha, Ismael Warleta, Manuel Mozo, Manuel de la Camara, Eduardo Revioso, and José de Guzmán; and Captains José Gómez Imaz, Antonio Terry, Joaquin Lazaga, Joaquin Cincúnegui, and Ramon Auñon.

[2] Documents; Cervera, p. 58 *et seq.*

battle, as may be best; that the idea of going back now could not be entertained, because the advance toward Puerto Rico could be made by the fleet either as a whole or in divisions by different routes; some of the vessels might even be sent to the Bermudas, in order to compel the enemy to divide his forces; that, whatever plan might be adopted, he harbored the hope that the victory would be on the side of Spain, owing to the good qualities of her ships, the skill of those who commanded them, and the valor of the crews.

Rear-Admiral Mozo favored concentration in the Canaries and the carrying on of the war "in the nature of an active defence."

Replying to Captain Auñon, who requested information at considerable length, the minister said:

The two battle-ships coming from Puerto Rico carry provisions for forty-five days and those coming from Spain for thirty days; that he had sent them 2,000 tons of coal and instructed the admiral to get at Cape Verde whatever he might need, and that he therefore considered the battle-ships in perfect condition to engage in a naval campaign; that the three destroyers were in similar condition, but of the torpedo-boats only two were able to put to sea, because the *Ariete* had arrived with her boilers disabled.

The fitting out of the *Carlos V* could not be completed until the beginning of May, the *Pelayo* would be ready before that time, and the *Alfonso* was ready now, but the greater part of the supply of ammunition for the *Carlos V* was on the way and he could not tell exactly when it would arrive. The *Pelayo* had so limited a radius of action that she could hardly go from the Canaries to Puerto Rico without being embarrassed, and the speed of the *Alfonso XIII* was so low that she might prove an impediment to the movements of the fleet. As to the *Vitoria*, he did not consider her fit to join the squadron on account of her slow speed, and as to the *Numancia*, although she would return to Spanish waters in a short time, the remodelling of this ship was not completed, owing to strikes which had interrupted the work.

In accord with a request:

The minister reads a telegram from the admiral in which he expresses a desire to have it plainly understood that it is his opinion and the opinion of the captains of the ships that the voyage to Puerto Rico may mean a disaster for the future of the country; but that obedient to instructions he is hastening all the preparations, so as to carry out the order the moment it is received. . . .

It remained for Rear-Admiral Lazaga to express to its full the extraordinary impracticality of Spanish naval ideas.

Mr. Lazaga says that he has given some thought to the plan of campaign, and he submits his plan, such as it is, to the consideration of all. At first he was in favor of scattering the forces, but since reading the cablegram from the governor-general he has modified his opinion. The *Carlos V* should go out immediately to join the squadron, taking workmen along to complete the electrical installation for operating the turrets. The *Pelayo* should complete the work of fitting out, working night and day, and purchasing without delay whatever might be required. At Cadiz they should join the *Alfonso XIII* and the two destroyers now in Spain and go in search of the squadron, after first agreeing on a geographical point of rendezvous 100 miles west of Cape Verde.

The united forces should then proceed to Puerto Rico and fight a battle there under regular conditions, after which they should continue their course south of Santo Domingo and Cuba, appear off Havana from the west, and enter that harbor, or, if necessary, engage in another battle with the blockading forces. The torpedo-boats should return to the Canaries or to Spain with the transatlantic steamers. The cruisers *Patriota* and *Rápido* should be detached and sent to the Bermudas to divert some of the hostile forces to that vicinity and prey upon the enemy's commerce.

The question was finally put:

In view of the present state of war and the situation of our naval forces in Europe and at the Cape Verdes, what orders should be issued to said forces relative to their movements?

In a council of war, the views of the officers are taken in the reverse order of seniority, and those of the junior, Captain Auñon, which were read first, were favored by twelve of the nineteen present, most of the remaining seven, however, favoring an immediate departure for the West Indies. One only, Captain Imaz, favored waiting until the *Carlos V*, *Pelayo*, and other available vessels should be ready to re-enforce the squadron. The views adopted were as follows:

The four battle-ships and three destroyers now at Cape Verde should start immediately for West Indian waters, and after the imperative necessity of defending the island of Puerto Rico has been pointed out

to the admiral, he should be given entire freedom of action as to the route, port to be entered, and as to the cases and circumstances in which battles should be sought or eluded, according to the condition in which the ships arrive, the strength of the hostile forces, and the information which the admiral may acquire or which may be transmitted to him prior to his arrival.

The three torpedo-boats now at the Cape Verdes should return to the Canaries when and as best they can under conditions of comparative safety. The ships *Pelayo, Carlos V, Alfonso XIII, Vitoria, Patriota,* and *Rápido,* the destroyers which are in Europe, and other available ships which may be purchased or fitted out should be concentrated at Cadiz and speedily equipped; but the final destiny of these vessels should not be determined *a priori,* but according to the situation of the war at the time when these vessels are ready.

The minister telegraphed the purport of these views to Cervera April 24, adding:

Fifteen thousand pounds are at your disposal in London. The torpedo-boats are to return to Canaries with auxiliary vessels. You will prescribe their route. The United States flag is hostile. I renew the enthusiastic greeting of the nation and government.

Cervera transhipped from the *Ciudad de Cadiz* the supplies, crews, and artillery of the destroyers, and made an attempt to repair the boiler tubes of the *Ariete,* with a view of taking her with him if possible. The ships were filled with coal; those of the *Teresa* class taking 1,080 tons each, the *Colón* 1,270. The destroyers were given 140 tons, or 34 in excess of their bunker space; with this they had, said Cervera, a theoretical radius of action of 2,800 miles at 10 knots. "But," he said, "I feel sure that I shall have to resupply them before reaching our destination in case the state of the sea should not permit me to tow them."

Numerous telegrams passed between Madrid and the admiral during the succeeding days, in which he was informed that the flying squadron had not left Hampton Roads; that San Juan, Puerto Rico, would be advised of signal agreed upon with pilot, and that orders had been sent to London to send 5,000 tons of coal to Curaçao, which were to be at the disposal of himself and the commandant of Puerto Rico. The minister's last telegram was sent April 28:

Hope this will arrive in time. Havana and north of Cuba still blockaded. San Juan, Puerto Rico, so far free. No hostile ships in European waters. Quiet and harmony reigning in Spain. Reiterate enthusiastic greeting of nation. Great activity displayed in fitting other ships.

Cervera's reply, sent April 29, had but the words agreed upon as announcing his departure: "Am going north."

CHAPTER V

THE BEGINNING OF HOSTILITIES

On April 21 the following ships of the North Atlantic fleet were at Key West or in the vicinity: The armored ships *New York* and *Iowa* outside the reef; the cruisers *Marblehead* and *Wilmington* anchored between the reef and inner harbor to repeat signals; the monitors *Puritan, Terror,* and *Amphitrite;* the cruisers *Cincinnati, Detroit;* the cruiser gun-boats *Machias, Castine, Nashville, Newport, Helena, Dolphin,* and auxiliary *Mayflower;* the torpedo-boats *Dupont, Porter, Foote, Winslow, Cushing,* and *Ericsson;* the armed tugs *Leyden, Algonquin, Nezinscot,* and *Samoset;* the *Fern,* and light-house vessel *Mangrove.* The *Helena* and *Dolphin* were under repairs. The *Indiana* had gone to Tortugas for coal the night of the 20th and returned the night of the 21st, anchoring near the flag-ship. Orders had been given to have the *Detroit* and *Machias* to take the duty of repeating ships on the 22d, and to coal and send outside the reef the *Cincinnati, Marblehead, Wilmington, Newport, Mayflower, Castine,* and *Nashville,* and then coal the *Puritan* and *Terror.*

The difficulty of communication with Key West was great, owing to the small number of tugs available for such constant and active service; the use of the torpedo-boats, in addition, despite the desire to keep them in thorough order for the emergency of action, was a necessity to that vital element in military preparations or movements—information. This necessity continued throughout the war; it was a case of *force majeure.*

A memorandum had been prepared some time before in anticipation of a blockade, and had been distributed to the fleet. This was recalled on April 18, and the following, of which the more important parts are given, was substituted:

U. S. F. S. *New York*,
Off Key West, Florida, *April* 18, 1898.

. . . . . .

2. Until colliers are provided for the squadron only ports on the north coast of Cuba will be blockaded. The following distribution of the vessels of the squadron is made for that purpose:

Off Havana: The *New York, Iowa, Wilmington, Helena, Dolphin, Mayflower, Vesuvius, Ericsson, Porter,* and auxiliaries to be designated.

Off Mariel: The *Nashville, Castine,* and auxiliaries to be designated.

Off Matanzas: The *Amphitrite, Cincinnati, Dupont, Winslow,* and auxiliaries to be designated.

Off Cardenas: The *Newport, Machias, Foote, Cushing,* and auxiliaries.

The *Indiana, Marblehead, Detroit,* and auxiliaries to be designated will form a division for special service.

The *Terror, Mangrove,* and *Fern* will remain at Key West.

Auxiliaries will be used as despatch-boats. A telegraph operator, with instruments, will accompany the fleet.

The ships detailed for Matanzas and Cardenas will comprise the second division.

The ships intended for special service will form the third division.

3. It will depend upon circumstances whether the torpedo-boats, any or all of them, will accompany the fleet upon its departure from Key West. They will, when attached to the fleet, be attached to vessels for supplies, towing, etc., as follows:

Ericsson to the *New York; Dupont* to the *Cincinnati; Porter* to the *Iowa; Winslow* to the *Amphitrite; Cushing* to the *Newport; Foote* to the *Machias.*

During the day, and in rough weather at night, torpedo-boats and other small vessels will seek shelter, where available, under the approval of the senior officer present, guarding with care against surprise or attack.

4. It is my intention to approach within sight of Havana with the entire force, and at that time or later to detach by signal the vessels designated to blockade Mariel, Matanzas, Cardenas, and for special service. The cruising order, upon leaving Key West, is appended.

5. When signal is made to get under way the vessels inside of the reef will weigh and come out at once, without regard to order, and as rapidly as the crowded state of the harbor and the safety of navigation will permit.

. . . . . .

9. Upon arrival off Havana, or at a later time, the second and third divisions will be detached by signal. . . . When a division is detached it will be taken in charge of by its senior officer, to whom

the vessels comprising it will look for signals. The senior officer will at once form his division in column, and will proceed to his station without further orders.

10. The *Cincinnati* and *Nashville* will repeat all signals. . . . The scouts will repeat signals which affect the torpedo-boats.

11. On the blockade, during the day, the vessels assigned to each port will form a single line of patrol, and will patrol in front of, and on either side of the mouth of the port, for a distance sufficient to ensure the detection of any vessel attempting to run the blockade. The distances between the ships will be equalized, and the line of patrol will be established just beyond the range of batteries.

At night, the vessels will close in around the mouths of the harbor. The torpedo-boats will patrol as near the mouth as is safe; the cruisers will form a second line of patrol to seaward, and will keep a bright lookout to avoid the attack of small vessels armed with torpedoes. When the weather and sea will permit, they will send out one or more picket-boats on patrol duty.

When the port is not defended by heavy guns, the blockading ships will remain close inshore, observing the same general plan day and night.

During the night all lights will be screened. Every ship or boat will display the private signal when approaching another vessel.

12. . . . Vessels will be assigned to their stations by signal from the senior officer present. Cruisers, which move in closer at night, will be considered as holding their stations on the same bearing from the blockaded port, but will somewhat extend their patrol for the purpose of better covering the heavy ships in the outside line.

. . . . . .

14. Two Very's red stars fired in rapid succession will indicate the discovery of an enemy's or suspicious vessel. If the two red lights be immediately followed by a green one, it will indicate the discovery of torpedo-boats. The same signal will be employed by all patrolling ships and boats. Paragraph 4, Circular Letter No. 5, of April 1, 1898, is modified accordingly."

During the forenoon of April 21, a telegram was received from the navy department:

Spanish fleet has left Cape Verdes, destination unknown.

but this was soon contradicted by information that they had banked fires, it being added, however, that Spanish vessels were reported off Port au Prince, Hayti.

At 4 P. M. came the following:

SAMPSON, Key West:
You are assigned to the command of the U. S. forces on the North Atlantic station with the rank of a rear-admiral immediately.
LONG.

The reception of this telegram was equivalent to information that war was declared, inasmuch as under the law the president could only make such an assignment in war. This was quickly followed by:

Blockade coast of Cuba immediately from Cardenas to Bahia Honda. Blockade Cardenas if it is considered advisable. Issue a proclamation of blockade covering the blockaded ports according to terms contained in my letter of April 6. Do not bombard. Permit neutrals now loading to come out.

And

Allow all neutral ships the latest possible hour in which to leave Cuba. Give every assistance and facility to foreign representatives who desire to leave Cuba.

Sampson telegraphed his readiness to start and asked if he should await additional instructions. At once, however, an officer of the staff was sent to all the ships inside the harbor with orders to come outside the reef immediately. Lights were placed on the buoys, and aided by them and their search-lights, all the ships that were ready for duty came out of the harbor before daylight of the 22d and lay to in the vicinity of the flag-ship.

All available ships were outside the reef and under way at 4.30 A. M. At 4.58, signal was made, "Form in order of cruising," and the fleet was formed in two columns, the *Cincinnati* and lighter ships forming the starboard column, the armored ships the port; the torpedo-boats *Porter* and *Dupont*, followed by the *Mayflower* and *Wilmington*, were in advance; the torpedo-boats *Foote* and *Winslow* on the rear flanks of the columns.

The *Detroit*, which had been advanced to the southward as a picket, under the scouting orders previously mentioned, was met at 5.30. She was ordered to coal and join the fleet as soon as

possible. Shortly before 8, a merchant-steamer was sighted standing north, close inshore; as she hoisted Spanish colors, the *Nashville* was ordered to take possession of her and carry her into Key West.[1]

At 8 the flag of the rear-admiral was hoisted on the *New York* and saluted.

The Cuban coast, distant from Key West ninety miles, was sighted at 3 P. M. Almost at the same time two large steamers were sighted to the south and east, standing eastward. It was first intended to send the *Mayflower* to overhaul them, and she was signalled to know what speed she could make. A heavy sea, however, was running, due to the very fresh trades blowing, and the admiral decided that the *New York*, which, from her size and power, was more independent of wind and sea, would more certainly and speedily overhaul the ships, which were steaming fast in an almost opposite direction. Signal was made to the *Iowa*, "Take command while F [flag] is absent. Stop eight or ten miles from Havana." The flag-ship left the column, and being under all boilers, with all four engines connected, rapidly overhauled the strangers. The first, boarded just at sunset, was the Spanish steamer *Pedro*, bound for Santiago de Cuba, with a cargo of which 1,700 tons was rice, supplies which would have been later of utmost importance to the beleaguered army at that point. A prize crew was put aboard and she was sent into Key West.[2] Night had fallen before the *New York* was able to board the other, a German ship, which was warned that a blockade was about to be established.

Before this duty had been finished, the fleet had long since disappeared to the westward, and nothing of it but an occasional column of smoke could be seen in the rapidly darkening western sky, which was misty with the haze which accompanies a strong

[1] The steamer, the *Buenaventura*, was condemned, and was sold; the cargo, being neutral property and not contraband, was restored to the owners. Appeal as to that condemnation was taken to the Supreme Court, and on a broad interpretation of Article 4 of the president's proclamation, the previous decision was reversed, without, however, allowing damages or costs. For the action taken in the prize cases, see *Recent Supreme Court Decisions and other Opinions and Precedents*, Naval War College, 1904; Benton, *International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-American War*, 165–178 (with references).

[2] The ship and cargo were condemned.

trade-wind. The flag-ship headed for Havana, but it was not until well toward midnight that she picked up the first ship of the fleet, which was lying with all lights screened, scattered over many miles of a rough and heaving sea. The flag-ship in her search had stood well in toward Havana, which was ablaze with its usual lights. She repeated frequently the "night letter" made by flashing the electric signal lights, without any answer except the firing of three guns from one of the Havana batteries, showing that a hostile ship had been discovered. It is probable that these were fired merely as a signal to those ashore, as no others were fired during the night, nor for many days after. Shortly after this the lights of the city and that of the light-house on Morro Castle were extinguished. Standing westward, some of the ships were gradually made out.

When morning broke with a sea which, as is usual in the regions of the trades near land, had become calm during the night, the fleet was seen scattered east, west, and north; added to it was the *Marblehead*, which had arrived from Key West at early daylight.

The ships were quickly gathered and orders for blockade were signalled in accord with the memorandum of April 18,[1] the *Nashville* and *Castine* to Mariel, the *Machias* and torpedo-boat *Foote* to Cardenas, the *Puritan, Cincinnati, Amphitrite*, and torpedo-boats *Dupont* and *Winslow* to Matanzas, the *Newport* to Cabañas. The ships off Havana were stationed: the *New York, Iowa*, and *Indiana* to the north, the *Marblehead* north-east, the *Detroit* north-west; the *Mayflower, Wilmington*, and the torpedo-boat *Porter* to the eastward and well inshore. The *Terror* and *Helena*, arriving in the afternoon, were sent, the former to Cardenas, the latter to the Yucatan channel to intercept arrivals from Vera Cruz which the admiral had been informed were to be expected with large supplies for the Spanish forces.[2]

The message regarding the expected arrival from Vera Cruz

[1] *Ante*. 128.

[2] The *Helena* on her passage from Key West had captured the large steamer *Miguel Jover*, bound from New Orleans to Barcelona, laden with cotton. She was sent into Key West but was released under the president's proclamation. (*Infra*, 143.)

had been delivered at daylight by the torpedo-boat *Ericsson*. She also brought a telegram, emanating from the hydrographic office at New York, that the Spanish transports had sailed from the Canaries, April 13, for Havana (a wholly incorrect bit of information). As these transports were the convoy of the Spanish torpedo-boat flotilla, the message, which stated the information as official, had weight with the admiral in the disposition of the vessels of the fleet, detaining the expedition which had been determined upon, for the cutting of the cables at Guantánamo and Santiago, and which, had it gone at this time on this duty, would probably have changed very materially the trend of events.

The *Ericsson* returned to Key West the same evening with a despatch to the navy department that the blockade of Mariel, Havana, Matanzas, and Cardenas had been established.

This misuse of the torpedo-boats was a necessity—a case, as said, of *force majeure*. It was recognized by every one that if they were to be kept ready for the work for which they were built, they should be carefully nursed rather than knocked about in the tossing sea of the Florida channel, but the question of information in war is paramount, and any sacrifice must be made to this end. There was, in fact, nothing else to use, and thus throughout the war these frail craft kept the sea, much as did the great ships of the fleet, but with a difference in comfort to their crews, both officers and men, which only seamen could appreciate, but which was borne with a cheerfulness beyond praise.

It was but a meagre force with which Sampson began a blockade which was necessarily confined to but a limited part of the Cuban coast-line of two thousand miles, an extent greater than that blockaded on our own coast during the civil war, the operations against which occupied the attention of over six hundred ships. It was plainly impossible to extend operations for the moment beyond the limits laid down by the government, that is eastward from Havana as far as Cardenas, eighty-five nautical miles, and westward to Bahia Honda, fifty-five miles. There were in this distance of a hundred and forty miles, the important harbors of Bahia Honda, Cabañas, Mariel, Havana, Matanzas, and Cardenas; the next port was Sagua la Grande,

still another hundred miles eastward, and this at the moment it was impossible to cover. On the south side five hundred and fifty statute miles from Havana round by Cape Antonio was Cienfuegos, almost as important as a base of supply by its proximity to Havana by rail, as Havana itself. To blockade this completely and efficiently as should have been done, necessitated the establishment in the vicinity of a coaling base for ourselves by colliers, which, at the moment, we were not prepared for.

During the afternoon of the 23d a large ship was seen close inshore to the eastward, with the *Wilmington* and *Cincinnati* apparently in chase. The flag-ship at once stood in that direction; the stranger was evidently a man-of-war, and from the distance at which we were looked uncommonly like one of the *Vizcaya* class, the whereabouts of two of which was then uncertain. Every ship at hand stood in her direction, and there was an animated moment until the Italian colors were made out, and it was discovered that she was the Italian cruiser *Giovanni Bausan*. Salutes were exchanged and she proceeded to Havana. The *Porter* shortly after captured the sugar-laden schooner *Sofia*, which was sent into Key West.

The Morro light was extinguished this evening at 7.30 and a powerful search-light, very effective in range and brilliancy, was turned onto the blockading ships, giving a startling feeling of discovery, though at such a distance it was impossible that the reflected light from their hulls should reach back to its origin.

The armed yacht *Hornet* joined at 2 the next morning (April 24), and was assigned to the western end of the Havana blockade. At 7 the *Detroit* came up from the westward with the Spanish steamer *Catalina* of 6,000 tons, laden with cotton from New Orleans to Barcelona.[1] The *Dupont* and *Wilmington* had also each captured sugar-laden schooners during the night, and several more such small craft were seized during the next few days, until coasting traffic entirely ceased.

Telegrams were received in the evening of April 24 that the Spanish steamers *Alicante* and *Montserrat*, the latter with 800 troops aboard, had left St. Pierre, Martinique, the day before

[1] She was sent into Key West, but released.

(April 23), destination unknown but believed by the consul to be Cuba, and also that the American mail-steamer *Alliança* was due to pass Cape Maysi at nightfall of Sunday (April 30), on her passage from Colon to New York. The admiral was authorized to take steps to protect her, but Cape Maysi was 500 miles away, the *Alliança* was fast, the time was to be night; the admiral knew that no Spanish gun-boat had her speed, and he rightly took no steps to render such useless assistance, the demand for which came, no doubt, from over-timid owners. He telegraphed the navy department the distribution of the ships already given, adding:

> Special service division *Indiana, Detroit, Marblehead, Mangrove,* and *Algonquin* being kept for more close blockade of Havana until the arrival of the Spanish transports and supply-vessels, after which they will proceed for coal to Key West, Dry Tortugas, and thence proceed at once to Guantánamo [and] Santiago de Cuba, to cut cables. *Mangrove* fully prepared. I shall blockade Bahia Honda as soon as *Eagle* and *Hornet* arrive. The greatest attention should be paid immediate need of colliers. Special service division [intended for cable-cutting at Santiago] would be quite independent if they could have one with them.

A telegram was also sent to the bureau of supplies and accounts requesting two fresh-provision supply-ships with cold-storage facilities to make regular trips between the fleet and some northern port.

The first of the telegrams mentioned as received this day conveyed information of special importance. It was in error regarding the *Alicante*,[1] but the surmise respecting the *Montserrat* proved true. This ship, one of the finest of the Spanish Trasatlantica line, was reported as carrying a large quantity of stores for the troops and ammunition and guns for the Havana defences, besides a large sum of specie. She was armed and fast; in every respect an important prize. The admiral at once took steps to intercept her, judging correctly that her port was Cienfuegos.

[1] This ship arrived at Fort de France, Martinique, in company with the *Montserrat*, April 23, 1898. She was supposed by the consul, Mr. Darte, to have been a hospital-ship laden with supplies. She remained at Fort de France throughout the war, leaving August 4, under a safe-conduct to Santiago de Cuba, to convey sick and wounded Spanish soldiers to Cadiz.

It was thought that the *Marblehead* with the *Nashville* in company would be able to reach Cienfuegos, 480 sea-miles distant, before the *Montserrat* could cover the 1,200 between that port and Martinique, despite the handicap of the latter's nearly two days' start. But the *Marblehead* was not able to get away until the next morning (April 25) when, at 9, she left, accompanied, in addition to the *Nashville*, by the fast armed yacht *Eagle*, which had arrived from Key West at 8 A. M. The *Nashville* was picked up off Mariel, and the little squadron proceeded at its best speed.

Next morning, however (April 26), at 3.45 A. M., the *Marblehead* and *Eagle* ran on to one of the shoals of the dangerous Colorado reef which skirts the whole of the western end of Cuba, from Bahia Honda to Cape Antonio.[1] The *Marblehead* got off at 9.55 A. M., but they did not succeed in releasing the *Eagle* from the intricate channel into which she had run until 3.50 P. M. and all three were going ahead again at 4.15.

This delay, however, had no bearing upon the result; the *Montserrat* had already, at noon of the same day, reached Cienfuegos, where she remained until May 6. Carrying so much of warlike value, her escape was, naturally, a great gratification to Spaniards both in Spain and Cuba. The rejoicings were extreme and the captain was much lionized in Havana and on his return home.

The only chance of capture was in the almost immediate reception of the information which had been sent to Washington very promptly by the consul at St. Pierre. She had left Fort de France the night of the 23d, the information reached the admiral the evening of the 24th; the only available ship at hand, with a good battery, was the *Marblehead*. Had she been able to leave at once, there would have been a chance; or had it been possible to divert the flag-ship temporarily, the capture, with her high speed, would have been a certainty. This diversion was, however, scarcely possible in the circumstances.

[1] This accident was caused by the deflection of the steering compass of the *Marblehead* through the quartermaster's having arranged a small screen of sheet tin of a few square inches to screen the binnacle light of the steering compass. The iron in this piece was sufficient to cause a serious error. So sensitive is the compass that men at the wheel are not allowed to have any steel objects of any kind, as knives, etc., about them.

Commander McCalla, who had become convinced, on account of his grounding, of the futility of attempting to intercept the *Montserrat*, did not immediately go off Cienfuegos. He boarded and warned a number of foreign vessels of the blockade and sought for the Silvertown bank, south-east of Cienfuegos, across which he hoped to find the cable to Santiago. He thus did not arrive off Cienfuegos until the morning of April 29.[1]

Shortly thereafter a torpedo gun-boat, believed to be the *Galicia*,[2] ventured out of the bay as far as Cocos Point, a mile within the entrance, but soon returned. Smoke sighted to the westward proved to be that of the coasting steamer *Argonauto*, from Batabanó to Cienfuegos and Santiago. On seizure she was found to have on board among her passengers eight Spanish officers and eight soldiers. Along with a general cargo, she was laden with provisions, Mauser rifles, and ammunition. A prize crew was put aboard from the *Nashville*, with Ensign Kuenzli in charge, and her civilian passengers with their baggage were sent into Cienfuegos in two of her boats. Shots later were exchanged with the torpedo gun-boat, which twice ventured as far as Cocos Point, over the lowland of which her smoke could be seen. A battery, supposedly of field-guns, and some infantry at the light-house, also opened fire, with, however, no result.

At 5 P. M. April 29, Commander McCalla, under the necessity of coaling, left with all his ships for the blockade off Havana.

While in the vicinity of Cienfuegos McCalla received infor-

[1] The very remarkable bay of Cienfuegos, one of the most typical of Cuba, is practically a large lake eight nautical miles in length and from two to three in breadth. Its main axis is north-west to south-east; it affords anchorage for large ships in almost every part. Midway on the eastern shore is the town of Cienfuegos, named from a former captain-general of Cuba. The bay is connected with the sea by a channel two and three-quarters nautical miles in length, which, starting from the south-west corner, goes south-west for three-quarters of a mile and thence turning at Point Pasacaballos goes south-south-east. The easterly point at the broad entrance, Point de los Colorados, has a light-house. The depth of water in the channel is from seventeen to twenty-eight fathoms. Opposite Point Pasacaballos is the antique castle of Our Lady of the Angels of Xagua (the Indian name of the bay). Shipping in the harbor can be seen from outside, from aloft, as was established by Commander Dayton in the *Detroit* on July 10, 1898. (*Infra.*) Map, p. 267.

[2] This was an error; the *Galicia* was never able to leave port. The gun-boat was the *Vasco Nuñez de Balboa.*

mation that but one line of torpedoes had been laid, and these just north of Point Pasacaballos, and that there was no intention of placing any farther out; also that there were some 6- and 8-inch modern guns on hand not yet mounted, though a new battery could be seen north-north-west of the castle of Los Angeles, in which there seemed to be mounted two large guns; he also heard that there were in the harbor two old gun-boats besides the *Galicia* and eleven armed steam-launches.

The *Dolphin*, from Key West, had joined the flag at 9 A. M. of the 25th, and was sent off to Bahia Honda; the *Hawk* reported at 11.30 and was stationed at the western end of the Havana blockade. At about 5 P. M. of this day, a steamer was reported by the signalmen of the *New York* in the north-east, which turned out to be the *Panama*, of whose departure from New York with contraband the admiral had been warned by the navy department in a telegram of April 23. The *Indiana*, which had been standing from that direction toward the flag-ship, had her attention called to this stranger and at once turned about for her, but before she was well on her way, the armed light-house vessel *Mangrove*, on her way from the Matanzas blockade to Key West for coal, had brought her to. A prize crew was put aboard by the *Indiana* (the *Mangrove* with her crew of twenty-eight having no men to spare for such purposes), and she was taken into Key West.[1]

The flag-ship, on observing that the *Mangrove* had already made sure of the seizure of the *Panama*, stood for a ship coming out of Havana, which proved to be the British ship *Lucilene*, bound for Bermuda and Philadelphia. The captain very foolishly stood on, disregarding two shots fired across his bows as a signal

[1] The *Panama* had left New York on April 20 with a large cargo and twenty-nine passengers, all Spanish except one Frenchman. With a species of Oriental fatalism which belongs to the race, no effort seems to have been made to avoid the blockading squadron, even by awaiting nightfall. The ship was finally condemned, the case turning upon the fact that she was armed. This armament, two 9-cm. guns, a Maxim, twenty Remingtons, and ten Mausers, had been placed aboard three years before, under the usual contract of the Trasatlantica company with the Spanish government, by which they could be taken over by the latter for war purposes. (See *United States Reports*, vol. 175, 535; also Naval War College, *International Law*, 1904, "Recent Supreme Court Decisions.")

to heave to, and his failure to heed such warning might have had serious consequences had not his better sense come to his aid. She had on board a large number of refugees, who, from their continuous cheering, were evidently pleased to get away from the blockaded city.

This same evening the gun-boats *Vicente Yañez Pinzón* and the *Marques de Molins* are reported by a Havana journal to have made an excursion outside the harbor, and to have remained some time "near the enemy's ships." "These," says the *Diario de la Marina* of April 26, "seeing the decision of our sailors, and that they were directing toward them, disappeared somewhat from view amongst their other ships. Our gun-boats, which proudly flew the Spanish ensign, moved about majestically at some distance from land and almost beyond the range of the shore batteries. At nightfall and after having reconnoitred the shore where the Cojimar and Chorrera batteries are established, they returned to port." Whatever the extent of their short cruise, it was not observed from the flag-ship, busied, in the fall of the night, with the *Panama* and *Lucilene*, nor was any report made by other ships of their venture; a failure to see which is not at all surprising, as it is extremely difficult to distinguish a ship, even at a moderate distance, with a background of high land.

Anxiety was expressed in a letter only now received from the navy department, dated April 20, regarding the telegraph line between Key West and Charlotte Harbor, Fla., which throughout this distance was laid in the shoal waters of southern Florida, and thus easily disturbed. These waters were frequented by the Havana fishing-vessels, and it was apprehended that some of these might be employed for such a purpose. The admiral was directed to send a light-draft vessel to Charlotte Harbor, so that in case the line should be cut, the government could communicate. The department was informed that the revenue cutter *McLane* had been patrolling these waters since the 14th. A letter of the same date (April 20) stated that the navy must convoy army transports conveying troops from New Orleans, Mobile, and Tampa to Cuba, and that as vessels would be detailed from the squadron this fact should, while making arrangements for the blockade, be borne in mind.

On the morning of the 26th the flag-ship stood eastward along shore on a tour of observation; parties of cavalry were observed along shore, but no demonstration was made. When some thirty miles east of Havana, the flag-ship was communicated with by the armed yacht *Hornet*, which had on board a lieutenant of infantry, Juan del Pino, and private Manuel Martinez, whose names are worth mentioning as those of the first prisoners of the war. The lieutenant had been on his way from his post at Santa Cruz, to Matanzas, to visit his wife, who had lately given birth to a boy, and the father, under the circumstances, was naturally desirous to see the two. His boat had been seized by the *Amphitrite* on the 25th, and the two men were transferred to the *Hornet* for transportation to the flag-ship. Both were in a state of trepidation when received aboard, but they were treated with kindness, fed well, and landed near by, after the signing by Lieutenant del Pino of a parole not to serve farther during the war. It so happened that as they were preparing to leave, a tug arrived alongside with the men who had been sent to Key West as a prize crew in the *Pedro*, among whom were five marines. As these men arrived on deck and were formed with their arms at an order, the fright of the private was extreme. He clearly thought that he had certainly been brought on deck to be shot. He was, however, soon reassured and left happy.

As already noted, it had been intended to send a special division eastward, with Captain Taylor, of the *Indiana*, as senior officer, to destroy the telegraphic connections of Cuba, which, with the exception of the Havana-Key West cable, centred about Santiago. Guantánamo (forty miles east of Santiago, and six hundred miles distant from Havana), where the French cable left the island, was to be the point of first attempt. As early as April 8, Sampson had telegraphed to the navy department asking that materials for grappling submarine cables be sent by the first vessel joining him from New York. Information had also been asked, by telegram of April 16, as to the landing-place at Guantánamo, and requesting all instructions possible as to methods of lifting and destroying the cables. As nothing arrived from the north, the admiral was thrown on the very moderate resources at Key West. A large winch fitted on board the *Man-*

grove and the well-worn cables used by the telegraphic company for service in Florida waters were appropriated. The *Marblehead, Detroit,* the armed tug *Algonquin,* and the *Mangrove* were to form part of the expedition under Captain Taylor.

On the 26th the *Indiana* went to Tortugas to fill with coal, the *Mangrove* being already there and the *Marblehead* expected to join as soon as she should return from Cienfuegos. Sampson had asked for a collier to accompany the expedition so that it might be independent of a distant base. During the day, however, a telegram arrived by the *Algonquin:* "Telegraph cables must not be interfered with until further orders." The admiral at once sent a telegram by the *Detroit,* to be despatched from Key West, asking if this referred to those on the south side also, with the following memorandum of instructions to her commanding officer:

> Upon your arrival at Key West wire Captain Taylor the substance of the despatch from the navy department and direct him to await at Tortugas the secretary's reply. Direct the telegraph censor at Key West to have all cipher despatches for me sent to you without delay. If the reply to my telegram to the navy department is "Yes," the plans for the expedition will be entirely off and you will direct the *Indiana* and *Mangrove* to rejoin the blockade at Havana and you will also rejoin it with your own ship. Should the answer be negative, the expedition will proceed. Should it be discretionary, transmit it to Captain Taylor and direct him to use his judgment.

A telegram was received the same day announcing that two Spanish steamers, the *Pio Nono* and the *Maria Herrera,* had arrived at Vera Cruz, and that the *Villa Verde* had cleared from there on the 24th with a valuable cargo of provisions for Havana.

During the early morning of the 27th a letter was received on board the flag-ship from Captain Harrington, of the *Puritan,* and senior officer off Matanzas, stating that the enemy were busily engaged in the construction of some new earthworks on the western side of the entrance at Gorda Point. The admiral, determining to observe for himself the state of things, left the Havana blockade at 10.40 and arrived off Matanzas shortly before 1 o'clock, finding the *Puritan* and *Cincinnati.* The flag-

ship stood in toward the batteries and on discovering the new works opened fire against them at 12.50, the first shot of the war by the navy being fired from the port 8-inch gun (in broadside) by Naval Cadet Boone. This gun was selected for the honor on account of the extreme rivalry between the crews of the two turrets, which was so intense that it was considered advisable not to give the first gun to either.

The new battery as well as the old opened a weak fire, but their shells passed over harmlessly. The *Puritan* and *Cincinnati* asked permission to open fire, and for some minutes there was a brisk cannonade, which tore up the ground in and about the earthwork, apparently with great effect as far as the work itself was concerned. Later we learned that no men were injured.

The action was a mere reconnaissance and had no object beyond the sudden determination to stop the building of the new works and to give the men some gun practice, for which there could not have been a better opportunity. Here was demonstrated for the first time the uselessness of the monitor in a rough sea, such as was running at the time. Some of the *Puritan's* 12-inch shells fell but a few hundred yards from the ship, though the gun had been laid against the eastern battery between two and three miles distant. It was a striking instance of the effect of the extremely rapid oscillation of this class of vessel, which makes any surety of gun-practice mere chance. It was the beginning of the doom, in naval estimation, of the monitors as sea-going fighting-ships.[1]

[1] However excellent in harbors (and in smooth waters they have most valuable qualities), the strongest advocates of the monitor had to yield to the experience in the campaign in the Caribbean, and grant to the battle-ship, which is but the logical development of the monitor, far higher qualities as a sea fighting machine. The battle-ship, besides having the general good qualities of the monitor, has also those of habitability and comfort, with the increased health and vigor to the crew accompanying such qualities, the importance and value of which are beyond estimation; it has further the capability of high speed, which the monitor has not. The writer would repeat a previously expressed opinion that the monitor is a floating hell in discomfort in such operations as those in the West Indies, and no government is justified in subjecting its servants to the torture which their crews must have undergone in such waters (and most heroically and uncomplainingly) so long as it is able to supply what, in the practically unanimous estimation of the naval world, is a far better ship.

The *New York* returned off Havana during the afternoon, having instructed the senior officer off Matanzas to not allow further work on the batteries. The *Terror*, off Cardenas, had captured during the morning the large Spanish steamer *Guido*, bound for Havana with provisions; having also seized the day before the small steamer *Ambrosio Bolivar*, attempting to run from Gibara to Havana with provisions and some seventy thousand Spanish silver dollars, worth the same as Spanish paper —about fifty per cent the value of gold coinage.

During the evening the tug *Tecumseh*, which had arrived from Key West the day before, came alongside the flag-ship and reported herself as sinking. Naval Constructor Hobson, who had been attached to the flag-ship for the purpose of looking after the repairs of the fleet, was sent on board to report. He shortly returned, reporting the cause as the opening out of a plate in the wake of the boiler compartment while watering alongside the *New York* in the rough sea, but thought the vessel might be kept afloat sufficiently long to take her into Key West, as they were able to control the leak to some degree. He asked permission to go in her to superintend repairs, and in a few minutes she left, with considerable uncertainty in all minds as to the outcome. The instance is an example of the readiness of Hobson to undertake any duty, and though the present one perhaps did not offer anything worse than a recourse from the sinking ship to small boats in a rough sea, it is indicative of the thorough courage which is his possession by nature, and which he showed in many ways during his career aboard the flag-ship. One of the press boats fortunately was going to Key West, and offered to accompany the *Tecumseh*, so that any fear of actual danger to the crew was removed.

During the day was received a telegram conveying the proclamation of the president, announcing the declaration of war. It was as follows:

Whereas, by an act of Congress approved April 26, 1898, it is declared that war exists and that war has existed since the 21st day of April, A.D. 1898, including said day, between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain; and

Whereas, it being desirable that such war should be conducted upon principles in harmony with the present views of nations and sanctioned by their recent practice, it has already been announced that the policy of this government will be not to resort to privateering, but to adhere to the rules of the Declaration of Paris:

Now, therefore, I, William McKinley, President of the United States of America, by virtue of the power vested in me by the Constitution and the laws, do hereby declare and proclaim:

1. The neutral flag covers the enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war;

2. Neutral goods, contraband of war, are not liable to confiscation under the enemy's flag;

3. Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective;

4. Spanish merchant vessels in any ports or places within the United States shall be allowed till May 31, 1898, inclusive, for loading their cargoes and departing from such ports or places, and such Spanish merchant vessels, if met at sea by any United States ship, shall be permitted to continue their voyage, if, on examination of their papers, it shall appear that their cargoes were taken on board before the expiration of the above term, provided that nothing herein contained shall apply to Spanish vessels having on board any officer in the military or naval service of the enemy, or any coal, except such as may be necessary for their voyage, or any other article prohibited or contraband of war, or any despatch of or to the Spanish government;

5. Any Spanish merchant vessel which, prior to April 21st, 1898, shall have sailed from any foreign port, or place in the United States, shall be permitted to enter such port or place, and to discharge her cargo, and afterwards, forthwith, to depart without molestation, and any such vessel, if met at sea by any United States ship, shall be permitted to continue her voyage to any port not blockaded;

6. The right of search is to be exercised with strict regard for the rights of neutrals, and the voyages of mail steamers are not to be interfered with except on the clearest grounds of suspicion of a violation of law, in respect to contraband of blockade.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington on the 26th day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight, and of the Independence of the United States the one hundred and twenty-second.

WILLIAM MCKINLEY.

By the President:

JOHN SHERMAN, *Secretary of State.*

The United States government thus finally accepted the Declaration of Paris (1856) in full, from which it had withheld

assent unless with the abolition of privateering should be coupled the exemption of private property from capture unless contraband.[1]

Spain, on April 23, also issued a decree, embodying the second, third, and fourth of the articles of the Declaration of Paris (the first, second, and third of President McKinley's proclamation), but declined to be bound by the first, which abolished privateers. While maintaining her right to commission these, it was declared that she would now organize from the merchant marine a service of "auxiliary cruisers of the war marine," to be subject to the statutes and jurisdiction of the naval forces,[2] thus following practically the example of the United States. At no time during the war did she issue letters of marque.

The United States government rules were, however, notably more liberal than those of Spain in dealing with enemy merchant shipping at the outbreak of war. Thirty days from April 21 were allowed under article five, whereas Spain gave but five from April 24. Article Five of the proclamation was also, it may be said, liberally construed, so that Spanish merchant-vessels which had already left American ports were included in the immunity.[3]

The admiral also on this date, calculating that the *Marblehead* and her consorts had reached Cienfuegos, sent the following telegram to the navy department:

> Blockade of Cienfuegos commences to-day. Cannot continue unless colliers are sent before supply approaches exhaustion.

In fact, as seen by Commander McCalla's report, all three ships were obliged to leave for Key West the 29th for coal, a striking instance of the necessity of having a supply immediately under

[1] President Pierce's annual message December 2, 1856. *Messages and Documents*, V, 412.

[2] *Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents*, 1896–1900, 157.

[3] Instructions to blockading vessels and cruisers, drafted by Lieutenant (now Rear-Admiral) Staunton, assistant chief of staff, covering the various questions which generally arise in the circumstances, were issued by Admiral Sampson on April 27. These, but slightly modified, by the state department, appear in General Order No. 10, *Report of the Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, *Appendix*, 168–170.

one's lee, and the want of which made the blockade of Cienfuegos largely inoperative for the greater part of the war.

The Spaniards in this short period had already lost a number of fine steamers. The capture of the *Buenaventura, Pedro, Catalina, Miguel Jover, Panama, Argonauta,* and *Guido,* within a week, was a very serious injury to their mercantile marine and formed a very considerable percentage of the whole. The squadron was also active in picking up the small vessels engaged in coasting traffic, and in the fisheries of the Campeche bank. Though this may seem small work, such measures are necessary in war as part of any scheme of blockade, which, as in this instance, particularly aimed to prevent further supplies reaching forces which were known already to have no surplus supplies of food. Several fishing-schooners were released after their cargoes were thrown overboard, but the admiral, in doubt as to the propriety of such release, telegraphed to the navy department:

> I find that a large number of fishing-schooners are attempting to get into Havana from their fishing-grounds near the Florida reefs and coast. They are generally manned by excellent seamen belonging to the maritime inscription of Spain, who have already served in the Spanish navy and who are liable to further service. As these trained men are naval reserves and have a semi-military character and would be most valuable to the Spaniards as artillerymen either afloat or ashore, I recommend that they be detained as prisoners of war, and should be authorized to deliver them to the commanding army officer at Key West.

His suggestions were approved by a telegram from the navy department, dated April 30, but not received until May 2, as follows:

> Spanish fishing-vessels attempting to violate the blockade are subject to capture with crews, and any such vessel or crew likely to aid the enemy may be detained.[1]

[1] The final outcome of this action was of an extraordinary character. In accord with the navy department's instructions, which would seem sufficiently explicit, a number of these vessels were sent into Key West. They were adjudged prize by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Appeal was made to the Supreme Court of the United States, where the decision was reversed and the vessels restored. The decision of the Supreme Court was written by Associate-Justice Gray. (*U. S. Reports,* 175, p. 677.)

Information was received April 28 that the *Miantonomoh*, on her way to join the fleet, had arrived at Charleston; that the transport *Panther* had left April 22 for Hampton Roads, with a battalion of 635 marines, whence she would go to Key West under convoy of the cruiser *Montgomery;* and that the *Resolute* would go to Newport, R. I., April 30, to receive mines requested by the admiral for countermining purposes in Cuban ports. It was ordered that on the arrival of the *Resolute* at Key West, as she had accommodations for a thousand men, the marines should be transferred to her and that she would remain with the squadron as a marine transport, the *Panther* going north to fit as an auxiliary cruiser. The *Newport*, with a captured schooner, and the *Puritan*, from Matanzas, went to Key West for coal. The *Fern* arrived at Key West with ammunition for the fleet from Tampa.

The admiral, on account of a report received of rough treatment of the prisoners in the numerous prizes now in the harbor of Key West, requested that the harbor be placed under the control of the commandant of the station, who should have an efficient assistant for affairs afloat. The result of this was the appoint-

While the present writer has the utmost respect for the ability and learning of this eminent judge, he cannot think his treatment of this case wholly logical. No one of his citations covering liberty to fish (and they extend back to the time of Henry IV of England, 1403) was analogous to the situation off Cuba. While there were seizures made in the North Sea by the British at the end of the eighteenth, and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, the general rule is that fishermen are not subject to capture. But in every case cited by Associate Justice Gray, the fishermen were furnishing food to a whole people and not to besieged places. The Havana vessels were furnishing food to a beleaguered army; beleaguered by sea by the fleet, practically by land by the insurgents, to the extent at least that food was not obtainable from the surrounding country. Their only ports were those so blockaded. The cutting off of the food supply of an enemy so situated has always been recognized as a military duty and as an important element in the reduction of a fortress. This of itself demanded at least their detention. The fact that their crews were reservists of the Spanish navy, trained men who undoubtedly would have been utilized in the Havana defence, was an additional reason of equal or perhaps greater weight. The writer is convinced that had the learned judge been commander-in-chief off Havana, he would have at least detained the vessels and crews for the period of the war. This perhaps was the action that should have been taken. But as the case stood, the fishing-vessels seized and condemned were intending to violate a blockade and carry food to a besieged enemy.

ment of Commodore George C. Remey as commandant of Key West as a naval base, and the following letter:

WASHINGTON, *April* 28, 1898.

SIR: The department has decided to send you two commodores, to serve under your orders, the senior to command the naval base at Key West, which will include the naval establishments on shore and all the vessels in the harbor permanently and those that at any time may enter.

In a general way his duty will be to see that the ships of your squadron are coaled, provisioned, and supplied with ammunition speedily, and that any repairs on them which have been authorized by you are pressed with all the despatch possible with the facilities on the ships themselves and at the station on shore. It will also be his duty to see that the coaling and provision facilities are maintained in a most effective condition and by the best methods practicable; and the same with the arrangements regarding the furnishing of ammunition. He is, in fact, to maintain a general command over the Key West station, but is entirely under your orders. This control on his part will extend to Tortugas. One of his most important duties will be to complete each vessel that you send him or that comes into his station as quickly as possible and return her to you.

The present commandant at the Key West naval station will continue to execute the duties which he is already charged with, but of course subject to the orders of the commodore who commands the whole base.

The junior commodore[1] sent you is to be employed in the squadron operating on the coast of Cuba or in the general neighborhood. You will assign him a ship on which to hoist his pennant and will charge him with such duties suitable to his rank as you may think best. The object of sending him is to assist you in the military duties devolving upon you in connection with the squadron of operations. This officer may of course be sent on any detached expedition or on the south side of the island of Cuba, or where it seems to you most expedient to have him go.

If for any reason you should be obliged to be absent from the station, the senior of these two officers will succeed to temporary command.

Very respectfully,

JOHN D. LONG, *Secretary.*

The following telegram was received, dated Washington, April 26:

[1] Commodore John C. Watson was appointed; he later was ordered to command the squadron destined for the East in case Admiral Camara's squadron had continued its voyage.

Your orders do not prevent the use of a few vessels to scour both coasts of Cuba, capturing and destroying Spanish men-of-war. Use your judgment in the matter (of) monitors accompanying. While the department does not wish to bombard forts protected by heavy guns, it must be left to your discretion to destroy light batteries that may protect vessels. If you desire to attack you can do so if without exposure to heavy guns.

In the early morning of the 29th the *Indiana, Detroit,* and *Mangrove* returned from Tortugas, the *Indiana* signalling:

No further message from the department respecting the cutting of cables, therefore have returned with the *Detroit* and *Mangrove.*

On the afternoon of the 29th, the flag-ship, accompanied by the torpedo-boat *Porter,* stood westward as far as Cabañas, thirty-five miles from Havana, with a general view to note the several points at which it was thought possible to land an army. The charming landscape of the region which rises a little west of Mariel into most picturesque hills, which a little further become a series of rugged mountains, was marred at every few miles by the scarred and blackened walls, which were all that was left of the splendid centres of the great sugar estates of the region. These had to be seen to have a realization of the sad destruction wrought by the ruthless orders of Gomez during the strife of the past two years. At several points were small ancient fortifications, and here and there signs of a Spanish military post. Looking into Mariel, a bay of the usual bottle-like conformation so peculiar to Cuba, were seen two small gun-boats, one well within range, the other at the town, some three miles from the entrance of the bay. The near one quickly lifted her anchor and skurried townward without any molestation on our part, the admiral humorously remarking, in reply to an inquiry as to whether a shot should not be fired at her, "She is too little." While lying quietly, just before sunset, about a mile and a half off Cabañas, musketry was heard, and looking ashore were seen from the water's edge of a neighboring knoll the flashes of a number of rifles, which it was seen were fired by some dismounted cavalry. A 4-inch gun was turned on them with the result of a hasty

mounting and skurrying for shelter. The flag-ship and her companion returned the same evening to the blockade off Havana.

The few days which the blockade had lasted had already made clear certain facts, the most prominent of which was that ships on the north shore west of Cardenas must return to Key West in order to coal, and that even at Cardenas, with some lee under the keys from the heavy sea of the trades, it was very difficult to coal from a collier. The other two important points were that our ships were very deficient in fresh-water supply, and that torpedo-boats were wholly unfit for the rough service to which they were being applied. They had been holding their own with hearty goodwill along shore, doing scouting work close in, which would have been admirable had there been anything to look after, but the short, heavy sea produced by a strong trade blowing east at from two to three knots an hour, knocked them about in a way which called for much greater strength of structure, and which must have made life almost unendurable to those aboard. The qualification of the "almost" is used; though no complaints ever came from the unfortunate officers and men aboard, it was evident that they were enduring more than those in the great floating fortresses, which they were attending, thought possible.

But their speed was too tempting not to use them as despatch-vessels, and several were kept running between the blockading squadron and Key West until warning came through complete break-down of several of the weaker.

The squadron had begun to feel the monotony of the blockade, the smaller ships were running out of coal and already a considerable number had been obliged to go in to Key West, and by May 2, the *Cincinnati*, *Puritan*, *Terror*, *Detroit*, *Hawk*, *Hornet*, *Mangrove*, and the torpedo-boats *Cushing*, *Dupont*, and *Winslow*, were included.

The boilers of the *Cincinnati* had almost completely given out. She had, of course, done a great deal of steaming during her commission on the South Atlantic station, and in her return north. She was ordered to Norfolk for the necessary work, and the admiral telegraphed asking that workmen be sent to Key West instead, where, while repairing by workmen to be sent from the north, she could act as station ship and be an effective defence

with her powerful battery of 5-inch quick-firing guns; but this was refused. Several things occurred, however, to detain her until some time later, and she finally did not arrive at Norfolk until June 3.

On April 30 the *Amphitrite* resumed her station off Matanzas. This same day a telegram was received that the *St. Louis* and *Harvard* had left New York that day to scout for Spanish fleet as follows: The *Harvard* on a line from 15° 38′ N. and 59° 4′ W., to 14° 25′ N. and 59° 30′ W., and to touch at Martinique on May 10 if no information had been received in the meantime; the *St. Louis* on a line from 16° 55′ N. and 59° 50′ W., to 15° 38′ N. and 59° 40′ W., and to touch at Guadeloupe on May 10 if no information had been received.

A letter was also received from the department stating the conditions under which Miss Clara Barton, the representative of the National Red Cross Association, had gone to Key West, and directing that she be afforded every facility for distributing the supplies carried by the *State of Texas* to reconcentrados at either Matanzas or Cardenas or both, taking care that none fall into the hands of the Spanish army. The admiral also received the somewhat belated news that the *Montgomery* had left Norfolk on the 27th for Key West, in company with the *Panther*, carrying the marine battalion of 647 officers and men, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. Huntington, taken on board at the New York Navy Yard whence they had sailed April 22 for Hampton Roads. Leaving there April 26 they had already arrived at Key West on April 29, where they had at once gone into camp on the beach some two miles east of the town.[1]

[1] The battalion was formed of six companies, one of which was an artillery company having four 3-inch rapid-fire guns, received from the ordnance department, navy yard, New York. The following was the organization of the battalion:

Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. Huntington, commanding; Major P. C. Pope (detached from the battalion at Key West); Major H. C. Cochrane; First Lieutenant H. L. Draper, adjutant; Captain C. L. McCawley, A. Q. M., quartermaster; Surgeon John M. Edgar, United States Navy, surgeon; First Sergeant Henry Good, sergeant-major; First Sergeant W. J. Limerick, quartermaster-sergeant. Company A: Captain Allan C. Kelton, First Lieutenant F. J. Moses, Second Lieutenant L. J. Magill. Company B: Captain B. R. Russell, First Lieutenant C. L. A. Ingate, Second Lieutenant M. J. Shaw. Company C: Captain G. F.

Further information was also received regarding the Spanish steamer *Villaverde*, reporting that forty car-loads of supplies had been placed aboard her at Vera Cruz by the Spanish patriotic association of Mexico, and that she was expected to sail on the 29th.

Sampson, knowing the desire of the government to keep in touch with the insurgent leaders, now sent Mr. Sylvester Scovel, the *World* correspondent, who volunteered for the duty, to communicate with General Gomez, writing him on April 30 a letter asking to be informed as to his ideas concerning co-operation and his needs as to arms, munitions, and supplies in general. Scovel was to go east in the torpedo-boat *Porter*, Lieutenant Fremont, and land at some point near Caibarien, which is some two hundred miles by sea east of Havana.

At the moment when the *Porter* was near the flag-ship, her commander receiving his final instructions, Mr. Seppings Wright, an English artist employed by the *London Illustrated News*, came aboard and presented his credentials. Hearing the mention of the *Porter's* duty, he at once asked permission to go, and within five minutes was over the flag-ship's side, taking as quick a leap into the unexpected and unknown as probably ever fell to a newspaper correspondent.

The *Porter* was off Caibarien the next morning; sighted two Spanish gun-boats, which withdrew, and was piloted in the shallow and intricate waters of the approach by Fremont himself, the Cuban pilot engaged showing himself useless. Landing Scovel and Wright at Point Caguanes, the *Porter* left for the Havana blockade uninterrupted by any of the five Spanish vessels known to be in the vicinity. The two adventurers ashore met the party previously landed, with the addition of Mr. Frederick Summerford, a correspondent of the *New York Herald*, who had been

Elliott; First Lieutenant L. C. Lucas, Second Lieutenant P. M. Bannon. Company D: Captain W. F. Spicer, First Lieutenant W. C. Neville, Second Lieutenant Newt. H. Hall. Company E: Captain H. K. White, First Lieutenant J. E. Mahoney, First Lieutenant A. S. McLemore. Company F (artillery): Captain F. H. Harrington, First Lieutenant C. G. Long, First Lieutenant W. N. McKelvy. Color guard: one sergeant, two corporals.

The battalion remained in camp at Key West until June 6, when it again embarked in the *Panther* for Guantánamo.

long with Gomez. Though very anxious to reach Key West, Summerford volunteered to go back and see Gomez, while the others cast about for a means of getting away in time to prevent the *Porter's* being risked in her proposed attempt to return and take them aboard, the information brought by the correspondents being thought sufficient in the circumstances. A fishing-boat was captured and the party started, but before getting away Summerford returned and joined them, with letters from Gomez to President McKinley, Admiral Sampson, and General Miles. The boat had made her way to the vicinity of Piédras Key, near Cardenas, some ninety miles west of Caibarien, when she was picked up by the torpedo-boat *Winslow*, which a few days later was to be so roughly handled in Cardenas harbor. The party was transferred to the torpedo-boat *Foote*, and landed at Key West in time to prevent the despatch of the torpedo-boat *Ericsson*, which had been detailed to fetch them away, the *Porter* being now with Sampson on her way to Puerto Rico. It was a bold and gallant adventure upon the part of all concerned, a marked instance of the spirit of the newspaper correspondent, who has so generally shown himself ready to dare with the best.

On May 1 the cruiser *Montgomery* and the armed tug *Osceola* joined the fleet and were stationed off Havana, the *Mayflower* and *Detroit* going to Key West for coal. The *Montgomery* brought information that the colliers *Saturn*, *Merrimac*, and *Niagara* had sailed for Key West and were to be attached to the fleet, but carried also the much more important word in a telegram from Washington dated the day before (April 30):

> The *Maria Teresa*, *Oquendo*, *Vizcaya*, *Cristóbal Colón*, *Terror*, *Furor*, and *Pluton* left yesterday (April 29), are believed for Cuba. The *Ciudad de Cadiz* and the *San Francisco*[1] for Canary Islands. You are authorized to cut cables south coast of Cuba.

[1] A collier.

CHAPTER VI

THE BATTLE OF MANILA

On the day that Sampson received word of the departure of Cervera from the Cape Verdes the Spanish squadron in the Philippines was annihilated by Commodore Dewey.

Since February, as already noted, the American ships of what was known as the Asiatic squadron had, except the ancient double-ender *Monocacy*, been concentrated at Hong-Kong under the telegraphic order of February 25. There were present on April 21[1] the *Olympia*, Captain Gridley;[2] the *Boston*, Captain Wildes; the *Raleigh*, Captain Coghlan; the *Concord*, Commander Walker; and the *Petrel*, Commander Wood. Besides these were the revenue vessel *McCulloch*, Captain Hodgson, which had joined April 17, and the two purchased steamers *Nanshan* and *Zafiro*, the one a collier the other a supply-vessel. The next day, April 22, Eastern date, arrived the *Baltimore*, Captain Dyer, with the ammunition which had been transferred to her from the *Mohican* at Honolulu, the third week in March. Had the conquest and retention of the Philippines been in the mind of the American government the two powerful monitors *Monterey* and *Monadnock* should at once have been added, instead of delaying the departure from California of the former until June 11, and of the latter until June 23. That they were not sent at once is but added proof that the holding of the islands was an afterthought.

[1] Manila is in 121° east longitude from Greenwich, or 196° east of Washington. Its time is thus thirteen hours earlier than Washington time. Its 1 A. M. of, say, April 21 is but noon of the Washington 20th. The difference in date should be kept in mind.

[2] Commander (now Rear-Admiral) Lamberton had arrived as the relief of Captain Gridley; the latter on his urgent request retained the command for the time and Lamberton was appointed chief of staff.


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COREA
Tokyo
Kobe
YoKohama
Fuchau
Canton
Mirs Bay
Macao
HongKong
FORMOSA
PART OF WESTERN PACIFIC OCEAN
HAINAN
Course of American Squadron 958 M.
Hue
C. Bolinao
LUZON
MARIANA OR LADRONE IS.
Manila Bay
S. Bernardino St.
Guam to Honolulu 3337 M.
to S. Francisco 5437 M.
Bangkok
Manila to Guam 1506 M.
to Hawaii 4843 M.
to S. Francisco 6943 M.
Guam
Mindoro
PHILIPPINE IS
Saigon
Iloilo
MINDANAO
CAROLINE ISLANDS
British N. BORNEO
SARAWAK
Malacca
Sarawak
BORNEO
CELEBES
Ternate
EQUATOR
NEW GUINEA

The question of docking the *Baltimore*, which had now been a long time without docking, was a delicate one. Diplomatic relations had already ceased between Spain and the United States by the withdrawal of the Spanish minister from Washington on April 20 (the date of the signature by the president of the joint resolution of Congress passed the day previous), and by the request of passports by the American minister at Madrid on April 21, the actual day, by Western date, of the *Baltimore's* arrival at Hong-Kong. War, however, had not been formally declared, though on the afternoon of that day Sampson had been ordered to blockade Cuban ports. This information was telegraphed Commodore Dewey:

> The naval force on the North Atlantic station are blockading Cuba. War has not yet been declared. War may be declared at any moment. I will inform you. Await orders.

Sent late on the Washington 21st, this telegram could not reach Hong-Kong until the forenoon of the Eastern 22d. The *Baltimore* went into dock Saturday, April 23, at 8 A. M., and came out at the same hour Sunday, the 24th, on which day Dewey was informed by the Hong-Kong authorities that as war had begun, and Great Britain was a neutral, his squadron must, within twenty-four hours, move out of British jurisdiction. At 2 P. M. the *Boston*, *Concord*, and *Petrel* left, accompanied by the *McCulloch* and the two store-ships, for Mirs Bay, thirty miles east of Hong-Kong, on the Chinese coast. The *Olympia*, with the *Baltimore* and *Raleigh*, waited for the arrival of the American consul from Manila, which he had left on April 23, and also for some parts of the *Raleigh's* machinery repairing ashore. The consul, however, was delayed longer than had been expected, and the time limit being expired, the three ships left Hong-Kong at 9 A. M., April 25, cheered to the echo as they steamed from the harbor by the British soldiers and sailors ashore and afloat, who, with the blood of the race, envied them the prospect of a fight. The afternoon of April 25 was spent in distributing to the several ships the ammunition which had been brought

by the *Baltimore*, and the next day was largely occupied in stripping the ships of all wooden articles which could be spared and sending them on board the transports.

The revenue cutter *McCulloch*, being regarded a non-combatant, was sent to Hong-Kong for news. She returned on Tuesday, April 26, with a telegram which removed all doubt, and which had been sent the day before (Washington date April 24):

> War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors.

On April 27 Consul Williams arrived in a tug from Hong-Kong, bringing with him the parts of machinery left by the *Raleigh*, and also the president's proclamation declaring the existence of war between the United States and Spain which had been telegraphed the same day (Washington date April 26).

The commodore returned by the tug a telegram to be transmitted from Hong-Kong:

> Williams, the United States consul from Manila, has arrived. The squadron will sail immediately for the Philippine Islands.

and called his captains aboard the flag-ship for consultation.

Mr. Williams brought information that the greater part of the force in the Philippines had been concentrated in Manila Bay; "that there were three or more batteries along the water-front of the city, two on Sangley Point protecting the navy yard at Cavite, one or more at Mariveles, two or more on Corregidor and Caballo Islands, and one or more on the south shore of the entrance to the bay, all of six to nine inch calibre. He had also been credibly informed that the customary entrance to the bay between Corregidor Island and Mariveles and the waters in the vicinity of Cavite had been extensively mined. He further stated that a large merchant transport, the *Isla de Mindanao*, of the Compania Trasatlantica, arrived the day before his departure, laden with munitions of war, including coast guns, automobile torpedoes, and submarine mines, the

latter intended for the larger entrance to the bay south of Corregidor."

His information as to batteries was in the main correct, and partially so as to mines. That these should be extensively placed in the waters in the vicinity of Cavite was, of course, necessarily incorrect, as it was in these the Spanish ships were finally to take position. It was the vague information brought by one not conversant with such matters, and naturally somewhat disproportioned to facts. Whatever the state of Spanish preparation, however, it weighed nothing with Commodore Dewey or his officers.

At 2 P. M. signal was made to get under way and the squadron stood for Luzon.[1]

Some preliminary explanation is necessary to enable the movements which follow to be understood.

Manila Bay is a pear-shaped sheet of water about thirty nautical miles in its longest axis. On the eastern side, twenty-five miles from the entrance, is the city of Manila, the population

[1] During the afternoon, on signal from the flag-ship, the following remarkable proclamation from the governor-general of the Philippines was read to each of the ships' companies:

"SPANIARDS:

"Between Spain and the United States of North America hostilities have broken out.

"The moment has arrived to prove to the world that we possess the spirit to conquer those who, pretending to be loyal friends, take advantage of our misfortunes and abuse our hospitality, using means which civilized nations count unworthy and disreputable.

"The North American people, constituted of all the social excrescences, have exhausted our patience and provoked war with their perfidious machinations, with their acts of treachery, with their outrages against the law of nations and international conventions.

"The struggle will be short and decisive. The God of Victories will give us one as brilliant and complete as the righteousness and justice of our cause demand. Spain, which counts upon the sympathies of all the nations, will emerge triumphantly from this new test, humiliating and blasting the adventurers from those states that, without cohesion and without a history, offer to humanity only infamous traditions and the ungrateful spectacle of Chambers in which appear united insolence and defamation, cowardice and cynicism.

"A squadron manned by foreigners, possessing neither instruction nor discipline, is preparing to come to this archipelago with the ruffianly intention of robbing us of all that means life, honor, and liberty. Pretending to be inspired by a courage of which they are incapable, the North Ameri-



Manila and its approaches showing course of American Squadron

of which was and is about three hundred thousand. As early as the beginning of the seventeenth century what is known as the walled town was surrounded by a wall of hewn stone some three miles in circuit. Through the middle, and separating the walled town from the native city, runs the Pasig River. The whole has a frontage on the bay of some two nautical miles. Six and a half miles south-west by south from the walled town, is Sangley Point, the extremity of a peninsula with a north-east and south-west direction, forming a bay about three miles broad, in which, on a small peninsula jutting east out of the larger one and about a mile and a half in length, is Cavite. A small bay between Sangley Point and Cavite is known as Cañacao.

The great bay opens to the sea at its south-west angle with an opening ten nautical miles broad. Two miles from the northern shore is Corregidor Island, of a squirming scorpion-like shape, with a head a mile in diameter to the west, and with a dwindling tail running east. A sand-spit and Caballo Island

can seamen undertake as an enterprise capable of realization, the substitution of Protestantism for the Catholic religion you profess, to treat you as tribes refractory to civilization, to take possession of your riches as if they were unacquainted with the rights of property, and to kidnap those persons whom they consider useful to man their ships or to be exploited in agricultural or industrial labor.

"Vain designs! Ridiculous boastings!

"Your indomitable bravery will suffice to frustrate the attempt to carry them into realization. You will not allow the faith you profess to be made a mock of; impious hands to be placed on the temple of the true God; the images you adore to be thrown down by unbelief. The aggressors shall not profane the tombs of your fathers, they shall not gratify their lustful passions at the cost of your wives' and daughters' honor, or appropriate the property your industry has accumulated as a provision for your old age. No, they shall not perpetrate any of the crimes inspired by their wickedness and covetousness, because your valor and patriotism will suffice to punish and abase the people that, claiming to be civilized and cultivated, have exterminated the natives of North America, instead of bringing to them the life of civilization and of progress.

"Philippinos, prepare for the struggle and, united under the glorious Spanish flag, which is ever covered with laurels, let us fight with the conviction that victory will crown our efforts, and to the calls of our enemies let us oppose with the decision of the Christian and the patriot, the cry of 'Viva España.'

"Your General,

"Basilio Augustin Davila.

"Manila, 23d April, 1898."

continue the tail to the south and west. The whole contorted length is about five miles. It is nearly five and a half nautical miles from Caballo Island to the south headland of the bay, but about three and a half miles from Caballo and nearly two from the headland is a large precipitous rock known as El Fraile (the Friar), not much larger than the deck of a small ship. The northern passage is known as the Boca Chica (little mouth); the southern as the Boca Grande; over the greater extent of these two passages the water is from eighteen to thirty fathoms or more in depth.

Thirty-five nautical miles north-west of the Boca Grande, is Subig Bay, some ten miles deep. About two-fifths the way up the bay and almost in the middle of its narrowest part (two and a half miles) is Isla Grande, which the Spanish had elected to fortify and did not. Farther in on the east side is the small bay of Olongapo, where the Spanish had begun a naval station, which later the United States government at one time thought seriously of completing and extending.

On March 15 the governor-general called together a meeting of the authorities, at which was Admiral Montojo, who expressed the opinion that his "poor squadron would not be able to withstand the onslaught of the American ships, and that he was firmly convinced that it would be destroyed." The governor-general asking the admiral's opinion as to the steps which should be taken, the latter gave these remarkable views:

"Considering that I have heard your Excellency say repeatedly that the port of Subig would have to be the refuge of our ships in extreme cases and that said port possessed exceptional qualifications as a military port, I suggest that it be fortified, if only temporarily, at the earliest possible moment, so that our fleet may repair to it and there await the enemy, provided they come at all, keeping the fleet in readiness, in case Manila should be assaulted, to hasten there at night and attack the Americans unexpectedly as soon as the governor-general sends notice by telegram that the time is propitious for such a manœuvre, counting on the hostile squadron being somewhat fatigued by that time."

"I am entirely of your opinion," answered General Primo de Rivera,[1] "and I trust the admiral will tell us what he deems necessary to be done at Subig for its immediate defence."

The admiral replying, advised that the narrower and more shallow

[1] General de Rivera was relieved and sailed for Spain April 12.

eastern channel to Subig be closed by sinking ships, the western to be protected by mounting guns on the coast and Isla Grande, which stands a little to the east of the mid-line of the entrance, and continuing, said:

"Then the fourteen Mathieson mines, the only ones there are at Cavite, should be planted in a line inside the entrance. The ships should be stationed still further inside, so that, under the protection of the batteries and mines, they can engage in battle with the Americans."

"And can anything be done at the other ports for their protection?" asked the governor-general. To this Montojo replied:

"Nothing can be done at Cebu, Ilo-Ilo, and Isabella de Basilan, which are the most important ones," said the admiral; "but the obstruction of the channels of the latter two ports is feasible, and the entrance to the former can be closed by sinking boats in it."

The admiral's suggestions were adopted and orders given to send a mixed commission to Subig to determine the best position for the four 5.9-inch guns which were at Manila. Two more 5.9-inch guns were to be sent to Sangley Point (Cavite).

Admiral Montojo made all preparations possible in his squadron for coming hostilities, and sent six hundred tons of coal to Subig and sank two merchant-vessels and the old transport *San Quintin* in the eastern entrance, the operations being superintended by Captain del Rio, the naval commandant in Subig Bay.

The mixed commission decided that no guns could be mounted on the almost perpendicular west coast and that only on Isla Grande or Maquiling would it be possible. Orders were so given, with directions that the work proceed with all energy. Admiral Montojo was informed from time to time that the work was progressing rapidly. "Del Rio informed him by telegraph that when he was not disturbed by insurgent parties from Bataán, he worked with two hundred men and never stopped a minute. Arizmendi, assistant inspector of ordnance, reported that as long as the engineers had not finished the cement work he could do nothing, and Rizzo, assistant inspector of engineers, stated that he could not just say what the status of the work was; that he was waiting for an official report from Commander Sidrach, who had charge of the work, before he could answer."

On March 26 Lieutenant-Commander Rafael Benavente, of the *General Lezo*, submitted an additional scheme for fortifying the entrances to the bay, which, being adopted by the ever necessary *junta* which had to be called together, and approved by the governor-general, was taken in hand by the navy, Colonel Maximiano Garces de las Fayos, of the marine artillery, and Lieutenant-Commander Benavente (whose ship was under repairs at Cavite) being placed in charge. The work was carried on with an unusual and most praiseworthy energy; two cranes, six launches of the harbor works, two gun-boats, and two hundred men from the Cavite Navy Yard, and from the *General Lezo* and the *Ulloa*, being used. From these two vessels were taken three of the 4.7-inch guns which were supplied.

The work was completed on April 29, at which date the following batteries in Boca Chica and Boca Grande were in condition to fire (the batteries being named from south to north):

Below Point Restinga (on the south side of Boca Grande): Three 6.3-inch M. L. R.

El Fraile Rock: Three 4.7-inch B. L. R. (one from the *Ulloa;* two from the *Lezo*).

Caballo Island: Three 5.9-inch B. L. R. Armstrong guns (taken from the *Velasco*).

Corregidor Island: Three 8-inch M. L. R. Armstrongs.

Punta Lassisi (on the north side of Boca Chica): Two 6.3-inch converted B. L. R.

Punta Gorda (on the north side of Boca Chica): Three 7-inch M. L. R.

Seventeen guns in all, nine of which, being muzzle-loaders, could scarcely be regarded as effective against a rapidly moving squadron on account of their slow service.

An attempt to improvise mines filtered down to the use of war-heads of the Whitehead torpedoes, which were carried by some of the ships and which were planted in the waters near Caballo Island.

The protection of so broad and deep an entrance as the Boca Grande by such means was, however, hopeless unless unlimited time and perfect appliances were used, such as would tax the best-equipped arsenal, and even in such case no dependence, on account of the depth and the strong tidal current frequently

found, could really be placed upon their action. As much also might be said of any in the Boca Chica. In fact, though the energy and will shown were fine, both were thrown away in such circumstances. Nor can a channel of such breadth be defended by gun-fire against a squadron entering at night, even with every provision of search-lights and numerous long-range guns; the chances of passing without damage are all with a squadron of fair speed and gun-power.

"It was hoped," said the author from which the information regarding the improvised batteries is taken,[1] "that the four 5.9-inch guns taken to Subig, if not already mounted, soon would be, but the admiral was to suffer a terrible disappointment and deception."

Of the two hundred and twenty-six guns of all kinds mounted at Manila (of which one hundred and sixty-four were muzzle-loaders), there were twelve breech-loaders of from 4.7 inch to 9.45 inch. These twelve, and particularly the 9.45 inch, of which there were four, were the only really effective guns on the sea face. Two of the 9.45 inch, built at Trubia, Spain, in 1883, were in a battery at the south end of the Luneta drive. They were 20 feet above water and behind 30-foot earthworks, sloping to the water's edge with a traverse about 20 feet at the base on each flank and between the guns. They were on gravity-return, centre-pivot, friction-recoil carriages trained by hand gear.

At the north end of the Luneta drive, near the water, were four 8.26-inch muzzle-loading rifled howitzers, behind 30-foot earthworks, with wing traverses, with casements in each wing. These were mounted on gravity-return, muzzle-pivot carriages trained by tackles and handspikes; the projectiles were nose-fused common shell. These pieces were of an old type and could not give serious concern.

Fifty yards north of this last was a third 9.45-inch breech-loading Trubia gun, built in 1885. A short distance north of this was a battery of six breech-loading rifled guns behind 30-foot earthworks with wing traverses, separating the guns in pairs. Four of these had been converted in 1887 from bronze smooth-bores of eighteenth-century design, by cutting off the

[1] C. P. *Admiral Montojo Before Opinion and Before History*, chapters III and IV.

cascabel rifling and slotting the breech for a Krupp breech-block, thus making them into 5.5-inch breech-loading rifles; the other two were 5.9-inch breech-loading rifled bronze siege-guns made in Seville in 1893. They were mounted on siege wheeled carriages, anchored by a hydraulic-recoil cylinder. They were supplied with nose-fused common shell.

Nine hundred yards northward again was a 9.45-inch breech-loading rifle similar to those in the south battery. All these were directly on the water-front, in front of the walls.

The walls themselves, with a sea frontage of nearly a mile, were of heavy masonry filled with earth over the casemates, with a breadth of 50 feet, a height above the land of 20 feet, and with a moat of 50 feet filled with water about 10 feet in depth. On the walls at the south bastion were nine 6.3-inch muzzle-loading rifled bronze guns, eighteenth-century design, rifled in 1864 for studded projectiles, having wooden gravity-return, centre-pivot carriages trained by tackles. These could serve no useful purpose. In the centre bastion were five 8.27-inch muzzle-loading rifled howitzers, similar to those already mentioned. In the north bastion were five 6.3-inch muzzle-loading rifled guns similar to those in the south bastion.

In a small bastion facing the Pasig River, with an arc of fire from the Pasig light-house north, were five 4.7-inch muzzle-loading rifled howitzers of no value; three more of these howitzers and two 3.15-inch Krupp field howitzers were in a lunette, in an angle between the sea-front and river-front walls, sweeping the river.

In a circular masonry redoubt on the south mole at the entrance of Pasig River were two bronze 4.7-inch breech-loading rifled field-guns of 1893, mounted on wheeled siege-carriages anchored by hydraulic-recoil cylinders, and two 6.3-inch muzzle-loading rifles of the same pattern as those in the south bastion, with a field of fire from Cavite to the eastward. The old fort at San Antonio contained only light field-pieces.

At Cañacao, near the beach, was one 4.7-inch Hontoria breech-loading rifle mounted on a ship's centre-pivot, gravity-return carriage, hydraulic recoil. This was on a timber foundation embedded in masonry. Another similar foundation had been prepared, but the gun had not yet been mounted, being found

later in the arsenal. There was a small masonry bomb-proof pit in the sand twenty feet east of the mounted guns, and a breast-work of sand about three feet high had been formed around the seaward front of the battery by placing boiler iron on edge and packing the sand against it. This gun had an arc of fire of one hundred and eighty degrees to seaward of the shore line. Eleven nose-fused common shells remained in the bomb-proof after the battle, and one shell in the gun.

In Fort Sangley, a permanent casement fort of a semi-hexagonal contour looking toward Manila Bay, there were six gun positions, two each in the east and west fronts and one in each of the next adjacent, the north front being occupied by the main magazine. High mounds of sand protected the rear of each gun position. Two 5.9-inch Ordoñez breech-loading rifled guns only were mounted in the fort, and they occupied the northernmost emplacements in the east and west fronts. The western gun trained from the village of San Roque (just south) one hundred and twenty degrees to the west and north; the eastern gun trained from Bacoor one hundred and twenty degrees east and north. The mounts were gravity-return, centre-pivot, hydraulic-recoil land-carriage trained by hand gearing. The muzzles were, when level, about twenty feet above water.

At Cavite arsenal there were mounted two 64-pounder Armstrong muzzle-loading rifles, a 6.3-inch converted muzzle-loading rifle on gravity-return, friction-recoil, muzzle-pivot carriages trained by tackles and elevated by wedges and screws, and two 6.3-inch breech-loading Hontoria and one of the two 4.7-inch breech-loading Hontoria guns taken from the *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, which ship was under repairs, these three guns being the only ones of any value, the range of the former being wholly ineffective as compared with that of modern guns. All these had an arc of fire from Cañacao to Manila.[1]

Admiral Montojo, as has been seen, fully recognized the difficulties of his position. He expected defeat.

On April 17 Montojo telegraphed:

> How many days free from molestation have I for installing new batteries and obtaining men from Mindanao?

[1] A report of defences was made by Lieutenant (now Commander) Ellicott.

There was no answer to this. But on April 19, the minister sent:

Circumstances demand the closing of ports on the islands with mines, merchant-vessels waiting outside will be guided in by pilots.

Montojo answered:

Your Excellency is aware that I have no mines; I will do all I can.

On the same day Bermejo replied:

Seventy mines are on the way. I regret I am unable to do more, for I am positive hostilities will break out on Saturday.

Montojo hoped that the mines would arrive by the *Mindanao*, expected every moment. She arrived April 23 without them. Montojo says in his report:

On the 25th of April, at 11 at night, I left the bay of Manila for Subig with a squadron composed of the cruisers *Reina Cristina*, *Don Juan de Austria*, *Isla de Cuba*, *Isla de Luzon*, despatch-boat *Marques del Duero*, and the wooden cruiser *Castilla*. This last could be merely considered as a floating battery, incapable of any movement or action, principally on account of the bad condition of her hull. The following morning, being at Subig, I had a conference with Captain del Rio, who, though he did not relieve my anxiety respecting the completion of the defensive works, assured me that they would soon be finished.

In the meanwhile the cruiser *Castilla*, even on this short cruise, was making much water through the bearings of the propeller and the seams of the stern. They worked day and night to stop these leaks with cement, finally making the vessel nearly water-tight, but making it absolutely impossible to use her engines.

On the morning of the 27th I sailed with the vessels to cover the entrance to the port of Subig. The *Castilla* was taken to the northeast point of the Isla Grande to defend the western entrance, since the eastern entrance had already been closed with the hulks of the *San Quintin* and two old merchant-vessels which were sunk there.

With much disgust I found that the guns which should have been mounted on that island still needed a month and a half to be got in position. This surprised me, as the shore batteries that the navy had installed (with no little difficulty) at the entrance of the bay of Manila, under the intelligent direction of colonel of naval artillery Señor

Garcés and Lieutenant-Commander Benavente, were ready to fire twenty-four days after the commencement of the work.

I was also disgusted that so little confidence was to be placed in the efficacy of the few torpedoes which they had found feasible to put there.

The entrance being thus undefended by torpedoes or by the batteries of the island, the squadron would have had to bear, with its poor means of action, the attack of the Americans in forty metres of water; therefore it was almost certain that our ships would not only be destroyed, but that they could not save their crews. I still held a hope that the Americans would not go to Subig, and give us time for more preparations, but the following day I received from the Spanish consul at Hong-Kong a telegram which said: "Enemy's squadron sailed at 2 P. M. from Mirs Bay, and according to reliable accounts, is bound for Subig to destroy our squadron, and then will go to Manila."

This telegram demonstrated that the enemy knew where they should find my squadron and that the port of Subig had no defences.

The same day, the 28th of April, I convened a council of the captains, and all, with the exception of Del Rio, chief of the new arsenal, thought that the situation was unsustainable and that we should go to the bay of Manila in order to accept there the battle under less unfavorable conditions.

The idea of placing our ships near the city of Manila was rejected because, far from defending it, this would provoke the enemy to bombard the plaza, which would infallibly have been demolished on account of its few defences. It was unanimously decided that we should take position in the bay of Cañacao, in the least water possible, in order to be able to combine our fire with that of the batteries of Point Sangley and the Ulloa.

I immediately ordered Del Rio to concentrate his forces in the most strategic point of the arsenal, making every preparation to burn the coal and stores before allowing them to fall into the power of the enemy. I sent the *Don Juan de Austria* to Manila to get a large number of lighters filled with sand to defend the water-line of the *Castilla* (which could not move) against the enemy's shells and torpedoes. At 10.30 A. M. on the 29th I left Subig with the vessels of my squadron, towing the *Castilla* by the transport Manila.

In the evening of the same day we anchored in the Gulf of Cañacao in eight metres of water. On the following morning, April 30, the *Cristina*, *Don Juan de Austria*, *Don Juan de Ulloa*, *Luzon*, *Cuba*, and *Marques del Duero* were anchored, with springs, in line of battle, while the transport *Manila* was sent to the Bacoor roads to join the *Velasco* and *Lezo*, which were undergoing repairs.

At 7 P. M. I received a telegram from Subig announcing that the enemy's squadron had entered the port at 3, reconnoitring, doubtless seeking our ships, and that they left directed for Manila.

It is clear from the foregoing that the Spanish sailors were far from inactive; that in fact they did all that gallant men could have done under the uncheerful circumstances in which they were placed and had in part selected. The refusal of the governor to allow the squadron to place itself in a situation where the guns at Manila could be used in its partial defence was fatal to any prospect of success. Not having left the bay, it was the one course left. Damage to Manila could not from a national point of view be commensurate with the loss of the archipelago, and this latter was the real risk which the governor insisted upon taking. He could not recognize that a great question was in his hands to decide as might be best for Spain, not for Manila.

The American force was as follows:

SHIP	TONS	SPEED	8 IN	6 IN.	5 IN. R. F.	6 PDR.	LESSER GUNS	DECK	TORP. TUBES	COMPLEMENT
Olympia	5,870	21.68	4	..	10	14	10	4.7	6	412
Baltimore	4,413	20.09	4	6	..	4	10	4	..	386
Boston	3,000	15.6	2	6	..	..	6	1.5	..	278
Raleigh	3,213	19	..	1	10	8	6	2.5	4	314
Concord	1,710	16.8	..	6	..	2	7	.3	..	195
Petrel	892	11.79	..	4	..	..	7	.3	..	122
	19,098	....	10	23	20	28	46	..	10	1,707

The ships under Admiral Montojo which the American squadron was to meet in action, were:

SHIP	TONS	SPEED	6.3 IN.	5.9 IN.	4.7 IN.	3.4 IN.	3 IN.	2.24 IN.	LESSER GUNS	DECK	TORP. TUBES	COMPLEMENT
Reina Cristina	3,520	13.98	6	..	..	..	..	3	12	..	5	409
Castilla	3,260	13	..	4	2	..	2	..	14	..	2	369
Isla de Cuba	1,045	14	..	..	4	..	..	2	4	2.5	3	187
Isla de Luzon	1,045	14.14	..	..	4	..	..	2	4	2.5	3	187
D. Juan de Austria	1,159	14.5	..	..	4	..	..	..	9	..	2	209
D. Antonio de Ulloa[1]	1,160	12.5	..	..	4	..	..	..	9	..	2	189
Marques del Duero	500	10	1	..	2	..	..	..	1	..	..	114
	11,689	....	7	4	20	2	2	7	53	..	17	1,664

NOTE:—The complements are taken from the Spanish navy list and are of course nominal. The *Castilla*, being a receiving ship, could scarcely have a definite crew. Montojo's Defence (*Ante la Opinion y Ante la Historia*, p. 149) gives 1,134 as the total.

[1] Two of the *Ulloa's* guns had been removed to shore batteries.

To the list of Spanish guns afloat, which were to be in action, should be added those which could be used at Cavite and Sangley Point; to repeat somewhat, these were the two 6-inch Armstrong muzzle-loading rifles mounted at Fort San Felipe in Cavite arsenal, and which could have been fired over the ships, two 5.9-inch breech-loading rifles (Ordoñez) at Sangley Point, and one 4.7-inch at Cañacao, about a mile south-west of Sangley Point.

The *Castilla*[1] was a wooden ship built in 1881, and used as a receiving ship. Her condition was as described in Admiral Montojo's report, just given. The *Ulloa*, though under repairs, and with two of her four 4.7-inch guns removed ashore, was to take her place in Montojo's line. The guns of the *Velasco* and *General Lezo*, both of which were repairing, had gone to strengthen Boca Chica and Boca Grande; their crews re-enforced those of the other ships. The surveying vessel *Argos*, with one small gun, and the *Mindinao* and *Manila*, transports, the latter of which carried three small guns from 3.15 to 2.75 inches, were under the shelter of Cavite.[2]

Summarizing the more effective guns afloat, which were to be used in the coming action, we have:

AMERICAN	SPANISH
10 8-inch	7 6.3-inch
23 6-inch	4 5.9-inch
20 5-inch	20 4.7-inch
	11 3.4 to 2.24-inch

The disproportion in gun-power, and the even greater disproportion in mobility (facts easily available to the Spanish naval officers from the official and other publications which give the qualities of naval ships in completest detail), naturally wrought despair in the heart of the Spanish commander. His acquiescence in doing exactly that which he should not have done: accepting battle wholly unsupported by the shore defences of Manila,

[1] Pronounced Casteelya.

[2] Though the presence of mines in the waters between Manila and Cavite was long mooted, definite information to the author from Spanish officers makes it certain that none existed.

strengthened as they might have been by the guns from what would have been the inshore batteries of the ships, removed any hope. The navy yard at Cavite should have been abandoned to its fate. That the ships would have been finally destroyed even in such a position by the longer-range eight-inch guns of the American squadron may be taken to have been almost as sure as their destruction at Cavite, but the Spanish would have fought under more heartening conditions and they would at least have had chances which did not exist at the point selected. The going to almost certain destruction at Cavite was but another sacrifice to *pundonor* such as that now just taken in sending Cervera's ships to the Caribbean.

In view of what has just been said and of the opinions expressed by the writer on the subject of Havana, it is not amiss to quote Mr. H. W. Wilson on the situation at Manila. Apparently the governor-general and the admiral were equally averse to subjecting the city and its population to bombardment. "But," says Wilson, "though few will blame Montojo for his anxiety to save the civilian population from suffering any injury, it was a military mistake not to take position under the far more powerful batteries of Manila [rather than under those of Cavite], when the issue of the engagement might have been different. The general or admiral must in war steel his heart and neglect no advantage."[1] The stake played for admits of nothing less.

It is six hundred and twenty miles from Mirs Bay to Manila, a distance which the American squadron at its ordinary cruising speed of eight knots would cover in three days. At 2 P. M. on April 27, the squadron started to the southward and eastward across the smooth sea of the season. No concealment was attempted; lights were carried as in ordinary cruising and electric signals freely exchanged. On their way across, the ships were stripped of their superfluous woodwork, of which so much existed in all men-of-war of their date. Says Lieutenant Fiske, who was navigator on the *Petrel:* "Probably the principal thing remembered about the trip to Manila by most of the

[1] Wilson, *The Downfall of Spain*, 132.

people in the American column is the enormous quantity of woodwork flung overboard by the ships." Chain cables were wound around the ammunition hoists, and all chests and other articles of wood not absolutely necessary and which had not already been put aboard the transports, were thrown overboard along with the wooden bulkheads.

The venture of the American commander was somewhat a leap in the dark. "The real problem was that of finding the enemy's ships. However defective they might be in offensive power and in mobility, they had their choice of a dozen harbors within a day's run of their naval base." [1]

Very little information had been received as to the Spanish preparations because very little existed, as we have seen in the report of Admiral Montojo, on account of vacillation of policy, even among the Spaniards themselves. There was no certainty as to the whereabouts of the Spanish squadron, though it was rumored that it had gone to Subig, which had been regarded by the Spaniards themselves as the natural naval base for the defence of Manila to the extent that they had begun, years before, the establishment at Olongapo, within the bay, of a naval arsenal. It was practically certain, however, that the squadron had not, and could not in the short interval which had elapsed since previous information, have left the vicinity of Manila Bay.

The *Olympia's* log for Saturday, April 30, begins with, "Light breeze from E. by S.; weather clear and warm. Bright starlight, moon set at 12.55. At 2.45 sighted Cape Bolinao a half point on port bow." The fair and pleasant weather and smooth sea continued, and the whole day was spent in skirting the western shore of Luzon toward Subig Bay. At 5 A. M. the *Boston* and *Concord* had been sent ahead to reconnoitre Subig, where it was expected the Spanish squadron might be found. At 10.40 A. M. the *Zafiro* had been ordered to speak a Spanish fishing-boat, which, however, could give no news, and at 11.20 the *Baltimore* was sent ahead also to join the other two scouts, the remainder of the squadron standing on steadily at eight

[1] Lieutenant Calkins, "Naval Campaign of Manila Bay," *Proceedings Naval Institute*, June, 1899, vol. XXV, 269.

knots. Many fishing-vessels were sighted during the forenoon watch.

At 5.15 the whole squadron, with no news of the enemy, was together off the entrance to Subig Bay, which had been examined to the very head, ten miles within. Shortly after, all the captains of the fighting-ships were ordered aboard the flag-ship for consultation and final instructions. At this time (5.30) was the usual evening muster of the crew at quarters, and ammunition was now got up and supplied at all the guns. At 6.24 the squadron stood S. 36° E. for Boca Grande, the main entrance to Manila Bay, thirty-five miles away.

The early nightfall of the tropics had now set in:

> As darkness slowly descended the scene took on a character at once soothing and disturbing; soothing, because everything was so beautiful and so calm; disturbing, because of the grim preparations evident. The guns were all ready; considerable ammunition was on deck, and the men lay or sat or stood by their guns. As few lamps as possible were lit, and all lights which would shine outward were screened, except one small light over the stern of each ship. The night was clear and calm, and the hours from 8 to 12 rather dragged. There was nothing to do, for all preparations had been made; there was nothing to see, except the dim outlines of a few ships and the vague outline of the coast two or three miles distant; and there was nothing to hear, except the sound of the engine and the swish of the water along the sides.[1]

It was moonlight when not obscured by passing clouds; warm with occasional flashes of lightning, and sometimes a passing shower; a true tropic night.

Approaching the entrance, the *Olympia* went to quarters at 9.42. She entered the channel on a course S. 68° E. The lights on Corregidor and Caballo Islands and on San Nicolas bank were found extinguished. The course was changed to east when the west end of Corregidor bore north, distant 3.7 miles. At 11.55 *El Fraile* (*The Friar*) bore south distant half a mile. Course was then changed to the northward and eastward. Signal lights, says the log, were observed and reports of guns heard, but as no flash was seen the position of the batteries could not be fixed.

[1] Lieutenant (now Captain) Fiske, *United Service Magazine*, Jan., 1902, 25.

At 12.17 A. M. in the next watch, the *Olympia's* log notes: "At 12.17 the *Raleigh* and ships astern and *Baltimore* began firing, shots having been fired from batteries along the south side of the channel."

The incident is noted by the other ships in the usual compressed language of the log-book; in that of the *Baltimore:* "Several shots were exchanged by a shore battery near Point de la Restinga." The *Raleigh's* says: "About 12.10, when Fraile Island was close abeam, saw a flash on the island. Shortly afterward another flash, then a gun was fired and a shell passed close over us, striking the water ahead. We replied with after 5-inch starboard side. The shore battery fired four more shells at *Concord* and *Boston*, which were answered, and firing ceased." The *Boston's* log says: "At 12.10 . . . the fleet was fired on by a battery on the southern shore, this single shot being followed by another after an interval of about six minutes. The *Concord* replied with three shots, the *McCulloch* with three, and this vessel with one."

The little action was thus quickly over, and no stop being made by the squadron they were soon out of sight and range. No attention was paid to the question of mines, as the great difficulty of mining so deep and broad a channel is, as already mentioned, well understood by every naval seaman.[1] All watertight doors, however, were closed in case of any possible accident of the kind.

Says Lieutenant Calkins:

As soon as our ships were clear of the danger space in the channels of entrance they commanded the bay with excellent anchorages anywhere within a circumference of sixty miles. This security led to some talk of clearing ship for action by getting rid of the boats. The *Olympia* had a dozen big wooden boats inconveniently arranged on cradles, requiring two hours' work of the ship's company, unassisted by steam winches, to launch them overboard. The other ships had their boats swung at davits and might have lowered them in a few min-

[1] Thus Admiral Dewey, on inquiry of May 12 from the navy department asking if in case of attack by a superior force he "would desire submarine mines," replied, May 20: "I do not consider submarine mines practicable here on account of great depth and width of bay and entrance." Appendix to "Report of Bureau of Navigation," 1898, 100.

utes. Of course the danger from fire and splinters was recognized, but it was not convenient to do the work after dusk and the sighting of the Spanish fleet at dawn disposed of any notion of precautionary delays. Yet it must be held as a wonder that no damage was done to the boats by the enemy's fire, and that our own fire was unobstructed by flames or fragments from these boats. Those carried outboard were generally wrecked by concussion, so that the *Olympia* had the advantage for this exceptional occasion.[1]

It was a run of twenty-two miles from the Friar to Manila, directly toward which the squadron stood. Speed was slowed so as not to arrive before daylight. The lights of the city were visible at 3 o'clock. The *McCulloch*, *Nanshan*, and *Zafiro* were now detached from the column and ordered out of range of the batteries. The situation at daybreak is well described by Lieutenant Fiske:

I was aroused from my sleep by a noise at my door and a voice saying, "The captain wishes to see you on the bridge." "What about?" I said sleepily. "I don't know," he said, "but it is ten minutes to 5, and they have begun to shoot at us." Then I aroused my dormant senses and realized the fact that I was about to go into battle for the first time. When I reported to the captain on the bridge, he simply smiled and said, "All right." I looked ahead in the dim morning light and saw the *Olympia*, *Baltimore*, and *Raleigh*, and ahead of them a great number of masts, which looked very indistinct. I heard the sound of one or two very distant guns ahead and saw their smoke. "The Spanish fleet is over there," said the captain, pointing over on our starboard side; and there could be discerned a few indistinct shapes that looked like ships. All the men were congregated about their guns, and the guns were loaded. A few were getting some coffee and crackers at the galley and the scene about the deck was as quiet and peaceful as I had ever seen it.

No stop was made, the squadron standing steadily in toward the city, its movements known to the Spanish commander from the moment of its passing Cape Bolinao.

Cavite, says Lieutenant Calkins (who, as navigating officer of the *Olympia*, was on the bridge with Commodore Dewey), was not reconnoitred in approaching from the westward. "At 5 o'clock we were three miles west of the mouth of the river

[1] Calkins, "Historical and Professional Notes on the Naval Campaign of Manila Bay," *Proceedings, U. S. Naval Institute*, June, 1899, 274.

which divides Manila. Sixteen merchantmen were counted; no steamers, no cruisers, lay off the city. Not many minutes



later the Spanish line was made out stretching to the eastward off Sangley Point [six miles away], in front of the white buildings of the arsenal." [1]

The *Olympia* turned to the right, followed "at distance" (four hundred yards between each ship) by the *Baltimore*, *Raleigh*, *Petrel*, *Concord*, and *Boston* in the order named.

The column stood to the southward, parallel to the shore, the

[1] It is six and a half nautical miles from the mouth of the river Pasig, which runs through the middle of Manila, to Sangley Point.

Olympia having the Spanish squadron well on the starboard bow. Fire had been opened by the guns of the Manila batteries, which was returned by the *Concord*, but the range of the Spanish guns, which continued their aimless cannonade through the coming action, was not sufficient to do harm. The squadron continued south.

"No attempt," says Calkins, "was made to count the enemy's force, or to identify individual vessels. Our own line was miscounted, and the *Helena* was added to the list in the report of the Spanish admiral. There was no occasion for close comparisons; general information served to convince us that our six cruisers could defeat all the vessels that Spain had in the Philippines, especially if they chose to lie massed and motionless within easy range of open waters deep enough for safe navigation. There were seven of them in line, as it turned out; two of them, the *Castilla* and *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, were moored with springs on their cables. The others steamed about in an aimless fashion, often masking their comrades' fire, occasionally dodging back to the shelter of the arsenal, and now and then making isolated and ineffectual rushes in advance-rushes which had no rational significance except as demonstrations of the point of honor. They were mere flourishes of desperation inspired by defeat."

The first shell came from Sangley Point, but fell short, as did also a shot fired by the *Olympia* to try the range, but she was still six miles or more from the Spanish squadron, the fire of which now grew more rapid as the American line advanced. When at an estimated range of fifty-five hundred yards (somewhat over three land-miles), the *Olympia*, with the Spanish squadron still on her starboard bow, fired an 8-inch shell from one of the forward turret-guns, and stood on nearly another mile, and turning westward opened with a general fire.

At this moment there was a distraction from the main objective, thus described by Lieutenant Calkins:

A small steam-launch with awnings spread and a big Spanish ensign streaming astern, advanced from the cove behind Sangley Point, crossed the bows of the *Olympia*, and then turned toward the shore as

if to lie in wait for that formidable antagonist. There could be but one interpretation of this movement: this was a torpedo-boat, and she had to be treated as such. Secondary batteries began to pick up the range and their shells were soon veiling the target in spray and smoke. A few rounds were fired from even the main batteries, while the marines did all that may be accomplished with Springfields at twelve hundred yards range. Yet the reckless craft still floated, though no longer able to steam or disposed to use any weapon. She drifted ashore under the guns at Sangley Point, where she continued to draw fire from the six-pounders, in spite of keen remonstrance from high authorities, until the action was over.

It seems proved that the launch was no deadly microbe, but only a humble market-boat, manned by Filipinos and bound to Manila by direction of the English family residing at Cañacao. The literal oriental manner of executing domestic routine amid the shock and thunder of battle eliminates the heroic from an action of amazing rashness. But the moral of this incident is all on the side of genuine torpedo-boats. Here was a conspicuous craft slowly executing the traditional manœuvres of torpedo attack, and awaiting the advance of a squadron not undistinguished in the annals of naval gunnery—a squadron which surpassed its enemy by a score of one hundred to one. Yet the frail hull was not shattered, nor the boilers exploded. Even the crew escaped with their lives, though a shot had pierced the steam cylinder. The boat was repaired and fitted to carry generals by the time that American troops appeared on the scene.[1]

The distance taken up by the American squadron was determined by the depths shown on the charts. It was not considered safe to take the *Olympia*, drawing twenty-four feet, into less than about five fathoms. Thus on reaching the five-fathom curve the column, steaming at six knots, turned westward and at 5.41 began firing at a range of about four thousand yards (two sea-miles),[2] which was decreased to about twenty-five hundred yards off Sangley Point, where the column "countermarched," returning nearly over its former track. The advance was thus at angle with the general line of the Spanish ships, making a gradually decreasing distance which brought

[1] Calkins, 276.

[2] The time and distances are those given by the *Olympia;* the reports from the other ships are as follows: *Boston* began firing 5.35, continued at varying distances; *Raleigh* "a few minutes after 5" (no distances); *Baltimore* began firing at 5.40, distance 6,000 yards, later 5,000 to 2,600; *Concord* (no report of time or distance); *Petrel* began firing 5.22, at 5,000 yards.

even six-pounders into effective action. This was, of course, to the relative advantage of the Spanish, as it brought the American ships well within range of the lighter batteries of the former. An equality of conditions was offered the Spanish which, through their want of anything to offset the American 8-inch guns, would have been almost wholly absent had Commodore Dewey chosen to fight at long taw. The battle was thus far less unequal than the comparison of armaments would indicate and became a contest of marksmanship.

Five times the American squadron thus passed before the Spanish position, thrice to the west, twice to the east, turning each time with port helm.[1]

To continue Lieutenant Calkins's excellent and graphic account:

Animated by desperate counsels, Spanish vessels had made one or two attempts to advance to meet us in front of their line. Only one of these efforts was persistent or significant enough to be remembered. As we stood to the eastward on our third passage along the zone of fire, the *Reina Cristina*, bearing the flag of Admiral Montojo, was seen to detach herself from her consorts and to approach a gap in the line, with the apparent purpose of coming to close quarters with the *Olympia*, which had just changed her course sixty degrees to the southward of her previous tracks toward the turning point. The two flag-ships seemed closing rapidly, but the Spaniard had only advanced a ship's length or so beyond his line before his progress was arrested by a hail of concentrated fire which produced immediate and visible results. His speed slackened; smoke puffed out forward and aft; a white plume of escaping steam showed that his motive power was crippled, and an awkward turn, exposing the unprotected stern, suggested that his steering-gear had met the same fate. The beaten flag-ship crept toward the arsenal, where she grounded, burned, and blew up during the morning. We all saw that she was disabled, but it required some hours to demonstrate her destruction.

Hitherto there had been much disappointment among those who tried to observe the effect of our fire. Some of the gun-boats had seemed to flinch and had dodged in and out near the arsenal. The

[1] There has been some confusion of statement as to the manner in which these turns were made, but that of the *Boston's* log would seem to fix this rather than later memory. The log says: "(4 to 8 A. M.) . . . This action was fought at an average range of three thousand yards, the fleet steaming twice around an ellipse, turning with port helm and engaging the enemy with both batteries." The log of the *Petrel* uses the phrase "around in circle."

white bulwarks of the *Castilla* had been scarred and blackened by our fire, but even her wooden hull had not burst into flames after two hours of brisk bombardment. Annoyed by this delay in destruction, the commander-in-chief had decided to try the effect of stationary practice. The signal was made to prepare to anchor; the *Petrel* was warned to detach herself for turning the eastern end of the Spanish line. The station selected for the *Olympia* lay well inside the five-fathom curve, and within two thousand yards of the centre of the enemy's position. The course had been changed to south-east when the *Cristina's* advance was noted. Since she had to be met underway, the signals were annulled. Anxiety in regard to the swinging of the ship when anchored was thus removed; it was a case of applying the maxim, "Ef know wind and know tide, know telling," written by an aspiring but unliterary mariner during the present year of grace. Doubtless the time for closing and finishing with the enemy was at hand, but the experiences of target practice, supplemented by that of this action, fail to show that any advantage would result from anchoring. Twin screws enable vessels to be pointed as well as to be held in their stations. But the circling movement in column had not failed in practice and might have been continued until resistance was crushed. In fact, one more turn was made and our ships passed to the westward of Sangley Point in unchanged order.

It has been assumed by remote interpreters of the lessons of this contest that the Spanish fire was promptly silenced or smothered by the superiority of our broadsides. There was a visible falling-off in the rapidity of the enemy's shooting, but, judging from our own experience, we attributed this to the expenditure of accumulated stores of ammunition—our decks were soon cleaned of great mounds of rapid-fire shells—and to the obstructive effects of smoke. In accuracy the Spanish gunners had neither gained nor lost; they could drop shells close alongside or they could send them soaring aloft. But each ship seemed to carry its own charmed circle—not always of large circumference either, since one seemed to count a hundred shells within a ship's length during the two hours of actual combat. Of course, these shells, which burst before our eyes, scattered radial showers of fragments which cut rigging and scored spars, and there is a record of some half a dozen actual hits, though nothing larger than a six-pounder accomplished both penetration and explosion. But the fact remains that the enemy was not silenced after two hours' work, and that none of his ships were structurally destroyed or obviously disabled during the period when our fire was returned.

The two largest Spanish ships, the *Reina Cristina* and the *Castilla*, had visibly suffered; flames had been seen to burst out in both; but the fire of the squadron had not visibly slackened

to any great extent. The action had lasted about two hours; a report of shortage of ammunition was started in the *Olympia*, and this determined the commodore to haul off and take an account of stock and damages. Mr. J. L. Stickney, formerly an officer of the navy, now a correspondent of the *New York Herald* aboard the *Olympia*,[1] says:

When we hauled off from the fighting line at 7.36 o'clock, the situation had become apparently serious for Commodore Dewey. We had been fighting a determined and courageous enemy for more than two hours without noticeably diminishing the volume of his fire. It is true, at least three of his ships had broken into flames, but so had one of ours—the *Boston*. These fires had all been put out without apparent injury to the ships. Generally speaking, nothing of great importance had occurred to show that we had seriously injured any Spanish vessel. They were all steaming about in the bight back of Sangley Point, or in Bacoor Bay, as actively as when we first sighted them in the early dawn. So far, therefore, we could see nothing indicating that the enemy was less able to defend his position than he had been at the beginning.

On the other hand, our condition was greatly altered for the worse. There remained in the magazines of the *Olympia* only eighty-five rounds of 5-inch ammunition, and though the stock of 8-inch charges were not proportionately depleted, it was reduced enough to make the continuance of the battle for another two hours impossible. When it is remembered that Commodore Dewey was more than seven thousand miles from a home port, and that under the most favorable conditions a supply of ammunition could not be obtained in less than a month, the outlook was far from being satisfactory. The commodore knew that the Spaniards had just received an ample supply of ammunition in the transport *Mindanao*, so that there was no hope of exhausting their fighting power by an action lasting twice as long. If we should run short of powder and shell, we might become the hunted instead of the hunters.

I do not exaggerate in the least when I say that, as we hauled off into the bay, the gloom on the bridge of the *Olympia* was thicker than a London fog in November. Neither Commodore Dewey nor any of the staff believed that the Spanish ships had been sufficiently injured by our fire to prevent them from renewing the battle quite as furiously as they had previously fought. Indeed, we had all been distinctly disappointed in the results of our fire. Our projectiles seemed to go too high or too low—just as had been the case with those fired by the Spaniards. Several times the commodore had expressed dissatis-

[1] Mr. Stickney acted as an aid to Commodore Dewey during the battle.

faction with the failure of our gunners to hit the enemy. We had begun the firing at too great a distance, but we had gradually worked in further on each of the turns, until we were within about twenty-five hundred yards at the close of the fifth round. At that distance, in a smooth sea, we ought to have made a large percentage of hits; yet, so far as we could judge, we had not sensibly crippled the foe. Consequently Commodore Dewey hauled out into the open bay at the end of the fifth round to take stock of ammunition and devise a new plan of attack.

As I went aft the men asked me what we were hauling off for. They were in a distinctly different humor from that which prevailed on the bridge. They believed that they had done well, and that the other ships had done likewise. The *Olympia* cheered the *Baltimore*, and the *Baltimore* returned the cheers with interest. The gun-captains were not at all dissatisfied with the results of their work. Whether they had a better knowledge of the accuracy of their aim than we had on the bridge, or whether they took it for granted that the enemy must have suffered severely after so much fighting, I do not know; but, at any rate, they were eager to go on with the battle, and were confident of victory. I told one of them that we were merely hauling off for breakfast, which statement elicited the appeal to Captain Lamberton, as he came past a moment later:

"For God's sake, captain, don't let us stop now. To hell with breakfast!"

Lieutenant Calkins's account says of this incident:

Since there has been so much public discussion of the motive for hauling off to the northward and discontinuing our fire at 7.30 A. M., it may be well to submit a reconciling statement to harmonize popular notions with official records. We did not stop fighting because our men were hungry, and there was no shortage of ammunition. Nevertheless, some seventeen hundred Americans did eat a hearty, though scrambling, breakfast during the next hour. The last meal seemed to belong to a different historic epoch, although the *Olympia's* people had had lukewarm coffee at four o'clock. Some ships' companies had missed even that unsatisfying refreshment. Few were glad to stop fighting, even for the sake of food, but all had a general sense of victory, though details remained questionable and the enemy's flag was still aloft when we ceased firing. It is true that there was some concern over the state of our ammunition rooms until the task of restowing and counting was completed. The weak point in the *Olympia* was the supply of shell for her ten 5-inch rapid-fire guns. These splendid weapons had consumed three hundred and fifty shells in two hours—nearly forty per cent of the original supply. But a mere verbal under-

standing had carried a more depressed account to those in authority, and the resulting inquiry consumed time and interrupted the battle. The 8-inch guns could hardly have expended their projectiles in a week's fighting and the 6-pounders were equally overstocked.

All the same, breakfast was not a thing under such circumstances to be despised. The *Olympia* had had nothing but coffee and hard biscuit at 4 o'clock. The immense nervous and physical strain of an early morning battle makes tremendous demands upon the powers of men. Even if given a sufficient breakfast, a 4-o'clock appetite is not generally such as to induce them to take much food. Hunger under the conditions of a long-continued action makes paramount demands, and the action apparently lengthening itself indefinitely, it was not unwise in the circumstances from this consideration alone to give his squadron the increased fighting power which would come to his seventeen hundred men from full bellies. The remark of Napoleon that an army "travels on its belly" is doubly and trebly true when it comes to battle.

Count of the ammunition was ordered, and it was found that fear of shortage was not justified.

The captains were called aboard at 8.40 to report and the surprise was great when it was found that there were no serious casualties, and that the damage to the ships had been of the slightest. The *Olympia* had an indentation of one and one-half inches on the starboard side of the superstructure just forward of the 5-inch sponson, three deck planks slightly torn up on the starboard side of the forecastle, the strong back of the gig's davits slightly damaged, a hole between frames 65 and 66 on the starboard side below the main-deck rail, made by a 6-pounder, a lashing of port whale-boat davit shot away; one of the rail stanchions carried away outside of port gangway, and a slight indentation in the hull starboard side. The *Raleigh* was struck by a 6-pounder, which passed through a whale-boat and glanced along the chase of the 6-pounder gun on the starboard side of the poop without injuring the gun or striking a man. On the *Boston* a 4.7-inch shell had pierced the foremast thirteen feet seven inches above the upper deck. Three 2.7-inch shells had struck five feet forward of port midship 6-inch gun five feet above the gun-deck; another, fourteen inches above the waterline, passing through a state-room on the port side, wrecking by explosion the berth and drawers; the third struck the

hammock netting, exploding in the chart-room and causing a fire sufficient to be noticed by other ships during the action. A shell had also grazed the main topmast just below the cap. The *Concord* was not hit. The *Petrel* was struck below the hawse-pipe by a piece of bursting shell. The *Baltimore*, which offered an unusually large target from her height above the water, had suffered more severely. She was struck five times. The most serious hit, happily attended with no serious injury to any one, came from a 4.7-inch steel projectile, which entered the ship's side forward of the starboard gangway, about a foot above the line of the main deck. It passed through the hammock netting, downward through the deck plank and steel deck, bending and cracking the deck beam in wardroom state-room No. 5, then glancing upward through the after engine-room coaming, over against the after cylinder of No. 3.6-inch gun (port), carrying away lug and starting several shield bolts and putting the gun out of commission; deflected over the starboard side, striking a ventilator ladder and dropping on deck. In its passage it struck a box of 3-pounder ammunition of the fourth division, exploding several charges, and wounded Lieutenant Kellogg, Ensign Irwin, and six men of the gun's crew—none very seriously. A second shot came in about a foot above the berth-deck, just forward of the blowers, passed through the thwartship alleyway, hitting the exhaust pipe of the starboard blower, causing a slight leak. A third shot struck about two feet above the water-line on the port side, abreast bunker B-110, passed into the bunker, cutting blower drain and main air-duct, and exploding in bunker. A fourth shot came in about six feet above the berth-deck, starboard side, abreast the forward end of the forward washroom, and broke up in a clothes locker. A fifth struck the starboard ventilator, slightly bending it. The upper cabin skylight, the after range-finder, and the two whale-boats hanging at the davits were all destroyed by the shock of discharge from the 8-inch guns of the second division.[1]

During the hours devoted to refreshments, to counting ammunition, and to consultation, the Spanish line was seen melting away; the

[1] Reports of the captains, *Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix 73 *et seq.*

Castilla in flames, the *Reina Cristina* blowing up as her magazines kindled, and the smaller vessels taking refuge behind the arsenal. Only the *Don Juan de Ulloa* kept her ensign flying and maintained her station close to the battery on Sangley Point. Two guns from this earthwork and two 24-cm. guns from the battery on the luneta south of the bastions of Manila still roared ineffectually at intervals. Four or five miles north of Sangley Point engines were stopped and our cruisers gathered in irregular groups, which continued to draw the enemy's fire. Now and then a shell splashed within a few hundred feet of one ship or another, but these demonstrations had lost interest. When we first found ourselves in range of the batteries at the entrance only twelve hours before, every nerve was strained and every gun was ready to answer the enemy's fire. Now we could wait while our crews finished breakfast and cheered themselves hoarse when comrades passed within hail or the enemy's ships exploded.

Uncertainty as to the enemy's condition and anxiety about the supply of ammunition served to obscure the magnificent completeness of our victory. Blockade was the next step of belligerent action, and the question was raised whether that operation could not be more safely conducted from the port of Mariveles at the entrance of the bay and twenty-five miles below Manila. Fortunately, it was soon made plain that only a shattered remnant could oppose absolute occupation of the whole bay.[1]

It soon became clear that no further resistance of importance was to be expected from the Spanish ships, and that the work remaining was in the form of an aftermath. "The Spanish cruiser *Reina Cristina*," says the log of the *Baltimore*, "was observed to be hauling into shoal water behind Sangley Point, on fire fore and aft; a gun-boat behind same point appeared to be aground or sunk in shoal water; a large merchant transport lay beached and abandoned under shore batteries on Sangley Point; and two gun-boats were retiring behind mole at Cavite. At 9.15 the captain visited the flag-ship, returning at 10.40. At 10.15 the Spanish cruiser *Castilla* was observed to haul down her flag and to be on fire, and the *Reina Cristina* to be completely destroyed by fire and explosion."

While aboard the *Olympia*, Captain Dyer, of the *Baltimore*, was directed to intercept a steamer coming up the bay, reported to be flying the Spanish colors. Soon after starting he discovered her to be British and so reported. In the meantime, at 10.50

[1] Calkins, p. 286.

general signal had been made to follow the motions of the flag-ship, and five minutes later the *Baltimore*, by the course she had taken being two miles south south-west of the flag-ship and, by so much, nearer Cavite, was directed to lead. The general signal was made, "Attack the enemy's batteries or earthworks," and the whole squadron stood in, the order being the *Baltimore*, *Olympia*, *Raleigh*, *Boston*, *Concord*, and *Petrel*.

The *Baltimore*, favored by her start, moved into a position off the Cañacao and Sangley Point batteries and opened fire with starboard battery at about 2,800 yards, closing in to 2,200, between which and 2,700 yards our best work was done, slowing the ship dead slow, stopping the engines as range was obtained, delivering a rapid and accurate fire upon the shore batteries and a gun-boat just inside of Sangley Point, since proven to have been the *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, practically silencing the batteries in question before the fire of another ship became effective, owing to the lead we had obtained in our start for the supposed Spanish steamer.[1]

The *Raleigh*, when signal was made to re-engage, started ahead at full speed (using reserve speed) to keep up with the flag-ship, but it was found to be impossible, and falling behind all the time I cut across to join line abreast of Cavite battery just as the flag-ship passed the *Baltimore* and that fort, at which time we opened fire with all guns. At 12, in obedience to signal, this vessel attempted to get into the inner harbor to destroy the enemy's vessels, but getting into shoal water—twenty feet—was obliged to withdraw and so reported. While attempting to get inside, the battery was used on an enemy vessel at anchor (supposed to be the *Don Antonio de Ulloa*) until she sank. Not being able to find a channel farther inside, and everything in sight having been destroyed, this vessel at 1.30 P. M. withdrew, and later anchored near the flag-ship.[2]

The *Concord* was signalled to destroy a steamer which, after the first action, had been run ashore near Las Pinas, some four miles eastward across the bay from Sangley Point. In passing, the *Concord* fired with great effect with her 6-inch guns at the curtain of the fort at Cavite, and at two of the vessels. Opening fire on the steamer ashore from a distance of 2,500 yards, the latter's crew deserted her in some ten boats and landed on the beach. Before the two boats lowered by the *Con-*

[1] Captain Dyer's report.
[2] Captain Coghlan's report.

cord for the purpose of setting fire to the ship had reached her, she burst into flames and was soon wholly destroyed.

It turned out that this was the mail-steamer *Isla de Mindanao,* which had been advertised to leave for Barcelona May 7. She had just arrived and was advised, April 30, by Admiral Montojo to go to Singapore, as the American squadron could probably not get to the entrance of the bay before midnight. But with the common paralysis which seemed to seize the Spanish mind in such an emergency, the captain did nothing except to follow the admiral's permission to anchor in shallow water as near as possible to Bacoor. He seems, from the admiral's report, to have based his inaction on the fact that "he was not authorized by the Trans-Atlantic (Company) to leave the port."[1]

The chief engineer Duncan McKinlay, a British subject, in his report to the office of the Trasatlantica Company in Madrid, says:

> At 1 o'clock P. M. two American cruisers came toward the *Mindanao.* All of us officers were on deck, wondering what they wanted to do with our ship and ourselves, when they suddenly opened a galling fire on us. After the first few shots, fire broke out in the captain's cabin, who, seeing that it would be futile to remain on board, ordered the crew to take to the boats, which was done in good order, while the enemy continued to fire on the ship. Luckily no casualties occurred either on board the *Mindanao* or in the boats, nor while landing on the beach, although the shells fell very near.[2]

The *Ulloa* seems to have served as a general target. Says Lieutenant Fiske of the *Petrel:*

> We engaged first a vessel, which afterward proved to be the *Don Antonio de Ulloa,* and we fired on her for a long time without seeming

[1] This steamer had aboard two 9-cm. (3.55-inch) guns, but no ammunition. A telegram had been received on April 28 to fit her for war. Says the chief engineer: "At 12.25 not a Spanish flag was flying in the harbor, except from the staff of the sunken cruiser *Don Antonio de Ulloa,* submerged behind Sangley Point. The *Reina Cristina* was a mass of flames and sunk near the bastion at Cavite, and the *Castilla* was burning rapidly in Cañacao Bay. The remaining vessels of the Spanish fleet sought refuge behind the arsenal, and several of them were on fire; the guns at the Cavite and Sangley batteries had almost ceased firing and a white flag appeared upon the sheers at the arsenal." (Report of Lieutenant-Commander Colvocoresses, executive officer of *Concord,* to Commander Walker.

[2] *Admiral Montojo Before Public Opinion and Before History,* 134.

to do much damage or eliciting any reply. We afterward found that the ship had been abandoned, and that, while our projectiles had pierced her a great many times, they had not really inflicted on her any very serious injury. One shell, however, went over to the arsenal, and went through the commandant's house (so we heard afterward), and passed through the dining-room, where a number of people were together. The result was the immediate hauling down of the Spanish flag (12.30 P. M.) and the hoisting of the white flag. As soon as this was known aboard the flag-ship, she hoisted the signal long expected by us, "*Petrel*, pass inside." This signal was shortly followed by another to us to burn the Spanish ships.

These events, as seen ashore, are thus described by the commandant of the Cavite Navy Yard:

The order to sink the ships which had taken refuge in Bacoor Bay having been carried out . . . the enemy had to concentrate his fire on the arsenal, directing against it a furious and destructive cannonade. The situation in a few moments became very serious. The Guadalupe gun useless, the two on the esplanade of the sheers injured, their fire in any case not bearing in the proper direction, left the arsenal without any means of attack against the enemy. The useless cannon being abandoned, the only offensive means were the Mausers with which the men had provided themselves in expectancy of a landing. On their part the ships of the hostile squadron, distributed in the quadrant north-east of the arsenal, swept it, unresisted, with a fierce and destructive fire; it was not a battle, but a slaughter, since the garrison of the arsenal found itself reduced to impotence. The many wounded disembarked from the squadron were forsaken; each instant the fierce fire of the enemy added to their number. Orders were thus given for the concentration of the men behind the lienzo (curtain) south of the wall of Fort San Felipe, the only shelter left the undefended arsenal. This protection lasted but a while, as the *Petrel* came to the south-west without apprehension from the destroyed vessels at Bacoor. She enfiladed the refuge with her guns, firing with impunity against the people collected there and who saw themselves newly uncovered. The means of defence already exhausted, abandoned by the garrison of the army post, which fired not a single shot during this terrible slaughter, and seeing that at each instant the number of victims increased, without advantage or benefit of any kind, Commodore Sostoa determined to sacrifice no more lives and finally ordered the white flag to be hoisted. . . .[1]

[1] *Defensa de General Sostoa*, 80–82. (The title of general is old Spanish usage for commodore and ranks above.)



POSITIONS OF SPANISH SHIPS
AT BEGINNING AND AT END OF ACTION
MAY 1, 1898

The duty of destruction, a work which was naturally to the satisfaction of the Spanish admiral himself, whose code required the destruction of his ships before surrendering, is thus described by Commander Wood in his official report:

Lieutenant Hughes was sent with a whale-boat's crew of seven men, this whale-boat being the only one on the ship which would float, and set fire to the *Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon, General Lezo,* and *Marques del Duero.* Afterward Ensign Fermier was sent to set fire to the *Velasco* and *El Correo* (*Elcano?*). The *Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon,* and *Don Juan de Austria* were aground and full of water when they were fired. Their outboard valves were opened and the ships allowed to fill. The breech-plugs of 4-inch [4.7] guns had been taken off and could not be found. During the night the magazines of the *Don Juan de Austria* blew up. The *Manila* was not burned because the Spanish officers begged that she be not destroyed, because she was unarmed and a coast-survey vessel. Lieutenant Fiske and Passed Assistant Engineer Hall raised steam on the ship this morning, the 4th instant, and brought her out. At the time she was aground. The *Don Antonio de Ulloa* was sunk, and the *Reina Cristina* and *Castilla* were burning in the outer harbor.

Lieutenant Fiske was sent ashore and brought off two tug-boats, the *Râpido* and *Hercules,* and three steam-launches.

I was anchored in Cavite harbor from 12.50 to 5.20 P. M., when I got under way and returned to the fleet.

There were no casualties or accidents of any kind, the ship having been struck only once, just beneath hawse-pipe, by a piece of shell, which burst just as it sank, and threw a column of water over the forecastle.

This plain and matter-of-fact statement, however, should be supplemented by Lieutenant Fiske's admirably graphic account of the ending of the battle.

During the time of the withdrawal of the American fleet the Spaniards had run their ships as close in as the depth of water permitted, and abandoned them. We supposed, of course, that they had laid trains to their magazines, so that the task of burning them would be by no means a safe one. The captain at once told the executive officer, Hughes, to go and burn them, and called for volunteers. The call for volunteers was immediately answered by a chorus of voices, the first being that of a seaman named Sprong, who called out instantly, "Here's one."

The *Petrel* had anchored near the long stone bastion of the arsenal, but from that position we could not see the Spanish ships that Hughes

went in to burn. The consequence was that soon after he started off he was lost to sight behind the bastion. I immediately went to the pilot-house to consult the chart and see if it was not possible to go in still farther, to a place where we could get a good view of the arsenal and the party of Hughes. I soon saw that it was possible, and went on the bridge to tell the captain so; but before I could suggest the matter, he said, "Don't you think we can get in closer?" I replied, "I know we can, sir, because I have just looked it up." So we picked up the anchor and steamed to the southward, to a position where our keel just cleared the bottom.

We saw a lot of nice-looking tugs and launches, and what seemed to be several thousand soldiers and sailors in the arsenal grounds. The captain said he thought that he ought to get as many of those tugs and launches as he could, as they might be very useful; I replied that it would be very easy to get them. He then called for volunteers, which were very quickly got, and in a few minutes I shoved off and went alongside of the arsenal dock, with half a dozen men. I never had at any time during either the Spanish or the Filipino war the slightest trouble with the men in pushing them ahead, but always trouble in holding them back. On this occasion as I went alongside of the dock I had to reiterate my order to remain in the boat and not load their muskets.

I got up on the stone dock and looked about me. I had scarcely done so when I saw advancing toward me a large number of Spanish officers, I should say from recollection at least twenty-five; behind them, farther up the dock, was what looked to me like a small army of soldiers drawn up in regular formation under arms, and a crowd of some hundred sailors, who did not seem to be in any formation whatever, but walking about as they pleased though armed. I advanced toward the officers and they advanced toward me, and we exchanged punctilious salutes. We tried to talk in English and Spanish, but they could not talk English well enough, and I could not talk Spanish well enough, but I managed to get along fairly well with one of the officers in French.

The Spanish officers seemed to be somewhat excited, and they asked me questions that I could not at first understand; but finally I found out that there were two principal questions: one was whether the firing from the American ships would begin again, and the other question was whether they would be permitted to go back on board their ships, which they had abandoned in such haste that they had left behind them their pocket-money, and the pictures of their families, and all their clothes. In reply to their first question, I told them that the Americans had recognized their white flag and that they would not fire again at the arsenal, but would respect their white flag so long as they—the Spaniards—respected it. This statement seemed to gratify them, and they all cried out, "Americanos siempre caballeros!"

To this I replied, "Siempre." To the other question as to whether they could go on board their ships and get their belongings, I replied I had not the authority to give them that permission, but that I had a boat there, and, if any of them wished, I would allow them to take it and go over to the *Petrel*, and that I was sure the captain would give them permission. My remark seemed to strike them queerly, for they half smiled and remarked that they did not care to take advantage of my kind offer. I then said, "Very well, I will go over myself and ask the captain and come back and tell you what he says." I did this and soon returned with the captain's permission. They were awaiting my reply, and when I told them that the captain gave his free permission on the condition that none of them would attempt to put out the fire on board their ships, they seemed much pleased, and some of them said again, "Americanos siempre caballeros." Now the peculiar ending of this incident was that, although there were quite a number of small boats at hand, belonging to the arsenal, not one of these officers went to a ship or took advantage in any way of the permission they had requested and received.

My men were soon engaged in the work of clearing away the fastenings which held the tugs and launches; and for some reason which I cannot now remember this work was not easy. Seeing a number of Spanish sailors congregated about, looking on with languid interest, I told a couple of them to help. This they did without any objection, and I soon had a number of our enemies pulling and hauling and working away like good sailors. The consequence was that in an hour or two I was going back to the *Petrel* with two large tugs, three steam-launches, and some smaller boats.

By this time Hughes had returned to the *Petrel*, having with the assistance of Ensign Fermier fully carried out his dangerous work, and the rest of the fleet was well out in the bay. Then the *Petrel* steamed up toward it, towing our prizes. At nightfall the whole fleet started toward Manila city, lighted on our way by the brilliant flames of the ships of our conquered foes.

It was, of course, as events turned, a needless destruction, but, done in the heat and excitement of action, and with the uncertainties of the moment, not to be criticised from a cool stand-point.

The Spanish commandant seems to have taken Lieutenant Fiske's statement of what he proposed to do as a message from Commodore Dewey, stipulating that the ships must be burned or the cannonade continue. Despite his helplessness in such a situation, he went through the form of soliciting by Commander Sidrach, who carried his message, his admiral's authorization

for "such convention," an "authorization which the admiral granted by the same channel," a curious instance of Spanish officialdom. "A little later," by Spanish account, "a second American officer arrived at the arsenal, expressing on the part of the commodore the desire that the batteries of Corregidor would not fire on the American ships on their leaving the bay, in exchange for which the ships would not fire upon them." There was again an evident difficulty in understanding one another, the Spanish officials evidently taking the message to mean the withdrawal of the American squadron from the bay, while Dewey's intention was merely to cause the surrender of the batteries without the necessity of an attack. In any case, Sostoa made a new reference to his admiral at the convent near by, with the result shown in the following telegram, sent at 5.15 P. M. from the latter to the senior naval officer in Manila for transmission to the governor-general:

> Second attack was upon fortifications, arsenal of Cavite and ships which had taken refuge in Bacoor Bay. Ships were abandoned the last moment and sunk. Commandant-general asked for parley with commander-in-chief of hostile squadron to place women and children in safety. He replied that it was not his intention to injure the town, but to destroy our fleet and burn the ships which had been sunk. The commandant-general consulted me on this point and I consented in view of the circumstances [!]. They asked, moreover, that they be not fired upon by the batteries when they left the harbor. Tell the governor-general of this in my name, asking for his decision, and in case he acquiesces a tug must be sent to Corregidor to give instructions not to fire.[1]

Evidently there was much confusion of ideas, but the sober expression of consent to a demand understood to be made, and impossible in any event to resist, and its reference to still another superior officer, are but antecedent phases of the difficulties which the defeated Spanish officer must prepare himself to meet in the coming court upon his conduct.

Turning to Admiral Montojo's report, we have a very fair account of the battle as seen from the Spanish side; he says:

[1] *Admiral Montojo Before Public Opinion and Before History*, 102.

At 4 A. M. I made signal to prepare for action, and at 4.45 the *Austria* signalled the enemy's squadron, a few minutes after which they were recognized, in a somewhat confused column parallel with ours, at about 6,000 metres distant; the flag-ship *Olympia* ahead, followed by the *Baltimore, Raleigh, Boston, Concord, Helena,*[1] *Petrel,* and *McCulloch,*[2] and the two transports *Zafiro* and *Nashan.*

The force of these vessels, excepting the transports that were non-combatant, amounted to 21,410 tons, 49,290 horse-power, 163 guns (many of which were rapid-fire), 1,750 men in their crews, and of an average velocity of about 17 miles. The power of our only five effective ships for battle was represented by 10,111 tons, 11,200 horse-power, 76 guns (very short of rapid-fire), 1,875[3] crew, and a maximum speed of 12 miles.

At 5 the batteries on Point Sangley opened fire. The two first shots fell short, and to the left of the leading vessel. These shots were not answered by the enemy, whose principal object was the squadron.

This battery only had two Ordoñez guns of 15 centimetres [5.9-inch] mounted, and but one of these could fire in the direction of the opposing fleet.

In a few minutes one of the batteries of Manila opened fire, and at 5.15 I made signal that our squadron open fire. The enemy answered immediately. The battle became general. We slipped the springs and the cables and started ahead with the engines, so as not to be enveloped by the enemy.

The Americans fired most rapidly. There came upon us numberless projectiles, as the three cruisers at the head of the line devoted themselves almost entirely to an attack upon the *Cristina,* my flag-ship. A short time after the action commenced one shell exploded in the forecastle, and put out of action all those who served the four rapid-fire guns, making splinters of the forward mast, which wounded the helmsman on the bridge, upon which Lieutenant José Nuñez took the wheel with a coolness worthy of the greatest commendation, steering until the end of the fight. In the meanwhile another shell exploded in the orlop, setting fire to the crews' bags, which they were fortunately able to control.

The enemy shortened the distance between us, and rectifying his aim, covered us with a rain of rapid-fire projectiles. About 7.30 one shell destroyed completely the steering-gear. I ordered to steer by hand, remaining without steering power in this interval, which was lengthened by the explosion of another shell on the poop, which put out of action nine men. Another destroyed the mizzen masthead and

[1] In the Atlantic. [2] Not in action.

[3] A grave discrepancy from Montojo's later statement 1134 (see p. 205). 1,875 is evidently an error, as the number is much in excess even of the standard complements (1664) of the seven ships noted on p. 170.

gaff, bringing down the ensign and my flag, which were replaced immediately. A fresh shell exploded in the officers' cabin, covering the hospital with blood, destroying the wounded who were being treated there. Another exploded in the ammunition-room astern, filling the quarters with smoke and preventing the working of the hand steering-gear. As it was impossible to control the fire, I had to flood the magazines when it was already beginning to reach the cartridge-room.

Amidships several shells of smaller calibre went through the smoke-stack and one of the larger ones penetrated the fire-room, putting out of action one master gunner and twelve men serving the guns. Another rendered useless the starboard bow gun; while the fire astern increased, fire was started forward by another shell, which went through the hull and exploded on the deck.

The broadside guns, yet without material injuries, continued firing, and one gunner with one seaman, the only ones remaining unhurt, went on firing them as they were loaded by the men on general duty about deck, who replaced repeatedly those who were put out of action at the guns.

The ship being out of control; the hull, smoke-pipe, and mast riddled with shot; enveloped in the flames of two fires; half of her crew out of action, among whom were seven officers, I gave the order to sink and abandon the ship before the magazines should explode, making signal at the same time to the *Cuba* and *Luzon* to assist in saving the rest of the crew, which they did, aided by others from the *Duero* and the arsenal.

I abandoned the *Cristina*, directing beforehand to secure her flag, and accompanied by my staff, and in profound grief, I hoisted my flag on the cruiser *Isla de Cuba*.

After having saved many men from the unfortunate vessel, a shell destroyed her heroic commander, Don Luis Cadarso, who was directing the rescue.

The *Ulloa*, which also defended herself with tenacity, using the only two guns which were available, was sunk by a shell which entered the water-line, putting out of action her commander and half of her small crew, which was only that indispensable for the service of the two guns already mentioned.

The *Castilla*, which fought heroically, was left with her artillery useless, except one stern gun, with which they continued to fight vigorously; she was riddled with shot and set on fire by the enemy's shells, then sunk, and was abandoned by her crew in the best order, and well directed by her commander, Don Alonzo Morgado. The casualties on this ship were twenty-three killed and eighty wounded.

The *Austria*, very much damaged and with bunkers on fire, went to the aid of the *Castilla*. The *Luzon* had three guns dismounted, and was slightly damaged in the hull. The *Duero* was left with one of her

engines useless, the bow gun of 12 centimetres and one of the redoubts.

At 8 o'clock in the morning, the enemy's squadron having suspended its fire, I ordered the ships that remained to us to take positions in the bottom of the Roads at Bacoor, and there to resist to the last moment, and that they should be sunk before they surrendered.

At 10.30 the enemy returned, forming a circle to destroy the arsenal and the ships which remained to me, opening upon them a horrible fire, which we answered as far as we could with the few cannon which we still had mounted.

There remained the last recourse, to sink our vessels, and we accomplished this operation, taking care to save the flag, the distinguishing pennant, the money in the safe, the portable arms, the breech-plugs of the guns, and the signal codes.

After which I went with my staff to the Convent of Santo Domingo de Cavite, to be treated for a wound received in the left leg, and to telegraph a brief report of the action, with preliminaries and results.[1]

The following transcript of the log of the *Olympia* for the next few days shows history as written in a ship's log. It begins with the first dog-watch of May 1, the *Olympia* now at anchor after the second action:

4 to 6 P. M.

Clear to warm. Light to gentle breeze from S. E. At 4.10 *Concord*, and at 4.25 *Boston*, went over to Cavite.

M. M. Taylor,
Ensign, U. S. N.

6 to 8 P. M.

Partly cloudy and warm, with light airs to light breeze from S. S. E. The *Petrel* came over from Cavite with several small launches in tow, anchoring near at hand. The commanding officer of *Petrel* came on board, and reported having burned several Spanish gun-boats, and captured a Spanish signal book. During the watch several explosions took place among the gun-boats on fire at Cavite. Compartments reported dry. Barometer steady.

F. Brooks Upham,
Ensign, U. S. N.

8 P. M. to Midnight.

Light breeze from S. E. Weather fair and pleasant. At 10.45 the *Concord* coming from Cavite signalled (Ardois), "Have Spanish officer

[1] The report printed in *El Mundo Naval Ilustrado* of August 1, 1898, is followed, as being fuller, in some respects, than that in Montojo's Defence (*Montojo Ante la Opinion y Ante la Historia*), 93 *et seq.*

on board with important communication for commander-in-chief," and at 11 Commander Walker and two Spanish army officers from the general commanding came on board and had an interview with the commodore.

V. S. Nelson,
Lieutenant, U. S. N.

MONDAY, MAY 2, 1898

Midnight to 4 A. M.

Fair and pleasant. Light breeze from north and N. N. E. Compartments dry. A Spanish officer, purporting to represent the captain of the port of Manila, came on board, and represented that he was on his way to Corregidor Island to instruct the forts there not to fire on the U. S. fleet.

Stokely Morgan,
Lieutenant, U. S. N.

4 A.M. to 8 A. M.

Clear and pleasant. Light airs from N. N. E. to calm. Compartments dry. At 6.30 the *McCulloch* shifted her anchorage. At 7 the *Petrel* got under way and stood over to Cavite. At 7 made the uniform and dress signal.

S. M. Strite,
Lieutenant, U. S. N.

8 A. M. to Meridian.

Clear and warm. Calm to light breeze from N. N. E. The representative of the senior Spanish naval officer in port, who left during the night purporting to take a message to the commandant at Corregidor not to fire on the U. S. fleet, returned, and at noon returned to Corregidor on the U. S. S. *Raleigh*, which ship was accompanied by the U. S. S. *Baltimore*. The U. S. S. *Concord* returned from Cavite in obedience to signal at 11, and after communicating returned to Cavite. At 11.35 the fort at Cavite fired on the U. S. S. *Boston*, who returned the fire, and at 11.45 the *Boston* signalled, "Enemy has hoisted flag of truce." The U. S. S. *Petrel* returned from Cavite at 11, and went back after communicating.

M. M. Taylor,
Ensign, U. S. N.

Meridian to 4 P. M.

Calm and light airs from west and south. Weather fair and hot. At 11.55 called all hands up anchor, got under way and stood across the bay for Cavite, and at 3.30 anchored off Cavite in 7½ fathoms of water

and veered to 30 fathoms on starboard chain. Observed several hundred troops marching across the peninsula from Cavite toward San Roque.

V. S. Nelson,
Lieutenant, U. S. N.

4 P. M. to 6 P. M.

Clear and warm. Calm to light airs from S. W. Sent landing party on shore under Lieutenant Morgan, U. S. N., to destroy Spanish batteries. English man-of-war, and tug-boat flying the Spanish flag, came in. *Concord* under way to overhaul them. *Zafiro* under way. Mustered at evening quarters. Discovered lenses for two broadside and after search-lights were broken.

A. G. Kavanagh,
Ensign, U. S. N.

6 P. M. to 8 P. M.

Clear and pleasant. Calm to light airs from E. S. E. Compartments dry. H. M. S. *Linnet,* accompanied by a Spanish tug, came near the anchorage. The commander-in-chief sent the *Concord* to board the English man-of-war, and to capture the Spanish tug. At 7.30 the *Concord* returned to the anchorage with the tug. At 7.50 the party in charge of Lieutenant Morgan, ordered to destroy guns in Cavite, returned on board.

S. M. Strite,
Lieutenant, U. S. N.

8 P. M. to Midnight.

Clear and warm. Light airs from E. S. E. At 11.50 U. S. S. *Raleigh* and *Baltimore* returned from harbor entrance and anchored. Compartments dry.

M. M. Taylor,
Ensign, U. S. N.

TUESDAY, MAY 3, 1898

Midnight to 4 A. M.

Partly cloudy and moonlight, with light airs from E. S. E. to light airs and light breeze from N. N. E. Riding to wind. Lights were seen moving about in the vicinity of Cavite, and three volleys were heard fired in same vicinity.[1]

F. Brooks Upham,
Ensign, U. S. N.

[1] Note by author. These were fired by *Concord.*

4 A. M. to 8 A. M.

Wind light N. N. E. Weather fair and warm. Compartments dry. *Concord* and *Raleigh* left for Corregidor at 6 o'clock. Sent *Zafiro* in shore to capture steamer *Isabel I.*

V. S. NELSON,
Lieutenant, U. S. N.

8 A. M. to Meridian.

Clear and warm. Calm to light airs from N. by W. U. S. S. *Petrel* got under way about 9 o'clock, and stood off the city of Manila. The *Zafiro* captured a Spanish steamer, *Isabel I*, about 10 o'clock, and towed it near our anchorage. Hauled the captured tug *Rápido* alongside and began repairing machinery. The landing parties ashore for the purpose of destroying the Spanish batteries around Cavite returned on board.

A. G. KAVANAGH,
Ensign, U. S. N.

Meridian to 4 P. M.

Clear and hot. Light airs to light breeze from south. Sent burial party from squadron to bury unknown dead in Cavite. Sent tug to transfer sick from hospital on reservation, but her services were declined. U. S. S. *Petrel* went to arsenal to tow out transport *Manila*, but could not, she being aground.

M. M. TAYLOR,
Ensign, U. S. N.

6 P. M. to 8 P. M.

Light breeze from S. E. Weather fair and hot. At 5.30 mustered at quarters, and had setting-up drill. Lieutenant Morgan and party returned on board at seven o'clock. *Raleigh* and *Concord* in sight returning from Corregidor. Compartments dry. Engineer's force at work repairing launches *Rápido* and *Vicia.*

V. S. NELSON,
Lieutenant, U. S. N.

8 P. M. to Midnight.

Cloudy but pleasant. Light to gentle breeze from N. E. to north. *Raleigh* and *Concord* returned and anchored about 8.45. Compartments reported dry. For fighting, J. Maice (sea) and T. Bates (Pr. M.) were placed in single irons to await action of commanding officer.

A. G. KAVANAGH,
Ensign, U. S. N.

A good deal, however, had happened of which but little or nothing appears in the scant "remarks" of the officer at the deck.

The *Olympia* had anchored, after the firing had ceased, about four miles north of Sangley Point and about the same distance from Manila, the light-house at the mouth of the Pasig River bearing north 57° east (magnetic). By 4 o'clock the *Baltimore* and *Raleigh* were anchored near the flag-ship. The *Petrel* was still busy in shore with her work of destruction, and did not arrive until 7, when she returned towing six captured launches. The *Boston* and *Concord* came out, but both were soon sent to the vicinity of Cavite, where they were later joined by the *Petrel.*

About 3 P. M. the British consul at Manila, Mr. Rawson Walker, came aboard the flag-ship, on behalf of the foreign residents, to request that the city should not be injured. Dewey, though he had no intention of action against it unless attacked himself, consented on consideration of being supplied with coal and having the facilities of the cable to Hong-Kong. Though to these demands the governor-general would not accede, it was understood that no shots would be fired. The question of the cable was to be solved by the cutting of it at 2 A. M., May 2, and taking the ends aboard the *Zafiro,* action which cut off Manila itself from the outer world.

On the morning after the battle, May 2, Commander Lamberton, Dewey's chief-of-staff, went in the *Petrel* to take possession of the arsenal. Says Lamberton:

> I steamed in close to the wall of the arsenal and with an armed boat's crew landed at the usual landing. Captain Sostoa, with his aid, a tall young medical officer acting as interpreter, met me at the landing and escorted me to his office near by. I explained my mission but specified no time for complying with it. Captain Sostoa requested time to consult and to my question as to with whom, mentioned "my government at Madrid; the captain-general of the Philippines; my admiral." I promptly refused each one, and then he said, "With my officers." Knowing he was fighting for time, I replied "Yes! you can have two hours to consult. At twelve o'clock you can hoist the white flag in token of unconditional surrender, or the Spanish flag which we will fire upon as soon as we see it." I then returned to the *Petrel* and steamed down to the flag-ship and reported what had taken place. The admiral replied, "Very well, Lamberton, go back and finish up your job." I again went to the *Petrel* and steamed

down toward Cavite. At 11.30 A. M. it was reported to me that a white flag had been hoisted over the arsenal.

When Lamberton reached the landing again there was no one to receive him, and upon going up to Captain Sostoa's office, he found that the entire naval contingent had marched away.

Lamberton continuing says:

Passing through the yard, I went to the gates and locked them. Shortly after I met a Spanish military officer in full uniform, who introduced himself as Colonel Pazos of the Seventy-fourth Spanish Line, who informed me that he commanded two regiments of troops outside the arsenal, in Cavite. He explained the predicament he was in and requested leave to remove his troops. I made no terms with him, but advised him to remove at once and to give us no cause to fire upon him. [Commander Lamberton here pays him a personal compliment.] I advised him to make a straight wake for Manila. He vacated before sundown and we had complete possession without having any prisoners or incumbrances on shore.[1]

Colonel Pazos was captured by the insurgents on his way to Manila, but suffered no harm.

Commodore Sostoa, though his previous hoisting of the white flag was a virtual surrender and though his departure without awaiting Commander Lamberton's return is open to criticism, had to keep in mind the military code of Spain, which is applied in cases of surrender often with irrational severity, as several were to find by personal experience. He is, too, the more easily excused as, however irregular his proceeding, his going away removed any difficulties which might have arisen as to the care of prisoners, a burden of which Commodore Dewey was more than satisfied to be free.[2]

[1] Commander (now Rear-Admiral) Lamberton to author.

[2] That Sostoa's fears were well founded is shown by the fact that both he and Admiral Montojo were put in the prison of San Francisco, Madrid, on March 4, 1899, pending a trial which was not completed until September of that year. The prison treatment was of extreme humiliation. The cells were small, with walls covered with obscene inscriptions; the prison bars were examined frequently by a sergeant and two privates. "Nothing," says the document from which this is taken, "can give an idea of the squalidness of those infamous quarters. At the very entrance the heart felt oppressed by the darkness of the corridors, the scaled off walls and the total absence of

The situation of the Spanish ships at the end of the action, as described by Lieutenant Ellicott, who made a careful examination of the ships and their injuries, was as follows: The *Reina Cristina*, which was the flag-ship of the admiral during the greater part of the action, was sunk in the shoal water under the north wall of Cavite, heading eastward, where she burned, with her bulwarks awash. The *Castilla*, which had been moored head and stern, with a string of iron lighters loaded with sand as a protection to her water-line, had sunk to her main deck. All her upper works had been consumed. The *Don Antonio de Ulloa*, which had been under repair, with part of her machinery and port battery ashore, was sunk by gun-fire and lay with her poop awash and the forecastle and superstructure above water. The *Don Juan de Austria* had been sunk by her crew behind Cavite arsenal, heading east. She was set afire by the *Petrel* and burned from the after engine-room bulkhead to the stern. The same fate happened to the *Isla de Luzon*, the *Isla de Cuba*, the *Marques del Duero* (which was entirely gutted by the fire), the *Velasco* (not seriously burned), the *General Lezo*, and the *Argos*. The ships had all been sunk in shallow water, so that a considerable

whitewash and paint." After describing the situation of the cells, the document continues: "In cell No. 1 was General Jaudenes (the governor of Manila at the surrender). . . . No. 2 was not as good. . . . Here was General Toral (who signed the capitulations at Santiago), sick at heart and in body, whose only diversion was the contemplation of the squalid walls and ceiling covered with objectionable inscriptions and obscenities. Admiral Montojo was locked up in cell No. 3. This cell had no alcove and was still more filthy than the preceding one. . . . It was impossible to look out. . . . Further on was cell No. 4, occupied by Commodore Don Enrique Sostoa, smaller than the others and, if possible, more squalid and obscene." (*Admiral Montojo Before Public Opinion and Before History*, by C. P., 309, *et seq.*)

The following decree was published in the *Gaceta de Madrid* on the 12th of October, 1899:

"As proposed by the minister of marine, in accordance with the council of ministers:

"In the name of my august son the King Don Alfonso XIII, and as Queen Regent of the kingdom:

"I order the retirement from active service of Don Patricio Montojo y Pasaron, rear-admiral in the navy, who will be placed on the reserve list, and forbidden to discharge any public duties. This by virtue of the sentence passed by the Supreme Council of War and Marine acting as Court of Justice, on the 21st of September of the present year, in proceedings instituted in

portion of their works was still above the surface. The destruction was not so complete but that the *Isla de Cuba*, *Isla de Luzon*, and *Don Juan de Austria* were raised later, sent to Hong-Kong under their own steam, repaired, and taken into service.

The following ammunition was expended in the American squadron:

SHIP	8-INCH	6-INCH	5-INCH	6-POUNDER	3-POUNDER	1-POUNDER	TOTALS
Olympia . .	36	...	281	1,000	...	361	1,678
Boston . . .	48	162	...	220	256	400	1,086
Baltimore . .	73	122	...	547	...	692	1,434
Raleigh . .	...	53	341	137	...	100	631
Concord . .	...	182	...	220	120	60	582
Petrel . . .	...	116	...	...	313	19	448
	157	635	622	2,124	689	1,632	5,859

single instance [*i. e.*, without appeal] in the matter of the destruction of the fleet of the naval station in the Philippines, and surrender of the arsenal of Cavite.

"Given at San Sebastian, October 10, 1899.

"MARIA CRISTINA.

"The Minister of Marine,
"JOSÉ GOMEZ IMAZ."

A similar royal order was published in the *Official Journal of the Ministry of War*, concerning the sentence of the Supreme Council of War and Marine, imposing the same penalty on General of Division Don Fermin Jaudenes y Alvarez, for the capitulation of Manila on August 13, 1899. Concerning the trial of the latter official, see: "Defensa del General Jaudenes, Hecha por el General de Brigada Don Ignacio Salinas y Angulo. Leida el 29 de Septembre de 1899 ante el Consejo Supremo de Guerra y Marina, reunida en Sala de Justicia."

Such treatment of honorable and brave men, who had done their duty and who, in the circumstances in which they were placed, succumbed but to the inevitable, is a stain upon the honor of Spain. Certainly Montojo's most gallant conduct deserved a better fate. His sentence, just given above, was, from an American stand-point, of extreme rigor and injustice. Sostoa was acquitted, notwithstanding that he had hoisted the white flag at 12.15 of May 1 at the arsenal, without referring to his near-by commander-in-chief, who was at the convent just outside the arsenal walls. His act, though he stated that it was merely to obtain a truce for the removal of women and children, could not be regarded by the Americans, at least, as other than a true surrender. The fiscals (the prosecuting officers) passed over that event very lightly.

The ammunition remaining after battle was as follows:

SHIP	8-INCH	6-INCH	5-INCH	6-POUNDER	3-POUNDER	1-POUNDER
Olympia	312	...	318	6,080	...	3,539
Boston	138	248	...	948	2,131	1,712
Baltimore	211	454	...	1,319	...	3,428
Raleigh	...	86	565	3,863	...	2,267
Concord	...	255	...	718	814	1,250
Petrel	...	274	...	...	745	...

The number of hits noted by Lieutenant Ellicott was as follows:

VESSEL	8-INCH	6-INCH	5-INCH	6 PDR.	UNSPECIFIED			TOTAL
					LARGE	SMALL	UNKNOWN	
Reina Cristina	5	..	5	7	13	9	..	39
Castilla	..	2	12	3	4	16	..	37
Don Antonio de Ulloa	4	3	5	10	14	1	..	37
Don Juan de Austria	..	2	4	5	..	2	..	13
Isla de Luzon	..	..	..	..	1	..	2	3
Isla de Cuba	..	..	..	4	..	..	1	5
Marques del Duero	1	1	..	2	..	..	1	5
Velasco	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
General Lezo	..	..	..	..	..	..	1	1
Argos	..	..	..	..	1	..	..	1
Total	10	8	26	31	33	28	6	142

Lieutenant Ellicott thinks that the number of hits noted on *Reina Cristina, Castilla, Don Antonio de Ulloa*, represent probably not more than half the shots which took effect. As the total number of shots fired by the American squadron during the action was 5,859, the percentage of hits noted was 2.43. If the number against the first three ships in the table be doubled the percentage would be 4.35.

The injuries to the crews were as disproportionate as those to ships. Of the 1,743 Americans engaged, but two officers and six men of the *Baltimore* were slightly wounded by splinters.

Of the Spanish, the losses as established by Lieutenant Ellicott, of the *Baltimore*, "by painstaking inquiry," were as follows:

	KILLED	WOUNDED	TOTAL
Reina Cristina	130	90	220
Castilla	23	80	103
Isla de Cuba	..	2	2
Isla de Luzon	..	6	6
Don Juan de Austria	..	22	22
Don Antonio de Ulloa	8	10	18
Marques del Duero	..	..	..
Shore batteries	6	4	10
Total	167	214	381

Montojo's own statement differs somewhat from this as to totals: he gives in his final statement but 1,134[1] as the number of his men, and the casualties:

	DEAD	WOUNDED	TOTAL
In the squadron	58	236	294
In the navy yard	17	45	62
Total	75	281	356

Lieutenant Ellicott's return of but ten casualties ashore would appear from many accounts much too small.

The wounded and sick at the naval hospital at Cañacao, numbering some 300, were sent to Manila under flag of truce. "A small marine guard was detailed to guard the navy yard. Working parties were sent ashore to disable the guns at Sangley Point, which was easily effected by exploding a ring of gun-cotton disks around the chase of each gun. The magazine was incidentally blown up during the operation. Much small-arm ammunition was dumped into the bay at Cavite, whence the Filipinos afterward recovered it and refilled the cartridges. Some

[1] *El Almirante Montojo ante la Opinion y ante la Historia*, 149.

of the smaller rapid-fire guns were recovered from the wrecks, and the *Manila* and *Callao* were destined to bristle with an eccentric armament. Some of the larger guns were also recovered from the ships, but breech-blocks were lacking, and rust and fire were allowed to do their work on the main batteries. The Filipinos were allowed to gather some weapons from the arsenal—perhaps a hundred serviceable rifles, a trivial pair of bronze howitzers, and two or three old smooth-bore guns were the only important items—all abandoned by the Spaniards as not worth carrying away." [1]

On May 3, in accord with the understanding made with two officers sent from the governor-general to the *Olympia* late in the evening of May 1, the batteries at the entrance of the bay were surrendered to the *Raleigh* and *Baltimore*, the guns disabled, and the ammunition thrown into the sea. Later, when it was found that the Filipino insurgents were endeavoring to remove some of the guns, these shared the fate of the ammunition. Colonel Garcés, in command of the batteries at the entrance of the bay, and Lieutenant Miranda, of the navy, who commanded at Corregidor, had no choice under the arrangement with the governor-general but to capitulate. Miranda, with 100 men, remained at Corregidor; Garcés with his officers and 293 men, with their equipment and ammunition, went to the near-by Port Mariveles and took up the difficult march to Manila round the head of the bay, through the provinces of Bataan and Pampanga, arriving at Manila on May 5. They, as did the other men of the fleet, aided thenceforth ashore in the defence against the insurgents.

The battle thus brought to a close must, despite the disparity of force and the unprepared state of the enemy, rank as a brilliant action on the part of the American forces. Commodore Dewey had every reason to believe in the existence of the mines which the Spanish were supposed to be supplied with, and had reason to suppose that attempts at least had been made to lay them in Boca Grande, though, as said before, no experienced

[1] Lieutenant Calkins, *Proceedings Naval Institute*, June, 1899. For the official reports of the battle, see *Appendix, Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, 73–86.

naval officer would pay serious attention to efforts to mine a passage of the width and depth of the latter with the limited resources at the command of the Manila authorities. The ranges of the Manila guns, and the value of the Sangley Point and Cañacao batteries, were unknown quantities with which to deal, and with reference to which he could only generalize in a hazy way, as he had no information as to the *locale* of the Spanish squadron. Having discovered the ships, he attacked with the confidence and decision which had marked thoroughly his preparation and advance. While the distinguished English author, Mr. H. W. Wilson, terms the battle "a military execution rather than a real contest" which "must be placed on the same plane with the destruction of the Chinese fleet at Foochow by Admiral Courbet, or with the bombardment of Alexandria," he likewise says, and truly, that this cannot detract from Admiral Dewey's deserved reputation. "It was not his fault that the enemy was not in great strength, and he did his work without a trace of doubt or hesitation." This latter is just and deserved praise; but the former statement is greatly misleading. The American ships were thoroughly vulnerable; the action was at short range; and had the scores in marksmanship been reversed, the victory, despite their inferiority of force, would have been with the Spanish. The gist of the matter is thus in that masterful quality in human affairs, racial temperament, and in the superior training of the American gunner. Coolness of action and its corollary, accuracy of aim, were the deciding factors.

The work which lay to the admiral's hand to do was thoroughly well done. The conduct throughout of officers and men, the handling of the ships and the boldness and decision of the admiral in every later event, were such as to merit the plaudits so generously extended by the country. While the military results of an action fought in a remote part of the world, at the antipodes of the real theatre of war in which lay the bone of contention, could not be great, the results, moral and political, were vast and far-reaching. It was not so much that a colony was taken from Spain as that the United States had planted herself in the East and had introduced herself as a physical factor in the Eastern world.

Perhaps none were more surprised to find a great archipelago at their command than were the gentlemen composing the administration in Washington; the idea of possession had probably but vaguely entered the minds of any until it was known that a victorious American squadron commanded so completely the situation. The moral effect was more immediate and equally forcible. The repose of Continental Europe in the value of the Spanish navy was largely shattered, to be completely so two months later. There was no longer talk in the press of sitting in judgment upon the United States, and of putting limitations upon their conduct. The victory at once gave a new aspect to the whole subject of the war.

The first news of the battle reached the United States by way of Madrid. The first of the telegrams to reach Spain was from the governor-general of the Philippines, and was such as to allow Spain a momentary elation. The text of this rather remarkable document was as follows:

Last night, April 30, the batteries at the entrance to the port announced the arrival of the enemy's squadron, forcing a passage under the obscurity of the night. At daybreak the enemy took up positions, opening with a strong fire against Fort Cavite and the arsenal.

Our fleet engaged the enemy in brilliant combat, protected by the Cavite and Manila forts. They obliged the enemy, with heavy loss, to manœuvre repeatedly. At 9 o'clock the American squadron took refuge behind the foreign merchant shipping, on the east side of the bay.

Our fleet, considering the enemy's superiority, naturally suffered severe loss. The *Maria Cristina* is on fire and another ship, believed to be the *Don Juan de Austria*, was blown up.

There was considerable loss of life. Captain Cardaso, commanding the *Maria Cristina*, is among the killed. I cannot now give further details. The spirit of the army, navy, and volunteers is excellent.

This was printed in the American papers of Monday, May 2. Its effect was qualified by despatches of the same date from Spain of a saner and more truthful sort, based no doubt upon telegrams from Montojo himself. These appeared as follows:

During the two engagements that took place Commodore Montojo, commanding the Spanish fleet, lost three of his largest ships.

His flag-ship the armored cruiser *Reina Maria Cristina*, and the cruiser *Castilla*, were burned, and the cruiser *Don Juan de Austria* was blown up. Several other Spanish vessels were badly damaged.

There was a heavy loss of life among the Spanish. Captain Cardaso, commanding the *Maria Cristina*, was killed. Commodore Montojo, commanding the fleet, shifted his flag from the *Maria Cristina* to the *Isla de Cuba*, a much smaller steel protected cruiser, just before the *Cristina* sank. The blowing up of the *Don Juan de Austria* was attended by a great loss of life among the crew, her commander also being killed.

Commodore Dewey's squadron, leaving Subig Bay, a few miles from Manila, about 4 o'clock yesterday afternoon, proceeded toward Manila. Under the cover of darkness he entered the harbor of Manila, the batteries located there announcing his arrival.

Both fleets lined up for battle about daybreak—about 5 o'clock—this morning. The guns of the American war-ships began firing on the fortress of Cavite and the arsenal of Manila.

Under the protection of the guns of these fortifications the Spanish war-ships opened fire on the American fleet. For several hours the harbor resounded with the roar of guns, the crashing of steel and timbers, the shrieks and groans of the wounded. Thick clouds of smoke at times almost obscured the opposing fleets from each other.

A well-directed shot reached the iron cruiser *Don Juan de Austria*, a vessel of 1,100 tons. A terrific explosion followed and the ship was blown up.

All the time during the engagement the American ships were under way, their manœuvring being intended to render the marksmanship of the Spanish gunners less effective.

The American squadron, about 9 o'clock, drew off to the east side of the bay, and took refuge behind some foreign shipping. The ships had evidently suffered considerable damage. After some hasty repairs they returned to the conflict.

During this engagement the guns of Cavite maintained a steadier and stronger fire upon Commodore Dewey's ships than in the first encounter, but the American guns were being used with telling effect.

As the smoke lifted it was seen that the flag-ship *Reina Maria Cristina* was on fire. The vessel was completely burned. In the interval between the two engagements Commodore Montojo moved his flag from the *Cristina* to the smaller cruiser *Isla de Cuba*. To the fact that he made this change he doubtless owes his life.

The cruiser *Castilla*, next to the flag-ship the largest and most powerful of the Spanish squadron, was also burned. The cruiser *Don Antonio de Ulloa* and the *Mindanao* were also badly injured in this encounter.

That the American squadron received severe damage in the engagement cannot be doubted. Early reports had it that five of Commo-

dore Dewey's ships had been sunk. Later advices from Madrid put the number at two. I have been able to ascertain nothing more definite than this, but I consider it highly significant that the latest advices I have received from Madrid and Lisbon make no mention of any American ship being destroyed.[1]

The next day the *New York Herald* printed the following from its special correspondent in Manila:

Commodore Dewey's squadron completely destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila harbor early yesterday morning. Three of Admiral Montojo's ships were burned, one was sunk, and the rest of the Spanish war-ships rendered *hors de combat* by the American guns.

Our fleet entered Manila Bay yesterday morning at 5 o'clock, and, anchoring before Cavite, the ships took up their positions in line of battle.

The forts on shore at once opened fire on our ships at long range, and the Spanish fleet, anchored off Cavite, immediately followed with their heavy guns.

Commodore Dewey's flag-ship, the *Olympia*, then signalled the rest of the American fleet to draw closer inshore, and soon afterward our ships opened a terrific cannonade.

After half an hour's hot fighting Dewey's ships moved out of range of the lighter Spanish guns and continued the bombardment with the big guns with terrible effect.

Twenty minutes later the *Olympia* again signalled the other American ships to draw in at close quarters and once more a rapid and incessant cannonade began.

This terrific bombardment soon ended the fight. One after the other the Spanish vessels were silenced, and three of them caught fire, including Admiral Montojo's flag-ship, the *Reina Maria Cristina*, from an explosion caused by a shell from one of our vessels. The admiral at once transferred his flag to the *Isla de Cuba*.

One Spanish vessel was sunk and several were run ashore to escape capture.

Commodore Dewey's attention was now directed to the land batteries, which he silenced after a brief and energetic bombardment.

The battle lasted an hour and a half, and it was a great and terrible spectacle. The Spanish fought bravely against a superior force and suffered leavy losses. Four hundred Spanish are reported killed, including two commanders. Their losses by fire are also probably very great.

The Spaniards would not give in and when the American fleet returned to Cavite some shots were still fired from the forts on shore,

[1] *New York Herald*, May 2, 1898.

but our ships poured in such a terrible cannonade that further resistance was impossible.

The American ships were apparently uninjured. Commodore Dewey's attack was well carried out. The manœuvres of his squadron were a beautiful sight, and the navigation of the bay by our ships was a remarkable feat of seamanship, avoiding as they did the numerous shallows.

All is now over at Cavite. Commodore Dewey awaits the decision of the Governor-General of the Philippines before commencing the bombardment of Manila. Unless a favorable reply is received from the governor-general to the United States' terms the bombardment will commence to-morrow at half-past 11.

That fairly accurate information had arrived at Madrid is shown by the account telegraphed from there by the correspondent of the *London Times*, May 2. On the evening of May 1, however, the British Foreign Office had received two despatches, appearing in the newspapers of Monday (May 2), the first stating that the Spanish squadron had been annihilated, and giving Dewey's demands upon the governor-general for the surrender of all torpedoes and guns at Manila and the cable offices; the second announcing the refusal of the governor-general to accede to these.

Enough had been received in the United States by May 3 to know that there had been a complete victory. The information sent out the afternoon of the 2d by the telegraph offices that communication with Manila had ceased made it clear that Dewey had himself taken possession of the cable. This had been grappled by the *Zafiro*, cut, the ends sealed and buoyed. As the Hong-Kong office refused to accept messages not originating in the Manila office,[1] the commodore was obliged to use the

[1] The Hong-Kong and Manila Telegraph Company held its concession from Spain on condition that it should not send telegrams forbidden by the Spanish government. The refusal of the company to forward Dewey's despatches from Manila was thus, in a way, a case of *force majeure*. The United States endeavored to get a concession from the British government to lay a new cable from the Philippines to Hong-Kong. On consultation with the law officers of the crown, it was decided that the government was not at liberty to grant this. The president of the cable company sought permission from the Spanish government to take telegrams from both sides. This being, for the time, declined by Spain, the use of the cable by the United States was refused, unless a guarantee against all losses should be given by the latter. On July

McCulloch, the only ship which could be spared, as a despatch-boat. It was necessary for her to fill with coal, in order to have enough to return, as she would not be allowed to coal at Hong-Kong. It was thus not until noon of May 5 that she left, carrying Flag-Lieutenant Brumby, three other officers, and three newspaper correspondents. She was escorted outside the bay by the *Boston* and *Concord*, and at noon of the 7th sent from Hong-Kong the two telegrams given below:

MANILA, *May* 1, 1898.

The squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning; immediately engaged enemy and destroyed the following Spanish vessels: *Reina Cristina, Castilla, Antonio de Ulloa, Don Juan de Austria, Isla de Luzon, Isla de Cuba, General Lezo, and Marques del Duero, El Correo, Velasco*, one transport, *Isla de Mindanao*, water battery at Cavite. I shall destroy Cavite arsenal dispensatory. The squadron is uninjured, few men were slightly wounded. I request the department will send immediately from San Francisco fast steamer with ammunition. The only means of telegraphing is to the American consul at Hong-Kong.

MANILA, *May* 4, 1898.

I have taken possession of the naval station at Cavite, Philippine Island, and destroyed its fortifications. Have destroyed fortifications bay entrance, paroling garrison. Have cut cable to mainland. I control bay completely and can take city at any time, but I have not sufficient men to hold. The squadron excellent health and spirits. The Spanish loss not fully known; very heavy; 150 killed, including captain, on *Reina Cristina*, alone. I am assisting and protecting Spanish sick and wounded, 250 in number, in this hospital, within our lines. Will ammunition be sent? I request answer without delay. I can supply squadron coal and provisions for a long period. Much excitement at Manila. Scarcity of provisions on account of not having economized stores. Will protect foreign residents.

Already, on May 3, President McKinley had telegraphed his congratulations. On May 7, on the reception of Dewey's tele-

11, the Spanish government signified, through the representative in London of its telegraph department, its willingness for a complete neutralization of the cable and freedom of use. The American ambassador was instructed next day to postpone consideration of this offer for the time being. It was not until August 22 that the cable was reopened. (See *For. Relations*, 1898, 976–980; also Moore, *International Law Digest*, VII, 940.)

grams, he thanked the commodore, his officers and men, in the name of the American people for their "splendid achievement and overwhelming victory," and assigned Dewey to his command with the rank of rear-admiral. On May 10 Dewey received the thanks of Congress, was later raised to the rank of admiral of the navy, and his chief of staff, flag lieutenant, and commanding officers, on his recommendation, advanced in rank.

Dewey was now in possession of a harbor in Asia with no one to dispute his occupancy. His future action was quickly determined by the home government, which, whatever its previous mind, now declared its intention of conquest by at once fitting out at San Francisco an expeditionary force, the first part of which was to sail for the Philippines on May 28.

NOTE.—A corrected list of the vessels destroyed and captured was given in a telegram of June 12: "Two protected cruisers, *Isla de Cuba, Isla de Luzon;* five unprotected cruisers, *Reina Cristina, Castilla, Don Antonio de Ulloa, Don Juan de Austria, Velasco;* two gun-boats, *General Lezo, Marqués del Duero;* one transport, *Isla de Mindanao;* one surveying vessel, *Argos,* both armed. The following have been captured: one transport, *Manila;* one gun-boat, *Callao.*" This last, a small vessel of 208 tons, had arrived from the south the day this telegram was sent. Her commander was wholly ignorant of what had happened.

CHAPTER VII

SAMPSON'S MOVE EASTWARD, THE ATTACK ON SAN JUAN, AND CERVERA'S ARRIVAL IN THE CARIBBEAN

On the reception by Sampson of the news of the departure of Cervera's squadron from the Cape Verdes a consultation of the captains was called aboard the *New York* and the admiral decided to go with part of the force eastward, and telegraphed the secretary of the navy:

> The *New York*, *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *Amphitrite*, and *Terror*, after coaling, will sail immediately Windward Passage Cuba and await developments. Request you to communicate through consul at Cape Haitien, Turks Island, Nicolas Mole. Duplicate despatches should be sent to all of them. Request the *Massachusetts* and *Texas* may meet me leeward of Tortugas Islands, Hayti, May 6.

The flag-ship left at 5.25 P. M., May 1, for Key West and anchored outside the reef, off Sand Key, at 11.45, finding there the *Cincinnati*, *Detroit*, and *Mayflower*. When daylight broke the *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *Hawk*, *Tecumseh*, and *Algonquin* were seen standing in from seaward, and the *Dolphin* was sighted in the harbor. The *Nashville* came in from Cienfuegos during the afternoon.

Though the admiral mentioned the Windward Passage as the point to which he intended to move, he was already practically determined to go to San Juan in case specific news should not be had in the Windward Passage to turn him from his purpose. He felt strongly that San Juan was Cervera's objective, as in fact it was. To find the Spanish squadron there in a harbor exposed to gun-fire from the sea was all that he could ask of fortune.

Sampson calculated upon arriving at San Juan by the time the Spanish squadron would reach that longitude; if it should turn out that San Juan should not be its objective, he calculated

that he would be able to return and be off Havana in time to assist in covering the blockade of that port. His reasoning, as it turned out, was perfectly sound and accurate, though the accuracy of his calculations as to his own movements was seriously upset by the inefficiency of the monitors as to speed. It was unfortunate, however, that they had not been even slower, in which case Cervera would have been found in San Juan and the war would practically have ended in May.

Much was to be done in preparations before leaving, besides the prosaic work of coaling and overhauling machinery. Letters were written calling the department's attention to the unserviceable condition of some of the auxiliaries sent to re-enforce the blockade and reiterating a suggestion to turn prisoners over to the care of the army post at Key West. Endeavor (without avail, however) was made by telegraph to modify orders now received to send the *Cincinnati* north for repairs, the admiral urging repair at Key West, where she could serve meanwhile excellently as a station defence.[1]

A telegram arrived from Washington:

> Clyde Steamship Line reports small Spanish gun-boats from Puerto Rico are cruising in Mona Passage and about Santo Domingo, trying to capture American steamships. *Cherokee* chased April 29 into port. Department thinks you should send one or two cruisers to eastern Santo Domingo ports and Mona Passage.

To this, however, Sampson gave no serious thought, putting no faith in the reported gun-boats, or if they did exist, was sure of their inability through their low speed to give trouble to steamers of the class mentioned. He was, besides, going himself into the vicinity of the reported danger.

The *Marblehead* and *Eagle* arrived next day (May 3) with the Spanish mail-steamer *Argonauta* as a prize, and at the same time the *Castine* and *Ericsson*, from the blockade, and the colliers *Niagara*, *Saturn*, and *Evelyn* from the north.

As one looked from the anchorage off the reef into the harbor six miles distant, with its increasing forest of masts, it was im-

[1] The *Cincinnati* did not, however, as will be seen, leave for the north until some time later.

possible not to be struck by the large percentage of ships in such circumstances unavailable. The absolute necessity of coaling, of replenishing water supply, the frequent break-downs of machinery in the smaller ships, made an estimate of one-third as a permanent number of unavailables not excessive.

In furtherance of the expedition eastward, orders were sent by the torpedo-boat *Porter* to the *Amphitrite*, off Matanzas, the *Terror*, off Cardenas, and the *Montgomery*, off Havana, to proceed at once to a point seven miles north of Cruz del Padre Light and await the arrival of the flag-ship with the *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *Detroit*, *Wompatuck*, and collier *Niagara*, the *Porter* herself to join the flag after the delivery of her messages. The navy department was telegraphed:

The *New York*, *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *Amphitrite*, *Terror*, *Montgomery*, *Detroit*, and *Niagara* (collier) will sail to-day for San Juan, Puerto Rico.

No reply had yet been received to the telegram of May 1, requesting the *Massachusetts* and *Texas;* and Sampson, telegraphing the coaling would delay him until 4 P. M., requested to know if there was to be one. He was answered:

It is considered undesirable to detach the *Massachusetts* and *Texas* at present. Army movement contemplated. Details not settled.

This was quickly followed by:

Large army movement cannot take place two weeks, and small movement will not take place until after we know whereabouts four Spanish armored vessels, three destroyers. If objective San Juan, Puerto Rico, they should arrive about May 8 and action immediately against them and San Juan is then authorized. In this case flying squadron will re-enforce you.[1]

Signal was made at 6 P. M., May 3, to get under way, but a few minutes later, when most of the ships were aweigh, a telegram was received: "Important instructions will be telegraphed you

[1] It is hardly possible to grasp the logic of this re-enforcement, unless it was supposed that Sampson would await for four or five days the arrival of this squadron before attacking. He certainly had no intention of any such delay.

this afternoon." Answer was made: "Fleet under way; please telegraph important instructions at once."

The reception of the telegram mentioned of course left the admiral somewhat in doubt, and after some hours of expectant waiting he ordered the *Iowa*, *Indiana*, and *Detroit*, at 11.15 P. M., to proceed off Havana, the *Wompatuck* and *Niagara* having been sent to the rendezvous early in the day.

The revenue cutter *Merrill* coming from Key West at 3.15 A. M. with no further despatches of importance, the admiral decided that the permission to proceed to San Juan was the important telegram referred to, and telegraphing the navy department, "Let *Yale* meet squadron off Cape Haitien early morning May 7, having sent a boat in for orders," got under way at 5.45 A. M., May 4, for Havana. On arrival off Havana at noon, Commander Hunker, of the *Annapolis*, was ordered to act as senior officer present until his senior, Captain Harrington, of the *Puritan*, still at Key West, should appear. A memorandum had been sent to the latter before the departure of the flag-ship with the expectancy that he would shortly arrive on the blockade.[1]

Night was falling when the *New York* and her three consorts from Key West arrived at the rendezvous, eighty-five miles east of Havana, where were found the other ships previously ordered.[2] The flag-ship took the *Terror* in tow, the *Iowa* the *Amphitrite*, and the *Montgomery* the *Porter*, but what with the heavy sea, the difficulties of making fast, and the parting of tow-lines, it was not until 9.15 P. M. that the squadron started ahead in double column.

The night was one of difficulties; tow-lines were snapped and

[1] The *Puritan's* arrival was unavoidably delayed by necessary repairs until May 21. These instructions were as follows: "I have directed the senior officer present at Key West to order the *Uncas*, *Wasp*, and *Annapolis*, and any other vessels that may arrive, to report to you off Havana for duty on the blockade. He has also the colliers *Saturn* and *Merrimac* to be held subject to your instructions. When you have sufficient vessels you will institute a blockade off Cienfuegos and such other ports on the south side of Cuba as will be possible with the force at your disposition. When such a blockade is instituted you will call upon the senior officer present at Key West for a collier to be sent to that coast."

[2] Part of the afternoon had been spent by the *New York* in chasing a strange steamer, which proved to be a Brazilian chartered by a press association.

rerun, and it soon became clear, with the added troubles of leaky boilers in the *Indiana* and *Detroit*, that the squadron would by no means reach San Juan by May 8, as was expected. The morning of May 5 was varied by the capture of the Spanish sailing vessels *Lorenzo* and *Frasquito*, standing west through the Bahama Channel, bound to Havana with dried beef from the



River Plate, which were boarded by the *Montgomery* and sent into Key West.[1] At 4.30, on the morning of the 6th, the *Montgomery* was sent ahead to Cape Haitien to communicate with the navy department, and return at once if anything important developed, turning over her tow to the *Terror*, which latter was still appended to the *New York*. At 2.30 P. M. the next day (May 7), the *Porter* was also sent ahead to Cape Haitien with a despatch from the admiral:

I have arrived off Cape Haitien, bound for San Juan. I shall communicate off Puerto Plata to-morrow, Sunday, morning for further information from the department.

[1] These vessels and cargoes were condemned.

Both the monitors were again in tow, with the same exasperating experiences, and the squadron, holding a course well off land to avoid being sighted, arrived at 10.45 P. M., May 7, at a point agreed upon, twenty-five miles north of Cape Haitien, where were found the *Montgomery* and *Porter* awaiting its arrival. Nothing had been received by either ship, and the *Porter* was at once sent in again, returning at 1 o'clock with the following telegrams, all dated Washington, May 6:

Ambulance steamer *Solace* will leave May 7 for Cape Haitien; leave orders to follow you.

American Line steamers *New York* [*Harvard*] and *St. Louis* keep a lookout for Spanish fleet about eighty nautical miles to the eastward of Martinique, Guadeloupe. *Paris* [*Yale*] cruising around Puerto Rico for that purpose. They will inform you if they get any reliable information.

German steamer reports from Cape Haitien to-day Spanish vessels coaling and loading ammunition at St. Thomas, and Spanish man-of-war patrolling outside of harbor.

Do not risk so crippling your vessels against fortifications as to prevent from soon afterward successfully fighting Spanish fleet composed of *Pelayo, Carlos V, Oquendo, Maria Teresa, Vizcaya, Cristóbal Colón,* four destroyers, if they should appear on this side.[1]

[1] This last telegram was supplemented by a written despatch of the same date (not received, however, until May 18, on the flag-ship's return to Key West), which gave full freedom of action against fortifications protecting ships of military value. This despatch was as follows:

"[Confidential.]

"NAVY DEPARTMENT,
"WASHINGTON, *May* 6, 1898.

"SIR: Referring to the department's confidential instructions of the 6th of April, 1898, to confidential order of April 21, 1898, modifying the above in so far as it concerns the blockade of Cuba, and to the department's cipher despatches of April 21, 1898, and April 26, 1898, you are informed that the department has not intended to restrict your operations in the West Indies, except in regard to the blockade of certain portions of Cuba and in the exposure of your vessel to the fire of heavy guns mounted on shore which are not protecting or assisting formidable Spanish ships.

"The department is perfectly willing that you should expose your ships to the heaviest guns of land batteries if, in your opinion, there are Spanish ves-

Fresh provision steamer will leave Philadelphia to-morrow for Cape Haitien. Leave orders with consul for her to follow you.

From Halifax, N. S., it is reported that several vessels with coal Spanish fleet are to be near Point à Pitre, Guadeloupe; possible contingent supply.

At 2 A. M., May 8, all the captains were called aboard the flag-ship to a conference, which ended only with the dawn and with a decision on the part of the admiral to continue to San Juan if nothing definite had been heard regarding the Spanish squadron. He was, as just said above, well aware that in making this decision he was running the risk of traversing the sound rule of holding the interior line, but he felt that the risk was worth taking; that he was not warranted in giving Cervera the chance to coal at San Juan, overhaul his machinery, and get away uninterfered with. He judged the activity and energy of the Spanish commander by his own. To wait off Havana to hear of their arrival at San Juan and thus give them opportunity to coal and start upon a raid of the eastern coast, which with any energy they could have done long before the squadron could have gone from Havana to San Juan, was, to Sampson's mind, out of the question. Had Sampson remained off Havana, and had Cervera arrived at San Juan, whither he was ordered, and had he left there and appeared upon the eastern coast of the United States, where there was no force with sufficient speed to bring him to action, one can well imagine the

sels of sufficient military importance protected by these guns to make an attack advisable, your chief aim being for the present the destruction of the enemy's principal vessels.

"The department writes this letter because it has been intimated by civilians, and it is believed by officers of rank serving under you, that you are not permitted to take the offensive even against small land batteries, and that you must wait to be fired upon before making an aggressive movement against any port, no matter how poorly fortified.

"The department does not think, however, that you have personally held this view; but in order to guard against any probable misconception on your part it has concluded to define more particularly its views as expressed above.

"Respectfully,

"JOHN D. LONG, *Secretary.*

"COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCE,
"North Atlantic Station."

outcry against the American commander-in-chief for not having met him at Puerto Rico. The question was a difficult one, but it was decided by Sampson with his usual independence of mind, and with accurate forecast of the enemy's intentions.

Naturally, and almost unavoidably, there were in company with the squadron a number of steamers belonging to the press. Admiral Sampson fully recognized the demand of the country for the fullest information which could be properly furnished, and placed no impediment in the way of this being supplied, beyond what military necessities demanded. His present movement demanded secrecy to the fullest extent possible and the press boats were in company with this understanding—fully and honorably regarded, the writer is glad to say, by every person but one. While it was evident that his movements could not be wholly secret, inasmuch as the mere disappearance of so many large ships from the blockade was in itself evidence to the enemy of an important change in the disposition of ships, the destination had been kept a profound secret on the side of the officers of the fleet, but the one correspondent referred to telegraphed to his paper all he knew or could surmise.[1]

On the other hand, valuable services were rendered by others, the *Dauntless*, of the Associated Press, serving at Cape Haitien as an excellent aid in order that repeated visits of the *Montgomery* and *Porter* should not excite suspicion of the squadron's presence. She carried, in the morning of the 8th, the final telegrams from the admiral:

Have received no information of the Spanish armored vessels. I request three American liners be ordered to report by telegraph or otherwise near St. Thomas. Lacking the service of these vessels I

[1] The following is a sample of the despatches published in one of the New York papers, which, of course, were known in Martinique at the time of Cervera's arrival there and helped to divert him from San Juan to Curaçao and Santiago:

"Cape Haitien, *May* 9.—Admiral Sampson's squadron of eight warships passed this harbor this morning going east. The appearance of the American fleet caused great excitement in the town. . . ."

Secrecy of movement on either side was an impossibility. Sampson forbade the presence of this correspondent in the squadron on account of his telegrams.

shall have to return to the westward immediately. I shall await answer to this request at Cape Haitien, and if granted shall proceed to San Juan, probably destroying fortifications, establish a temporary base Culebra Island to the east of Puerto Rico, as entrance to San Juan is obstructed. If Spanish squadron in the West Indies I shall expect the *Massachusetts* and *Texas*.

The *Dauntless* at 11.45 A. M. brought out a telegram from the navy department dated the same day (May 8):

The receipt of telegram of May 8 is acknowledged. *Pelayo, Carlos V*, one deep-sea torpedo-boat, cannot leave Cadiz two weeks. *Oquendo, Vizcaya, Maria Teresa, Cristóbal Colón*, two deep-sea torpedo-boats, published in newspaper were seen last night Martinique. Completion of cruise American Line steamer off Windward Passage May 10, Puerto Rico, May 13, I order them to St. Thomas to await instructions from you. Blockade Cuba and Key West will be in danger if skipped by you Spanish squadron. Therefore you should be quick in your operations at Puerto Rico. In everything the department has utmost confidence in your discretion. The department does not wish to hamper you. LONG.

It will be seen from this telegram, wholly incorrect as to news, how vague was still the information regarding the *Pelayo* and *Carlos V*. It left Sampson to understand that these ships, though somewhat delayed, were to be added to his possible antagonists at a period not far away. The news regarding the Cape Verde squadron was much more important. It placed it near at hand, within three hundred and thirty miles, a day's sail, of Puerto Rico, from which, with a squadron supposed very much lower in speed, Sampson was equally distant. It seemed clear that the report was believed by the department, which was also evidently deeply exercised as to the possibility of Sampson's being passed by and left in the air, while the Spanish squadron could at will break the blockade, destroy the weak blockading force, and enter Havana. The nervousness regarding the safety of Key West was shown to be still in full force.

In the meantime rumors were rife in the United States: the strength of the Spanish fleet was reported to be as yet unknown; so defective was the information of the press that it was doubted whether the armored cruiser *Carlos V* had not already joined

Cervera's squadron;[1] an Associated Press despatch of May 4 reported the return of Cervera to Cadiz, to be denied, however, the next day; wild rumors had gone from Hayti of the arrival the evening of May 8 of seventeen Spanish vessels, war-ships and others, at Puerto Rico, and of an engagement between the *Montgomery* and a much larger Spanish ship, supposed to be the *Vizcaya*, off Cape Haitien.

Sampson's arrival at Cape Haitien could not in the circumstances be concealed, nor was there, as just said, secrecy as to his final destination kept in the United States. Certainly the governor of Puerto Rico knew of his approach May 9, having telegraphed this information to Madrid that day, and one New York journal printed in its edition of May 10 a sketch map, showing with very fair accuracy the squadron's position.

The interval of waiting off Cape Haitien had been industriously used in coaling the monitors and the *Montgomery* and *Detroit*, all of which were of such small coal capacity that advantage had to be taken of every opportunity, however slight. At noon, however, May 9, the flag-ship took the *Terror* in tow, the *Amphitrite* signalling that she could make eight knots, and the squadron, after standing to the northward and westward sufficiently to give the impression in Cape Haitien that it was bound westward, stood east. It was for two short hours only, however, as at 2 P. M. the *Amphitrite's* engines gave out and she was not ready to start again until 6 P. M. The *Indiana*, with sadly leaky boilers, was making but seven knots at best; the monitors occasionally steamed alone, but for most of the time were in tow, the *New York* varying the *Terror* with the *Amphitrite*.

The situation is well described by the Associated Press correspondent aboard the *New York:*

> At 5 o'clock that evening, after the *Montgomery* was well on her way, the *Indiana* signalled that the crown sheets of one of her boilers were coming down, and that she could only make eight knots. So the speed of the squadron was reduced to that limit. Then the hawser between the *Iowa* and *Amphitrite* broke, and for an hour the squadron stopped, so that another hawser could be passed to the monitor. The *Terror* cast a line to the torpedo-boat *Porter*, and the squadron

[1] Washington despatch to *New York Herald*, May 3.

went ahead slowly, presenting the curious sight of the armored cruiser *New York* towing both the bulky *Terror* and the tiny *Porter*. The delays caused by these accidents were intensely irritating, in view of the fact that Long had specified the 8th as the day Cervera should arrive at Puerto Rico. But the worst was yet to come. The next morning, between 4 and 5 o'clock, the *Iowa's* hawser to the *Amphitrite* again parted, and the squadron slowed down to five knots. At 1 o'clock in the afternoon the *Terror's* steering gear got out of order, and once more the war-ships scarcely moved through the water, waiting for the monitor to make repairs. After nearly two hours' delay a fresh start was made. Forty minutes later I happened to be in the rear-admiral's cabin, discussing these various accidents. They worried him greatly, and he deplored the necessity that compelled him to take monitors so far from home. Suddenly there was a report like the firing of a 4-inch gun just over our head. The flag-ship shook as if she had been jerked out of water. Before the deck steadied there was another loud report. I jumped up, thinking, though it was broad daylight, that we must have discovered an enemy. "I am afraid she's gone," said Sampson, in a tone of resignation. "Who's gone?" I asked, impatiently. "The *Terror*," he replied, and taking his cap went up on deck. And so it turned out. The *Terror's* steering gear had broken down again, and she had taken a rank sheer to starboard, carrying both hawsers with her and just missing the *New York's* stern in her mad career. After stopping for an hour and thirty minutes new hawsers were passed to the monitor, and just before midnight the squadron lay motionless twenty miles north of Cape Haitien.[1]

The squadron was still distant three hundred miles from San Juan. It was a disheartening piece of business, which reflected no credit upon any one but the unhappy crews who labored in these monstrosities of ill design and construction, with a loyalty and manfulness which deserve every recognition. To fight a battle was easy work in comparison with the ceaseless heat, the toil of carrying broken tow-lines, and the everlasting sweep of the sea across the low decks, which made the life aboard the monitors a living hell to officers and men. The writer rejoices in this opportunity to give public expression to his admiration for the pluck and endurance of their crews, from captain to messenger-boy. Even the cheap reward of a medal for the coming battle, the longest continued and in some of its phases the hottest of the war, was long denied them.

[1] Goode, *With Sampson Through the War*, 63.

Sampson had become determined to engage the batteries of San Juan, even should he find the Spanish squadron not there, in the possibility of its yielding without such resistance as might endanger the efficiency of his squadron. His attitude of mind was somewhat expressed in the answer to an inquiry, "If you don't find the Spanish fleet at San Juan will you take the city?" "Well," he replied, "if they want to give us the city, I suppose we can't refuse it." [1] But there was more than this; he felt that it should not, if ready to fall, be left to the possible occupancy of any of the Spanish ships. Its seizure would take from them a stepping-stone toward the true seat of conflict of distinct advantage, which it was his duty, if conditions favored, to annul. It was his intention, if successful, to leave the monitors in possession, and transport the garrison north in the *Yale*, or nearest scout, either of which could have carried the whole.

At 5 P. M. of the 11th, the squadron now nearing San Juan, the admiral shifted his flag to the *Iowa*, taking with him Lieutenant Staunton, assistant chief-of-staff, Lieutenant Marsh, his secretary, and Ensign Bennett, flag lieutenant. The chief-of-staff, being also captain of the *New York*, remained, of course, aboard his ship. The shifting of his flag was due to the superior ability of the *Iowa* to take heavy knocks in case such should come, and the natural desire of the admiral to be in a position to command, under any circumstances, the situation. There was, too, it may be supposed, the latent affection for the "old ship," which he had commanded from her first commissioning until he was made commander-in-chief.

The second battle order, based upon the supposition that the Spanish ships would be found in the harbor, had been sent to each ship during the morning. Though they were not there, it was in accord with this plan that the battle was fought. It was as follows:

Order of the Battle—Second Plan of Action.—Finding the Spanish vessels in the harbor of San Juan de Puerto Rico.

Anticipating this condition the squadron will pass near Salinas

[1] Goode, *With Sampson Through the War*, 77.

Point and will then steer about east to pass just outside the reefs of Cabras Island. The column will be formed as follows:

Iowa (flag),
Indiana,
New York,
Amphitrite,
Terror.

The *Detroit* will go ahead of the *Iowa*, distant one thousand yards.

The *Wompatuck* will keep on *Iowa's* starboard bow, distant five hundred yards.

The *Detroit* and *Wompatuck* will sound constantly after the land is closed, and will immediately signal if ten fathoms or less are obtained, showing at night a red light over the stern, and in the daytime a red flag aft.

The *Montgomery* will remain in rear of the column, and will stop outside of the fire from the Morro, and will look out for the torpedo-boat destroyers. If Fort Canuelo opens fire she will silence it.

The *Porter* will take station under cover of the *Iowa* on the port side.

The *Niagara* will remain to the westward off Salinas Point.

While approaching, a sharp lookout will be kept upon the coast between Salinas Point and Cabras Island for the torpedo-boat destroyers.

When near Cabras Island—one-half mile to one mile—the *Detroit* will rapidly cross the mouth of the harbor and will lie close under Morro to the westward, screened from the fire of Morro's western battery.

If the old guns on the north face of Morro are used she will silence them. The two cruisers will look out especially for the Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers coming out of the harbor.

The *Porter*, when the action begins, will cross the harbor mouth behind the *Iowa* and will get close under the cliff to the eastward of the *Detroit* and will torpedo any Spanish armored cruiser trying to get out of the harbor, but will not attack a destroyer.

The *Wompatuck* will tow one of her boats, with a mast stepped and a red flag flying, and will have the boat's anchor on board the tug so arranged that she can slip the boat and anchor it at the same time. She will anchor this boat in about ten fathoms of water, with Fort Canuelo and the western end of Cabras Island in range.

There will be two objects of attack, viz.: the batteries upon the Morro and the men-of-war in port. If it is clear that the Spanish vessels are lying in the port, fire will be opened upon them as soon as they can be seen over Cabras Island, the motions of the flag-ship being followed in this regard. If it should become evident, however, that neutral men-of-war are in the line of fire, a flag of truce will probably be sent in before the vessels are opened upon.

The *Porter* will hold herself in readiness for this service.

Care will be taken to avoid striking the hospitals on Cabras Island.

If it becomes necessary to silence the Morro batteries a portion of the fire will be directed to this object; but the principal object is to destroy the ships.

After passing the harbor mouth the *Iowa* will turn a little to starboard toward the town and then will turn out with starboard helm and will again pass the port, and will, after passing Cabras Island to the westward, turn again with starboard helm and pass as at first.

Should this plan be changed and it be decided to hold the ships in front of the entrance, the signal "Stop" will be made at the proper time.

The *Indiana*, *New York*, and the monitors will follow the motions of the flag-ship, and will remain in column. The course after Fort Canuelo is brought in range with the west end of Cabras Island will be E. by S.

Should nightfall come with the port still in the enemy's hands, and their ships inside, the cruisers will take up positions just outside the harbor, the *Montgomery* to the eastward and the *Detroit* to the westward, their batteries ready and men at the guns. They will show no lights.

The other ships will in succession sweep the entrance to the harbor and the channel leading in to the anchorage with search-lights to keep the torpedo-boat destroyers from coming out.

In case the enemy should attempt to escape from the port the fire will be concentrated on the leading ship. Should the attempt be made at night the search-lights in use will be turned on her bridge and conning tower and held there. Attention will be specially given to this, as it is of essential importance in the event of such attempt to sink the leading vessel in the channel.

Arrangements will be made for illuminating all sights not telescopic.

A heavy swell was evidence that a strong gale had been blowing to the northward, boding ill for the accuracy of next day's firing. Every preparation had been made which foresight could suggest; woodwork had been ruthlessly torn out and thrown overboard until the sea was strewn with the wreckage for hundreds of miles, which later washing on to the Cuban coast caused General Blanco to telegraph reporting the wreck of an American ship; the ship's cables were wrapped about the ammunition uptakes and the more vulnerable parts of the turret supports; chests, carpenter's benches, alcohol, and other inflammable articles were got rid of until the ships were stripped of everything not absolutely necessary for fighting purposes or to life aboard.

A word as to what we were about to meet: The little city of San Juan, of 30,000 people, enclosed by ancient and elaborate

fortifications, is built on the western end of what is apparently a long spit but is really an island, some two and a quarter miles long, which is but three-eighths of a mile broad in most parts, but about five-eighths[1] at the point where lies the compact little town. South-west of this island lies the bay, some three miles in its longest axis, which runs north-west and south-east. At the extreme north-west corner is the castle of the Morro, built on a precipice, the face of which rises almost vertically from the water; the walls, rising over a hundred feet above the water, make it one of the most imposing and picturesque of seventeenth-century strongholds. The western extremity for half a mile, and the northern face for a mile, thus presented a lofty aspect of wall and fortification.

Mounted upon these, beginning with the Saint Helena battery an eighth of a mile south of the Morro and going round by the north, were the following guns:

	B. L. RIFLES 5.9-INCH	B. L. RIFLE HOWITZERS 9.5	M. L. RIFLE HOWITZERS 9.5	M. L. RIFLE HOWITZERS 8.25
Santa Elena	3	..	..	..
San Fernando	..	..	..	4
Macho	3	..	2	..
Carmen	2	..	..	..
San Antonio	4	..	..	..
San Cristóbal (Signal Station)	..	1	..	..
San Cristóbal (upper north and west face)	2	..	..	..
San Cristóbal (east angle, Plaza de Armas)	..	2	..	..
San Carlos (commanding bay and approaches)	3	..	..	..
Santa Teresa	2	..	..	..
La Princesa	2	2	..	..
Escambron (2½ miles east of the Morro)	..	3	..	..
In the entrance and commanding the approach were:				
Concepcion	1	..	..	..
Santa Catalina	1	..	..	..
San Augustin	2	..	..	2
Totals	25	8	2	6

[1] The measurements are in nautical miles; about a sixth should be added to turn these into statute miles.

All these guns were in place, and with the exception of the two at Santa Catalina and Concepcion, were engaged on May 12.

Later, the rapid-fire battery of the *Isabella II* (a small vessel of 1,150 tons, with an armament of four 4.7-inch guns) was installed just inside of and below the San Fernando battery.

It was a formidable armament which the fleet was to meet; stronger, in fact, even than report made it, and stronger than, under a strict reading of the orders of the navy department, should have, in the circumstances, been engaged. It may frankly be said that when the actual situation was faced, the admiral's fighting instincts, supported by the reasons previously given for the occupancy of the place, were too strong for him.

It was also understood that the entrance, which was about seven hundred feet broad, was obstructed by a hulk and that there were mines. Though later there were two hulks sunk, each of which was filled with explosives, and in the middle of the channel an electric mine with six hundred pounds of explosive, and an inner line of Bustamante contact mines, nothing of these existed on May 12.

There were 4,500 troops in the island, besides several thousand volunteers. They were distributed in small detachments over the island, none of the garrisons exceeding 300 (as at Ponce), excepting that at San Juan there were 600 men.

The lights of San Juan were sighted at 2.30 in the morning of May 12, eight days after leaving Key West. It had thus taken nearly four days longer than the admiral had first calculated, to make the 960 miles, the average speed of the squadron during the time it had been under way being less than 6 knots instead of the 10 hoped for. It was, however, one of the fortunes of war, though in this case not so much a matter of fortune, as of the antiquated and ill-designed machinery in some of the ships, and the ill-repair of some of the others, a status which must always be that of a navy which is not rigidly kept up to a war standard.

San Juan was still a good many miles away and there was plenty of time before daybreak for breakfast, which was given all hands at 4 o'clock. The morning was hazy and the lofty precipices on the eastern side of the narrow entrance, crowned

by the picturesque castle, were barely visible as the *Montgomery* and *Detroit* steamed ahead to take the positions assigned and the *Wompatuck* to place the boat which was to serve as a turning point. When this had been done the column steamed slowly in, in the order named. No sign was shown of discovery of the squadron; the flag had not yet been hoisted over the Morro, it being not yet sunrise. Over the misty, heaving sea a deep stillness brooded, which seemed only accentuated by the distant boom of the surges against the low coral shore west of the harbor entrance; the whole, with the deeply rolling ships, and with the lofty battlements of the Morro Castle showing gigantic in the dim light, forming a picture not soon to be forgotten. After a little a few masts could barely be discerned in the harbor, showing, however, sufficiently clearly to make it pretty certain that the Spanish squadron was not there. Every one was watching the *Iowa*, in the lead, when, just as she gave a deep plunging roll, she fired at 5.16 the first shot, a 6-pounder, as the signal to begin firing. This was followed quickly by guns from all the squadron.

The surprise was apparently complete; it was eight minutes, though it seemed longer, before there was an answering shot; one wondered at the silence of the towering fortress which was our target. When it opened, its first shot was fired at the *Detroit*, to which attention for some little time was wholly devoted, the constant splashes of white foam about the little ship showing a very proper activity on the part of the enemy. The guns of the eastern batteries joined as the column turned to head west. Thence on, there was no cessation of a heavy fire until the end of the action. The column had become disordered by the slower action of some of the ships in turning and by the loitering in going westward. Signal was made at 5.59 to form column and the *Iowa* again led in to the attack. At 6.09 the admiral signalled, "Use only large guns," partially to prevent the expenditure of so much small ammunition against the heavy stone walls of the fortress, partially to avoid enveloping the squadron again in the heavy pall of smoke which in the usual calm of the early morning there was no wind to drive away. The *Detroit* was ordered out of her unsafe position at 6.15, and



Batteries: *A*, Concepcion; *B*, Santa Catalina; *C*, San Augustin; *D*, Santa Elena; *E*, San Fernando; *F*, Macho; *G*, Carmen; *H*, San Antonio; *I*, San Cristóbal; *J*, San Carlos; *K*, Santa Teresa; *L*, Princesa; *M*, Escambron.

she and her sister ship, the *Montgomery*, ordered at 6.30 not to follow the battle-ships, were thereafter practically passive. Firing by the *Iowa* was begun again at 6.35 at a range of 1,500 yards, the other ships following closely. A third and last turn was made, 7.16 and 7.45 o'clock marking its beginning and end as made by the flag-ship. The ships of the rear of the column by this time, however, had become more intent upon the batteries than they were upon the flag-ship, and loitered in the last turn, loath to leave the stirring work of battle. The *Terror* was close in under the eastern batteries still most actively engaged, and became the target of all the batteries as one by one the other ships, following the order of the admiral, withdrew. Her gallant captain, Ludlow, seemed determined to fight to a finish, and the dense clouds of smoke having drifted away from the other ships left an unobstructed view of a wonderful picture; the sunlit sea, the nobly picturesque fortress, the loitering ships, the fighting monitor, and smoke-crowned batteries making a scene which had in it every element of the beautiful and stirring.

It was not until 8.45 that the final shot was fired from ashore at the withdrawing force, the *Terror* the last, being then some 6,000 yards distant.[1]

[1] The following times were taken by the admiral's secretary aboard the *Iowa:*

4.00: Call "All hands" complete clearing ship for action. Squadron standing in for San Juan, the lights of the town being plainly visible, *Detroit* leading; *Wompatuck* on starboard bow to anchor boat for turning stake, as provided in my "Order of battle—second plan of action"; the other ships in column as follows: *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *New York*, *Amphitrite*, *Terror*, and *Montgomery*. Speed, 4 knots.

4.58: *Detroit* inshore, standing across harbor entrance. In this passage across the front of the harbor, and very close to the town, the *Detroit* received no fire at all. No Spanish flag was flying on the Morro or elsewhere. No Spanish vessels could be seen in the harbor. There was one merchant steamer in the inner harbor.

5.00: Sounded "General quarters."

5.16: *Iowa* began firing on the Morro with forward 6-pounder, and then with all starboard battery. Smoke hanging over the ship made firing slow.

5.24: First return shot from the shore batteries.

5.30: *Iowa* turned from the batteries, circling to the westward.

5.59: Made signal, "Form column."

6.09: Made telegraphic signal, "Use only large guns." The smoke from the smaller guns had been interfering with the fire of the heavier guns. The

The torpedo-boat *Porter*, which had been sent eastward close under the cliff, had soon drifted far enough seaward to come under the enemy's fire. Nothing could have been more exposed than she was in such a position. Lieutenant Frémont, her commander, had apparently lost sight of the purpose for which he had been sent into his earlier berth, or perhaps had become convinced that there was no Spanish cruiser to be torpedoed, as called for in the battle order, and spent his time in exercising his 1-pounder against the batteries so close above him. That the frail little craft escaped without a scratch appeared little short of miraculous. But this word may, indeed, be applied to the wonderful immunity of all the ships, not only then but ever after. But two ships were struck. In the *Iowa*, a 6-inch shell exploded in the skid frames, on the port side, abreast of the after 8-inch turret. The fragment of this shell wounded three men, passed through the sailing launch and made several holes in the stanchions, ventilators, and other deck fittings; other

column was headed in for the batteries in the same line of attack as in the first round.

6.15: *Detroit* seen standing from Morro, with the *Montgomery* not far off her port beam. From the time when the shore batteries began firing (5.24) until this time (6.15) the *Detroit* had been lying close inshore, between the line followed by the squadron and the Morro, and she had been subjected to what seemed a concentrated fire of all the shore batteries for all this time, she in the meanwhile pouring in broadsides from her own rapid-fire battery.

6.30: Made signal to *Detroit* and *Montgomery* not to follow battle-ships. By this time all the shore batteries had been developed and they were more numerous than the information received had led to suspect.

6.35: *Iowa* began firing at Morro on the second round; range, 1,500 yards.

6.40: *Iowa* ceased firing. Almost calm; smoke hanging over the shore fortifications, pretty effectually screening them.

7.12: *Amphitrite* signalled, "After turret disabled for to-day."

7.16: *Iowa* began firing on the third round.

7.38: Signalled to *Detroit* and *Montgomery*, "Report casualties." Received replies as follows: *Detroit*, "0"; *Montgomery* "0."

7.45: *Iowa* sounded, "Secure."

7.45: Made signal, "Form column, course north-west," and hauled down the signal at 8.01.

8.12: Made signal, "Report casualties."

8.15: The *Terror*, which had been lying close inshore engaged with the fortifications, ceased firing.

8.47: *New York* reports "1 killed, 4 wounded." All other ships reported no casualties, except the *Amphitrite*, which reported the death of one gunner's mate from the effects of heat.

fragments did considerable injury to the joiner work of the bridge, narrowly missing the admiral, Captain Evans, and Lieutenant-Commander Rodgers, who were standing together upon the bridge. Another shell exploded above the boat skids on the starboard side, inflicting trifling injury. In the *New York*, at 7.40, a 6-inch shell struck the after stanchion on the port side of the superstructure deck. Its explosion killed a seaman and wounded four others at the port waist 8-inch gun, wrecked the fourth cutter and port search-light, made numerous holes in the ventilators and smoke-pipes, and cut the boat-falls to such an extent that the lowering of a boat to obey the admiral's command to commanding officers to go aboard the flag-ship was long delayed. The only life lost besides the seaman of the *New York*, was a gunner's mate aboard the *Amphitrite*, who succumbed to the heat in the turret.

It was after 9 o'clock; the fatigue of all hands, astir since 3, and with a breakfast but an hour later, made a rest advisable and food a necessity in any case. Numbers, both officers and men, as soon as they found that the action was not to be at once continued, had thrown themselves upon the deck, sunk with fatigue, and were sound asleep.[1]

The fact faced the admiral that the main object of the expedition was absent, but with every probability that it was not far distant. The mere credit of the reduction of the place weighed not at all in his mind, and its occupancy, unless immediate, could have no weight in comparison with a meeting with the Spanish fleet. It seemed clear that the news of his being in Puerto Rican waters would cause a divergence of the Spanish admiral elsewhere. Was it wise, even with the certainty of surrender of the port, to risk further any danger of injury to his most important ships? None of importance, except to the monitors from concussion of their own guns, had yet occurred. Sampson agreed with the general judgment of his captains, and finally decided, No. As put by himself in his report:

> It was clear to my mind that the squadron would not have any great difficulty in forcing the surrender of the place, but the facts that

[1] For the several reports by commanding officers of the action, see *Appendix, Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, 368–382.

we should be held several days in completing arrangements for holding it; that part of our force would have to be left to await the arrival of troops to garrison it; that the movements of the Spanish squadron, our main objective, were still unknown; that the flying squadron was still north and not in a position to render aid; that Havana, Cervera's natural objective, was then open to entry by such a force as his, while we were a thousand miles distant, made our immediate movement toward Havana imperative. I thus reluctantly gave up the project against San Juan and stood westward for Havana.[1]

While pondering upon and discussing this important question, the resting fleet was allowed to drift idly, awaiting the repair by the *Terror* of her main stop-valves.

The whereabouts of the Spanish fleet was to be solved also, if possible, before leaving too quickly the vicinity of the only available telegraph station, St. Thomas, sixty miles away. The press boat *Dauntless* was awaiting the despatches of the correspondent who had accompanied the admiral on board the *Iowa*, and it was decided to move slowly westward, awaiting such news as might be had from St. Thomas by the *Yale*, expected to be found there, and which, if found, was to be ordered to report to the flag. The following despatches were sent by the *Dauntless:*

Have received no information Spanish armored vessels. The Spanish fleet is not here. The United States fleet in great need of repairs seven days from Havana to San Juan. If I cannot obtain information of Spanish vessels by *Yale* at St. Thomas will leave tomorrow for blockade of Havana.

A portion of the fleet under my command reached San Juan this morning at daybreak. No armored vessels were found in the port. As soon as it was sufficiently light I commenced an attack upon the batteries defending the city. This attack lasted about three hours and resulted in much damage to the batteries and incidentally to portions of the city adjacent to the batteries. The batteries replied to

[1] There were 13 persons in all killed ashore; 113 was the total of killed and injured, the large majority, unfortunately, being not of the army.

The author has been informed by one officially with the evacuation commission that a Spanish officer, in a position to know, told him that the place would have surrendered had the fleet remained a half hour longer; not so much on account of the injury done, which was moderate, but on account of the terror of the inhabitants and the pressure brought thereby upon the governor.

our fire, but without material effect. One man killed aboard the *New York* and three slightly wounded in the squadron. No serious damages to any ship resulted.

The admiral returned aboard the *New York* at 1 P. M., column was formed at 4, and the squadron, after stopping to bury the two dead, stood slowly to the northward and eastward until it should be dark, when course was changed to the westward, the *Montgomery* at 9.30 leaving for St. Thomas, also in search of news lest the *Yale* should fail to bring any.

At this most critical time the means of information were painfully defective. There were but three efficient scouts to cover the eastern Caribbean, a thing impossible to do with so limited a number, and even now but two were sent where they could do real service.

Scouting to be effective should cover every point of the probable line of the enemy's advent. Detection at night being, as has already been so frequently said, almost impossible but by accident, the line of scouts should be so handled as to assure (as may be done with a reasonably sufficient number of ships) that the enemy must pass the line, if at all, in daylight. We used but two of our six,[1] three being kept north through the agitation of the public, and one being sent to cruise around Puerto Rico.

On the arrival at Washington, April 29, of the news of the departure of the Spanish fleet from the Cape Verdes, sealed orders were sent to Captain Cotton, of the *Harvard:*

> The department intends to employ you to ascertain whether the Spanish fleet, which was lately at the Cape de Verde Islands, intends moving upon the West Indies, and if so, to what locality.
>
> For this purpose you will proceed, with the U. S. S. *Harvard* under your command, immediately to the eastward of the Windward Islands and cruise on a line extending between latitude 15° 38′ north longitude 59° 40′ west, and latitude 14° 25′ north and longitude 59° 30′ west.
>
> If you get no positive information by noon of May 10, you will proceed to touch at the chief ports of the island of Martinique, for the purpose of obtaining information concerning the Spanish fleet in case it should have passed you without your knowledge, and if you obtain

[1] These six, as already mentioned, were the *Harvard* (*New York*), *Yale* (*Paris*), *St. Paul*, *St. Louis*, *Columbia*, and *Minneapolis*.

what you consider to be reliable information as to its presence in the West Indies, you may, if advisable, proceed to that vicinity to get confirmatory evidence, being careful, however, not to thus sacrifice time that might be better employed in giving notice to the commander-in-chief in Cuban waters and to the department, as mentioned in paragraph 4.

If you should find the Spanish fleet is approaching, or has entered the West Indies, you will telegraph the department and also the commanding officer at Key West for transmission to the commander-in-chief on the coast of Cuba, or wherever he may be at that time. You will then proceed, with your ship, either to observe and keep touch with the Spanish fleet, or to personally inform the commander-in-chief, either off Havana or wherever he may be at the time.

The department relies upon your discretion as to whether it would be best to observe the Spanish fleet, or to proceed to personally inform the commander-in-chief that it has entered the West Indies.

If the Spanish fleet enters the West Indies, and you have informed the commander-in-chief on the station, you will, if he so requires, proceed to act in accordance with his instructions, in further observing or getting intelligence of the movements of said fleet. If he does not require such service, you will proceed to a port where there is telegraphic communication, inform the department, and wait twenty-four hours, after which, if you get no instructions, proceed to Hampton Roads, Va.

In case you should get no reliable intelligence of the Spanish fleet being bound to the West Indies, or if you obtain reliable intelligence of its movements or destination elsewhere, you will so telegraph the department and the commander-in-chief on the station, after which you will wait at the same place twenty-four hours for orders from the department, and if not received, proceed to Hampton Roads, Va.

For your information there is enclosed a copy of the orders sent to the commanding officer of the U. S. S. *St. Louis*, who is directed to cruise on a line in extension of the one assigned to you. One of the American liners has been detailed to cruise around the island of Puerto Rico.

A copy of your orders has been sent to the commander-in-chief of the North Atlantic Station.

In case of capture, you will, without fail, destroy or sink these instructions, as well as any publications of a confidential nature.

It is very important that you should, if possible, make 336 miles per day on the passage from New York to your cruising ground.

Similar orders were sent the *St. Louis*, Captain Goodrich, the latter's limits of cruising being set at latitudes 15° 38′ and 16° 55′ north, and longitudes 59° 40′ and 59° 50′ west, being a

continuation of the line of observation by the *Harvard*. May 1, the *Yale*, Captain Wise, was ordered to cruise round Puerto Rico until the evening of May 13, and if no positive information should be received by the evening of that day, the ship was to go to St. Thomas or to any other island where the captain should think it probable that word of the Spanish movements could be obtained. He was also informed that the *Harvard* and *St. Louis* were cruising between latitudes 14 and 17 on a line about one hundred miles east of Martinique and Guadeloupe.

The orders were most judicious in character and showed an almost perfect forecast of the Spanish movements. A serious error, however, as it turned out, was made in the date set for going into the island ports, due to the unexpected slowness of the Spanish ships. The *Harvard*, obeying orders, went into St. Pierre, Martinique, arriving there at 9.30 A. M., May 11, expecting to sail for St. Thomas the following morning. While Captain Cotton was ashore with the consul, the latter received, at a few minutes before 6 P. M., from Fort de France, the naval station and capital of the island, a telegram that a Spanish torpedo-destroyer had arrived at 4 P. M. At 8 o'clock, Captain Cotton, having at once gone aboard to prepare a telegram for despatch to Washington, was visited by the captain of the port with the official information from the governor at Fort de France of the arrival of the Spanish destroyer *Furor* at 4, and that she would depart at 7, and "that therefore in accordance with usage in such cases, our ship could not go to sea before 7 P. M. on the 12th." Being thus detained, Captain Cotton at once requested the consul, accompanied by Lieutenant Kane, of the Marine Corps, to go to Fort de France for complete information. They made the journey (12 miles) in a row-boat, arriving at 2 A. M. of the 12th, returning to St. Pierre by the local steamer at 9 A. M. "They reported that they saw and counted, hull down, in the offing five large steamers; that the Spanish steamer *Alicante*,[1]

[1] It is inexplicable, if this ship carried coal, as would appear by the minister's telegram of May 15th (*infra*, 252), why she should not have been at once directed to Curaçao or Santiago. That Villaamil should not have known of her presence would seem impossible, but no mention of such knowledge appears in the correspondence, which gives the impression that her presence was not known to him, or if so he did not know that she carried coal.

a so-called hospital or ambulance ship, was lying in the inner harbor, and said to have hospital stores and troops aboard, and that as they were leaving the harbor in the steamer bound for this port they passed, at about 8.15 A. M., a quarter of a mile distant, a large Spanish torpedo-destroyer standing into the harbor from the direction of, and evidently belonging to, the ships in the offing, to the southward and westward, which were apparently standing off and on."

At noon the captain of the port brought word from the governor that the *Terror* had arrived at 8 A. M. and would probably leave about noon, and that Captain Cotton was at liberty to go to sea at 8 (of the 12th) if he so desired, but that if he did not do so he would be required to give the governor twenty-four hours' notice of his leaving. Captain Cotton became mistakenly convinced that he was under the surveillance of the Spanish squadron to an extent that he was practically blockaded by it. In his report of May 15 he says:

Our friends are very few here or at Fort de France, while those whose sympathies are wholly and openly with Spain are many. Fishermen and men from the hills report that Spanish cruisers and small steamers have been seen cruising at night near St. Pierre, and in the straits north and south of the island; that strange and unusual signals have been made at sea and on the hills back of the town; that a torpedo-cruiser passed near the town, going to the northward and southward, on the night of May 11, and that one lay off Pearl Island last night six and one-half miles north of the town. As to the signals there is no doubt, for at frequent intervals last night we saw them on shore along the hills, back, and north and south of the town, and one colored signal some distance at sea. On the night of the 11th we saw rocket signals from a hill north-east of the town, and an English gentleman who owns a plantation in that vicinity told Mr. Davids that some men, known to be Spanish sympathizers, had been found on his place with rockets on the night of the 11th instant. In view of all the circumstances connected with our situation here; of the presence of a powerful Spanish fleet, including fast destroyers, in our vicinity; of their undoubted intention to capture this ship if possible; of her great value to the United States; of her much greater value, as a prize, to Spain; of the fact that it requires nearly one hour after getting under way for this ship to reach a speed of 20 knots; of the peculiar status of the officers and crew, who are serving on board of an armed ship, while they do not belong to either branch of the naval

or military service of the United States; the doubt as to their treatment by Spain, under the existing conditions, should they be captured—a long and careful consideration of all those conditions finally led me to the conclusion that I would be fully justified in not putting to sea at the present time; and I acted accordingly. That we were expected to go to sea last night was evidenced by the lively signalling going on on shore; and that the Spanish squadron was so distributed as to give us the least possible chance of escape, I have no doubt. What would have been the result had we gone out is conjectural. Two other reasons that weighed with me in remaining are, that while we are here I may be able to give valuable information relative to the Spanish fleet, and that we may be such a bait as to induce it to remain in this vicinity until the approach of one of our fleets.[1]

That this extreme watchfulness was kept by the Spanish squadron on the *Harvard* we may now, knowing what we do of its intentions and difficulties, well doubt. The Spanish admiral was much more intent upon the shelter of a port than upon the detention at Martinique of a steamer of the *Harvard's* character, which could not be reckoned as a factor in the coming battle. All this is seen clearly from the account of Captain Victor Concas, of the *Maria Teresa*, who mentions that Captain Villaamil, in the *Furor*, being informed by the governor of Martinique that the *Harvard* had gone, "believed that she had about six hours' start of him, and when he saw a large steamer on the coast, he believed himself discovered and even pursued,"[2] a striking instance of the fact that one's enemy is usually the victim of imaginary dangers as much as may be one's self.

The news from Captain Cotton of the arrival of the Spanish squadron off Martinique reached Washington during the night of May 12. It was in the *New York Herald* of May 13, sent by a resident of St. Pierre, who, however, in his next day's despatch exaggerated the force to "eight war-ships and seven torpedo-boats."

Sampson was slowly going westward, hoping for some news out of St. Thomas by the *Marblehead*, sent there, as mentioned, particularly for despatches. At 10.30 A. M. of the 13th the torpedo-boat *Porter*, accompanied by the collier *Niagara*, left the

[1] *Appendix, Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, 408.

[2] Concas, *The Squadron of Admiral Cervera*, 45. (Translation by the Office of Naval Intelligence, U. S. Navy Department, 1900.)

squadron to go to Samana Bay in order to coal in smooth water, the squadron standing slowly on, a vague report having arrived by a press boat from St. Thomas, now distant nearly 300 miles, that the Cape Verde squadron had returned to Cadiz. At midnight, May 13–14, while stopped off Puerto Plata to await the arrival of the *Porter*, and hoping for the *Marblehead*, the hospital ship *Solace*, Commander Dunlap, which had left Key West May 11, being hurried thence on account of the action at San Juan, joined the fleet. It was not impossible that Cervera had returned to Spain and was at Cadiz, a report no doubt which had as a basis the telegram to return sent him while off Martinique. Should this be true, there was but one thought in Sampson's mind: to return at once to San Juan and take the place. When the *Porter* rejoined, at 10.30 A. M., she was at once sent in to Puerto Plata with the following despatch to the navy department:

Is it true the Spanish ships are at Cadiz; if so, send to San Juan collier from Key West or elsewhere.

The *Porter* was to await an answer, or to come out as soon as she should receive any news of importance. The wounded were transferred to the *Solace* and the monitors attempted to coal from the collier *Niagara*, which had rejoined, but the sea was too rough for this. The day thus passed in weary waiting, and it was not until half-past three the next morning, May 15, that the *Porter* arrived, preceded, an hour earlier, by the scout *St. Louis*, Captain Goodrich, from the eastward. The *Porter* brought despatches which effectually disposed of any further thoughts of San Juan. They were as follows:

Flying squadron will sail to-day for Charleston, S. C., ready to reenforce Cuban blockade or Key West if necessary. The *Minneapolis* leaves to-day to watch between Monte Christi and Caicos Banks, Bahamas, and the *St. Paul* to watch between Morant Point, Jamaica, and west end of Hayti. Very important that your fast cruisers keep touch with Spanish squadron.

Later. The Spanish fleet from Cape Verde Islands, off Curaçao, W. I., May 14. Flying squadron en route to Key West, Florida. Proceed with all possible despatch to Key West. Acknowledge by telegram.

The Spanish torpedo-boat, deep-sea class, *Terror*, remains at Fort de France, Martinique, only Spanish man-of-war observed May 13. The *St. Louis* reported having arrived from St. Thomas. Captain Goodrich reports having cut a cable between St. Thomas and San Juan.

Telegrams were sent to the *Yale* at St. Thomas and the *Harvard* at Martinique:

Take all coal permitted at St. Thomas and await additional instructions. Telegraph any news to Cape Haitien.

To Commodore Remey, commanding at Key West:

Have all coal lighters filled with coal for ships in my squadron on 18th.

Despatches went to the navy department, asking for more men for the ships; to Curaçao asking if the Spanish ships were at Curaçao and if so what ships. The *Porter*, after sending these at Puerto Plata, was to go to Cape Haitien to receive replies.

The *St. Louis*, which had left Guadeloupe the 11th, had passed St. Thomas the 12th and was off San Juan the 13th, thus failing to receive the navy department's telegram of that day, sent to St. Thomas with the hope of catching her there, giving information of the presence off Martinique of the Spanish squadron and directing that Sampson be informed. Captain Goodrich had cut the cable between St. Thomas and San Juan. His appliances were very meagre and the ship of great size for such work, but he was confident of his ability to continue it, and a large part of the early hours of the morning was thus spent in sending aboard all the wire hawsers and heavy grapnels which the *New York* could furnish. Notwithstanding the difficulties in equipment, she left, accompanied by the *Wompatuck*, with the object of cutting the cables leading from Santiago and Guantánamo and of cutting those from Puerto Rico, in the endeavor to isolate Cuba completely from communication with Spain.

The monitor *Terror*, having broken down, was taken in tow by the collier *Niagara*, the monitor *Amphitrite* by the *Iowa;* and the flag-ship, having arranged a rendezvous in the Wind-

ward Passage, left the squadron to pursue its course of enforced leisure and steamed for Cape Haitien, off which she arrived at 8 P. M., the 15th, finding there the *Montgomery* from St. Thomas. At 12.30 A. M. of the 16th the *Porter* came out with telegrams from the American consul, Smith, at Curaçao, sent to the American consul at Cape Haitien:

Maria Teresa and *Vizcaya* in harbor coaling; arrived Saturday; *Oquendo, Cristóbal Colón, Terror,* and *Plutón* outside; only two admitted at time; short of coal and provisions; dirty bottom.

Inform Admiral Sampson Spanish squadron will leave 6 postmeridian, destination unknown.

Two telegrams came from the navy department:

Five vessels supposed to be men-of-war observed off Fort de France, Martinique, May 14, afternoon;

and

Spanish fleet from Cape de Verde off Curaçao on May 14. *Vizcaya* and *Maria Teresa* entered into port as reported and to leave Curaçao on May 15. Department heard from London 10th instant colliers would probably meet them north coast of Venezuela. Flying squadron sailed May 13 for Key West.

The navy department also telegraphed Commodore Remey at Key West:

Inform at once vessels blockading at Cienfuegos the Spanish fleet may appear at any time on south coast of Cuba.

Sampson gave orders to the scouts, which are embodied in the following telegram to the navy department, May 16:

Auxiliary cruisers are ordered to cruise as follows: *Yale* to assist *St. Paul* between Morant Point, Jamaica, Nicolas Mole and Cuba; *Harvard,* Mona Passage and on north side of Puerto Rico Island; *St. Louis* cutting cables at Santiago and Guantánamo, Cuba, then at Ponce, Puerto Rico, then to St. Thomas about May 19 to await orders. United States squadron proceeding at best speed, 7 knots, to Key West and will arrive early May 19. *Solace* and *Supply* joined squadron.

He telegraphed the *Harvard,* at St. Thomas:

Four Spanish cruisers, two torpedo-destroyers, now at Curaçao to leave 6 P. M. May 15. Probably small supply of coal. Destination unknown, probably Santiago de Cuba[1] or San Juan, Puerto Rico. *St. Louis* will destroy cables at Santiago, Guantánamo, May 16, then Ponce, P. R., arrive St. Thomas about May 19. Cruise as follows: *Yale* to assist *St. Paul* between Morant Point, Jamaica, Nicolas Mole and Cuba. *Harvard* Mona Passage and north side of Puerto Rico. *St. Louis* to await orders at St. Thomas.

At noon of the day (May 16) when these telegrams were sent, the harassed Spanish admiral was but 135 miles north-west of Curaçao, having made less than a fourth of his distance to Santiago de Cuba (635 miles), toward which he was proceeding at the very slow rate of about 7 knots. It had been impossible for the American commander to suppose that these fine ships, all of them rated at not less than 20 knots trial speed, had been brought to such condition. Sampson's course to Key West laid directly past the Windward Passage, and at noon, May 16, he was looking down it with Cervera 450 miles south-east of him heading for Santiago, still 500 miles distant, but which was only 160 miles from Sampson's position of that day.

Sampson's foresightful orders of May 16 failed of execution. On May 14 the navy department ordered all the scouts to Key West to watch the Yucatan Channel. Changing these the next day on the misguiding information that Spanish colliers had been sent to the Venezuelan coast, it ordered thither the *Yale*, *St. Paul* and *Minneapolis*, orders which rapid developments soon annulled. There was thus no ship but the *St. Louis*, now cutting cables, in the sea between Jamaica, Hayti and Cuba which Sampson had ordered watched and over which Cervera had taken his course. With the flying squadron now probably in a situation to watch Havana, there can be little doubt that Sampson, left to his own judgment, would himself have gone by the south side of Cuba. Short, however, of its annulment, Sampson was obliged to obey the imperative order of the navy department to return to Key West.

[1] It should be noted that Sampson placed upon record, as shown by this telegram to the *Harvard*, his belief in the possibility of Santiago's being an objective.

Sampson, having sent the telegram just mentioned into Cape Haitien by the *Porter*, and being joined by the *Montgomery* and store-ship *Supply*, which carried to the fleet a most welcome cargo of fresh provisions, stood westward to overtake his own slow-moving squadron, which had been standing its westerly course throughout the night, and which was overhauled at 10 o'clock the next morning, May 17. Instructions were given Captain Evans, of the *Iowa*, the officer next in rank, to make the best time possible to Key West; and, directing the *Niagara* and *Montgomery* to go off Cardenas to coal the latter and any other ships there, the flag-ship at 11.30 left the squadron at full speed for Key West. Some little delay was experienced by the flag-ship's overhauling and capturing in the afternoon the Spanish bark *Carlos F. Rosas*, with a cargo of jerked beef for Havana. After a futile attempt to tow her at a good speed, she was left with a prize crew aboard under the command of Ensign Brumby, to make her own best way to Key West, and the *New York* stood on at 16 knots.

At 6 P. M. the torpedo-boat *Dupont* was met, with a copy of a despatch from the navy department to the station commandant at Key West and telegrams to the commander-in-chief. The following was that to Commodore Remey:

Sampson is due May 17, 1898, in the vicinity of Lobos Cay. Send immediately your fastest vessel to inform him that department has just heard that Spanish fleet have munitions of war essential to the defence of Havana and the order of the Spanish fleet is imperative to reach Havana, Cienfuegos, or a railroad port connected with Havana at all hazards, and as Cienfuegos appears to be the only port fulfilling the conditions, Schley, with the *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, and *Texas*, to arrive Key West morning of the 18th, will be sent to Cienfuegos as soon as possible, so Admiral Sampson take or send his most suitable armored ship (one) to join Schley and hurry with remainder of his heavy ships to join Havana blockade. Acknowledge this by telegraph, reporting action taken.

To the commander-in-chief:

WASHINGTON, *May* 14.—On account of the presence of Spanish fleet near Curaçao send with all possible despatch swift vessel to direct all except smallest blockading vessel off Cienfuegos to Key West.

Warn the blockading vessels off north coast of Cuba but do not remove any of them. *Hornet* sent Cienfuegos May 14 P. M. *Uncas* sent to north coast 2 A. M. 15th.

WASHINGTON, *May* 14.—Spanish fleet with torpedo-boats are reported sighted off Curaçao by our consul at that place, morning May 14. Are probably fleet which was at Martinique on May 12. Keep close lookout for Yucatan Channel, as the enemy may round Cape Antonio, or enter Gulf of Mexico. Keep very efficient despatch service to these lookout ships. *St. Paul* will probably join you early morning 17th May. Enemy may appear at point on south side of Cuba. *Cincinnati* and *Vesuvius* in Yucatan Channel.

WASHINGTON, *May* 16.—Previous plans for *St. Paul* are changed and she must coal immediately and proceed with all possible despatch to Venezuela Gulf, South America, where it is considered the Spanish fleet from Cape Verde Islands will coal. She must find and keep in communication with enemy, exercising the utmost care to avoid being captured. More vessels will be sent to join her, probably *Harvard*. Key West and the department must be kept advised of important movement and plans of enemy. *St. Paul* and *Harvard* not arrived 6 P.M. 16th.

WASHINGTON, *May* 16.—The *Texas*, *Massachusetts*, and *Brooklyn* are expected to arrive to-morrow to coal.

WASHINGTON, *May* 17.—Armored vessels and monitors and flying squadron must be coaled immediately upon arrival at Key West, also four gun-boats of the force of the *Marblehead*. Flying squadron, after being increased by the armored vessels commander-in-chief North Atlantic station considers most suitable, proceed with despatch (utmost) off Cienfuegos, accompanied by the smaller vessels above mentioned and such torpedo-boats, if any, as the commander-in-chief will choose to send. The remainder of the naval force on the North Atlantic station and the monitors will blockade Havana closely, remembering the importance of having current in their favor. Sampson have choice the command off Havana or at Cienfuegos, Schley in either case to remain with his own squadron. Commander-in-chief is authorized to make such changes of detail in this plan as he may think proper. In general, the object is to engage and capture the enemy off Cienfuegos if possible, or otherwise blockade him in that port. See department's telegram of the 16th.

From Captain Cotton, of the *Harvard:*

MARTINIQUE, *May* 17.—In obedience to your orders May 15 will leave to-morrow. Detained on account of twenty-four hours' notice. *Terror* remains at Fort de France. Coal eight days 15 knots an hour, eleven days 12 knots per hour.

The flag-ship arrived at Key West at 4 P. M. the next day, May 18, and found Commodore Schley, who had arrived at 1 A. M. the same day, with the *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, and *Texas* anchored outside the reef.

Commodore Schley had left Hampton Roads May 13 under these orders:

Direct squadron to proceed at once off Charleston, S. C., taking colliers. Anchor. Keep in communication with department by vessel. You are thus moved to be more near to re-enforce either Sampson or blockade of Cuba, as movements of Spanish squadron may require. Keep the *New Orleans* at Hampton Roads. The department will send *St. Paul* immediately to cruise Windward Passage.

He was met at Charleston with an order carried out to him by the light-house tender to proceed to Key West "with all possible despatch and on arrival report Remey. He will have instructions."

The *Iowa* arrived at Key West three hours after the *New York* and reported having been overhauled by the *Porter* from Cape Haitien with the following telegram which had been sent to Cape Haitien from the department to the store-ship *Supply:*

Cruise between Caicos Bank and Monte Christi until you fall in with the *Minneapolis*, due there the 16th or 17th, and transmit to her commander the following cipher message, after which proceed to Key West, distributing supplies *en route*. For *Minneapolis:* the Spanish squadron off Curaçao on May 15 is believed going to Venezuela Gulf, South America, to coal. Proceed with all despatch to that vicinity, get and keep touch (Spanish squadron). Care must be taken to avoid capture; *St. Paul* and *Yale* have been ordered upon this duty. If not able to find enemy, communicate by telegraph by nearest station.

The *St. Paul*, Captain Sigsbee, was at the anchorage, about getting under way, with instructions already delivered by Commodore Remey:

Order *St. Paul* proceed with all despatch to Cape Haitien and there communicate. If he meets *Yale* Windward Passage Cuba, take *Yale* with him, but he must not delay in order to find her. Further instructions at Cape Haitien.

Sigsbee, leaving as Sampson arrived, picked up the *Yale* in the old Bahama Channel, and arrived with both ships at Cape Haitien, May 20.[1]

The natural anxiety of the navy department was shown in supplementing its previous telegrams by sending to Key West, the day of Sampson's arrival, orders to Schley to go off Havana with all possible despatch to support blockade until the former's arrival, leaving the *Puritan* and *Miantonomoh* to defend Key West; but as both squadrons arrived the same day, arrangements were made as the department had first intended.

The flying squadron had been coaling since its arrival; Commodore Schley at once came on board the *New York* and a consultation was held in the admiral's cabin as to the dispositions to be made under the navy department's two important telegrams given above, embodying the orders for the general disposition of the fleet—orders given under the misinformation which appeared to make Cienfuegos or Havana Cervera's necessary objective, whereas his only orders had been to go to San Juan, Puerto Rico.[2]

Sampson had already decided before arrival to give the opportunity at Cienfuegos to Schley, and himself remain off Havana. He had determined upon adding the *Iowa*, as the best ship of the fleet, to Schley's squadron, which, with the smaller vessels, the *Marblehead*, *Castine*, and *Eagle*, and torpedo-boat *Dupont*, soon to be available, gave an ample and indeed an overpowering force with which to meet that of Cervera, who had but four armored cruisers against the one armored cruiser and three

[1] The developments during his passage were to cause both ships to go at once off Santiago instead of Venezuela; the *Minneapolis*, at St. Thomas May 19, immediately followed on May 20.

[2] The following ships were now at Key West, or arrived next day. Off the reef: *New York*, *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Iowa*, *Texas*, *Indiana*, and colliers *Niagara* and *Sterling*. In the harbor: the monitors *Amphitrite*, *Miantonomoh*, *Puritan*, and *Terror;* the cruisers *Marblehead*, *Montgomery*, and *Detroit;* gun-boats *Machias*, *Castine*, and *Newport;* armed revenue vessels *Windom* and *Morrill;* armed yachts *Scorpion*, *Wasp*, *Eagle*, *Hawk*, and *Hornet;* armed tugs *Osceola* and *Tecumseh;* torpedo-boats *Ericsson*, *Dupont*, *Rodgers*, and *Winslow;* the dynamite cruiser *Vesuvius;* the transport *Panther*, with the marine battalion; the hospital ship *Solace;* a total of thirty-five vessels.

battle-ships (two of which were of the first class) to be with Commodore Schley. The smaller ships named and the powerfully armed yacht *Scorpion* were an ample set-off to the two torpedo-destroyers of the Spanish squadron.

Telegrams came and went with painful frequency. On the 18th the navy department ordered a fast cruiser of 2,000 or 3,000 tons to be sent as soon as possible to keep a close lookout for the Spanish fleet off Cienfuegos, but answer was made that none was available larger than the *Castine*. A suitable defence was ordered by the department to be left at Key West, and the utmost despatch was urged to get the force off Cienfuegos; information was also received that the *Oregon* had arrived at Barbados all well.

Sampson telegraphed:

> Schley will leave Thursday morning, 19th, for Cienfuegos with *Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas,* and two cruisers and two torpedo-boats. *Iowa* will leave as soon as coaled.

CHAPTER VIII

CERVERA'S VOYAGE

The Spanish squadron had lost sight of the Cape Verdes at 10 A. M., April 29. The large ships, the *Vizcaya* excepted (on account of her foulness and consequent large coal expenditure), had towed the three torpedo-destroyers the greater part of the way across the Atlantic. There was no special equipment for this work, and much difficulty was experienced with the improvised appliances; the tow-lines parted frequently through the yawing of the destroyers. An average of but 6.5 knots had thus been made to May 10 (a slowness which it was impossible for the American authorities to anticipate), when the admiral sent the *Terror* and *Furor* ahead to Martinique to obtain coal, and more especially news. In doing this duty they had been expected to make 20 knots, but a few hours after leaving the squadron the *Terror's* boilers gave out "and there she was on the open sea nothing but a buoy."[1] Villaamil, in the *Furor*, stood by her until picked up by the squadron, when she was again taken in tow. Villaamil was ungraciously received by the governor (who seems to have preserved an entirely neutral attitude throughout), who informed him he could have no coal, and that he was prohibited from going out on account of the *Harvard's* arrival just before. Nor was there news of the collier which the Spanish government had promised should be at Martinique. Despite the governor's prohibition, however, the *Furor* left at midnight, boats from the Spanish hospital ship in port, the *Alicante*, lighting the positions of the buoys.[2]

[1] The *Terror* repaired her boilers at Fort de France, Martinique, and left there May 25, arriving at San Juan, Puerto Rico, May 26.

[2] Concas, 44.


UNITED STATES
New York
Boston
Halifax
St Johns
Philadelphia
Washington
Newport News
Norfolk
Charleston
Tampa
Key West
Habana
CUBA
Cienfuegos
Santiago
JAMAICA
HAYTI
PUERTO RICO
ST THOMAS
BERMUDA
BAHAMA IS
Inagua
Turk Is
Mole St Nicholas
Port au Prince
Jacmel
Gonaives
Cape Haytien
Monte Cristi
Samana
Puerto Plata
Santo Domingo
Azua
Barahona
Trujillo
HONDURAS
NICARAGUA
Greytown
COSTA RICA
Cartagena
Panama
Caracas
VENEZUELA
COLOMBIA
GUIANA
TRINIDAD
BARBADOS
CURACAO
GUADELOUPE
MARTINIQUE
CAPE VERDE IS.
CANARY IS.
MOROCCO
SAHARA
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
Madrid
Lisbon
Cadiz
Gibraltar
New York to Cadiz 3900 miles
New York to Palmas 3600 miles
New York to Cape Verde Is 2812 miles
New York to Havana 1365 miles
Key West to Habana 110 miles
Kingston Roads to San Juan 1280 miles
San Juan to C. Verde Is. 2340 miles
TRACK OF ADMIRAL CERVERA'S SQUADRON
TRACK OF CHRISTOBAL COLON
DISTANCES IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC
AND
DAILY POSITIONS OF SPANISH SQUADRON
UNDER ADMIRAL CERVERA

It was shortly after 2 A. M. (of the 12th) that Villaamil, in the *Furor*, was picked up by the squadron by her searchlights thrown upon the clouds, and at 3 was alongside the admiral.

The information brought by Villaamil as to Sampson's proximity to Puerto Rico was sufficiently definite to convince the admiral that it would be madness to follow the orders to go to San Juan. He called a council of war, the unanimous decision of which was as follows:

> Having carefully studied the situation of the squadron, which is extremely critical, owing to the scant supply of coal, the Governor of Martinique having refused to give aid in that direction, and it having been learned that there is no coal in San Juan, nor probably at Santiago, and in view of the bad condition of the boilers of the destroyers, those of the *Terror* being practically unserviceable, so that it became necessary to send her back to Fort de France this morning to await orders from the government, these officers seeing no other solution—on penalty of placing the squadron in a position where it will be unable to move and will hence become an easy prey for the enemy—except to go to Curaçao, in hopes of finding there the coal announced by the minister of marine in his telegram of April 26.
>
> In witness whereof they sign the foregoing, at sea, off Fort de France, Martinique.[1]

[1] Signed by the admiral, the commodore, and all the captains. (Cervera, *Documents*, 73.)

A telegram from Cervera had been sent from Martinique to the minister of marine:

"Squadron arrived safely. Spirit excellent. Villaamil is to obtain information on which future operations will depend."

A request for increase of credit at London followed.

Had Cervera awaited an answer, the complexion of affairs would have been very materially altered, as the reply, sent the same day, permitted a return to Spain. The minister sent the three following telegrams this day:

"Government is pleased to hear of your arrival at Martinique. Nothing new in the Peninsula. Telegram received to-day announcing attack San Juan, Puerto Rico, by hostile fleet, composed of *New York*, *Indiana*, *Terror*, *Puritan*, two cruisers, one torpedo-boat, and two colliers. Island of Puerto Rico is watched by auxiliaries *Paris* and *New York*. Admiral at Havana says four hostile ships in sight yesterday, one at Matanzas and several off Cienfuegos. News of bombardment of Cardenas by a battle-ship, monitor, and another vessel; enemy repulsed.

"Credit increased; another 15,000 pounds on same house London. Steamer *Alicante* with coal must have arrived at Martinique, and an English steamer

Cervera's own account of what to this moment had happened, is shown in a letter written three days later at Curaçao:

[Confidential.]

The Commander-in-Chief of the Squadron (Cervera) to the Minister (Bermejo).

CAPTAINCY-GENERAL OF THE SQUADRON.

HONORED SIR: Through my official letter of the 8th, written on the sea, your Excellency knows of the few incidents of our monotonous voyage across the Atlantic, during which I sacrificed everything in

with 3,000 tons is to make that harbor under orders of captain of *Alicante*. Both vessels at your disposal."

"According to late information battle-ship *Oregon*, accompanied by *Marietta* and another similar ship, are on the way from Rio de Janeiro to West Indies."

"Situation changed since your departure. Your instruction amplified so that if you do not believe that your squadron can operate successfully may return to Peninsula, choosing route and destination, preferably Cadiz. Acknowledge receipt and indicate decision." [These never reached Cervera.]

The knowledge in Havana and San Juan of the sending of the latter telegram brought violent protests from Blanco and Macias, the governors of Cuba and Puerto Rico, to the minister of the colonies, Girón:

HAVANA, *May* 17, 1898.

(To be deciphered by your Excellency personally.)

Have asked commandant navy whether he has received news on situation of our squadron. He tells me received from San Juan confidential cipher message saying that telegram has been sent to commander-in-chief of squadron at Fort de France that his instructions are amplified, and if he cannot operate there successfully may return to Peninsula. If this should happen, situation here would be wholly untenable, and I could not prevent bloody revolution in this capital and whole island, feelings being already overmuch excited by delay in arrival of our squadron. Therefore, beg your Excellency to tell me whether it is true that order has been issued to squadron to return to Peninsula, and if so does government realize the significance of such a decision, which might be the cause of a bloody page staining our history, and of final loss of this island and the honor of Spain? If our squadron is defeated, it would increase here determination to vanquish or die; but if it flees, panic and revolution are certain.

PUERTO RICO, *May* 18, 1898.

Orders for squadron to return to Peninsula will end enthusiasm and high spirit in island. Inhabitants will say Spain abandons them and situation may become very critical. Consider it my sacred duty to tell you so. (Cervera's *Documents*, 72, 73, 78.)

order that our frail torpedo-boat destroyers might arrive fresh and in condition to render useful service. But my efforts were in vain, for hardly had the *Furor* and *Terror* been made for twenty-four hours to maintain two-thirds of their trial speed, when the boilers of the latter became disabled, putting us to the necessity of losing still further time, and finally leaving the *Terror* in the neutral port of Fort de France in the island of Martinique.

The accompanying copy of the official report of her captain, marked "Document No. 1," will give your Excellency further details as to what has occurred. It was a great and very unpleasant surprise to me when I saw our two destroyers at daybreak of the 11th, the *Terror* nothing but a buoy, and the *Furor* guarding her, so that she might not be abandoned in the midst of the ocean until she was sure of being seen by the squadron. When we reached her I took her in tow, and we had to proceed even more slowly than at the beginning, as the destroyer no longer had the protection of the swifter with which the commander of the flotilla had provided her.

I will say nothing further of this accident, since it has occurred to a ship under very efficient command, and with an engineer-in-chief who enjoys the highest reputation. It only proves the frailness of these ships. They have another defect, almost worse, namely, the temperature which develops in them and which is unbearable for all, but especially for the engineers and firemen, who are frequently overcome by the heat.

The commander of the flotilla, who, as your Excellency is aware, went to Martinique in search of information, went out with the *Furor* at daybreak of the 11th, and at midnight of the 11th he rejoined the squadron, brimful of news, but all bad, and, among other obstacles encountered, having had to contend with a chase by a hostile cruiser. The commander, Captain Villaamil, has once more demonstrated in this enterprise the rare intelligence, energy, and presence of mind with which he is gifted. The information he brought me, in answer to the questions I gave him upon trusting the mission to him, is as follows: That the hostile ships are blockading the western part of Cuba, from Cardenas to Cienfuegos, with the nucleus of their fleet; that just now, according to secret information which, however, is not entirely reliable, they are off San Juan de Puerto Rico, with their admiral, and bombarded the capital on the 11th; that San Juan appears to be blockaded and Santiago free; that two of the enemy's auxiliary cruisers, the *Harvard* and *St. Louis*, are at Guadeloupe and Martinique, respectively; that the Americans have taken possession of Puerto Plata and, it is believed, also of Samaná; that the war of insurrection in Cuba is still going on, and the last news is of a fierce battle at Sierra Maestra; that Spain is passing through a ministerial crisis; that we should not be permitted to take coal in Martinique,

but that we could get provisions there; and finally, that there was no special news from the Far East.

He also brought me a bundle of press telegrams containing a great deal of news; among others, of the destruction of our poor fleet in the Philippines, which, glorious though it may be, is nevertheless a great disaster. In view of the very serious news, and although my opinions on the subject have been manifested (too frankly, perhaps) in my correspondence with the government, by telegrams as well as official letters, and in my confidential communications to the minister of marine, I considered it my duty to assemble the captains and second in command of the squadron, whom I acquainted with the situation and consulted as to what, in their opinion, was best to be done.

After discussing this very serious question, it was decided that there was no advantage in going to Martinique, since we would gain nothing thereby and only consume coal. To go to San Juan would be madness, as we would only be preparing an easy triumph for the enemy. And, as we have hardly coal enough to reach Santiago de Cuba, with the speed necessary on the sea of operations, and as our destroyers would probably not be able to withstand the trip, it was the unanimous opinion of the officers that we should go to Curaçao in search of the coal which was promised us by telegram of April 26. Proceedings were drawn up to that effect, a copy of which, marked "Document No. 2," accompanies this letter.[1] As I was of the same opinion, we proceeded to that island, adopting at first a wrong course in the direction of Santo Domingo, until at a distance of 30 miles from Martinique.

Cervera then proceeds to reiterate the folly of mere sacrifice and ends with events at Curaçao:

Permit me here to make a few observations to explain and justify my operations.

There is not the least doubt that a sacrifice, such as made by our comrades in the Philippines, is worthy of the highest honor, and I take pleasure in expressing to them from here my enthusiasm and admiration. But is there any practical result in such sacrifice? Evidently not, and from pitting vessels like the *Castilla* and *Cristina* against modern ships no other result than the one obtained can possibly be expected. The result will always be the same where there is great disparity between the opposing forces, whether in the number of ships, their efficiency, or the stores they carry.

This painful result therefore justifies the crude ideas I have expressed in my correspondence above referred to, upon which I insist no further, as I do not want to be a bore, which is always a bad thing,

[1] *Supra*, p. 252.

especially when addressing a superior. I therefore proceed with the report of our voyage. The run from the waters of Martinique to those of Curaçao offered nothing worth mentioning. At 7 o'clock A. M. of the 14th, about five miles from Little Curaçao, I gave orders to the destroyers to enter the port first; but at 8.30 I saw them off the entrance. The *Plutón* signalled: "Awaiting permission of governor." The squadron stopped and soon after the *Plutón* signalled that only two ships were permitted to go in. This was confirmed by the pilot, who arrived soon after, demanding to know the names of the ships, their complements and armament, and the amount of coal required. I selected the *Teresa* and *Vizcaya*, whose coal supply was lower than that of the others. I gave the information asked for, stating that each ship needed 700 tons, and the pilot went back.

I gave instructions that the *Furor* should be recoaled from the *Colón*, and that the latter ship, together with the *Oquendo* and *Plutón*, should remain outside. The pilot returned, accompanied by the Spanish consul, who told me that the stay in the harbor must be limited to forty-eight hours. At 12.30 we cast anchor inside, after which I had an interview with the governor, who told me that this was a necessity imposed upon his government by both belligerents. I accepted the 600 tons of coal, which was all that could be had in the town, and ordered the purchase of provisions so as to supply each ship for thirty days, from the captain down to the cabin-boy.

The reasons for going to Curaçao are given in greater detail by Captain Concas:

In the first place, it had been reported for some time that the United States was negotiating for the purchase of the island of St. Thomas. We had therefore good reasons to suppose that the enemy would have a station there, if only a merchant vessel, so that the squadron which we had been told was at San Juan would be notified of our arrival that very day, and as said squadron could have no other object in view but to await us, it was highly probable—almost certain—that knowing us to be to the southward, the hostile fleet would cut off our passage at Cape Maysi and Mole St. Nicolas or at Gibara, from which points the hostile squadron was 450 and 600 miles distant, respectively; while we, passing to the southward of Santo Domingo, since to the northward an encounter was certain, were 950 miles from Cape Maysi and still further from Gibara, without being able to elude an encounter with much superior forces, if we wanted to go to Havana through the Old Bahama Channel, which encounter would probably have taken place at a distance of not less than 400 miles from Havana. In that case, the hostile forces being overwhelmingly superior, our ships, if even slightly injured, were hopelessly lost, for

under such circumstances, and when harassed by the enemy, ships cannot run hundreds of miles.

The only harbors that we could enter were, first, San Juan, which we had to discard altogether because, as the United States admiral has said with good reason, he could have taken it whenever he pleased. Second, Havana, which we had to suppose to be well guarded, and it was, indeed, since the Americans themselves have since said that *it was considered highly* improbable that we should attempt to enter Havana, and it must be understood that it was better guarded by the squadrons at a distance than near by, because, in spite of the blockade, it would have been difficult to prevent ships, whether injured or not, from placing themselves under the protection of the batteries of the city, while an encounter at a distance from Havana meant the total destruction of our squadron. Third, Cienfuegos, which we also supposed guarded . . . is a veritable rat-trap, very easy to blockade, and from which exit is more difficult than from any other harbor of the island. We knew there were torpedoes there, but no fortifications to amount to anything, and, moreover, the entrance is very difficult to defend against a serious attack from the sea. On the other hand, we were 1,250 miles distant from the latter harbor, while from Havana, or Dry Tortugas or Key West, the enemy's base of operations, they had to make a run of only 500 miles to cut us off. . . . Later, when starvation stared us in the face at Santiago, the former harbor was thought of as a possible solution, but not on the day of our arrival at Martinique. There remained as the only solution, going to Santiago de Cuba, the second capital of the island, which we had to suppose, and did suppose, well supplied with provisions and artillery, in view of the favorable condition of the harbor entrance. Moreover, the southern coast of the island offered chances of sortie on stormy days and an open sea for operations, after we had refilled and made repairs. But as we also supposed that the fortifications there were not sufficient to afford us much support in the sortie, it was not at that time decided to go to said harbor in the hopes of a solution which would permit us to force our way into Havana harbor. The distance from Martinique to Santiago is about 950 miles, so that the hostile squadron, which was at San Juan, could easily have arrived there ahead of us. But we never believed that it would do so, thinking that Admiral Sampson, though it has since come to light that he did not know of our arrival, would do what he actually did do, namely, to cover the remotest possibility, the entrance to the only fortified point, Havana.

Moreover, the government had notified us that we should find a collier at the island of Curaçao, and as we were not more than 480 miles from said island and by going there should lose only about 200 miles on our way to Cuba, it was decided to go to Curaçao, because if we had a collier with us, we could have disappeared in the Caribbean

Sea and, though at great risk, reached Havana; and our entering the harbor, though we might have to suffer more or less in the attempt, would not have been prevented by any one, provided always that the battle had taken place in sight of the forts.[1]

The Spanish squadron lost sight of Martinique at twenty minutes past noon, May 12, sighted Curaçao at 6.30 the morning of the 14th, and at 8 was off the port, having made the run of 485 miles at an average speed of a little more than 11 knots. The Spanish admiral has already described the discouraging situation in his letter above of May 15,[2] but the graphic words of Captain Concas give the more complete picture. He says:

After lengthy and unpleasant negotiations, the governor stated that the conditions of neutrality permitted him to allow only two ships to enter and that these could not remain more than forty-eight hours; also, that we could ship only a limited quantity of coal. It was about 2 o'clock P. M. by the time the armored cruisers *Infanta Maria Teresa* and *Vizcaya* entered the harbor, while the *Colón*, *Oquendo*, and the destroyers, *Furor* and *Plutón*, remained outside.[3] It was with difficulty that we acquired the coal available, which, if I remember right, amounted to only 400 tons, and we proceeded to get it on board, working frantically, shipping also such provisions as we could obtain. Nothing can give an idea of the anxiety of that night of May 14, when we interpreted every noise we heard as an attack upon our comrades, and we could not even go to their assistance, for the harbor of Curaçao, which is closed by a bridge, is completely cut off from the outside at sunset.[4] In the meantime we had ascertained the sad fact that the anxiously looked-for collier was not there, nor was there any news for us; and as though ill luck were pursuing us even in the least details, one of those two days was a holiday and everything was strictly closed up, so that we could not even buy postage stamps for our letters, which we had to entrust to the consul to be mailed the next day.

On the evening of the 15th, as daylight was fading, the two cruisers went out, having to leave in the harbor launches with coal and provisions, but did not rejoin the other ships until it was quite dark, owing to the fact that a man of the crew of the *Plutón* had fallen overboard, but fortunately he had been rescued.

[1] Concas, 47. [2] Cervera, *Documents*, 75, 77.

[3] The *Plutón* was allowed to go in later. The *Terror* was supplied with thirty-four tons from the *Colón* by the ship's cutters.

[4] This very extraordinary harbor is entered by a narrow canal which passes through the town into a deep and commodious basin.

Captain Concas proceeds to describe the passage to Santiago:

When the line had been formed again with every precaution made necessary by the grave situation, we proceeded at an economical speed on account of the *Oquendo* and *Colón*, which were short of coal,



and timing ourselves so as to reach Santiago de Cuba at daybreak, the squadron shaped its course for that harbor, which the admiral indicated by signals to be our destination. All the ships were in complete readiness to open fire.

During the night of May 18, off Jamaica, we crossed two transatlantic steamers, which left us in doubt as to whether they were

auxiliary cruisers or not. But soon one of these vessels passed within sight of us, making signals with the Morse alphabet and with a searchlight in operation. But she did not discover us, as we were proceeding without lights, with the exception of a small screened lamp at the stern, of such feeble light that it could not be discerned beyond a distance of three cables, which was the distance maintained between our ships.

We paid no attention to these cruisers or merchant vessels, for as their presence seemed to indicate that there were hostile forces at Santiago it was necessary for us to reach that harbor before daylight, whether to fight at the entrance, or whether to force our way through before being defeated in case the enemy was superior. The admiral did not have the least information as to whether there were hostile forces there, and if so, what they consisted of.

At dawn of May 19 the squadron was off Santiago, without having seen a hostile ship. The destroyers therefore made a reconnoissance of the coast, while the large ships entered the harbor, where they cast anchor in complete security at 8 o'clock A. M. of that day. This was very fortunate, as the *Oquendo* and *Colón*, which had not been able to enter Curaçao, had very little coal left, especially the former, which had hardly 100 tons.[1]

Cervera telegraphed his arrival to the minister of marine, saying that it was imperative to clean engines and boilers, which made it necessary to remain several days, and that he needed

[1] Concas, 49, 50.

At this moment the fast scout *St. Louis*, accompanied by the tug *Wompatuck*, was at Guantánamo, but forty miles to the east of Santiago, attempting to cut the cables leading to the coast of Hayti. She had been on the same duty off Santiago the day before, where the two vessels, handled with great courage and ability by Captain Goodrich, and under fire of the batteries, with which they had a sharp engagement, had cut one cable leading thence. It was hazardous work for a great merchant steamer, whose crew, furthermore, were not even enlisted men of the navy, The affair is described by Goodrich:

"At daylight [May 18], being then some seven miles off Santiago light and the Morro Castle, I steamed with this ship on various courses, gradually approaching the fortifications. The water is so deep close to, that with the meagre and improvised appliances at my command I was obliged to come within 1.3 miles of the castle. I had no sooner hooked the cable in over 500 fathoms of water than I was fired upon from the Morro, from a new work to the westward of the harbor, and most formidable of all, from a mortar battery on Gaspar Point. Of course, with the very modest broadside of this vessel, aided by the one 3-pounder of the *Wompatuck*, which joined me just as the firing began, it was impossible to do much execution on the fortifications. Nevertheless we silenced the one gun on the Morro, which was placing its shot dangerously close, both over and short of us; the crew, as could be plainly

more coal than he had. Telegraphing Governor-General Blanco he said: "Have cast anchor in this harbor, whence whole squadron sends you greeting, desirous of co-operating in the defence of the country." Blanco had already, at 9 A. M., telegraphed to the minister of the colonies that "Our squadron has just entered Santiago de Cuba. Congratulate the admiral on his arrival and skilful voyage."

As an answer to a telegram of May 18 from Blanco to the same minister, that the return of the squadron to Spain would "end enthusiasm and high spirits in the island," the minister of marine, before knowing of Cervera's arrival, telegraphed both to Santiago and Martinique cancelling the recall.

seen, running away from their piece. Similarly our fire silenced the western battery. From the mortar battery above mentioned the projectiles came with singularly good aim, both as to direction and distance, falling close aboard, some not 100 feet away, and rendering our position extremely uncomfortable. The damage of which one of their shells is capable might have been serious, even to wrecking or completely crippling this fine and costly vessel. Our position was now extremely uncomfortable, but we held firmly on to the cable, firing all the time, and steamed slowly out of range, where we could pick up the cable at leisure. We cut out quite a length. A sample accompanies this letter. It may be said with absolute exactness that we not only succeeded in our undertaking, but had to fight for our success in a ship entirely unsuited to fighting.

"The action, which took place at 2,500 to 3,000 yards, lasted forty-one minutes. I am exceedingly happy to report no injuries to either ship and no casualties among the officers or men." (*Report of the Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, Appendix, 209.)

Of the occurrences next day he says:

"I regret to have to report my failure this morning early to cut the French cable at Guantánamo. The port is guarded by a Spanish gun-boat carrying heavier guns than the 6-pounders of this ship; she is commanded by an officer who did not hesitate to attack us. Doubtless he had been informed from Santiago of the light nature of our batteries, and had been warned to be on the lookout for us. In addition was a small gun on shore. I sent the *Wompatuck* into the mouth of the harbor to drag for the wire while I lay just outside. She caught the cable just before the action. It was only after a hot engagement in which both ships took part that the necessity of abandoning my enterprise in that locality was forced upon me. To have remained longer might have caused the loss of the ship, for she is very vulnerable, as you know." (*Ibid.*, 210.) Captain Goodrich particularly praises Lieutenant Jungen in both actions, as also Chief Officer Segrave, whom he recommended for a commission in the navy. He expresses his thanks to Ensign U. S. Payne, U. S. N., and Lieut. A. W. Catlin, of the marine corps, for labors in preparing a set of raw recruits for battle, and praises their coolness and courage.

CHAPTER IX

THE MOVES TO INTERCEPT CERVERA

At 8 A. M., May 19, the hour and day that Cervera anchored at Santiago, Commodore Schley, with the *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Texas*, and *Scorpion*, sailed for Cienfuegos with the following orders from Admiral Sampson, supplementing the department's telegrams of the two previous days.[1]

No. 5. U. S. F. S. *New York*, 1st Rate,
Key West, Fla., *May* 19, 1898.

Sir:—I send you a copy of a telegram received last night from Secretary Long, concerning a vessel which was to sail on the 15th, and carrying a large amount of specie, and is supposed to be going to land at Trinidad or to the east of Cienfuegos. This may be a blind, however, and the vessel may be bound for Cienfuegos, or even to Havana.

The two cruisers will be sent out to-day, and with the two torpedo-boats following them. As soon as the *Iowa* is coaled, she will follow you.

It is unnecessary for me to say that you should establish a blockade at Cienfuegos with the least possible delay, and that it should be maintained as close as possible.

Should the Spanish vessels show themselves in that vicinity, and, finding you on the lookout, attempt to come around the island, either east or west, please send me notice by the best vessel you have for that purpose, as to their direction, that I may be prepared for them at Havana.

I will try and increase the number of light vessels at your disposal, in order that you may have them to send with messages to me in case you desire to do so.

After I have the situation more in hand I will write you and give you any information that suggests itself.

Very respectfully, W. T. Sampson,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.

The Commanding Officer,
Flying Squadron.

[1] *Supra*, pp. 245–249.

The coaling of the *Iowa* was hurried forward with all possible rapidity. At 1 P. M. the *Marblehead*, accompanied by the *Eagle*, and followed shortly by the *Nashville*, *Hornet*, *Vixen*, and collier *Saturn*, arrived from Cienfuegos in obedience to the orders of the navy department of May 14 sent thither by the *Hornet*, directing that all but the smallest blockading vessel off Cienfuegos return to Key West. Commander McCalla, however, took the responsibility of withdrawing all, leaving for Key West the evening of the day the *Hornet* arrived, May 16. The day before, the *Eagle* had picked up at sea a boat with five Cubans who had come, in an endeavor to open communications with the blockading force, from an insurgent camp thirteen miles west of the entrance, and had been forty hours afloat. The men were transferred to the *Marblehead*. The next day the *Eagle* was sent to the Cuban camp, with which her captain communicated and where four of the Cubans were landed with 6,000 rounds of ammunition. While on board the *Marblehead* the Cubans had arranged with Commander McCalla that in case they wished to communicate with the force afloat they would show three horizontal lights at night, or three horses in line on the beach by day.

The *Marblehead*, accompanied by the *Eagle* (an engine of the *Nashville* being disabled and the other vessels slow), met Commodore Schley when but thirty miles west of Sand Key light.[1]

As is customary in meeting a senior officer at sea, Commander McCalla made the signal asking for permission to proceed, which was granted. McCalla, however, signalled the *Eagle* to "communicate with *Brooklyn*. Acquaint him with the situation as we know it. Notify him with regard to the *Nashville*." The *Scorpion* met and took the message from the *Eagle*, the incident appearing in the *Scorpion's* log as follows:

Spoke *Eagle* at 10.15 and reported reply of *Hornet* [*Eagle*] to flag-ship as follows: "*Eagle* sent by Captain McCalla from Cienfuegos to report. *Nashville* following about 25 miles in rear to westward. Starboard high-pressure cylinder disabled. Proceeding slowly. *Cincinnati* and *Vesuvius* off Cape San Antonio about

[1] On the reef bordering Key West.

15 miles and to the northward. All blockading squadron has left Cienfuegos for Key West. No news of the Spaniards." [1]

Both squadrons stood on without stopping. Commander McCalla on arriving off the reef at Key West came on board the flag-ship and reported the conditions he had found at Cienfuegos. The navy department had, before his arrival, telegraphed:

Commander McCalla to telegraph what force and character of ships would, in his opinion, be necessary for destroying the battery at Cienfuegos and what army force would be required to capture and hold entrance and make it safe for our vessels to lie inside, also what practicable landing for troops in immediate vicinity.

In accordance with this McCalla prepared the following, which was sent both to the navy department and to Commodore Schley: [2]

A good landing-place for troops has been found thirteen and one-half miles west of Savanilla Point. The Spanish force about Cienfuegos is reported, on good authority, to be between four and five thousand men. The Cuban force, only a small part of which is armed, is between two and three thousand men. The Cubans need arms for two thousand men, and ammunition for the whole number. I was informed that the Cubans had perfect knowledge of what was going on within Cienfuegos, and that a force of our men could be taken into Cienfuegos without the knowledge of the Spanish force within that city. About fifteen hundred men are said to be kept within the vicinity of the castle. The only battery which fired on the ships at all was made of the old guns in the castle. They have modern six and eight inch guns, I am told, but not mounted five days ago. An

[1] Lieutenant Southerland, of the *Eagle*, stated later that his message to the *Scorpion* was substantially as follows: "We left Cienfuegos the night of the 16th, at which time, as we learned from an insurgent camp about thirteen miles to the westward of Cienfuegos, some of the people from which were in town every night, the only vessels in the harbor were the torpedo gun-boat *Galicia*, one or two gun-boats, and several canoneros. The *Nashville* is astern, proceeding slowly to Key West, with damaged machinery. The *Cincinnati* and *Vesuvius* are patrolling off Cape San Antonio." (*Record of the Court of Inquiry in the case of Rear-Admiral Winfield S. Schley*, 1901. I, 314). [This will be referred to hereafter as *Court of Inquiry*.]

[2] The delivery of this on May 22, off Cienfuegos, by the *Iowa* and *Dupont* (which were supposed to carry duplicate despatches), was questioned. There was, however, no question of the reception of a copy by the *Hawk* on May 23.

emplacement for guns is being built on the hill above the castle. A line passing through the new emplacement and the castle leads down the middle of the river to the sea. There was working a force of men on the ground immediately below the castle, and I was told a new water-battery was being erected there. It is possible that since the attempt to cut the cables, a masked battery of small calibre is being erected on Colorados Point. The insurgents want dynamite to destroy the railway. I asked them to devote their efforts to cutting telegraphic communication between Havana and Cienfuegos. They report the inland wires are repaired as fast as destroyed, while the railroad is intact. The Cuban forces in the San Juan mountains control the railway between Cienfuegos and Trinidad, so provisions cannot be sent between these places. I have Spanish charts of Cienfuegos and vicinity. Troops must be prepared for rain every day. No resources in the country; all destroyed. Fair road from landing-point to Cienfuegos.

This was accompanied by a forwarding letter:

No. 6. U. S. Flag-Ship *New York*,
Key West, Fla., *May* 19, 1898.

Sir: I enclose a copy of a memorandum from Commander McCalla.

2. You will take steps to prevent the enemy from continuing work on the new fortifications mentioned therein.

3. There is a rumor by way of Havana that the Spanish squadron has put into Santiago.

Commander McCalla had mentioned to the chief-of-staff the arrangement of signals with the insurgents mentioned, but, influenced by a fear that if given out it might in some way be known by Spanish sympathizers in Key West, and by the fact that he himself expected to return at once to Cienfuegos and thus be the earliest possible means of communicating the arrangements to Schley, he omitted it from his memorandum.[1]

[1] Respecting this much-discussed omission, the writer, who was chief of staff, would say that he did not regard the question of these signals, in the prospect of the immediate return of the *Marblehead*, as of any particular importance, and in the tremendous rush of business it soon passed out of his mind, though it was evidently mentioned to Captain Evans of the *Iowa*. (*Court of Inquiry*, I, 366.) The signal, in fact, was not thought of especial importance so far as the Americans were concerned. It was wholly for the convenience and benefit of the Cubans, as McCalla's memorandum embodied

The telegram from the navy department which follows, received at 12.30 A. M., May 20, was so ambiguous in character as to cause much perplexity in the mind of the commander-in-chief. It read:

WASHINGTON, *May* 19, 1898.

The report of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago de Cuba might very well be correct, so the department strongly advises that you send immediately by the *Iowa* to Schley to proceed off Santiago de Cuba with his whole command, leaving one small vessel off Cienfuegos. And meanwhile the department will send the *Minneapolis*, now at St. Thomas, [and] auxiliary No. 461[1] [to] proceed at once off Santiago to join Schley, who could keep up communication via Mole, Haiti, or Cape Haitien, Haiti. If the *Iowa* has gone, send order to Schley by the fastest despatch-vessel.

The department but expressed the doubt which as we now know was felt there at the moment. It was vital to a proper understanding of such a telegram that the source of the report should

every information necessary to enable the Americans to communicate. It mentioned the presence of the insurgents, the point where a landing could be made, and that "the Cubans had perfect knowledge of what was going on in Cienfuegos." Both Admiral Sampson and the chief of staff supposed, judging from the chart, that the hills were low enough to permit Cienfuegos to be observed. This supposition, as we now know, was partially correct. Commander (now Rear-Admiral) Dayton of the *Detroit*, sent to take charge of the Cienfuegos blockade, reported July 10, 1898, as follows:

"During the afternoon (of June 30) I made as close an inspection as practicable. From aloft could detect in the inner harbor four large steamers flying Spanish colors—one with four masts and one smoke-stack, one with three masts and one smoke-stack, and two with two masts and one smoke-stack; also two fair-sized gun-boats, the larger being apparently of the *Ensenada* class. . . . The four-masted steamer was surrounded by lighters and appeared to be discharging cargo." (Appendix to *Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, 219.)

Captain Dunn, U. S. N., states the following from personal observation in a letter to the author:

"If an observer at the mast-head, say over a hundred feet high, gets on a N. by W. line of bearing passing over Punta Pasacaballos, from a position a mile to the westward of the light-house, he could see a limited portion of the harbor where large vessels usually anchor, the distance being about six miles. A large portion of the N. W. bay, where any vessel could anchor (but do not generally), cannot be seen from outside. Small vessels could not anchor behind the town and could not be seen from the outside."

Cienfuegos Bay, it should be said, is about six miles deep with excellent anchorage almost anywhere. It is clear that the usual anchorage, however, can be observed from the outside.

[1] *St. Paul.*

be mentioned, for the department's previous telegrams regarding the Spanish movements were so explicit as to the reasons why Cervera must come within reach of Havana that Sampson

could not feel justified in setting these aside on what apparently was mere rumor.[1] He thus replied to the navy department:

Replying to department's telegram of the 20th, [19th] considering the information therein contained I have decided to follow the plan

[1] The first report reached the navy department at 4.45 P. M. May 19, through Mr. Martin L. Hellings, the manager of the cable station at Key West, who had arranged before the war for intelligence from Havana. The hour is

already adopted to hold position Cienfuegos with *Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas,* and the *Iowa, Marblehead, Castine,* and *Dupont* and two auxiliaries. There remain *New York, Indiana,* and *Monitor* for Havana. The latter very inefficient and should not be sent from base. Have directed Schley to communicate with auxiliary at Santiago and direct one of them to report to department from Mole or Cape Haitien. Then to return to Santiago and further report at Cienfuegos or Havana, as he thinks best. Plan may be changed when it becomes certain that Spanish ships are at Santiago.

He also wrote Commodore Schley:

No. 7. U. S. Flag-Ship *New York,* 1st Rate,
Key West, Fla., *May* 20, 1898.

Dear Schley: The *Iowa* leaves this morning at 11 o'clock bound for Cienfuegos. The collier *Merrimac,* in company with the *Castine,* is also bound for Cienfuegos. The *Marblehead* and the *Eagle* will both be ready to depart to-night to join you. Enclosed is a copy of a telegram received at Key West, dated May 19, marked

fixed by official documentary evidence. The news was received by Mr. Hellings and sent under a private code to New York, this course being taken to establish the reliability of the report. Rear-Admiral Crowninshield, at the time chief of the bureau of navigation and a member of the naval war board, writing April 30, 1901, says: "This information was absolutely the first which was received in Washington of the arrival of the Spanish Squadron at Santiago." A telegram "Five Spanish ships have entered the harbor of Santiago, have informed admiral commanding," was also sent by Captain (now Brigadier-General) Allen of the army signal service, in charge of the censorship at Key West. Mr. Charles H. Allen, then assistant secretary of the navy, says in his diary for May 19: "Word received at the Department through Signal Officer of the Army and brought in by General Greely that Spanish fleet had gone into the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. Most important. President desired confirmation." Mr. Allen writing the author puts the hour as about five o'clock. He took the message to the war board, where were all three members, Admiral Sicárd and Captains Mahan and Crowninshield. The admiral declared the news impossible on account of the [supposed] necessity of Cervera's reaching railway communication with Havana to deliver munitions of war, thus expressing the same doubt as was felt by Sampson in view of the doubting tone of the department's telegram. Mr. Allen continuing says: "Subsequently I called upon President McKinley . . . and gave him the information as received at the Department. He directed Captain Montgomery, Signal Officer in charge at the White House, to obtain confirmation."

There is no record in the fleet files of the information which Sampson refers to in his No. 6 as "a rumor" and which must therefore have come as word requiring confirmation. No. 7 carried all documentary information received up to the time it was sent.

"A."[1] After duly considering this telegram I have decided to make no change in the present plan: that is that you should hold your squadron off Cienfuegos. If the Spanish ships have put into Santiago, they must come either to Havana or Cienfuegos to deliver the munitions of war which they are said to bring for use in Cuba. I am therefore of the opinion that our best chance of success in capturing these ships will be to hold the two points—Cienfuegos and Havana—with all the force that we can muster. If, later, it should develop that these vessels are at Santiago, we can then assemble off that port the ships best suited for the purpose, and completely blockade it. Until we then receive more positive information we shall continue to hold Havana and Santiago.[2]

I enclose copy of a telegram received at Key West, dated May 19, marked "B."[3] With regard to this second telegram, in which the consul at Cape Haitien says that a telegram from Port de Paix on May 17 "reports two ships, etc.," is probably of no importance, and the vessels referred to may have been our own ships.

The statement made by the United States minister of [to] Venezuela, contained in the cablegram of the same date, is probably not true, because these ships are reported to have left Curaçao at 6 P. M. on the 16th. If they were seen on the 17th, apparently heading for the French West Indies, they could not possibly be at Santiago de Cuba as early as the 18th, as is reported.

From the first cablegram, marked "A," it will be seen that the department has ordered cruisers *Minneapolis* and Auxiliary No. 461 [*St. Paul*] to proceed for Santiago de Cuba to join you. Please send the *Scorpion* to communicate with these vessels at Santiago, and direct one of them to report to the department from Nicolas Mole off Cape Haitien the change which I have made in the plan "strongly advised" by the department. As soon as this vessel has communicated with the department, let her return to the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, and learn the condition of affairs, and immediately report at Havana or Cienfuegos, as he may think most advantageous.

Very respectfully,

W. T. SAMPSON,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Comdr.-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.

COMMODORE W. S. SCHLEY, *U. S. Navy,*
Commanding Flying Squadron.

[1] The report given above.

[2] "Santiago" was an error, of course, for "Cienfuegos."

[3] Enclosure "B": "The United States consul at Cape Haitien states that telegram from Port aux Paix, Hayti, on May 17, reports two Spanish ships cruising off Mole every night two weeks. The United States minister to Venezuela says that cable employee reports confidentially the Spanish men-of-war seen May 17 apparently heading for French West Indies."

The desire to get information as quickly as possible to Cienfuegos caused a duplicate of the despatches prepared to go by the *Iowa*, which sailed at 11 A. M., May 20, to be sent also by the torpedo-boat *Dupont*, which was to be used as a part of Commodore Schley's squadron, and which, leaving a half hour after the *Iowa*, reached Cienfuegos five hours earlier; the *Iowa* lengthening her course, under the admiral's instructions, in order to show herself off Havana. The collier *Merrimac*, under convoy of the gun-boat *Castine*, sailed at the same time and with the same destination, and the *Puritan* for the Havana blockade.[1]

It is about 520 miles from the anchorage off Key West to Cienfuegos, or 47 hours in time, at 11 knots. The flying squadron, at an average speed of a little less than 9 knots, reached the neighborhood of Cienfuegos at midnight of May 21–22, 64 hours from Key West, and stopped. Starting ahead again at 5.17 A. M. of the 22d, the squadron, after a run of 12 miles, was at 6.34 off the entrance of Cienfuegos Bay.[2] The *Iowa*, leaving a day later but taking a shorter course, though itself lengthened by appearing, by order of the admiral, off Havana, ran about 520 miles at an average speed of 10.4 knots and reached the position of the flying squadron off Cienfuegos about 7 hours later than the latter. The torpedo-boat *Dupont* arrived at 9 A. M.

[1] As Sampson, who had no faith in the efficiency of monitors, observed the *Puritan* leaving, he said humorously, referring to the possibility of Cervera's coming northward through the Bahama Channel: "We are pretty weak at this end of the line. I am afraid we have been too kind to Schley," a very natural thought, when it is considered that the *New York* was the only armored ship left him which was not broken down in speed.

[2] Extract from the *Brooklyn's* log:

"4 to 8 A. M., May 22, 1898. At 4.50 started to round to course for Cienfuegos, and at 5.17 started ahead at standard speed, 10 knots, on course N. 37° E. . . . At 6.34 slow speed. At 6.45 slow speed, and stood for entrance of Cienfuegos harbor."

The columns of the *Brooklyn's* log show but 8.5 miles but the remarks herewith given show a speed of 10 knots for 1h. 17m., which would make 12.8 miles; the squadron was then (6.34) slowed, and again slowed (presumably when in position) at 6.45.

The log of the *Brooklyn* of May 21 mentions: "About 4.20 [P. M.] heard the report of two great guns to the N'd and E'd." Cienfuegos was then distant about forty miles.

Returning to the events of the 20th at Key West; a telegram was received from Washington:

Send some light ships to blockade Cienfuegos if necessary. The department advises a couple fast unarmored cruisers to be sent to join Schley, going east on north side of Cuba to help against torpedo-destroyers.

The day, however, brought a completely new aspect of affairs; Lieutenant Staunton, assistant chief of staff, while in Key West at the office of the commandant, had met, about 9 A. M., Captain Allen, of the Army Signal Corps, who had been placed in charge of the censorship office. Lieutenant Staunton's own account is given:

He called me aside and told me that he had very important information that he believed to be correct. He stated I must keep it a secret from everybody except the commander-in-chief and his staff, as if it were divulged the man in Havana who sent it would probably lose his life and the source of information would be stopped. He then told me that on the night[1] before he had received from Havana a despatch stating that Cervera had entered the harbor of Santiago that morning, that is, the morning of the 19th of May, with his squadron. As I recollect the figures given they were three armored cruisers and two torpedo-boat destroyers. He said this information came from an employee in the telegraph office at Havana, who sent these despatches about 6 o'clock while the office was cleared of people, who went to dinner, and he could send them with safety, and that they would come every night. I returned to the *New York*, during the forenoon of the 20th of May, and reported this to Admiral Sampson, the commander-in-chief. That evening, the evening of the 20th, I went on shore again about 6 o'clock and obtained from the signal officer the confirmatory despatches which he expected.[2]

The corroboration at 6 P. M. completely satisfied Sampson that Cervera had entered Santiago, and a despatch was at once prepared to go by the *Marblehead* directing Schley to move to Santiago. It bore the date of May 21, as it left the flag-ship in the midwatch of the night of May 20–21 to be sent to the *Marblehead*, word having come from Commander McCalla that he was delayed in Key West by inability to get fresh water for his boilers. The phrase, "If you are satisfied that they are not at

[1] *I. e.*, the night May 19–20.
[2] Testimony, *Court of Inquiry*, I, 858.

Cienfuegos," was due to the admiral's belief, already mentioned, that the land was probably sufficiently low to see within the bay.

No. 8. U. S. Flag-Ship *New York*, 1st Rate,
Key West, Florida, *May* 21, 1898.

Sir: Spanish squadron probably at Santiago de Cuba—four ships and three torpedo-boat destroyers. If you are satisfied that they are not at Cienfuegos, proceed with all despatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and, if the enemy is there, blockade him in port. You will probably find it necessary to establish communication with some of the inhabitants, fishermen or others, to learn definitely that the ships are in port, it being impossible to see into it from outside.

2. When the instructions sent by the *Iowa* and *Dupont* (duplicates) were written, I supposed that two fast scouts would be in the vicinity of Jamaica, but I have since learned that they have been ordered by the department to get touch with the Spanish fleet on the north coast of Venezuela. I have just telegraphed them to report for orders at Nicolas Mole.

3. Report from Nicolas Mole.

W. T. Sampson,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.

The Commodore,
U. S. Flying Squadron.

The night was one of extreme activity, with a constant going and coming of tugs and torpedo-boats with despatches, but at 4 A. M. (Saturday, May 21) the flag-ship got under way and stood for Havana, sending before sailing the following instructions to the naval commandant at Key West:

No. 4. U. S. Flag-Ship *New York*, 1st Rate,
Key West, Florida, *May* 20, 1898.

My Dear Commodore: I feel that I must take up my station on the Cuban blockade as soon as possible, and I will therefore leave here for Havana some time during the evening.

2. I desire that all the vessels that can be spared for the purpose, be sent to me at Havana as fast as repairing can be completed. After looking into the matter I find that the monitors *Terror* and *Amphitrite* will require several days to put their machinery in a service condition. Will you, therefore, hasten the repairs on the *Amphitrite*, and send her to me as soon as completed.

3. I believe that the department wishes some vessels to be retained here for the protection of Key West. You can use the *Terror* for that purpose while she is under repairs.

4. I have directed the *Niagara* to discharge the coal which she still has on board after coaling the *Indiana*, and to proceed north to Lambert's Point for another cargo.

5. The *Dupont* has been sent to the south side of Cuba with copies of recent despatches from the department regarding the movements of the Spanish ships; and she has been directed to remain under Commodore Schley's command, unless he finds it necessary to send her back with information. The *Iowa* has also been sent to report to Commodore Schley.

6. I have given direction that the *Marblehead* and the *Eagle* shall sail to-night for the same destination. The *Merrimac* and the *Castine* sailed in company this morning, also to oin the squadron under Commodore Schley.

7. I shall myself take station at Havana, on board the flag-ship *New York*. If you have occasion to communicate with me, I shall probably be found at that point.

Very respectfully,

W. T. SAMPSON,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.

COMMODORE GEORGE C. REMEY, *U. S. Navy,*
U. S. S. Suwanee, Key West, Florida.

Before the flag-ship left, the following telegrams were received:

WASHINGTON, *May* 20.—Army expect to have within a few days about thirty transport steamers at Tampa, Fla. Please take such means as you think proper for guarding them.

From Captain Goodrich, commanding the *St. Louis:*

Have destroyed (May 18) one submarine cable to Jamaica although it is possible both, under the fire of the battery at Santiago. If second cable is in working order I shall require deep-sea outfit. At Guantánamo, Thursday (May 19), was driven away by superior Spanish force. I shall attempt the French submarine cables elsewhere, then proceed to Ponce, Puerto Rico. Request orders, St. Thomas, proceed to New York for coal and stores.

Reply was made to this latter telegram:

Proceed to whatever point will give greatest despatch. Report here.

And Captain Wise, of the *Yale*, was telegraphed:

Spanish squadron is reported at Santiago de Cuba. Flying squadron will be at Santiago the 24th. Cruise in Bahama Channel and join Schley at Santiago May 24.

The *New York* arrived off Havana at noon and spoke the *Dolphin*, then flying the broad pennant of Commodore Watson, who came aboard the flag-ship. It had become evident before leaving Key West that the *Marblehead* might be delayed still longer than had at first been anticipated, and the admiral on the way across decided to ensure the earliest reception possible by Commodore Schley of the important information in the despatch placed aboard the *Marblehead*, by sending it also by the fastest ship at hand on the blockade. After some consideration the armed yacht *Hawk*, Lieutenant Hood, was selected. Picking up the *Hawk* and taking Lieutenant Hood aboard the flag-ship, both ships stood westward, in order that the *Hawk* should gain distance toward the object of her duty, and the following memorandum additional to a copy of the despatch was prepared as follows:

Memorandum. U. S. Flag-Ship *New York*, 1st Rate,
Off Havana, Cuba, *May* 21, 1903.

It is thought the enclosed instructions will reach you by 2 o'clock A. M., May 23. This will enable you to leave before daylight (regarded very important) so that your direction may not be noticed and be at Santiago A. M., May 24.

It is thought that the Spanish squadron would probably be still at Santiago, as they must have some repairs to make and coal to take.

The *St. Paul* and *Minneapolis* have been telegraphed to scout off Santiago, and if the Spanish squadron goes westward, one is to keep touch and the other go into Nicolas Mole to telegraph me at Key West. I shall be off Cay Frances, 200 miles east of Havana. If you arrive off Santiago and no scout meets you, send a vessel to call at Nicolas Mole and get information to be left there by scout as to direction taken by Spanish in case they may have left Santiago de Cuba.

The *Yale* has been ordered to cruise in the Bahama Channel until May 24. It is thought possible that the Spanish, hearing of your departure from Cienfuegos, may attempt to go there.

If this word does not reach you before daylight, it is suggested to mask your real direction as much as possible. Follow the Spanish squadron whichever direction they take.

W. T. SAMPSON,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.

THE COMMODORE,
Flying Squadron.

Lieutenant Hood was directed to impress upon Commodore Schley, as from the admiral, the necessity of getting off Santiago as quickly as possible, and in addition the following written orders were given him:

U. S. FLAG-SHIP *New York*, 1ST RATE,
May 21, 1898.

SIR: You will proceed, with the utmost despatch, with the accompanying orders, which are to be delivered to Commodore Schley off Cienfuegos at the earliest possible moment. When this duty shall have been completed, return to your station off Havana.

In case you meet with the *Vesuvius* in going, and she can make better speed than yourself, transfer the papers to her with this memorandum, with the direction that, after delivery, she is to return and report to the commander-in-chief off Havana.

In case you fall in with the *Vesuvius*, either coming or going, an order to report off Havana is to be given her.

Verbal instructions were given Lieutenant Hood to remain with the *Hawk* alone at Cienfuegos, after the flying squadron had left, as long as his coal would allow, in order that the blockade should not be vacated until necessity should compel.

Hood left at once, but he did not make the speed anticipated; he arrived off Cienfuegos and delivered his despatches at 7.30 A. M., May 23. He had passed the *Castine* and her convoy, the collier *Merrimac*, also bound thither, at 5 A. M., the morning of his arrival.

Admiral Sampson had determined to take position in the Bahama Channel, 200 miles east of Havana, where were the narrowest waters of the region, and it was thought impossible for the Spanish squadron to pass without discovery should it leave Santiago and attempt to reach Havana from that direction.

The flag-ship thus, on the night of May 21-22, moved about among the ships of the blockade, signalling them, as found:

Join "F" (flag-ship) at early daylight to-morrow at a point ten miles north of Morro. Prepare to proceed 200 miles to the eastward to a point north-east of Cay Frances.

The *Puritan* and *Miantonomoh* were directed to go in advance, and left at midnight. The many arrangements necessary, however, delayed the leaving of the squadron, which held over until the next morning (May 23). A despatch-boat from Key West brought the following telegrams from the navy department:

Telegraph details of coal supply taken by Schley with his vessels. The department has ordered four auxiliary cruisers (*Yale, Harvard, St. Paul,* and *St. Louis*) and the *Minneapolis* off Santiago de Cuba to keep informed of movements of Spanish fleet. The department also suggests for consideration possible advantages lee Cape Cruz, Cuba, as a coaling station and that in case Cervera has landed stores for Blanco, Cape Cruz, Cuba, would be critical point for coasters carrying them to the west. Orders are being sent placing Schley under your command while in the West Indies.

The following telegram of May 21 has been received from the former American consul at San Juan, Puerto Rico, now at St. Thomas, West Indies: "Reliably informed that Spanish fleet is expected to arrive at San Juan, Puerto Rico, soon. Preparations for coaling; supply food is very important before attacking the Americans; coal is declared short. Sig. Fonna." Schley should have this information. If he finds that the Spanish fleet has left Santiago he should follow. Report is current to the effect that the Spanish destroyers are not at Santiago.

Commodore Remey, at Key West, in forwarding these informed Sampson that he had already replied to the department that the collier *Merrimac* had left May 21 with 4,500 tons of coal for the flying squadron, and also that the *New Orleans*, Captain Folger, had arrived at 6.30 P. M. of the 21st, needing 200 tons of coal and some water.

The arrival of the *New Orleans* was a particularly pleasant piece of news in view of the melancholy array of slow ships with which Sampson had to deal. None but the flag-ship, the torpedo-boats *Rodgers* and *Foote*, and some light unprotected cruisers, were capable of more than 10 knots; with such he was moving to meet an enemy each of whose ships had on

trial steamed over twenty. The addition of a powerfully armed cruiser of 19 knots was in such circumstances of vital importance. There were guns enough in the squadron, and more than enough, but it takes two to make a fight and if the Spanish admiral should evade an action, trusting to his speed, the *New York*, singly, could not have forced one with much prospect of detaining them long enough to keep them within reach of the *Indiana*, which was the other main reliance. Not much was to be hoped from the *Puritan* and *Miantonomoh* in the rough sea of the trades. With a good second, however, in the *New Orleans*, with a fine battery of the newest type of 6-inch guns, the prospect was far different, and when she reported on May 23 matters took on a more cheerful aspect.

In the morning watch of May 23 the captains of all the ships present came on board to receive their instructions and the printed Order of Cruising and Orders of Battle. These were as follows:

ORDER OF CRUISING



ORDER OF BATTLE.

U. S. Flag-Ship *New York*, 1st Rate,
Off Havana, Cuba, *May* 22, 1898.

It is possible that the vessels of this squadron now off Havana will meet the Spanish ships, consisting of the *Cristóbal Colón*, *Vizcaya*, *Oquendo*, *Maria Teresa*, and one torpedo-boat destroyer. These

vessels are supposed to be now in Santiago de Cuba, where they are taking coal and provisions. The squadron of Commodore Schley will probably leave Cienfuegos to-morrow morning, bound east, in pursuit of the Spanish ships, and it is anticipated that they will leave Santiago de Cuba on the same day that Commodore Schley leaves Cienfuegos or reach Havana by the north coast of Cuba, in which case the blockading squadron off Havana will attempt to intercept them by going east about 200 miles beyond the junction of Santarem and Nicolas Channels. It appears to be possible that if these ships come toward Havana from that direction they can be intercepted and brought to action.

The order of battle will be as follows, subject to such modifications as may appear advantageous at the time:

Owing to the superior speed of the Spanish vessels, I have decided to form the ships in one column, heading to the eastward, on the assumption that the enemy will be proceeding to the westward in column. The *New York*, *Indiana*, *Puritan*, and *Miantonomoh* will be the four leading vessels. These will be followed by the cruisers of the blockading squadron, the idea being that the heavy ships should first meet the enemy and the fire of the cruisers be brought into play after the damage inflicted by the larger ships.

The armored ships, after passing the rear of the Spanish squadron, will return in succession by using the starboard or port helm, as the case may require, turning toward the enemy. It is believed that the fire of the cruisers, following that of the armored ships, will so embarrass the Spanish vessels that the armored vessels can turn, as before stated, and double on the enemy's rear.

The ships designated will assemble 12 miles north-east of the Morro at early daylight, Monday, the 23d instant; thence they will proceed in three columns to the eastward in the order of cruising designated. (See plan I, first order of cruising.)

The *New Orleans* will act as scout on the starboard hand, the *Montgomery* on the port, the *Wasp* ahead.

When the enemy heaves in sight, the vessels will proceed to the eastward to meet them. While so doing they will be formed in column. (First order of battle.)

The attention of commanding officers is called to the necessity of stopping these vessels.

In the first order of battle the two torpedo-boats will take the station on the offside of the *New Orleans*, *Detroit*, and if there be a third, it will take its place on the offside of the *Machias*. They will take advantage of any opportunity to torpedo an enemy's ship.

While the *Vizcaya*, *Maria Teresa*, and *Oquendo* have strong protection on barbettes and water-line, they have no protection elsewhere, and are vulnerable to even 6-pounders. Fire should be concentrated on the centre part of these ships just above water-line. In case of

Cristóbal Colón, her belt and barbette armor is inferior to that of the other ships, but her protection elsewhere extends over a larger area. None of this armor is face-hardened.

W. T. Sampson,
Rear-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief.

FIRST ORDER OF BATTLE

Interval—400 yards.

1 () New York.
2 () Indiana.
3 () Puritan.
4 () Miantonomoh.
5 () New Orleans.
() Foote 14
6 () Detroit.
() Rodgers. 15
7 () Machias.
8 () Wilmington.
9 () Montgomery.
10 () Newport.
11 () Mayflower.
12 () Vicksburg.
13 () Wasp.

SECOND ORDER OF BATTLE

Spanish Ships

Indiana. () 2 1 () New York.
Miantonomoh. () 4 3 () Puritan.
Detroit. () 6 5 () New Orleans.
Wilmington. () 8 7 () Machias.
Newport. () 10 9 () Montgomery.
Vicksburg. () 12 11 () Mayflower.
() 13 () Wasp.

In case the Spanish ships are found to be approaching in line, signal will be made to form double column, which will be done by the even-

numbered ships obliquing to the left until the interval between columns is sufficient to allow the columns to pass through the second and third intervals between the Spanish ships, counting from the left of their line.

After the heads of columns have passed through the Spanish line they will turn as follows: The head of the starboard column will turn with the port helm; the head of the port column will turn with the starboard helm; each column will thus double on the Spanish ships.

This is indicated in the diagram where five Spanish ships are shown.

N. B.—The following signals will be provisionally employed:

Signal 241: Order of cruising.
Signal 242: First order of battle.
Signal 243: Second order of battle.
As prescribed.

W. T. Sampson,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.

Sampson calculated that the distance to which he proposed to go should not be such that it would be impossible to fall back and cover Havana in case the approach of the Spanish squadron by the western end of Cuba should be signalled. The latter movement was thought possible, as the broad sea to the south made it very possible to escape observation by Commodore Schley's squadron, which was supposed to be on its way to Santiago.

At 8 A. M., May 23, the squadron, comprising the *New York*, *Indiana*, gun-boats *Newport*, *Vicksburg*, and *Machias*, armed yacht *Mayflower*, and torpedo-boats *Rodgers* and *Foote*, started eastward, leaving on the blockade the *Dolphin* (Commander Lyon) with Commodore Watson's broad pennant. The *New Orleans* joined at 5 P. M., and at nightfall she and the *Mayflower* were sent ahead, the former fifty, the latter twenty-five miles, as scouts.

Standing eastward very slowly during the forenoon of May 24, the *Puritan* and *Miantonomoh* were picked up off Cruz del Padre light, and the store-ship *Supply*, which had been diverted by the department from her duty of provisioning the fleet to scouting, came up from the eastward, her captain reporting that he had been cruising on a north-and-south line between Caicos Bank and Monte Cristi, where he had met the *Harvard* and *Minneapolis* on Sunday, May 22, at noon. They had parted company with the *Supply* at 4, going round the east end

of Tortugas (off the north-west corner of Hayti). The *Supply* had been off Inagua at 10 P. M. Sunday, but during her scouting and while coming west, had sighted no enemy except a small gun-boat, which came from Cay Romano (in the Old Bahama Channel), but was lost in the rain-squall.

At 1 P. M. the *Montgomery*, Commander Converse, with Commodore Watson, who had shifted his broad pennant from the *Dolphin*, arrived with despatches from Key West. Commodore Watson in his call aboard the *New York* stated that telegraphic information believed to be reliable had been received about 6 o'clock or later Monday evening (May 23) that the Spanish fleet had not left Santiago at the time the information was sent. He also brought word that the *Vesuvius* and *Cincinnati* expected to sail at daylight Tuesday morning, May 24, the monitor *Amphitrite* at 6, and that the monitor *Terror* was to come out towed by the *Panther;* the *Sterling*, collier, had been ordered out at once and the *Detroit* had left Monday morning, the 24th. It was a re-enforcement excellent in spirit, thoroughly efficient in battery, but all, excepting the dynamite cruiser *Vesuvius* and the *Detroit*, with no speed to catch any enemy who should choose to steam away at more than 10 knots.

Telegrams from Washington, May 23, had been brought by the *Montgomery*, as follows:

Notify the admiral the department leaves at his discretion the question of watching Yucatan Channel and Gulf of Mexico.

The department authorizes the withdrawal of one gun-boat guarding Tampa.

The information of the department all goes to indicate that the principal aim of the Spanish fleet and government is to introduce a supply of munitions of war and of food to Blanco by Havana and Cienfuegos. This is for your information.

The department desires you to station vessels of your squadron as you may consider best for the blockade of north coast of Cuba and for watching Yucatan Channel, if you deem the latter necessary. Information has been received a supply of corn being shipped from Mexico to Cuba. Until further instructions division under Schley not to be diminished, as the Spanish division at Santiago must, if possible, be prevented from escaping.

The third of these as given above indicates the continued conviction of the American government as to the military supplies so mistakenly supposed to be carried by Cervera's squadron, and would have brought renewed doubt in a more vacillating mind than that of Sampson, but the admiral having once weighed all the circumstances was convinced that Cervera would remain at Santiago for some days at least, and felt sure that Commodore Schley's squadron would reach Santiago in time to establish a blockade which would secure his retention there.

The converted yacht *Wasp* joined about nightfall; a memorandum regarding lights at night, and the Third Order of Battle, which was also a cruising formation, were issued:

[Memorandum No. 10, regarding lights at night.]

U. S. Flag-Ship *New York*, 1st Rate,
At Sea, *May* 24, 1898.

Sir: While cruising off Cay Frances in expectation of meeting the enemy, great care will be taken to screen all lights and to see that none are accidentally shown. No night signals will be made unless unavoidable, and then only by the flag-ship and in reply to her. No Very's light will under any circumstances, except that of the discovery of the enemy, be made.

No running lights will be used except the red oil lantern over the taffrail screened to show only through four points, viz., two points on each side from right astern.

No whistle helm signals will be made, but as the helm is put over a second red light, screened like the first, will be shown astern if the ship's course is changed to starboard, and a white light if the course be changed to port, and will remain shown until the ship is steadied on her new course, when it will be withdrawn.

The squadron will generally cruise to the eastward during the daytime, and to the westward during the night. It will change direction by countermarching. Vessels must therefore be on the lookout for this countermarch. If in double column the flag-ship will show her red truck light when she countermarches as a signal to the leader of the second division The countermarching will always be to the right.

The formation will be column or double column at distance of 400 yards or less.

Commanding officers will enjoin officers of the deck to keep touch without fail of the next ahead. They must keep near enough to follow her motions with or without lights, and whether thick or clear.

Scouts will upon the discovery of the enemy fire two red Very's lights in succession, and as they fall back upon the fleet will repeat

this signal at intervals until it is answered by a single red Very from the flag-ship.

Should a scout be captured she will, before surrrendering, fire two green Verys in succession.

Very respectfully,

W. T. Sampson,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.

THIRD ORDER OF BATTLE



Provisional signal for third order of battle, 244.

Interval between columns for cruising, 3,000 yards.

Interval between each column and the enemy, 1,500 yards.

This formation will also be used as an order of cruising with the same signal.

W. T. Sampson,
Rear-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief.

U. S. Flag-Ship *New York*, 1st Rate,
Off Cay Frances, Cuba, *May* 24, 1898.

During the night of May 24 the squadron cruised slowly to the eastward, with the *New Orleans* and *Mayflower* again in advance as before. The squadron, now north-east of Cay Frances and at the entrance of the Old Bahama Channel, countermarched at 4 A. M. and withdrew westward slowly into Nicolas Channel. Though this latter was some thirty miles broad, or twice the breadth of the Old Bahama Channel in its narrowest part, the movement brought the fleet a hundred miles nearer Havana, and it was thought that with these two scouts advanced into the narrower channel, the Spanish squadron could not escape discovery should it come that way.

At daylight on May 25, the *Vesuvius* and *Cincinnati* joined, the latter adding one more to the number of the broken-down elements of the fleet, the character of which had become so much a joke that its designation among the men was the "Bargain Counter Squadron." The *Cincinnati*, however, though so much of a lame duck, was animated by a spirit on the part of captain and crew which, if anything could have done so, would have offset her physical difficulties. She had, weeks before, been pronounced unfit for service, and had been ordered north, though Admiral Sampson had strongly urged sending workmen to do the repairs at Key West. Exigency had held her, until now, when surely starting northward, Captain Chester took in Nicolas Channel *en route*, determined that if his guns could help in the expected encounter, they should be there. The writer is happy to be able to make public mention of the zealous spirit which, while conspicuous in general throughout the fleet, was so markedly shown in this instance. The *Vesuvius* made an admirable despatch-boat, and in the thirst for information, that vital element in war, was at once sent back to Key West. At noon the *New Orleans* was despatched to scout fifty miles, with instructions to return and be off Matanzas by 10 A. M. of the next day, May 26, where the fleet, gradually edging toward Havana in fear of the impossibility, with so many broken-down ships, of being able to meet a movement by Cervera from the westward, was expected to be. The *Hornet* came in the afternoon with two telegrams of May 24, one a hint that an army movement was anticipated:

Be prepared to convoy and guard about 30,000 United States troops in about forty transports from Tampa, Fla. You require some armored vessels to attack batteries to clear landing. More details to-morrow.

The other announced:

Till further orders flying squadron is under your command; Schley so informed.

The *Hornet* brought word that the *Amphitrite* had been sent out in tow of the *Panther* instead of the *Terror*, as the latter was still repairing; and also brought a copy of instructions which had been sent May 24 through the commandant at Key West:

Send following to all commanding officers south coast blockade and inform Sampson it has been done. If Spanish fleet bringing ammunition and other munitions of war for heavy guns perhaps they will land them at Santiago with the intention of coasting them close along shore around Cape Cruz and inside reef to Cienfuegos and thence by rail to Havana. Therefore, you are recommended to blockade close to the shore off Cape Cruz and to the westward especially at night and stop the transportation.

At 7 P. M. the *Hornet* was sent back to Key West with a telegram from Sampson to the navy department:

Schley ought to have arrived at Santiago May 24. The force at my command occupied Bahama Channel last night, but not having any information from Schley, and as the Spanish squadron may have avoided him at Santiago and attempted to reach Havana by Cape San Antonio, I have moved westward to provide against this contingency. I shall attempt to cover Havana from both directions. I will be Thursday morning, May 26, at the west end of Nicolas Channel, where I expect information from Schley via Key West. Movements greatly hampered by monitors constituting the principal force under my command. I cannot despatch armored vessels until movements Spanish squadron thoroughly known.

CHAPTER X

CIENFUEGOS

During the forenoon of May 26 Sampson's squadron stood slowly west, the monitors *Puritan* and *Miantonomoh* having been sent with the collier *Sterling* under Cay Piédras to coal. At 11, the *Vesuvius* returned from Key West with the first news from Commodore Schley. This was in telegrams sent by Captain Cotton of the *Harvard*, who at 5.30 A. M. May 24, off Santiago, had communicated with the armed yacht *Scorpion*, which had left Cienfuegos at 7 P. M. May 22, with despatches from Schley. The telegrams were sent from Nicolas Mole early May 25. Cotton's own despatch to Sampson was as follows:

Sent by Schley here with official despatches. Left at Santiago de Cuba May 24, *Yale* and *St. Paul*. *Minneapolis* left yesterday for Cienfuegos to report Schley. *Yale* reconnoitred Santiago de Cuba on the 21st May. He reports strongly fortified; saw nothing in harbor. I have not seen Spanish fleet; have not ascertained anything respecting recent movements Spanish fleet. Proceed for coal to Key West, May 26. I have only 1,250 tons of coal. The *Minneapolis* must coal within the next few days. *Yale* early next week. Schley directs me to inform the department Sampson decided to have the command of Schley stationed at Cienfuegos and his own off Havana. *Minneapolis* reconnoitred San Juan May 21. Spanish fleet was not there.

The following was Commodore Schley's despatch to Sampson:

Arrived May 21 off Cienfuegos, Cuba. Standing in to-day (this morning) May 22, within four thousand yards entrance, found them busily mining; cannot say whether Spanish fleet in port or not; the anchorage not visible from entrance.[1] *Iowa* and torpedo-boat *Dupont* arrived to-day. Expect difficulty here will be to coal from colliers in the constant heavy swell. Other problems easy compared with this one, so far from the base.

[1] As seen (*supra*, 266), this was a mistaken supposition.

The *Scorpion* had also carried the following, which was delivered to Captain Cotton as senior officer present off Santiago:

U. S. Flag-Ship *Brooklyn*,
Off Cienfuegos, Cuba, *May* 22, 1898.

Sir: Enclosed is a copy of a telegram, marked "A," [1] received at Key West, dated May 19. After considering this telegram, the commander-in-chief of the N. A. station informs me that he has decided to make no change in his present plan, *i. e.*, to have the flying squadron, with the addition of the *Iowa*, *Marblehead*, *Castine*, *Hawk*, and *Merrimac*, stationed off Cienfuegos and the remainder of his own force off Havana.

2. Therefore, if this order is delivered to the commanding officer of the *Harvard*, he will proceed with that vessel to Nicolas Mole or Cape Haitien and report to the department the change which the commander-in-chief of the North Atlantic station has made in the plan "strongly advised" by the department, then return to Santiago de Cuba, learn the condition of affairs and immediately report at Havana or Cienfuegos, as may be thought more advantageous. If the *Minneapolis* be in company with the *Harvard*, direct her to join me off Cienfuegos.

3. If either the *Harvard* or the *Minneapolis* are alone, as soon as you have communicated with the department return to Santiago de Cuba, learn the condition of affairs, and immediately report to Havana or Cienfuegos, as may be thought most advantageous.

Very respectfully,
W. S. Schley,
Commodore, U. S. N.,
Commander-in-Chief, Flying Squadron.

The Senior Officer Present,
Off Santiago de Cuba.

As the telegrams from the *Harvard* had been sent May 25 from Nicolas Mole (distant 122 miles east of Santiago), it was clear to Sampson that either the *Hawk* or *Marblehead* had failed to reach Schley early on the 23d, or if they had arrived as expected, that Schley had not reached Santiago by the next evening. If he had done so there had been quite time to have despatched a telegram from Nicolas Mole by one of the fast scouts the same day the despatches had been sent by the *Harvard*.

[1] This was the telegram from the department enclosed with No. 7, of May 20, to Commodore Schley.

The *Vesuvius*, as the fastest vessel, was thus at once sent to Key West, leaving at 1 P. M. with a telegram to all the scouts supposed to be in the vicinity of eastern Cuba:

Commanding officers *Yale*, *Minneapolis*, *St. Paul*, St. Nicolas Mole, Hayti. Spanish squadron is at Santiago. If Schley has not arrived there, go Cienfuegos and inform him.

To Commodore Schley:

Fifteen miles east of Santiago is the pier and harbor belonging to the Spanish-American Company; excellent fresh water obtainable and you can coal there from collier.

To the United States consul at Cape Haitien:

Keep in communication with our ships Mole St. Nicolas, informing them fully all news.

It had not been supposed by Sampson that the flying squadron would fail to move under the orders carried by the *Hawk* should they be delivered, so that when the *Dolphin* arrived at 9.30 P. M., May 26, with despatches showing that Schley's squadron had not left Cienfuegos, he was deeply disturbed. These had been received from the *Hawk* at 10 A. M., May 25, off Havana, by the *Dolphin*. She had at once gone eastward in search of the admiral, firing a green Very signal every fifteen minutes and showing her running lights with great frequency during darkness, until 8.25 A. M. of the next day, when she was abreast of Paredon Grande light. She had thus gone 165 miles beyond the position of the fleet. It was an extraordinary illustration of the difficulty of discovering ships at night. She had steamed 390 miles before reaching the admiral instead of the 90 necessary had the fleet at once been sighted.

She brought the following:

M43. OFF CIENFUEGOS, *May* 23, 1898.

SIR: 1. In reply to your letter No. 8, I would state that I am by no means satisfied that the Spanish squadron is not in Cienfuegos. The large amount of smoke seen in the harbor would indicate the presence of a number of vessels, and under such circumstances it would seem

to me to be extremely unwise to chase up a probability at Santiago de Cuba reported via Havana, no doubt as a ruse.

2. I shall therefore remain off this port with this squadron, availing myself of every opportunity for coaling and keeping it ready for emergency.

3. Regarding the enclosed information from Commander McCalla, I would state that I went twice yesterday close in to the mouth of the harbor, the first time about two thousand yards and the second time within about fourteen hundred yards, but saw no evidence of any masked battery near the entrance. Well up the river across their torpedo mine fields, now laid across the mouth of the harbor, there is a new battery constructed hardly within range from the mouth of the river.

4. The *Castine*, *Merrimac*, and *Hawk* arrived this morning and I send the *Hawk* back with these despatches.

5. Last night I sent the *Scorpion* east to Santiago de Cuba to communicate with the scouts off that port, with instructions if they were not there to return at once to me here, and I expect her back day after to-morrow.

6. I am further satisfied that the destination of the Spanish squadron is either Cienfuegos or Havana. This point being in communication by railroad with Havana, would be better for their purposes if it was left exposed, and I think that we ought to be very careful how we receive information from Havana, which is no doubt sent out for the purpose of misleading us.

7. The *Iowa* is coaling to-day, having reached this station with only about half her coal supply.

Very respectfully,

W. S. Schley,
Commodore, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, Flying Squadron.

The C.-in-C.
N. A. Station.

M44. Off Cienfuegos, *May* 23, 1898.

Sir: 1. Steamer *Adula*, chartered by Consul Dent with proper papers from U. S. State Department, to carry out neutrals from Cienfuegos, was stopped off this port this morning. She had no cargo and was permitted to enter.

2. She reports that she left Santiago de Cuba at 4.30 p. m. on Wednesday, May 18, and that night she saw the lights of seven vessels, seventy miles to the southward of Santiago. Next day, Thursday, May 19, at Kingston, cable reported Spanish fleet at Santiago. Friday, May 20, the fleet was reported to have left Santiago.

3. Now, on Saturday, May 21, when about forty miles southwest of this port, I heard from the bridge of this vessel, firing of guns toward Cienfuegos, which I interpreted as a welcome to the Spanish fleet and the news this morning by the *Adula* convinces me that the fleet is here.

4. Latest war bulletin from Jamaica, received this morning, asserts that the fleet had left Santiago. I think I have them here almost to a certainty.

Very respectfully, W. S. SCHLEY,
Commodore, U. S. N., C.-in-C., etc.

THE C.-IN-C.,
N. A. Station.

A copy of notes taken by Lieutenant Hood on board the *Brooklyn* on the return of Lieutenant Simpson, the boarding officer from the *Adula*, was as follows:

May 23, 1898, off Cienfuegos.—Boarded British steamship *Adula* of Atlas Line, Captain W. Walker, bound from Kingston, Jamaica, to Cienfuegos under orders of United States Consul Louis A. Dent, at Kingston, to bring away Hoffren, a seaman of the *Niagara*, in hospital with a broken leg, and such other Americans and neutrals as wish to leave.

The original letter, dated May 7, 1898, in first trip made, leaving Cienfuegos May 10, 1898, with 327 passengers—4 Americans and 323 neutrals.

This trip being made under countersign of original orders, dated May 21, by Consul Dent.

In original letter Lombard, clerk in the consulate, was mentioned, but he had left before *Adula* arrived at Cienfuegos.

Left Kingston May 21 and came here direct, having seen nothing *en route*. On last trip from here stopped at Santiago. While there two American men-of-war came off the port and were bombarded by the forts from 12 noon until 1.30 P. M. Could not learn if these ships were hit. City rumor that they had been driven off.

When *Adula* left Santiago the same afternooon she saw nothing of the American ships, nor marks of shells on the forts. She don't know the ships, as they were never in sight from the inner harbor.

At midnight on the 18th sighted the lights of seven ships about seventy miles south one-half west off Santiago. The next afternoon, the 19th, while at Kingston, it was reported there that the Spanish fleet had arrived at Santiago.

Information: Santiago is mined with twenty-one electric mines to be fired from a small thatched house on west side of entrance well inside (about 300 yards) the entrance.

Know of no contact mines.

Harbor of Cienfuegos is mined. Electric mines were put down, but did not work, so they have been changed to contact mines. Don't know the number or situation of mines.

When last in Cienfuegos, May 10, 1898, there were two little gun-boats and one torpedo gun-boat in port. The former are a little larger than tugs, and not very formidable. The latter is the one the *Eagle* had to fight with, hitting one of her smoke-pipes. She has two smoke-pipes, two masts, and is painted lead color.

Note: The *Adula* has a passenger, a British subject, P. H. Baxter, who represents the Atlas Line and is interpreter.

There was also handed in from the *Dolphin* a memorandum dated May 25:

The *Hawk* has just reported from Cienfuegos with despatches from Commodore Schley. Hood says a good number of officers do not believe the Spaniards are there at all, although they can only surmise.

The situation was one to bring great complexity to the mind of the commander-in-chief. The first thing was to reiterate his instructions in language of no doubtful import. The armed yacht *Wasp*, reported the fastest vessel present, was at once called alongside and despatched to Cienfuegos with orders to Commodore Schley:

No. 10. U. S. Flag-Ship *New York*, 1st Rate,
St. Nicolas Channel, *May* 27, 1898.

Sir: Every report, and particularly daily confidential reports received at Key West from Havana, state Spanish squadron has been in Santiago de Cuba from the 19th to the 25th instant, inclusive, the 25th being the date of the last report received.

2. You will please proceed, with all possible despatch, to Santiago to blockade that port. If, on arrival there, you receive *positive* information of the Spanish ships having left, you will follow them in pursuit.

Very respectfully,
W. T. Sampson,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.

Commodore W. S. Schley, *U. S. Navy,*
Commanding Flying Squadron, South Coast, Cuba.

The orders to the *Wasp* were as follows:

SIR: Proceed off Cienfuegos with greatest possible despatch via Cape Antonio.

2. If you find Commodore Schley off that port, deliver to him the enclosed despatch and return to Key West.

3. Return to Key West at once in case you assure yourself that he is not in that vicinity.

The *Dolphin* was immediately after sent into Key West with a despatch to the navy department:

Have received information from Schley via Cape San Antonio, Cuba, dated May 23, stating he is not satisfied the Spanish squadron is not in Cienfuegos, Cuba. He has no apparent good reasons for his opinion and states he will remain off Cienfuegos, keeping squadron all ready for an emergency. He reports the steamer *Adula* entered into Cienfuegos May 23. He probably learned from her as she left if the Spanish squadron was in port. I think that he has probably gone to Santiago. To assure this I sent the *Wasp* to Cienfuegos to-night. If he has not left this will enable him to reach Santiago de Cuba before I could do so.

Word having now been received of the arrival of the *Oregon* at Key West on May 26, the *Dolphin* also bore a letter to Commodore Remey to hasten her departure for Sampson's squadron, and informing him that upon her arrival the monitors would be returned to Havana and Key West. The weather at this time was fine, and the monitors were coaling from the collier without difficulty.

At 1 P. M., May 27, the *Vesuvius* arrived from Key West with despatches; one from the *Harvard*, dated May 26, at Mole St. Nicolas:

The department instructs me to communicate immediately with Schley. I leave immediately.

Copies of other telegrams to the naval commandant at Key West were brought, one directing a convoy to Santiago for the cable steamer *Adria* (chartered by the war department) and also directing the senior officer off Santiago to furnish Captain Allen of the Army Signal Corps, under whose direction she was, all

assistance practicable; another to be forwarded to Commodore Schley to send the *Minneapolis* to Lambert's Point (Norfolk, Va.) for coal upon the arrival of the auxiliary cruiser *Yankee*, Commander Brownson.

But information of much greater moment was conveyed in copies of telegrams sent by Commodore Schley in the *Dupont*, which had left Cienfuegos at 7.08 P. M., May 24, for transmission from Key West to the navy department, and which were sent thence May 26. These two telegrams were as follows, the first said:

Coaling off Cienfuegos, Cuba, is very uncertain. One collier not sufficient for the work, when it is possible to coal. In great need of two more for this squadron, thoroughly equipped with hoisting engines, buckets, etc., for utmost despatch. The *Sterling*, not having hoisting engine, would not be useful. Recommend that she discharge cargo at Key West? I would suggest quality must equal best Pocahontas coal for this work. Every collier should carry several thousand gallons of oil, also three or four compressed bales as fenders, to prevent accidents. I have communicated with insurgents to-day and have supplied ammunition and dynamite, also clothing. The *Marblehead*, *Vixen*, and *Eagle* arrived to-day. Have ascertained that the Spanish fleet is not here and I will move eastward to-morrow communicating with you from Nicolas Mole. On account of short coal supply in ships, cannot blockade them if in Santiago.

The second was:

I shall proceed to-morrow (25th) off Santiago, being embarrassed, however, by the *Texas'* short coal supply, and her inability to coal in the open sea. I shall not be able to remain off that port on account of general short coal supply of squadron, so will proceed to the vicinity of Nicolas Mole, where the water is smooth and I can coal *Texas* and other ships [with] what may remain in collier. Will communicate with you from Nicolas Mole.

Sampson's views of the possibility of blockading Santiago, under the circumstances of coal supply which he felt should exist in the flying squadron, were in disaccord with those expressed in the telegrams just received. It was known that the *Brooklyn* had left with about 1,400 tons, the *Massachusetts* with 1,100, the *Texas* with 800, and the *Iowa* with about 1,000. These

were the important ships. Any others, however serviceable in general, were not expected to render efficient aid against the armored ships of the enemy. While convinced that all the heavy ships except the *Texas* would have ample coal to maintain a blockade for a considerable period at Santiago, he had no doubt whatever of ability to coal the ships at sea. It was done daily in his own squadron outside the reef at Key West as well as frequently elsewhere, and he could see no reason why it should not be done on the south side, as was in fact demonstrated by the experience both at Cienfuegos and Santiago. He at once made up his mind to go himself to Santiago unless matters should take another aspect. So far as the writer knows, he had previously had no thought of taking direct charge of operations in that vicinity. The importance of an immediate blockade of Santiago was the paramount consideration in determining this action.

Commodore Watson and Commander Converse, the captain of Watson's flag-ship, the *Montgomery*, as also Captain Folger of the *New Orleans*, were called aboard the *New York* for consultation. The question of blocking the entrance to Santiago harbor, which from its extreme narrowness lent itself admirably for such action, had already been somewhat discussed, and when these officers arrived was continued. The question of means was decided by a suggestion from Commander Converse of using the *Merrimac*, which, with her great length and heavy cargo of coal, would, if properly placed, make an absolute barrier to the egress of the Spanish squadron for the rest of the war. The criticisms of the action, which were chiefly the product of afterthought founded on very different bases from those of the moment, will be dealt with later.

It was decided to send the *New Orleans* at once, accompanied by the collier *Sterling*, to Santiago, with orders as follows:

ST. NICOLAS CHANNEL,
May 27, 1898.

SIR: You will proceed to Santiago de Cuba to convoy the collier *Sterling*.

2. You will communicate with Commodore Schley and direct him to remain on the blockade of Santiago at all hazards, assuming that the Spanish vessels are in that port.

3. Tell him that I desire that he should use the collier *Sterling*[1] to obstruct the channel at its narrowest part leading into this harbor. Inform him that I believe that it would be perfectly practicable to steam this vessel into position and drop all her anchors, allow her to swing across the channel, then sink her, either by opening the valves, or whatever means may be best in his judgment.

4. Inform Commodore Schley that the details of this plan are left to his judgment. In the meantime he must exercise the utmost care that none of the vessels already in the port are allowed to escape; and say to the commodore that I have the utmost confidence in his ability to carry this plan to a successful conclusion, and earnestly wish him good-luck.

Very respectfully,

W. T. Sampson,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.

Commanding Officer,
U. S. S. New Orleans.

Captain Folger was also given personal directions to allow the *Sterling*, which was to replace the *Merrimac*, to make her own way after rounding Cape Maysi, he himself to proceed thence at full speed and deliver the orders which he carried to Commodore Schley, who by this time was supposed to be at least in the vicinity of Santiago.

The two ships left at 6.55 p. m., May 27, and the flag-ship at once left for Key West in order to get a thorough understanding of the situation as soon as possible, the admiral having, as mentioned, made up his mind to go himself to Santiago unless the situation there should be found more satisfactory than the previous advices gave reason to believe.

The *New York* arrived at the reef off Key West at 2 a. m., May 28, and Sampson at once sent the following telegram to St. Nicolas Mole for Commodore Schley:

The *New Orleans* will meet you off Santiago May 29 with important despatches. The Spanish squadron must be blockaded at all hazards. Immediate communication with persons on shore must be entered upon. You must be sure of the Spanish squadron being

[1] This was an accidental error for *Merrimac*.

in port. I suggest communicating with the Spanish American Company pier at Daiquiri Bay, at a distance of fifteen miles east of Santiago de Cuba. One collier for you left yesterday; shall send as soon as possible another. If Spanish squadron has left Santiago immediate pursuit must be made.

CHAPTER XI

THE MOVEMENTS OF THE FLYING SQUADRON

To turn to the events of the week on the south side of Cuba:

Any question of further delay at Cienfuegos on the supposition that Cervera was there was settled on the arrival at 8 A. M., May 24, of the *Marblehead*, *Eagle*, and *Vixen*, which had left Key West at 4 P. M., May 21.

Commander McCalla, on going aboard the *Brooklyn* to report, informed Commodore Schley "that the Spanish force under Cervera had been reported authoritatively in Santiago the preceding Thursday, which was the 19th of May, and that when I sailed on the afternoon of the 21st of May the Spanish squadron was still reported to be at Santiago."[1] McCalla continued: "Admiral Schley told me that he thought the Spanish squadron was in Cienfuegos, that he received a Kingston newspaper from the steamer *Adula* some days previous, and that one of the newspapers contained a cable despatch from Santiago, and that from that he gathered that the Spanish force under Cervera might have sailed from Santiago in time to reach Cienfuegos just before the arrival of the force under his command. I said that I had on board arms, ammunition, and dynamite for the Cuban camp to the westward, and that if he would let me go I would at once find out whether the Spanish fleet was in Cienfuegos. He immediately assented."

Taking the *Eagle* with him, as her commander knew the exact place from previous communication, the two ships went to the point mentioned in the memorandum, thirteen miles west of the Cienfuegos entrance, arriving about noon, and found a force of Cuban insurgents on the beach; from whom it was at once found that the Spanish squadron was not in Cienfuegos. The dynamite, arms, and ammunition taken from the prizes

[1] *Court of Inquiry*, 278.

at Key West were landed, some clothing and food furnished, and the *Eagle* ordered back, as the faster vessel at the moment to carry the information to Commodore Schley.

This report, which was supplemented by a conversation[1] with Captain McCalla, removed any reason, under the orders which had been received, for remaining off Cienfuegos. Being satisfied that the enemy was not there, the order to "proceed with all despatch but cautiously to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is there, blockade him in port," was now unqualified.

Commander McCalla returned to his ship at 5.30 and at 6 P. M. (May 24) the *Brooklyn* signalled to form column at slow speed, course south by east. At 7 the squadron was stopped. At 7.10 signal was made, "We are bound to Santiago. In case of separation rendezvous off Gonaives Bay, Hayti, outside marine limit,"[2] and at 8.20 the squadron started ahead again in column, the *Marblehead*, *Vixen*, and *Eagle* on the right flank, the *Merrimac* on the left, on a south-easterly course. The squadron steamed at speeds varying from 7 to 9 knots, which during the forenoon of the next day was reduced through the bow compartment of the *Eagle* getting full of water, which, as there were no other appliances aboard, had to be bailed out with buckets.[3] But 13 knots in all were made in the four hours of the forenoon watch, and the average of but 6.6 knots from noon of the 25th to midnight. The squadron thus did not reach the longitude of Santiago until the afternoon of May 26, having been forty-four hours in covering the distance of 315 miles at an average of about 7 knots.

At 4.30 P. M., the flying squadron was 22 miles south by west of Santiago entrance, and with the course signalled at 2 P. M., "East." The *Iowa* now signalled, "Two of our cruisers, *St. Louis* and *Yale*, bearing N. N. W."[4] The flying squadron stood

[1] *Court of Inquiry*, I, 280. [2] *Official Record of Signals.*

[3] "This," says Lieutenant (now Rear Admiral) Southerland, "took a long time. When this was done and the water was out of the vessel she was in good condition to make good speed." (*Court of Inquiry*, I, 321.) "A little after 1 o'clock of the 26th" she was ordered to Port Antonio, Jamaica, to coal and return thence to Key West.

[4] *Official Record of Signals.* The signal was in error as to one of the ships being the *St. Louis.*

toward them at 5,[1] the flag-ship signalling at 5.20 to "Clear for action." Nine minutes later, ships' numbers having been exchanged with the *Minneapolis*, the signal was made to "Discontinue present exercise," and at 5.38 to stop.[2]

The *Yale*, cruising in Bahama Channel, had been met on the night of May 19–20 by the *St. Paul*, which had left Key West the evening of May 18 under orders to proceed to Cape Haitien, directing the *Yale* thither also if she should be spoken. Both ships arrived at Cape Haitien about noon on May 20. "There," says Captain Sigsbee, "I received telegraphic orders from the department which had been received at Cape Haitien at 10.45 P. M. of the 19th, to proceed to Santiago de Cuba and communicate occasionally, and was informed that Commodore Schley was ordered to proceed to the same place. My orders stated that the Spanish fleet had been reported at Santiago. I left Port Haitien without anchoring and arrived off Santiago the following day, Saturday, the 21st, at 9.30 A. M., and engaged in target practice some five or six miles from the fortifications at the entrance to the port."[3]

The *Yale* had remained at Cape Haitien after the *St. Paul* had left. At midnight (of May 20–21) the American consul came on board with a despatch sent by the navy department to his care:

> The Spanish squadron arrived on the 19th at Santiago. Proceed off that port, get in touch with the enemy and communicate occasionally. Wait for another despatch.[4]

Two hours later (2 A. M., May 21) the second came:

> Inform every vessel off Santiago de Cuba flying squadron is off Cienfuegos and that orders have been sent to it to proceed with all possible despatch off Santiago de Cuba.

In a few hours the *Yale* was on her way to Santiago, 215 miles distant. She arrived off Santiago at 10.54 P. M., May 21, but

[1] *Brooklyn's* log. [2] *Official Record of Signals.*
[3] Appendix to *Report of Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, 410.
[4] This is the form of the despatch as given by Captain Wise. (*Court of Inquiry*, I, 212.)

neither Captain Wise nor Captain Sigsbee (also now there) saw any ships of the Spanish squadron, the narrow and twisting cañon of the entrance and the high bluff bordering it, forbidding any view of the harbor beyond the river-like reaches stretching in for about a mile, with several turns before opening into a beautiful bay three and a half miles long and nearly a mile in its broadest part.

On the high eastern bluff, a precipice two hundred feet high, which extends without a break in its vertical face three miles to Aguadores, is the picturesque castle of the Morro, just east of which was a battery newly built of five 6.2-inch muzzle-loading rifles converted from old bronze smooth-bores; on the west the hills though steep were not so high, and on the summit of these, the Socapa, were three 8-inch muzzle-loading howitzers and two 6.2-inch rifles, the latter taken from the cruiser *Reina Mercedes*, long stationed in the harbor and useless through broken-down boilers.

Lower down the hill and near the water were one 57-millimetre, four 37, and one 11-millimetre Hotchkiss guns for the defence of the mine field. Nothing, however, as just said, could be seen by the *Yale* and *St. Paul* of the Spanish squadron in the inner harbor, though the former was near enough to the entrance for a close inspection. They cruised, the *St. Paul* east, the *Yale* west, of the port, awaiting the expected arrival of the flying squadron, and without interference from the batteries.

The *Harvard* and *Minneapolis* had met and parted company at 6 in the evening of May 18 off Puerto Rico. The *Minneapolis* stood for St. Thomas, where she arrived at 11.30 the next morning and began to coal. On the 20th Captain Jewell received the following telegram from Washington, dated May 19:

Minneapolis, St. Thomas:

Proceed at once off Santiago de Cuba; the Spanish fleet reported there; Schley ordered there; find *Harvard*, if practicable, she is somewhere off the north coast of Puerto Rico; proceed with off Santiago; her orders same as yours; keep touch with Spanish fleet; communicate occasionally.

The *Minneapolis* was under way at 10 P. M. and at daylight the next morning, May 21, off Cape San Juan, captured the

Spanish bark *Maria Dolorosa* with coal for the port of San Juan. Putting a prize crew of an officer and six men aboard with arms and provisions,[1] she again stood westward, picked up the *Harvard* at 3.20 A. M., delivered the despatch to Captain Cotton, and with her stood for Santiago, where both arrived the morning of the 23d.

Four out of the six large and fast scouts were thus present together May 23 off Santiago. At 5.30 A. M., May 24, the day after his arrival, Captain Cotton of the *Harvard*, as senior officer, received the order sent in the *Scorpion*, May 22, from Cienfuegos by Commodore Schley in accord with Sampson's letter No. 7 of May 20, and left at once for St. Nicolas Mole with the despatches brought by the *Scorpion*.[2]

The *Minneapolis*, obeying also the order brought by the *Scorpion* on May 24, started at 12.30 P. M. for Cienfuegos in search of the flying squadron, and at 11.25 A. M., May 25, off Cienfuegos, spoke the *Castine* (the only ship besides the *Minneapolis* now present), and was informed of Commodore Schley's departure eastward. She returned at once off Santiago, where she arrived again at 10 A. M., May 26, without sighting the squadron.

At 6 A. M., May 26, the *St. Paul* captured the British collier *Rostermel* as she was nearing the entrance of Santiago harbor. Her captain stated that he had touched at Puerto Rico May 16 and had left the same day, under orders for Curaçao, where he arrived May 19. He had been ordered thence to Santiago to discharge,[3] a fact of moment when taken in connection with the numerous specific reports that Cervera's squadron were in that port.

On the 26th, at 10 A. M., the *St. Paul* met the British steamer *Jason*, from Kingston to New York, which had diverted her route to bring two Cubans, sent to Commodore Schley, under direction of the department of state, by Mr. L. A. Dent, the American consul at Kingston. Both had been in the employ of the American consulate at Kingston; one, Eduardo Nuñez, as a pilot, the other, Señor Reval, as interpreter.

[1] The *Maria Dolorosa* was sent into Key West and adjudged prize.
[2] These despatches are given on pages 286, 287.
[3] *Court of Inquiry*, I, 414, where appear full details of capture.

About 5 P. M. the smoke of a number of ships was seen to the southward and eastward, and all three ships present, the *Yale*, *St. Paul*, and *Minneapolis*, stood in its direction in the expectancy, as it was now known to have left Cienfuegos, that it would prove to be Commodore Schley's command, thus leaving the port wholly unguarded. The smoke of the scouts had been seen at the same time by the squadron, and the latter's course was changed to meet them. At 6 the two forces joined and Captain Sigsbee, signalling the flag-ship that he had a pilot aboard, was ordered aboard the flag-ship.

Captain Sigsbee carried with him a letter which had been written to Captain Jewell of the *Minneapolis*, but which he now addressed to Commodore Schley:

U. S. S. *St. Paul*,
OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *May* 26, 1898.

SIR: This morning I boarded the British steamer *Jason*, bound for New York. She transferred to me a colored pilot named Eduardo Nuñez, recently employed by the Spanish navy at Santiago de Cuba. Also a Cuban recently employed as clerk in the United States consulate at Santiago de Cuba. I send you two letters from the United States consul at Kingston, Jamaica, bearing upon the matter.

Captain W. C. Wise, senior officer here, directed me to transfer these men to the *Minneapolis*, and later he revoked the order. I note that the consul's letters have not the consular seal attached. Still, I assume that they are genuine.

I had 1,200 tons of coal on board at noon.

Yesterday I captured as prize the British steamer *Restormel*, of Cardiff. She had touched at Puerto Rico and Curaçao. I send you a "memo" copy of a letter I wrote to the navy department and the prize commissioner at Key West, Fla., where I sent the prize. The captain and crew seemed to be glad to be captured. She had 2,400 tons of coal on board. I captured her very close to the Morro off Santiago de Cuba in broad daylight.

No news here. I have seen absolutely nothing of the Spanish fleet.

Very respectfully,

C. D. SIGSBEE,
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.

COMMODORE W. S. SCHLEY, *U. S. N.*[1]

Neither of the captains of the scouts had any knowledge of the whereabouts of the Spanish ships beyond what had been

[1] *Court of Inquiry*, I, 413.

telegraphed from the navy department, though the *Colón* had moved down to Gaspar Bay and taken position the day before, but a mile from the entrance; they had (for reasons which will be explained later) seen nothing except the masts of a small vessel in the entering reaches of the bay, and nothing had come or gone except the two British steamers mentioned. Captain Sigsbee, the only officer called aboard the flag-ship, could give nothing new regarding the Spanish ships.

The *Merrimac* at 6.15 signalling, "Intermediate valve stem broken short off. It will take two or three hours to repair it," the *Yale* was ordered to take her in tow. Captain Jewell reported the *Minneapolis* short of coal and with her machinery in bad condition. He was signalled asking if he had enough to go to Key West and replied, "Just enough." He was ordered to take position on the port beam of the *Iowa*, the *Yale* with her tow on the starboard, and the *St. Paul* on the port beam of the flag-ship.

A little later (at 7.45) signal was made to the squadron: "Destination Key West via south of Cuba and Yucatan Channel as soon as collier is ready. Speed 9 knots."

The *Yale* at 8.50 reported, "All ready with tow," and signal was made to form column, and the squadron started back toward Key West.

The signal record herewith, in part, gives best the course of events to noon of the next day:

MAY 26

9.45 P. M. *Brooklyn* to *Yale:* "What speed can you make with tow?"
9.50 " *Yale* to *Brooklyn:* "With tow we can make 10 knots, but will use up too much coal, and our coal supply is small."
9.55 " *Brooklyn* to *Yale:* "Can you get to Key West on 9 knots?"
10.00 " *Yale* to *Brooklyn:* "Yes."
11.20 " *Yale to Brooklyn:* "Hawser is parted."
11.25 " *Brooklyn* to squadron: "Stop."
11.30 " *Yale* to *Brooklyn:* "We are getting our steel hawser out. It will take four hours before we are able to go ahead again."
11.35 " *Brooklyn* to *Yale:* "Is the collier repaired enough to steam herself?"
11.40 " *Yale* to *Brooklyn:* "No, her engines are not repaired."

MAY 27

12.15 A. M. *Brooklyn* to *Minneapolis:* "Keep *Yale* and collier in sight and do not lose the fleet."
7.35 " *Yale* to *Brooklyn:* "*Merrimac* let hawser go. Bad work."
8.00 " *Brooklyn* to *St. Paul:* "Did *Scorpion* communicate with you off Santiago a day or two ago?"
8.00 " *St. Paul* to *Brooklyn:* "No; *Yale* or *Harvard.*"
8.05 " *Brooklyn* to *Minneapolis:* "Did you communicate with the *Scorpion* off Santiago?"
8.15 " *Minneapolis* to *Brooklyn:* "Haven't seen her. *Harvard* said she was off Santiago the 24th."
8.30 " *Minneapolis* and *Marblehead* to *Brooklyn:* "Strange vessel bearing N. E. ½ E."
9.15 " *Brooklyn* to *Iowa:* "Repeat signals."
9.15 " "Exchanged numbers with *Harvard.*"
9.30 " *Brooklyn* to *Harvard:* "From where are you?"
9.30 " *Harvard* to *Brooklyn:* "Nicolas Mole."
9.30 " *Brooklyn* to *Harvard:* "I have despatches for C.-in-C."
10.30 " *Yale* to *Brooklyn:* "I am ready to go ahead."
10.45 " *Brooklyn* to squadron: "Can you fetch Key West with coal remaining?"
11.00 " *Brooklyn* to *Yale:* "Proceed; steam at 7 knots."
11.05 " Squadron to *Brooklyn: Marblehead, Iowa, Texas, Massachusetts, St. Paul,* and *Minneapolis* answered affirmative.

The *Harvard,* Captain Cotton, had arrived at St. Nicolas Mole early May 25, and sent the despatches brought for transmission from the *Scorpion* the day before off Santiago.[1] At 10.30 A. M. the captain received a despatch from Admiral Sampson:

The Spanish squadron at Santiago. If previous to May 19, scout off Santiago. Communicate with Schley if he (they) move west. Schley is expected May 24 at Santiago from Cienfuegos, Cuba. Telegraph me from Nicolas Mole to Key West if he (they) move east, and leave letter for Schley, then go off Santiago to meet him. I shall be Cay Frances with squadron. If two scouts are available, one should keep touch with the Spanish squadron.

Captain Cotton awaited reply from the navy department to the despatch forwarded by him from Commodore Schley, and at 8.30 A. M., May 26, received the following:

[1] *Supra,* pp. 94, 95.

Proceed at once and inform Schley and also the senior officer present off Santiago, as follows: All department's information indicates Spanish division still at Santiago. The department looks to you to ascertain facts, and that the enemy, if therein, does not leave without a decisive action. Cubans familiar with Santiago say that there are landing-places five or six nautical miles west from the mouth of the harbor, and that there insurgents probably will be found, and not the Spanish. From the surrounding heights can see every vessel in port. As soon as ascertained, notify the department whether enemy is there. Could not squadron and also the *Harvard* coal from *Merrimac* leeward of Cape Cruz, Cuba; Gonaives, Hayti Channel, or Mole, Hayti? The department will send coal immediately to Mole, Hayti. Report without delay situation at Santiago de Cuba.

The time taken to decipher the despatch and other matters delayed the *Harvard* until 1.47 P. M., when she left the Mole for Santiago, telegraphing Admiral Sampson:

The department instructs me to communicate immediately with Schley. I leave immediately.

The *Harvard* was sighted by the *Brooklyn* to the northward and eastward at 9 A. M., May 27, and at 10 Captain Cotton delivered the despatches to Commodore Schley, whose squadron through the preceding night had, as mentioned, been waiting for the *Yale* taking the *Merrimac* in tow,[1] which may be taken as summarizing the situation until 3.40 P. M. of that day.

At the same time he delivered the despatches, Captain Cotton mentioned the request made to him by Lieutenant Beale to be allowed to go ashore and ascertain if the Spanish ships were in Santiago harbor.[2] Beale, charged with the duty of deciphering and putting into cipher all despatches received and sent by the *Harvard*, had seen the opportunity offered and pressed upon his captain his desire to make the attempt. On Captain Cotton's return from the *Brooklyn* he was informed that his offer was declined.[3]

The *Harvard* was despatched to Kingston, Jamaica,[4] with a telegram from Commodore Schley in answer to that from the

[1] *Brooklyn's* log 12 to 4 A. M., May 27.

[2] *Court of Inquiry*, I, 202.

[3] *Court of Inquiry*, I, 909.

[4] The *Harvard* arrived at Kingston at 9 A. M. the next morning (May 28) and was allowed sufficient coal (700 tons) to take her to Key West, the nearest

navy department, which was received by the latter on May 28. It was as follows:

Received despatch May 26 delivered by *Harvard* off Santiago de Cuba. *Merrimac's* engine is disabled, and she is helpless; am obliged to have her towed to Key West. Have been absolutely unable to coal the *Texas, Marblehead, Vixen,* and *Brooklyn* from collier, owing to very rough seas and boisterous weather since leaving Key West. *Brooklyn* is the only one in squadron having more than sufficient coal to reach Key West. Impossible to remain off Santiago in present state of coal account of the squadron. Not possible to coal to leeward of Cape Cruz in summer owing to south-west winds. *Harvard* just reports to me she has only coal enough to reach Jamaica, and she will proceed to Port Royal. Also reports only small vessels could coal at Gonaives or Mole, Hayti. *Minneapolis* has only enough coal to reach Key West, and same of *Yale,* which will tow *Merrimac.* It is also regretted that the department's orders cannot be obeyed,

American port. She also took water and provisions, her time being extended beyond the usual limit on account of the slowness of coaling. She left at 3.18 P. M., May 30, and arrived off Santiago at 7 A. M. next day. She remained there until June 2, when she was ordered by Admiral Sampson to Hampton Roads.

[1] Mr. John D. Long (ex-secretary of the navy) commenting upon this telegram says (*The New American Navy,* I, 276–277): "The situation of his command appeared at the Schley Court of Inquiry in 1901 not to have been as Schley reported it. At noon on May 27 his vessels had coal enough to have remained on blockade duty off Santiago de Cuba—the *Brooklyn* for 26 days, the *Iowa* for 16 days, the *Massachusetts* for 20 days, the *Texas* for 10 days, the *Marblehead* for 5 days and the *Vixen* for 23 days, and they then would have had sufficient fuel to reach Gonaives or Cape Cruz, where they could have refilled their bunkers from the *Merrimac,* which contained 4,350 tons of coal. The amount of coal required to completely supply these ships was 2,750 tons. Schley must have known when he sent his despatch that the *Iowa, Castine,* and *Dupont* had coaled at Cienfuegos on May 23 and the *Massachusetts* and *Castine* on May 24. Permission had been asked by the *Texas* on May 23 to coal but she was refused, and ordered to coal on the following day. This order was subsequently revoked. Indeed the *Texas* and *Marblehead* did actually coal from the *Merrimac* at sea off Santiago on the evening of May 27 and the morning of May 28 and the *Massachusetts* and *Vixen* on May 29, the *Brooklyn* and *Iowa* on May 30, and the *Brooklyn, Texas* and *Marblehead* on May 31. Thus there were but two days—the 25th and 26th—when no coal was transferred from the collier to the men-of-war, and the failure to take fuel on these days was not due wholly to rough seas and boisterous weather or to the helplessness of the *Merrimac,* but to the fact that the squadron was under way."

earnestly as we have all striven to that end. I am forced to return to Key West via Yucatan Passage for coal. Can ascertain nothing certain concerning enemy. Was obliged to send *Eagle* to Port Antonio, Jamaica, yesterday, as she had only twenty-seven tons of coal on board. Will leave *St. Paul* here. Will require 9,500 tons of coal at Key West.

CHAPTER XII

THE SITUATION IN SANTIAGO

At this critical moment it is well to turn to the squadron whose arrival in Santiago harbor at 8 A. M., May 19, had been received with so much rejoicing both in Spain and Cuba. Cervera was fully alive to the difficulties of his situation. He wanted coal and provisions; his engines must be repaired and boilers cleaned. Santiago itself was short of food and, said Cervera, "if it does not receive any, must succumb; if we are blockaded before we finish taking coal, which is scarce, we shall succumb with the city."[1] He was kept well informed by the governor-general in Havana, whose sources of information were evidently excellent, of the movements of the American ships and of the colliers to be expected, among which was the *Restormel*, so soon to be captured. General Blanco had telegraphed the minister of war, Correa:

HAVANA, *May* 20, 1898.

As I notified your Excellency, Cervera's squadron arrived at Santiago minus *Terror*, which was left at Martinique with *Alicante*, both blockaded by hostile ships. Squadron without provisions and coal. Taking coal at Santiago, where it cannot remain long; danger of being blockaded and entirely cut off; resources of place limited. If *Pelayo*, *Carlos V*, and torpedo-boat flotilla had come with them might attempt some action and lend powerful assistance in defence of islands. But reduced as it is, squadron must elude encounter and confine itself to manœuvres which will not compromise it and which cannot have great results. Has brought no transports with coal and provisions which would have helped so much, nor weapons and ammunition.

It is extremely doubtful, however, if Blanco fully appreciated the situation; he seemed, by a telegram of May 21 to General Linares, the army commander at Santiago, to expect free in-

[1] Cervera, *Documents*, 80, 83.

gress and egress for some time to come, saying: "Tell Admiral Cervera that English ship with coal has left Curaçao to-day for Santiago. You can afterward use said vessel for provisions."

Telegrams passed with great frequency. On May 21, the minister of marine (now Admiral Auñon) asked if Cervera had sufficient coal and whether he had news of the *Terror*. The answer to the first of these questions has just been mentioned; coal was scarce, and later Cervera says that there was not enough to fill the bunkers; to the second inquiry he replied that he had received word on May 20 that the *Terror's* boilers were repaired, and that he had instructed her to go to Puerto Rico if opportunity occurred.

Admiral Manterola, commanding the naval station of the Antilles, sent Cervera three telegrams on May 21:

Guantánamo, Mulata, Cardenas, Matanzas, Mariel, and Nipe have Bustamante torpedoes; latter place doubtful; Cienfuegos and Havana, electric torpedoes.

Cienfuegos has resources and communications by land with this capital. I send this now and will answer other questions to-morrow.

The hostile forces are composed of eight cruisers, namely: *Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Minneapolis, Columbia, New York, Indiana, Iowa,* and *Oregon.* Two of 6,000 tons, *Texas* and *Puritan,* expected in the near future. Five of from 3,000 to 4,000, seven of from 1,000 to 2,000, six torpedo-boats of from 127 to 180, and another cruiser have been sighted off Havana and Cienfuegos. Also large number of tugs and transports, more or less well armed, but of high speed; number reported to exceed sixty, which I can neither deny nor confirm.

At present there are off the harbor cruisers *New York, Indiana, Puritan,* and five other cruisers, six gun-boats, and two despatch-boats. Have in store only 150 rounds for 5.5 inch guns, twenty-five rounds for 11-inch, three boxes fuses for *Vizcaya.* On April 1 I reported to minister in Key AB 0553: "Of the fifty-five vessels composing this fleet thirty-two are auxiliary launches of little usefulness, even for police service on the coast, being intended only for service against filibustering expeditions. The two cruisers are wholly useless.

"Engines of *Alfonso XII* totally disabled. *Reina Mercedes,* seven of the ten boilers useless and three almost so. Of *Marques de la Ensenada, Isabel II,* and *Venadito,* the latter is the only one in condition to put to sea; all others will not be able to move for a month. *Magallanes* cannot light fires, either. Gun-boats converted into

cruisers, for which purpose they were not constructed, have lost their speed, which constitutes their principal defence. Transport *Legazpi*, highest speed 7 knots. Of the small English gun-boats I believe I need say nothing."

A look at the *Reina Mercedes* will give an idea of what my forces are. *Infanta Isabel* and *Marques de la Ensenada* will soon be ready. Torpedo gun-boats *Martin A. Pinzón, Nueva España, Marques de Molins,* and *Vicente Y. Pinzón* can be used, or at least are able to move. Provisions for two months for this fleet and the one under your Excellency's command. Our coal, 9,000 tons; an embargo on private stores probably about 20,000. I had counted on your arrival with your squadron and numerous convoy of provisions and stores of every kind, and torpedo-boat flotilla.

Your arrival, as it is, compels me to tell you that it is necessary for me to know and inform captain-general if more ships and convoys are coming, so that, if we can count on nothing more than what we have, we may agree with your Excellency upon a plan for uniting all we have in the most efficacious manner according to circumstances. We have not a single fast vessel for that purpose, neither government nor private, and the fastest one we have, the *Santo Domingo*, is in dock. I await your answer.

Cervera answered this last:

Have received your cipher telegram advising me of pitiful condition of your naval forces. Believe no more can come from Spain, as none were available except *Carlos V*, *Alfonso XIII*, and a few destroyers and torpedo-boats. *Pelayo* has not, I believe, her secondary battery installed. Possibly some of the transatlantics purchased may come with stores. I believe there are four; speed good. My coming here has been somewhat fortuitous; according to instructions I was to go to Puerto Rico. Do not believe convoys have been thought of at all, since I have always been told that I should find everything here. These ideas may perhaps have changed with ministerial crisis.

Cervera now, May 22, received word from the *Alicante*, at Fort de France, Martinique:

Marquis Comillas tells me to go to Santiago and leave coal. Captain of destroyer advises me on part of your Excellency that hostile ships are stationed to capture me. Beg that you will give me instructions.

Cervera answered the same day: "Do not go out for the present."

Word came from San Juan that the English steamer *Restormel* with coal had left Curaçao on May 21 for Santiago, "speed 7 knots."

The following came from Minister Auñon:

MADRID, *May* 23, 1898.

I approve increase of firemen.[1] Coal left San Juan for Santiago. There are 3,000 tons at Cienfuegos. Hostile squadron, Admiral Schley, left Key West for south Cuba on night 20th, and afterward Sampson's. It is believed [4] monitors and several cruisers watching Yucatan Channel. If transatlantic *Alfonso XIII*, armed, arrives with coal and provisions, you may, if desired, incorporate her in squadron. I notify commandant-general of navy yard. If impossible to pass through channels, may go roundabout way or create diversion on hostile coast, but not considered necessary.

During May 23 four telegrams regarding the movements of the American ships came from General Blanco at Havana: one that twelve were off Cienfuegos, another that since 10 A. M. of that day almost the entire horizon was free of hostile ships, "only four insignificant gun-boats remaining to windward. The others have gone with course to windward."[2]

The news received moved the admiral to action. He called a council of war on May 24 at which were present the second in command (Paredes), all the captains of the armored cruisers, the chief of staff, and the commander of the torpedo-boat division; the result was given in a telegram to Minister Auñon the same day:

Squadron being ready to leave anchorage in search of stores it needs, have assembled captains of ships, who are unanimously of following opinion: In view maximum speed this squadron reduced to 14 knots, account of *Vizcaya* bottom fouled, lack of coal, location of hostile fleets, and condition of harbor, certain danger of sortie greater than advantages gained by reaching San Juan, only harbor where we could go. Proceedings drawn up signed by me. Shall await more favorable opportunity. Meanwhile will get all possible supplies, and in conjunction with commander-in-chief of army division aid in defence of harbor and city. To supply city, necessary to run blockade with fast vessels 20 knots at night, after agreeing on

[1] Cervera had reported necessity of shipping firemen at Santiago.

[2] Cervera, *Documents*, 87.

day and hour to send out of harbor pilot and keep channel clear. Have instructed transatlantic steamers *Havana* and *Martinique* not to go out because would certainly be captured.

This decision was so momentous in every point of view, and had so weighty a bearing upon later events, that the telegram should be supplemented by the actual record of proceedings now given:

The admiral acquainted the officers present with the information received since the preceding evening, from the governor-general of the island, the commandant-general of the navy yard, and her Majesty's government, to the effect that Admiral Schley's fleet had left Key West on the 20th instant, bound for the south of the island of Cuba, and that Admiral Sampson's fleet had been sighted off Cienfuegos yesterday. As these forces are each far superior to this squadron, and as the truth of such information was confirmed by the fact that four ships remained in front of the harbor entrance all day yesterday, the admiral desired to hear the opinions of said officers as to what was best to be done by the squadron under the circumstances.

It had been decided yesterday that the best plan was to start at daybreak for San Juan, Puerto Rico, where the necessary telegrams had been sent to detain there the collier and the transatlantic steamer *Alfonso XIII*, which the government had, by telegraph, placed at the disposal of the squadron.

Owing to the location of the hostile forces and their number and strength, it was unanimously considered impossible to carry out said plan, as the maximum speed of this squadron is calculated to be 14 knots, which is the speed of the *Vizcaya* as the result of the fouled condition of her bottom. Taking into consideration that the ships had not been able to get more than one-third of their coal supply, that the conditions of the harbor make it necessary for the sortie to be effected by the ships one by one, at slow speed, which might make it necessary for the first ship, or ships, that go out to return, though only for the purpose of reconnoitring, with a consequent loss of moral strength, all the officers present were of opinion that the certain danger of the squadron was much greater than the few advantages which might be derived from reaching the harbor of San Juan de Puerto Rico, and that it was therefore necessary to abandon this plan and remain at Santiago, refit as far as possible from the stores to be had here, and take advantage of the first good opportunity for leaving the harbor, at present blockaded by superior forces.

All the officers present were also of opinion that the present situation of the squadron compels it to remain in this harbor.[1]

[1] Cervera, *Documents*, 88. The signatures to this document appear as follows: Pascual Cervera, José de Paredes, Juan B. Lazaga, Victor M. Con-

On the same day General Blanco telegraphed to Santiago:

Oregon has reached Key West. Flying squadron proceeding to Santiago, where Sampson also intends to arrive to-morrow, unless notified of departure of Cervera's squadron. If latter does not go out, may be closed in.

Also:

Private telegrams from the United States say it is intended to close in squadron Santiago. Entrance should be watched to prevent carrying out of this plan.

So fully was Cervera convinced by General Blanco's telegram and by the presence of the *Minneapolis* and the auxiliary cruisers *Harvard, Yale,* and *St. Paul* that he was now blockaded, that he sent next day (May 25), to the minister of marine, a despairing telegram:

We are blockaded. I qualified our coming here as disastrous for interests of country. Events begin to show I was right. With disparity of forces any effective operations absolutely impossible. We have provisions for one month.[1]

The same day (May 25), already regretful of the decision of the day before, he wrote General Linares, the general in command of the eastern department of the province of Santiago, and whose headquarters were in the city:

Honored Sir: I have the honor of acknowledging the receipt of your two official and confidential letters on the movements of the hostile fleets, for which I thank you very much. It is much to be regretted that the squadron did not go out yesterday while it had all the fires lighted. But information received from the government confirmed the report that Schley's fleet had started for Santiago on the night of the 20th and that Sampson was following with his fleet, and for that reason all the captains of this squadron were unanimously of opinion that the sortie was impracticable, and, owing to the scarcity of our coal, I ordered three-fifths of the fires to be put out.

cas, Fernando Villaamil, Joaquin Bustamante, Antonio Eulate, Emilio Diaz Moreu. Paredes was a commodore with his pennant in the *Colón;* Bustamante was chief of staff.

[1] Cervera, *Documents,* 91.

As these ships require a number of hours to get up steam, they would not be ready before night, and that would be too late, especially in view of the rapid consumption of coal. For these reasons there is no other course open at present but to take up positions, as we agreed yesterday, to defend the harbor and city in case an attempt should be made to force the entrance. The *Colón* is already at her post and the *Teresa* will be there shortly, the others will not be there until to-night or to-morrow, as they have to get water for their boilers. If another opportunity presents itself, I intend to try and take advantage of it, but as I cannot hope with these scant forces to attempt any definite operations, it will only be a matter of changing this harbor for another where we would also be blockaded.

It is to be regretted that bad luck brought me to this harbor, which is so short of everything we need, and I had chosen it in preference because, not having been blockaded, I supposed it to be well supplied with provisions, coal, and stores of every kind. Although I always thought that it would be blockaded, I flattered myself that I could keep the greater part of the hostile fleet busy here, which is the only effective service that can be expected of this small and poorly equipped squadron. I beg that you will transmit these explanations to his Excellency the captain-general, as the highest representative of the nation in this island, so that he may know the causes of my apparent inaction.

The disposition of the ships, referred to by Cervera, was to moor the *Colón* in Gaspar Bay, three-quarters of a mile within the entrance and broadside to it, with lines running from the stern to trees on the east bank. She could thus haul herself into a position commanding a full view seaward. Another three-quarters of a mile north of the *Colón*, off Cojimas Bay, was the *Vizcaya*. Still another mile within, south of Cay Ratones, were the *Maria Teresa* and *Oquendo*. The partially disarmed *Reina Mercedes*, some of whose guns had gone to re-enforce the batteries, was in the narrow passage between Puntilla and Cay Smith.

The succeeding day, May 26, the same day on the evening of which Commodore Schley arrived some twenty-two miles south of Santiago and started for Key West, Cervera held a second council and there was a second change of mind, in which it was unanimously decided to leave for San Juan, Puerto Rico, and orders were given to spread fires and be ready at 5 o'clock P. M. But at 2 o'clock the semaphore signalled the presence of

three hostile ships[1] and doubt again came over his soul. The officers were again convened, with, as Cervera reported, the following results:

Doubts as to whether the prevailing swell would permit the going out of the ships were expressed more forcibly than at the meeting in the morning. To settle this question Pilot Miguel was called, who had piloted the flag-ship in, and who, in the opinion of the captain of the harbor, is the most intelligent of the pilots (with the exception of the chief pilot, who is ill). Miguel stated that with the weather prevailing there would be no trouble whatever about taking out the *Teresa*, *Vizcaya*, and *Oquendo*, any time, day or night, their draft being only from 23.3 to 23.6 feet, but that the going out of the *Colón*, whose draft is 24.9 feet, might present difficulties on account of a flat rock in the water off Point Morrillo, where the water is only 27½ English feet deep.

The pilot was sent to the harbor entrance to form a more exact opinion on the state of the sea, and returned, saying that he thought it very probable that, owing to the swell, the *Colón* might touch bottom on the flat rock referred to. Under these circumstances the admiral propounded the following question, on the assumption that the whole squadron should go out together, leaving only the torpedo-boat destroyers in the harbor: Is it expedient to risk the *Colón* being injured, or should the sortie not be effected, awaiting more favorable circumstances?

The question being put in this form, Captains Concas and Bustamante were in favor of the sortie, for reasons hereinafter set forth, and all the other officers were in favor of not going out, with the exception of the admiral, who reserved his opinion. Upon his instructions the foregoing proceedings were drawn up.

José de Paredes.
Antonio Eulate.
Juan B. Lazaga.
Emilio Diaz Moreu.
Fernando Villaamil.[2]

Captains Bustamante and Concas, as Cervera mentions, were of sounder opinion. Both dissented from the proceeding, Bustamante expressing himself as follows:

My reasons for expressing the opinion that the squadron should go out immediately, in spite of the statement of Pilot Miguel, are as fol-

[1] The three scouts, *Minneapolis*, *Yale*, and *St. Paul*.
[2] Cervera, *Documents*, 95, 96.

lows: My impression on the probable situation of the hostile squadrons is the same as that formulated by the admiral. To-day we are certain that they are not off this harbor; they are almost sure to be there to-morrow. On this basis, which I believe well founded, I reason as follows: Our squadron, blockaded by far superior forces, has very little prospect of going out united by forcing the blockade. For each ship to go out alone, at a venture, does not seem practicable in my opinion and would expose us to the loss of one or more ships.

To go out openly and accept battle seems to me almost inhuman, because our defeat would be certain, and unwise, because it would be preparing an easy triumph for the enemy. Outside of this there seems to me no other recourse than to capitulate with the city when, in a month from now or little more, we shall find ourselves without provisions, since we are completely cut off by land and sea. This last solution is to my mind even more inadmissible than any of the former.

This is, in my opinion, the situation of the squadron at the present time, and in view of its terrible gravity, I am in favor of saving three of the ships, even at the risk of losing the fourth ship, as I do not believe such loss very probable, since pilots always leave a margin of safety, and so do hydrographers. The *Colón's* draft, according to her captain, is 7.60 metres, that is to say, 24.93 English feet. The rock, according to the pilot, has 27.50 feet of water and is of very little extent (he says considerably less than the width of the admiral's cabin). Hence there would be a margin of 2½ English feet, and the swell did not seem excessive to me this morning, when I was at the mouth of the harbor and the wind was blowing harder than it is now. Moreover, the *Colón* might pass over the rock without being struck by any sea, and even if she should be struck it would not be at all certain that the resulting injury would disable her from continuing the voyage.

Above all, I repeat, within the range of possibilities, I believe it preferable for the *Colón* (which, in my mind, should be the last to go out) to remain disabled at the harbor entrance than for us to await what I fear is in store for us. This is my opinion. I sincerely hope that I may be mistaken, but my conscience dictates it to me, and I can not hold it back. JOAQUIN BUSTAMANTE.

Captain Concas concurred entirely with Captain Bustamante, but the admiral sided with the more apprehensive of his officers and made the following endorsement of the proceedings:

I do not consider the circumstances so extreme as to make it necessary to risk the loss of the *Colón* at the rock where the *Gerona*, of less draft than the former, lost part of her false keel, and in hopes that the sea will calm down and that another opportunity will present itself the sortie is deferred.

His decision was fatal. After May 28 no further opportunity occurred.

It is one of the curiosities of history that the appearance of the three scouts which brought trepidation, should have been followed so quickly by the disappearance of all three to the southward in pursuit of the smoke of Commodore Schley's squadron, which had been sighted by them at the very hour, 5 P. M., which, in the afternoon, had been set by Cervera as that at which to be ready for leaving port. Had he gone, as intended, he could have only regarded their sudden disappearance as providential, leaving the way absolutely clear for him to proceed without hindrance or even detection. His ships would probably, with the delays incident in such cases, not have cleared the port before 6 P. M., an hour which in that latitude and on that day was within thirty-four minutes of sunset. The rapid fall of the tropic night would have covered his direction; there was, long before 6 o'clock, no ship of the hostile force in sight, the three set to watch for him being by that hour twenty-two miles away with the flying squadron, which was about turning for Key West. It was not until two days later (May 28) that it headed for Santiago and next morning looked into the harbor entrance. Before this time Cervera would have been in San Juan.

Had Cervera's leaving been unobserved and his destination not been revealed from Havana, there could have been no movement toward San Juan until his arrival there had been generally noised abroad, as no doubt it would have been. Even had his departure from Santiago been at once made known next day through the Havana telegraph office, Sampson, on his way to Key West with the intention of coaling and going to Santiago, could not have known it until his arrival there on the 28th. He then would have had available but the *New York* and *Oregon* as the only two heavy ships, and but one cruiser, the *New Orleans*, and a few slight auxiliaries, which could have maintained any considerable speed. Under the best of circumstances, even with this moderate force, he could not have been off San Juan before May 31.

The chances of Cervera's escape were thus fair; the order to return to Spain, which failed to reach him at Martinique, would

no doubt have been repeated at San Juan, and had he coaled quickly and sailed, the American fleet would have had to look for him on the Spanish coast.

We can see now, however, that such expedition was not part of the temperamental equipment of the officers in command, and the chances are very large that however great the delay of the American fleet, it would have found the enemy still at San Juan and it would have been attacked in harbor instead of, as happened later, at sea. War has seldom furnished a more extraordinary incident than the situation which might have been produced and which was so happily escaped through the vacillation of Cervera and his officers.

The Junta for land and sea defence of the city was composed of General of Division José Toral, the military governor of the city; Captain Pelayo Pedemonte, of the navy; Colonel Florencio Caula, of the engineers of the army; Lieutenant-Colonel Luis Melgar, the chief of artillery, and Lieutenant José Muller y Tejeiro, of the navy, temporary chief of submarine defences.

It was unanimously held that the only defence to be relied upon against sea attack was torpedoes, and as early as April 2, preparations for laying them were begun. The torpedo firing stations were removed from the Morro and the Estrella and Catalina batteries and were placed in better-sheltered positions on the bay. On April 14 the work of laying torpedoes was turned over to Lieutenant Mauricio Aranco, the commander of the small gun-boat *Alvarado*. The first row of seven, with firing stations at Estrella Point and Socapa, were finished April 21, and the second, of six, with stations at Socapa and Cay Smith, on April 27. A commission of three officers went to Guantánamo April 21 to select locations to be mined, and on April 23 the gun-boat *Sandoval* was sent to lay them, remaining there for the rest of the war.

The only available material for batteries was the armament of the *Reina Mercedes* (lying in the harbor with machinery in such disrepair as to be helpless), a small number of modern guns of light calibre, and some thirty-four guns of ancient pattern, ten of which were muzzle-loading howitzers; the others were muzzle-loading eighteenth-century bronze guns rifled with three grooves

and of very little efficiency. Six of the howitzers had been received about April 18 from Havana, at which time, so impossible was it to prevent the American press from giving out information, also came word of Sampson's fitting the *Mangrove* for cutting the Santiago cables.

About 210 yards east of the Morro was the light-house on the vertical cliff some 200 feet high, which continues thus without a break for the three miles to the Aguadores. A hundred yards east of this was built a new battery in which were placed, by May 28, five of the 6.3-inch muzzle-loading rifled bronze guns and two 8-inch muzzle-loading howitzers. The parapet consisted of wooden boxes filled with cement, on top of which barrels, also filled with cement, were placed. The distance between the guns was twenty feet and the spaces between partially filled with cement and sand. Thirty feet back of the battery was a trench five feet deep and two wide parallel with the front of the battery. From this trench small zig-zag trenches led to the guns, which made them a most difficult mark for ships. A near approach only increased this difficulty, as the edge of the lofty cliff became itself a protection. Four hundred and fifty men were stationed here as a support.

On the Socapa, about 430 yards from the Morro, on the west side of the entrance was a battery of three 8-inch muzzle-loading howitzers and two 16-centimetre (16.3-inch) Hontoria guns, with 1-inch shields, taken from the *Reina Mercedes*, all of which were in position and ready to fire by May 28. The guns were separated from the howitzers by a wide traverse. About twenty yards back of the guns was the ammunition magazine, a tin-covered building. East of this battery, and lower down the hill, was another, intended for the defence of the submarine mines, composed of one 57-millimetre gun, four 37-millimetre Hotchkiss guns, and one 11-millimetre machine-gun. All the guns on the Socapa were manned by men taken from the *Reina Mercedes*, under command of officers of the ship. A supporting force of 400 men was entrenched near by.

A battery was begun on Punta Gorda, a mile within the entrance, where were later to be mounted two 6.3-inch guns from the *Reina Mercedes*, two 6-inch breech-loading howitzers,

and two 3.5-inch Krupp guns. As everything had to be done, from building a pier to land the guns and a road carried to the top of the hill where they were to be placed, the first of the 6.3-inch was not mounted until June 3, and the second not until June 17. The remainder of the available guns were mounted later at various interior points in the neighborhood of the city.[1]

[1] These guns were as follows:

June 12. One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun and two short 8-cm. rifled bronze guns at Fort San Antonio.
One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at Santa Ines.

June 13. One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun and one short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at the road from El Caney.

June 14. One 16-cm. rifled bronze, one short 12-cm. rifled bronze, and two short 8-cm. rifled bronze guns at El Sueno.

June 16. One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun and two short 8-cm. rifled bronze guns at St. Ursula.

June 17. One 16-cm. rifled bronze gun at Cañadas.

June 25. One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at Fort Horno.
One short 12-cm. rifled bronze gun at Fort Nuevo.

After the battle of July 1 were mounted:
Two long 12-cm. bronze guns at Santa Ursula.
Two of the same at road from El Caney.
One long 8-cm. bronze gun (old) at Santa Ines (the breech-piece was missing).

General Escario's column brought two 8-cm. (3.15-inch) guns, but they were never fired.

CHAPTER XIII

SAMPSON LEAVES FOR SANTIAGO; SCHLEY BEGINS BLOCKADE

It is necessary to return to affairs as seen by the commander-in-chief, who, as mentioned, had reached Key West at 2 A. M., May 28, with the intention of proceeding himself to Santiago, should the outlook not improve. On arriving he received copies of telegrams which had passed between the navy department and Commodore Remey on May 26, as follows:

Telegram of May 24 from Schley conveys no information. What vessel brought it? What vessel took orders from Sampson to Schley on night of May 20, or morning of May 21, directing him to proceed Santiago de Cuba? Direct commander of vessel that brought telegram just received to report intentions of Schley so far as known, stating definitely whether Schley had gone to Santiago de Cuba or intended to go there, and when.

To which Commodore Remey replied:

Vessel referred to is *Dupont* in both cases. The commander was not informed of the intentions of Schley. From a letter of Schley of May 24 I am informed that Schley would proceed from Cienfuegos to Santiago de Cuba on May 25. He would not be able to remain off that port, on account of general short coal supply. Would proceed to vicinity of [St. Nicolas] Mole, Hayti, to coal in smooth water and communicate.

On receiving these Admiral Sampson sent a telegram answering the inquiry more explicitly:

Orders to go Santiago if satisfied Spanish squadron was not in port, were sent in *Marblehead*, and duplicate, with explanatory memorandum later on 21st by *Hawk*, to make sure of early arrival; copies of these despatches are forwarded by mail. Schley, not being satis-

fied that Spanish squadron was not in port, did not go. The department has his despatch dated May 24, sent through Remey, stating his intention of leaving May 25. I do not understand this delay until next day. Cipher message will follow.

At 8 A. M. came the following:

If the Spanish division is proved to be in Santiago de Cuba, it is the intention of the department to make descent immediately upon that port with 10,000 men, United States troops, landing eight nautical miles east of that port. You will be expected to convoy transports, probably 15 or 20, going in person and taking with you the *New York* and *Indiana* and the *Oregon*, and as many smaller vessels with good batteries as can possibly be gathered, to guard against possible attack by Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers, etc. The blockade off Havana will be sufficiently provided for during the movement with the monitors and some small vessels. After arrival off Santiago de Cuba every small vessel that can be spared will be returned to north coast of Cuba. This early notice enables you to prepare details at once for immediate execution when order is issued. At the request of the war department, and by approval of this department, movement will be on the north side of Cuba, and Windward Passage.

At 4 P. M. Sampson sent the cipher message which he had mentioned in his previous telegram:

I received yesterday, May 27, at 2 P. M., a copy of a despatch from Schley dated May 24 to department, reporting his movements. I despatched immediately the *New Orleans* to convoy collier *Sterling* through Bahama Channel and then, leaving collier, go with all despatch to Santiago with orders to Schley to blockade Spanish squadron at all hazards and take every action necessary to prevent their egress. Shall send immediately another collier. Have advised Schley to use Spanish-American Company's property as coaling station. Notwithstanding apparent uncertainty of Schley's movements, I believed Spanish squadron still in port, and I came here immediately to be in better communication, and telegraphed Schley to St. Nicolas Mole same orders conveyed by *New Orleans*, hoping to reach him earlier. He undoubtedly has sufficient coal aboard ship to still keep the sea some time, as all except *Iowa* left here full. My orders to Schley by *New Orleans* included sinking of the *Sterling*[1] collier across the entrance to Santiago. The channel is but 300 feet broad, and if this be properly done the port will be closed until steamer is raised. The details of the operation were left to Schley, with verbal explanation,

[1] Should be *Merrimac*.

through Captain Folger, of my own views. It is for this reason additional coal has been sent. The importance of absolutely preventing the escape of the Spanish squadron is so paramount that the promptest and most efficient use of every means is demanded.

At midnight, May 28–29, came from the navy department the following:

Schley telegraphs from Santiago de Cuba he goes to Key West with his squadron for coal, though he has 4,000 tons of coal with him in a broken-down collier. How soon after arrival of Schley at Key West could you reach Santiago de Cuba with the *New York* and the *Oregon*, the *Indiana*, and some lighter vessels, and how long could you blockade there, sending your vessels singly to coal from our colliers at Gonaives, Hayti; Channel; Mole, Hayti; Nipe Port, Cuba, or elsewhere? There is one collier *en route* to Mole, Hayti, from Norfolk and another one has been ordered there from Key West, and others will be sent immediately. Consider if you could seize Guantánamo and occupy as coaling station. Schley has not ascertained whether Spanish division is at Santiago. All information here seems to show that it is there.

It took some time to decipher the telegram, but as soon as its contents were known there was no hesitancy in Sampson's action, and at 3 A. M. (Sunday, May 29) he telegraphed the navy department:

Answering first question, three days. I can blockade indefinitely. Think that can occupy Guantánamo. Would like to start at once with the *New York* and *Oregon*, arriving in two days. Do not quite understand as to the necessity of waiting the arrival of Schley, but would propose meeting and turning back the principal part of the force under his command if he has left. Try to hold him by telegraph. Watson will be in charge of everything afloat. Does department approve proposed action?

Nine hours passed without reply and at noon a second telegram pressing for a reply was sent:

Referring to my telegram of this date I urge immediate reply to my last paragraph. Failure of Schley to continue blockade must be remedied at once if possible. There can be no doubt of presence of Spanish squadron at Santiago.

Two hours later was received a despatch from Commodore Schley, carried from the *Brooklyn*, May 28, by the *Yale* to Port Antonio, Jamaica, of more cheerful import than the preceding; a telegram came also from the navy department containing the substance of this:

Collier now having been temporarily repaired and able to make six knots or seven will endeavor to coal *Texas* and *Marblehead* in open sea and hold position off Santiago until coal supply of larger ships is reduced to lowest safe limit. Will then go to Gonaives or coast near or in vicinity of Port-au-Prince to coal. Good opportunity occurring yesterday, took a quantity of coal on board of *Texas* and *Marblehead* about twenty-five miles west of Santiago, which enables me to hold that place until coal is reduced so much as to force me over to Hayti coast to replenish. Two more colliers, well fitted, to report at Gonaives, urgently needed to hastily coal all vessels when chances occur. Need also another auxiliary for picket work and for communication. I send *Yale* and *Minneapolis* Key West. *St. Paul* still off Santiago. Repairs to *Merrimac's* machinery being completed on board flag-ship. Sigsbee on 27th captured British collier bound in with coal evidently for fleet; also had touched previously at San Juan and Curaçao.

Sampson immediately telegraphed the navy department:

Telegram just received from Schley shows he is to-day blockading off Santiago de Cuba and will continue to do so until coal supply has been reduced to safe limit for large ships. Yesterday Auxiliary No. 557 (*St. Paul*) captured collier bound to Santiago de Cuba, cargo of coal. The *Indiana* and the *Minneapolis* and Auxiliary No. 591 will arrive at Key West for coal. The *New York* is ready to start to Santiago as soon as authorized to do so by the department.

Sampson also sent the following to both Port Antonio and St. Nicolas Mole, Hayti, in order to surely reach Commodore Schley at the earliest opportunity:

Congratulate you on success. Maintain close blockade at all hazards, especially at night; very little to fear from torpedo-boat destroyers. Coal in open sea whenever conditions permit. Send a ship to examine Guantánamo with view to occupying it as base, coaling one heavy ship at a time. Appraise captured coal, use it if desired, and afterward send ship in as prize.

At 5 P. M. (still May 29), the authority to go to Santiago arrived:

Your telegram May 29 received. Department thinks it very desirable that you carry out recommendations to go yourself with two ships to Santiago de Cuba. Act at your discretion with the object of blockading Spanish division as soon as possible. Goodrich reports Guantánamo, Cuba, very weak. The seizure immediately is recommended. *St. Paul* is now off Santiago de Cuba and *Yankee* starts to-day and *St. Louis* to-morrow afternoon from New York for Santiago, touching St. Nicolas Mole.

At 11 P. M., May 29, the *New York* left for the squadron east of Havana, arriving at 7 A. M., May 30. At 9.07, after conferring with Commodore Watson, who was now left in command on the north side of Cuba, signal was made to the *Oregon*, *Mayflower*, Commander McKenzie, and the torpedo-boat *Porter*, Lieutenant Fremont, to form column, and the squadron of four ships stood eastward for Santiago, 550 miles distant. The flagship signalled the *Oregon*, "Can you keep up thirteen knots?" to which Captain Clark answered, "Yes, fourteen if you wish." As, however, the former speed would bring the ships sufficiently early in the morning off Santiago, it was maintained. At 1.30 P. M. the armed tug *Osceola*, convoying the merchant steamer *Florida* under the war department, was met, standing west after having, as mentioned, successfully landed without incident a body of Cubans with stores and arms for General Gomez at Port Banes.

At 7 P. M. the *Yale* and *St. Paul* were also met, *en route* for Key West for coal, and their captains ordered aboard the flagship to report as to the situation at Santiago. Captain Sigsbee had left Santiago at 10.30 A. M., May 29, for St. Nicolas Mole, carrying, as mentioned, a despatch from Schley to navy department and to Sampson, which was sent at 7 P. M. the same day. This telegram was as follows:

OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, 10 A. M., *May* 29.

Enemy in port; recognized *Cristóbal Colón* and *Infanta Maria Teresa* and two torpedo-boats moored inside Morro behind point. Doubtless the others are here. We are short of coal, using every effort

to get coal in. *Vixen* blew out manhole gasket; have sent boilermaker on board to repair. Collier's repaired machinery being put together. Have about 3,000 tons of coal in collier but not easy to get on board here. If no engagement in next two or three days Sampson's squadron could relieve this one to coal at Gonaives or vicinity of Port-au-Prince. Hasten me despatch-boats for picket work. *Brooklyn, Iowa, Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead, Vixen,* and colliers compose squadron here. [Following additional sentence to department.] Am sending *St. Paul* to communicate with Sampson.[1]

Captain Sigsbee had deciphered and left for the next arriving ship the following telegrams from the navy department to Commodore Schley:

RECEIVED AT ST. NICOLAS MOLE, *May* 27.

The most absolutely urgent thing now is to know positively whether the Spanish division is in Santiago de Cuba harbor, as if so immediate movement against it and the town will be made by the navy and division of about 10,000 men the American troops which are ready to embark. You must surmount difficulty regarding coaling by your ingenuity and perseverance. This is a crucial time and the department relies upon you to give information quickly as to the presence of Cervera . . . to be ready for concerted action with the army. Two colliers have been ordered Mole, Hayti. Your vessels may coal singly there or in Gonaives, Hayti Channel, or leeward Cape Cruz, Cuba. Sampson coming around by Windward Passage. Orders have been issued to the commander of the *Yankee* [?] to report to you and the *Minneapolis* will go north. Cervera must not be allowed to escape.

RECEIVED AT NICOLAS MOLE, *May* 29.

It is your duty to ascertain immediately the Spanish fleet if they be at Santiago de Cuba and report. Would be discreditable to the navy if that fact was not ascertained immediately. All naval and military movements depend on that point.[2]

At 5 P. M. the next afternoon (May 31) the torpedo-boat *Porter* was sent into Nicolas Mole with a despatch from Sampson to the navy department:

[1] *Court of Inquiry,* II, 1371.

[2] These two telegrams were also sent to Port Antonio, Jamaica. The former as translated both aboard the *St. Paul* and the *Brooklyn* differ somewhat in phraseology from the original (Appen. *Rep. Bu. of Nav.* 1898, 397), but there is no important change of sense. It was received by Commodore Schley by the press boat *Dandy* on May 31; the second by tug *Triton* on June 1.

Shall arrive Santiago 4 A. M., June 1, with *New York*, *Oregon*, *Mayflower*, and *Porter*. Last night met *St. Paul* and *Yale*. Ordered *St. Paul* to New York and *Yale* to Hampton Roads for coal. Please have preparations made for coaling immediately.[1] Will telegraph situation at Santiago on arrival.

Returning to Commodore Schley's squadron: This, as already has been seen, was, during the morning and forenoon of May 27, "laying to, waiting for [the] *Yale* to get collier *Merrimac* in tow."[2] At noon the *St. Paul* was signalled, "Remain where you are two or three days," and the following conversation by signal ensued:

St. Paul.—Then where?
Brooklyn.—Follow instructions of department.
St. Paul.—Instructions come meet you here.
Brooklyn.—When coal supply remaining suffices reach Key West proceed there.

The *St. Paul*, ordered at 1.35 to overhaul a strange vessel, reported her at 3.15 as a press boat which had left Key West Monday, May 23, and as going to Jamaica for coal. The important but inaccurate information was added: "Sampson had sailed. Boat had missed him in heavy weather." It was, however, evidently taken as meaning that he was probably on his way to Santiago, as twenty minutes later (3.35 P. M.), having just before signalled, "Form column in natural order. Course west," the *Brooklyn* signalled the *St. Paul*, "If Sampson comes here tell him half the squadron out of coal and collier's engine broken down."

The information that Sampson was on his way very naturally may have had influence in the decision, shortly reached, to turn for Santiago. After standing west at 7 knots for several hours (the *Merrimac* now using her own engines), the *Brooklyn*, at 7 o'clock, signalled the *Texas*: "If collier is cast off do you think you could coal to-night?" The *Texas* said: "We can try."

[1] The destination of these ships was changed to New York by Admiral Sampson on account of the large depletion of the coal supply at Key West which their coaling there would occasion.

[2] *Brooklyn's* log. *Court of Inquiry*, 2, App. 216.

The same inquiry of the *Marblehead* at 7.05 brought the reply: "Yes, if collier stops." The signal was then made by the flagship at 7.10: "Stop."

At 8.05 the next morning, May 28, the *Texas* by this time needing but 175 tons to fill up, the *Brooklyn* signalled the *Minneapolis:* "We are going to hold on here as long as coal lasts. Proceed to Key West and coal." Signal was made at 11.35: "Fleet will rendezvous in case of separation or disaster at . . . latitude 19° 24′ N., longitude 73° 04′ W." (Gonaives Bay, Hayti), and at 1.20 P. M., "Course E. ½ N. Speed 6 knots." The squadron, at the moment 37 miles west of the harbor entrance, turned toward Santiago, and at 2 P. M. was informed: "No news. Have requested more coal sent Gonaives Bay. Will try to remain off Santiago as long as coal holds out, leaving safe allowance to reach coast of Hayti," and "While off Santiago the general meeting-place will be twenty-five miles south of that place."

At 8 P. M. the squadron was stopped ten miles south of Santiago's entrance[1] and the *Marblehead* sent inshore as a vidette.

At 5.50 the next morning, May 29, the *Massachusetts* signalled: "A vessel inside of harbor looks like a man-of-war." The *St. Paul*, which, cruising off Santiago, had been led away by frequent chases of strange steamers which turned out to be press boats, had stood in again the morning of the 29th and in passing the entrance at 8 A. M., standing west, also sighted and reported "in the entrance, apparently coming out, two men-of-war resembling armored cruisers with flags at each mast-head, also two smaller vessels."

There could no longer be any question in the mind of any one present as to the whereabouts of the Spanish squadron. The ship nearest the entrance was clearly the *Cristóbal Colón*, her single mast differentiating her from all her consorts, and the neighboring ship, one of her armored companions.[2]

[1] Position on official chart.

[2] The following extract from the log of the *Colón* describes her position:

"Shifted anchorage in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba on the morning of May 25, 1898; draft forward 7 m. 50, aft 6 m. 45. At 6 engines ready and, with the pilot on board, weighed anchor, which was soon catted; cast to port. Under direction of the commanding officer passed between Ratones Cay and Julias Point and proceeded in the channel to a point to the northward of

At 8.30 commanding officers were called aboard the flag-ship and a consultation was held, Commodore Schley explaining that in case the ships came out he wished to concentrate the batteries of all the ships on a portion of those of the enemy.[1]

The forenoon passed with the squadron moving slowly east and west in face of the harbor at a distance of about six miles,[2] but at 11.50 it steamed toward the *Merrimac*, from which the *Massachusetts* and *Vixen* coaled during the day, leaving the *Marblehead* off the entrance of the port on patrol. The *St. Paul* had left at 10 A. M. for Key West,[3] with a telegram to be sent from Mole St. Nicolas to the navy department and to Admiral Sampson, announcing the discovery of the enemy in port and the recognition of the *Cristóbal Colón*, the *Maria Teresa*, and a torpedo-boat.

At 6 P. M., after having laid to during the afternoon and sending the *Merrimac* some fifteen miles to the southward for the

Smith Cay and at mouth of Gaspar Bay, where we anchored at 7 A. M. in 20 m. of water with the port anchor, mud bottom. At this time the vessels [*Yale* and *St. Paul*] of the enemy were discovered off the mouth of the harbor; Morro made signal to begin firing; orders were given to man the main battery; but in a short time it was seen that it would be obstructed, as an English steamer [the *Restormel*] was about to enter the harbor. Got out stream cable from port quarter to the south beach of the bay (Gaspar) and veered and hauled chain until another was gotten from starboard to the opposite shore and then secured both. Head S. 57° W. with 75 fathoms of chain outside and moored on the following bearings:—Gorda Point, N. 19° W.; Cuarentina Point, Smith Cay, S. 48° E.; and Morro Point, S. 5° E. 8.40 A. M. to noon got out a second mooring to starboard and made fast until we had secured the buoy on the same quarter which had been placed as a mark. Got out steel hawser on starboard side, and sent crew to breakfast."

Admiral Sigsbee has explained why the *Colón* was not observed by any of the scouts, although, as he stated, "during the day of the 26th [of May] I went in four miles, or perhaps a little less, from the harbor." Answering the question, "Can you account for how it was that you did not see her on that day?" he replied: "I think she warped ahead afterward [*i.e.*, after mooring]. I have no doubt that she was lying in that entrance on this day, but unless she warped into sight I could not have seen her in there. There is plenty of room for her there. You will see that the log shows that she did shift her fasts—did shorten them in at different times." (*Court of Inquiry*, I, 422.)

[1] Log of *Marblehead*, May 29, 1898.

[2] Log of *Brooklyn*.

[3] The *St. Paul*, *Yale*, and *Minneapolis* were necessarily obliged to coal elsewhere than with the squadron on account of the large quantities (3,600 tons each, the *Minneapolis* 1,900) required to fill them; nor was their presence longer of moment, as the two first were not in the category of fighting ships; nor was the third suitable to be pitted against armored vessels.

night,[1] column was formed and the squadron, at "speed as slow as possible"[2] and at double distance, stood back and forth on east and west courses of five miles each across the harbor entrance, the *Marblehead* and *Vixen* being closer inshore as videttes. At 8.53 the *Vixen,* sighting a rapidly moving white light east of the entrance, showed a signal of alarm for a torpedo-boat, and shots were fired from the secondary batteries of several of the ships before it was concluded by the captain of the *Marblehead* that the light was from a locomotive of the mineral railway bordering the shore from Aguadores to Siboney and at 11, reported the alarm a mistake.

At 9.30 A. M., May 30, H. B. M. ship *Indefatigable* arrived from Jamaica, and though authority was asked and granted to enter the port, she left for Jamaica again at 10.30 without availing herself of the permission. The *New Orleans,* with the despatch previously mentioned, regarding the use of the *Merrimac* in closing the entrance, with the collier *Sterling* and tug *Triton,* arrived at 1.30.

The day and the following night were without event. The weather, of a character typical of that which in general was experienced for a month to come, and the situation, are described in the terse history of the log as "Cloudy and pleasant. Light breeze from S. E. and light airs from north. Sea smooth. Bright moonlight until 1.30 when the moon set behind the clouds. Squadron in column double distance. Steaming over a course east and west five miles in length and about six miles south of Santiago. The *Vixen* and *Marblehead* inshore and the *Merrimac* and *Sterling* offshore from the squadron. Average revolutions 18."[3]

At 6.25 in the morning of May 31 the *Harvard* arrived from Kingston, Jamaica, with telegrams from Washington of May 28, 29, and 30.

May 28: Following must be delivered to Schley as soon as possible; utmost urgency. Unless it is unsafe for your squadron depart-

[1] From this time onward the ships were coaled regularly off Santiago from colliers, until after the occupancy of Guantánamo; it then became more convenient to send most of them there. [2] *Brooklyn's* signal record.

[3] *Brooklyn's* log, midnight to 4 A. M., May 31, 1898.

ment wishes you to remain off Santiago, so can not you take possession of Guantánamo, occupy as a coaling station? If you must leave, are authorized to sink collier in the mouth of the harbor if you can obstruct thereby, but if not so used and not necessary to you, it would be desirable to leave her Nicolas Mole or vicinity. You must not leave the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba unless it is unsafe your squadron, or unless Spanish division is not there.

May 29: Deliver Schley following: Where are the other two armored cruisers, Spanish fleet? When discovered please report promptly. Commander-in-chief North Atlantic station has started to join you.

May 29: Return to Schley with this message: Hold on at all hazards. *New York*, *Oregon*, and *New Orleans* are on the way. *St. Louis* and *Yankee* just leaving New York for Santiago, via Nicolas Mole. Two more colliers *en route*. Torpedo-boat destroyer at San Juan said to be damaged.

May 30: Deliver following to Schley: Sagua, twenty-five miles east Santiago, is reported a good place for landing, and that the insurgents have entire possession of this vicinity, and some horses of their cavalry are kept about a mile inland. From thence it has been reported easy to reach the heights in the rear of Santiago, commanding view of the whole harbor, without any probability of meeting with the Spanish forces. For miles the road is mountainous, and after this very fair.

At 9.55 A. M. Commodore Schley, having determined the previous afternoon to attack the *Colón*, which was still at anchor in sight, went with his personal staff aboard the *Vixen* and at 10.30 hoisted his broad pennant in the *Massachusetts*. At 11.10 signal was made:

The *Massachusetts*, *New Orleans*, and *Iowa* will go in after dinner to a distance of 7,000 yards and fire at the *Cristóbal Colón* with 8, 12, and 13 inch guns. Speed about 10 knots.

At 1.25, the *Massachusetts*, followed at double distance (800 yards) by the *New Orleans* and *Iowa*, stood in, heading about east by north, at 10 knots. The *Massachusetts* began firing when the *Colón* came into view at 1.50, followed by the *New Orleans* at 1.51 and the *Iowa* at 1.56. At 2.05 the *Massachusetts* turned with port helm and standing west reopened at 2.10, hauling off

at 2.13. At 2.30 the commodore left the *Massachusetts*, went aboard the *Vixen*, and returned to the *Brooklyn*.

The *Harvard* was sent the same evening to Nicolas Mole with the following:

Made reconnaissance this afternoon, May 31, with the *Massachusetts, Iowa, New Orleans,* to develop fortifications, with their character. The range was 7000 yards. Reconnaissance was intended [to] principally injure [or] destroy *Colón*. Fire was returned without delay by heavy batteries to the east and west [of] entrance, large calibre and long range. Reconnaissance developed satisfactorily the presence of Spanish squadron lying beyond island, near inner forts, as they fired over the hill at random. Quite satisfied the Spanish fleet is there. I shall send pilot to-morrow morning in *Vixen* to ascertain fully and I shall report.

In great need of smaller vessels for picket duty. I would suggest that it is most important to send with collier a large number of coaling bags holding about 600 pounds, as all coaling must be done in such a manner. Can you send *Solace* here in order to give relief to exhausted and injured in any operation? Owing to extreme heat the suffering of all hands is great particularly [in the] engineer's department. We are coaling squadron in face of the enemy every good day. United States ships were not struck this afternoon.[1]

[1] The logs of the three ships engaged are as follows: Meridian to 4 P. M., May 31, 1898:

Massachusetts: Cloudy weather. Light southerly airs. At 1.30 this ship with the *New Orleans* and *Iowa* steamed in to 8,000 yards and at ten knots speed heading eastward opened fire with the 13-inch and 8-inch guns on the *Cristóbal Colón* (the *New Orleans* on the batteries), countermarching to the westward at 2.05 and engaging with the starboard battery at 2.10 as we passed the entrance, hauling off at 2.13, total time of firing 7 minutes, 35 seconds. The forts and the *Cristóbal Colón* returned the fire without damage to the fleet. The commander-in-chief transferred his flag to the *Vixen* at 2.30 *en route* to the flag-ship *Brooklyn*. Expended in ordnance nine 8-inch common shell, nine 8-inch full charges, five 13-inch common shell, five 13-inch full charges, fifteen electric primers, and five percussion primers.

Iowa: Warm. Light airs from south. At 12.45, in obedience to signal from the flag-ship, began to clear ship for action. At 1.15 went to general quarters. The *Massachusetts* (carrying the broad pennant of Commodore Schley) led the attacking force, followed in column at double distance by the *New Orleans* and *Iowa* and heading about east by north. Began steaming in column at about 10 knots. When the *Cristóbal Colón* came into view the *Massachusetts* opened fire (time 1.50). The *New Orleans* opened at 1.51 and the *Iowa* at 1.56. The range at which our guns fired was 8,500 yards, but the shots fell short. The range (setting of the sights) was gradually increased to nine thousand yards during this run. At 2.01 the *Iowa* ceased firing,

the other Spanish ship (one of the *Vizcaya* class) being no longer visible. The *Massachusetts* had already turned with a port helm and headed about west. At 2.05 the *Massachusetts* reopened fire, followed by the *New Orleans* at 2.06 and the *Iowa* at 2.08. During the second passage the speed was decreased. The sights were set first at 9,500 yards, gradually increased to 11,000. Nearly all shots fell slightly short, but as they all appeared to burst on graze it is likely that the enemy was struck by many fragments and possibly by some shell. At 2.16 the *Iowa* ceased firing. The flag-ship stopped before this vessel was out of range and several shell fell near us after we stopped firing, one close aboard. At 2.50 secured the battery. At same time Commodore Schley transferred his flag to the *Vixen* and thence to the *Brooklyn*. At 3.10 the vessels and forts of the enemy ceased firing. Expended eleven 8-inch full charges (one broken); ten 8-inch common shell, nine 12-inch full charges, nine 12-inch Semi-AC shell. Secondary battery did not fire, the crews of the guns being kept below. . . . Average revolutions 31.8.

New Orleans: Cloudy and warm. Light airs from S.S.E. till last hour, when shifted to light breeze from N.E. Barometer steady first two hours, then broken during action. At 12.48 in obedience to flag-ship *Massachusetts*, signalled to *New Orleans* and *Iowa* to "Clear for action," sounded to general quarters and cleared for action. At 1.00 started ahead both engines, *Massachusetts* leading the column and followed by the *New Orleans* and *Iowa* in order named. At 1.08 *Massachusetts* hoisted ensign at truck and the *New Orleans* and *Iowa* hoisted their ensigns at main truck. At 1.10 *Massachusetts* headed in shoreward. At 1.15 ported our helm and stood in toward shore, heading E.N.E. At 1.50 following *Massachusetts* we opened fire on forts at entrance to Santiago Channel, and when opportunity offered, fired at Spanish cruiser *Cristóbal Colón*. At 2.05 ceased firing. At 2.10 again commenced firing. At 2.25 ceased firing. Fired at ranges varying from 7,000 to 10,000 yards. Our fire was returned by fire from forts on both sides of Santiago Channel, and occasionally by Spanish cruiser. No vessel of our column was struck, and the fire of the Spaniards was generally wild though occasional shots passed quite near our vessels. The Spaniards kept up a hap-hazard fire some time after the main action had ceased and at this time their shell generally fell very short. Some of the shots from this ship fell short, but others apparently struck the ridges on which the shore batteries were situated and observers in the tops reported that a shell from our 6-inch No. 1 smashed off one corner of Morro Castle. The shots from our battle-ships appeared to fall generally short. It further appeared to us that a conflagration had been started behind the hills at the entrance on the left hand back of the channel.

The *Colón's* log reports having fired 62 rounds from the 5.9-inch guns and 14 from the 4.7-inch. "An enemy's shell exploded near the stern making dents in the side and cracking some bowls in the round-house."

For Commodore Schley's report of the operations of the flying squadron, see Appendix.

CHAPTER XIV

THE BLOCKADE AND THE SINKING OF THE "MERRIMAC"

SAMPSON arrived off Santiago at 6.30 A. M., June 1, and found Commodore Schley's squadron steaming in column on an east and west line in face of the port.[1]

As the *New York* steamed toward the entrance a shot was fired, apparently from the Morro, which fell far short; the *Colón* and a mast of another ship were observed within, but even while the flag-ship was communicating with the flying squadron they hauled out of sight.[2]

[1] Log of the *Vixen*, June 1.—Light airs from east. Patrolling inshore to westward off Morro. *Marblehead* patrolling to eastward. Fleet about eight miles off shore.

[2] The log of the *Colón* states: "At 10.20 A. M., by order of the commandant general of the squadron, cast off the springs. At 10.35 A. M. got under way, and under direction of the commanding officer cast to starboard and under slow speed passed between Punta Gorda and the bow of the *Oquendo*. Directed our course into the inner harbor until 11.50 A. M., at which time we came to anchor in 9.5 m. of water, with 15 fathoms on port chain; bearings at anchor Ratones Cay, S. 36° W.; Yarey Pier, N. 11° W.; and Compadres Rock, S. 30° E." There was, however, no difficulty in disappearing from view, by handling the fasts. She had but to move her length to disappear from view as mentioned by Captain Sigsbee. Her disappearance on Sampson's arrival, and her getting under way at 10.30, are thus not in disaccord, as some have supposed. In fact, she must have occupied a position in which she could not be observed from the outside for the greater part of her stay in Gaspar Bay, as she was not observed by the *Yale*, *St. Paul*, *Harvard*, or *Minneapolis*, all of which were off the port; the *Yale* continuously from May 22 to May 26. The *St. Paul* had captured the *Restormel* May 25 near the entrance after the *Colón* had anchored in Gaspar Bay. None of these ships had observed the *Colón*, though the usual distance off land is mentioned as but six miles, and frequently much nearer.

The *New York* had stopped at 6.30 in a convenient position for communicating with the ships already there, "the harbor entrance [to quote from the log] bearing north, distant seven to eight miles." The log of the succeeding watch (8 A. M. to meridian) says: "At 9 went ahead N. W. by W. and stopped at 9.15. Mustered at quarters at 9.30, followed by fire quarters. At 9.45

At 8 Commodore Schley visited the *New York* and reported the situation. The ships present besides the squadron just arrived were the *Brooklyn* (broad pennant), *Iowa*, *Massachusetts*, *Texas*, *New Orleans*, *Marblehead*, and *Harvard*, with the *Sterling* and *Merrimac*, colliers, from which the *Massachusetts* and *New Orleans* were coaling.

The *New York*, at 9 o'clock, stood in north-west by west for a quarter of an hour,[1] a course which would bring her nearer the shore. As the flag-ship stood past the entrance, a steam launch had been lowered, in which, at his request, Assistant Naval Constructor Hobson went inshore to observe more closely the several points of the entrance with a view to sinking the *Merrimac* the following night. At 9.45, discovering a vessel close inshore to the westward, she stood along shore and found the *Vixen* in the bight four miles west of Santiago (in which later the Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers were sunk), the *Vixen* having returned from Aserraderos, a small village sixteen miles west of Santiago, landing a pilot there in the endeavor to communicate with the insurgents. Having stood down and spoken the *Vixen*, which had been at first taken for a suspicious vessel, the flag-ship turned for the *Merrimac*, picking up the launch on the way, and preparations were at once begun by the removal of the 6-pounder guns with which she was armed, the ammunition and other easily portable property; the coaling of the *Massachusetts*, which was alongside, in the meanwhile continuing.

The torpedo-boat *Porter* had arrived from St. Nicolas Mole at 11, bringing the following telegrams from Washington; the first being somewhat belated orders:

May 30, 1898.

Schley has seen and recognized two armored cruisers and two torpedo-boat destroyers the Spanish division at Santiago de Cuba.

sighted a vessel inshore to W. N. W., stood toward her and went to general quarters. The vessel was the *Vixen*. After communicating with her stood to the S. Ed. to rejoin fleet." As will be seen in the text, the *New York* had sent Assistant Constructor Hobson in, on his own request, to observe more closely the entrance with reference to sinking the *Merrimac*. Of course, this would not have been done had the *Colón* still appeared in the passage. Mr. Hobson in a letter to the author entirely agrees as to the *Colón* not being visible at this time.

[1] Log of *New York*.

Proceed to Santiago with the *New York* and *Oregon* and such other vessels you may desire, leave orders concerning army convoy senior officer present. The Spanish torpedo-destroyer *Terror* reported at San Juan, Puerto Rico, damaged.

May 30, 1898.

General Miles states if you can communicate with Cuban insurgents request Garcia to assemble his force at (or in) the rear of Santiago de Cuba, and our army division will take with them to Santiago de Cuba five thousand stands of arms and ammunition for Cubans.

May 31.

It has been suggested that an alternative line of communication could be opened with General Garcia as follows: Landing Maceo Inlet about thirty nautical miles west of Santiago de Cuba, not far from Jucaro anchorage, a message would find the neighboring country in possession of insurgents, and Garcia would probably be found at Baire, thirty-three miles to the northward over the mountains. An outpost of Garcia's force would probably be found at the northern foot of the mountains and about half-way from the sea to Baire. The highest point on the road is Naranjo, from where there are two paths on to Matias, Auras, Fors, Negros; the other by Baños Calientes and Oja de Agua. Our army wishes Garcia to close down on the land side of Santiago de Cuba, as previously telegraphed.[1]

May 31, 1898.

It is essential to know if all the four Spanish armored cruisers at Santiago de Cuba, as our military expedition must wait for information out of [thence]. Report as soon as possible.

The army now embarking at Tampa, Fla., estimated 25,000 men to proceed to Santiago de Cuba as soon as you inform me whole Spanish fleet in harbor; will be accompanied by cavalry, siege-guns, mortars. It is suggested that you select places suitable for landing infantry as near as possible to Santiago de Cuba and be prepared to advise regarding landing guns and cavalry. Of first importance to secure bridge San Juan River, the pier at Daiquiri, and others. Department expects you will assist of course landing the army to utmost of your power but desires you shall not risk by operation on shore or in landing crews of the armored vessels or those needed in case of a naval engagement. Will not Guantánamo, Cuba, be best place for landing cavalry? *St. Louis* and *Yankee* must be available for calling at St. Nicolas Mole, Hayti. Several colliers on way to Mole.

[1] This and the preceding telegram were sent to Key West and thence forwarded; the second was also sent to Commodore Schley.

At 5 P.M. the Danish cable steamer *Adria*, chartered by the army signal corps, arrived, convoyed by the despatch-vessel *Dolphin*.[1]

The port watch of the *New York* had been sent aboard the *Merrimac* in the early afternoon to hasten the work of preparation. Mr. Hobson had, when the question was first bruited, been called upon to give a professional opinion as naval constructor as to the means to be devised to sink the ship in the quickest time, this being, of course, an important element in success, unless the ship's bow beaching at exactly the right place, would enable her to swing across the channel at this point and ground at both stem and stern. Improvised torpedoes of reduced powder charges of 78 pounds for 8-inch guns in their cylindrical copper tanks, to be fired by electric primers, were decided upon, and ten of these were fixed in place on the port side of the ship about twelve feet below water. The anchors were to be slung, one at the bow and one at the stern, the lashings to be cut with

[1] The *Adria* had a very anomalous status. She was a chartered ship under Danish colors, and was fitted with the cable gear of the Mexican Telegraph Co. She left Key West May 29 under convoy of the *Dolphin* and arrived off Santiago June 1. The men aboard refused to go in sufficiently near the shore to offer any prospect of success in grappling, the water in the vicinity deepening with extraordinary rapidity to 900 and 1,000 fathoms. The *Texas* and *Oregon*, however, were placed between the *Adria* and the batteries, while the latter was at work. On June 5, at 6 P. M. a cable was caught in 1,044 fathoms and with aid from men of the *Texas* was lifted and cut. It was, however, but one of several old ends. The *Adria* cut no live one. In the bombardment of June 6 several shells from the batteries passed over the *Adria* and the men refused any longer to work, on the ground that the *Adria* was a neutral ship and that their government would not protect them in cutting international cables. By arrangement made with the French company by the chief signal officer, in Washington, Captain Allen was supplied with instruments from the office at St. Nicolas Mole. The cable was lifted at Guantánamo and repaired, and on June 20, the day of the arrival of the army off Santiago, the Guantánamo office was again in operation with the cable company's employees as operators. On June 25 the cable from Guantánamo to Santiago was repaired and, had the commanders permitted, communication open to Santiago. On June 29 the cable was cut near Aguadores and an office established at Siboney. As a telephone service had been established by this date between Siboney and the army advance, General Shafter was now in direct communication with Washington. The difficult cipher of the navy department, however, came and went from this office so mutilated by the employees, unaccustomed to such work, that many of the naval despatches were still sent to and from Guantánamo, forty miles distant, to ensure accuracy. (For Cable Cutting, see Goodrich, Proceedings Nav. Ins. No. 93, 157,)

an axe; the crew was to be reduced to six, one at the wheel, one to assist with the torpedoes, one each in the engine and fire rooms, and one at each anchor.

The work was pushed with feverish activity, as the moon set this night at a most favorable hour (3.05) for the work, being between 2 and 3 o'clock high enough to light the sea and cliffs sufficiently to assure perfect direction but not to light the sea so generally as to make the approach of the ship distinguishable too soon.

The final question as to command had arisen during the afternoon. Sampson recognized the claim of the commanding officer, Commander James M. Miller, who protested against being displaced by any one. Hobson had energetically urged his own claim as being more thoroughly conversant with the preparations than any one else. Several young officers persistently asked to go, but Sampson finally concluded that Hobson, as having done the main work of preparation and being perfectly conversant with it, should as a matter of fairness be given preference. The question in his mind was wholly one of fairness. Hobson had been an officer of the line and had as such served at sea; he had left the military branch to enter the construction corps so that the propriety of the choice from the stand-point of his ability to handle a ship could not well be gainsaid. There was much feeling over the decision, and most urgent requests were advanced by various officers, but the admiral's view, embodied in the remark, "Hobson has done the work," should be allowed full weight.[1] Nor was there any question of a crew;

[1] Sampson wrote the following kindly letter to Commander Miller. He fully appreciated the latter's feelings:

U. S. Flag-Ship *New York*,
Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, *June* 1, 1898.

Sir: 1. Preparations have been made for the use of the collier *Merrimac* to be sunk in the channel leading into Santiago. As these plans have been in the course of preparation for several days, and as the details have been worked out by Assistant Naval Constructor Hobson, I am convinced that they can be carried out more effectually by the officer who has given the subject careful attention than by turning over to you those details at the last moment before execution.

2. It is without prejudice to your claim, as the Commanding Officer of this vessel, that I have reached this decision. I recognize your claim to take this vessel into Santiago channel, and I believe that, under ordinary circum-

practically all the men of the fleet were volunteers for the service and the ship had to be searched and stowaways removed before she started in.[1]

The night, though there was nearly a full moon, was much overcast with the heavy cumulus clouds of the trade winds, and the flag-ship thus had difficulty in keeping touch with the *Merrimac*, drifting with the strong current which sets along the coast with the tides; no lights were allowed, and with the large number of ships scattered over many miles of sea the picking up of any particular one was, of course, in the circumstances very difficult. There were still a large number of men at work on board the *Merrimac*, as the work of preparation was far from complete at nightfall. It had been arranged that those who were not on the detail to go in the ship were to be taken off by the steam launch of the *New York* when the admiral should go aboard to make a final inspection, about 1 A. M. This, through the separation of the *Merrimac* from the flag-ship, despite all endeavors to keep near her, did not occur until nearly 3. Further detention was caused by fouling the propeller of the steam cutter in one of the *Merrimac's* lines as the cutter was leaving the ship. Start was

stances, the expedition could not be entrusted to a more competent person, but, owing to the great amount of detail which is involved and which must be thoroughly observed in order that it may reach a successful conclusion, I trust that you will agree with me in the decision which I have reached in entrusting this execution to the officer who has worked out the detail with so much care during the past few days when it was impossible for me to consult you, or acquaint you with the amount of work involved.

3. You will therefore go on board the *Harvard* to-morrow morning and proceed north in that ship, report to the Department by letter and transmit a copy of these orders.

Very respectfully,

W. T. SAMPSON,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.

COMMANDER J. M. MILLER, *U. S. Navy,*
U. S. Collier Merrimac.

[1] Those aboard besides Hobson were Assistant Engineer Crank (who belonged to the *Merrimac*); Boatswain Mullen, of the *New York;* D. Montague, chief master at arms; George Charette, gunner's mate, third class; R. Clausen, coxswain (these three of the *New York*); machinists, first-class, G. F. Phillips and Water-Tender F. Kelly, both of the *Merrimac*, and Coxswain J. E. Murphy, of the *Iowa.* Crank and Mullen finally were not allowed to go.

thus not made until after 4 o'clock. The ship was farther out than Hobson had calculated upon being, and before she got a fourth of the distance shoreward day was breaking; it was clear that she would not reach the entrance until it was full dawn. Under such circumstances she offered a target which could scarcely be missed by any of the batteries, and certainly not by the light guns known to line the sides of the entrance. It was thus decided to recall her, and the torpedo-boat *Porter* was sent with the message. She returned, saying that Hobson wished to go in any case, and was sure he could do so. He did not slacken speed, hoping that four red lights might be shown from the *New York* to express the admiral's consent, as he had requested by the *Porter* might be done. The *Porter*, however, was sent again to reiterate the order, and the *Merrimac* turned.[1]

The delay, of course, had at least the advantage of enabling an overhauling of material. A relief crew was sent aboard to take charge, the men of the *Merrimac* being taken on board the *New York* to give chance for a rest, which, however, the nervous strain of the night before scarcely permitted. It was arranged that the ship should go in in the last hour of the moon (which set about 3.50), and it was understood that if the light was too dim, Hobson should await the break of day, without danger of recall.

The day was without incident, except that at 7 A. M. a strange steamer was sighted to the westward heading shoreward; the *New York* stood down to speak her, when she turned and gave an unlooked-for chase of about three hours, when she was brought to by a couple of 8-inch shells fired at a distance of over four

[1] Hobson, in his excellent and accurate account, regrets his recall, being of the opinion that it was better to take all risks then than to suffer the reaction which necessarily came in waiting. I now think that he was right and that it would have been better that he should have proceeded. Sampson himself in the first offgo was of this opinion, and I am pleased to make this amend for any share I had in influencing his recall.

In the light of fuller knowledge of all of the circumstances I am now also of the opinion that the best plan would have been to send the *Merrimac* in at early dawn and to have feigned a pursuit, thus giving her the character of one of the chartered British colliers, two of which were wandering about the Caribbean. The appearance of pursuit would almost certainly have prevented her being fired upon, and she could have been grounded deliberately. Fortunately we failed. F. E. C.

miles. She proved to be the steamer *Hampstead* from St. Vincent to Mobile, and had come in from curiosity. Views were expressed to the master somewhat forcibly, as there was no reason why he should not have communicated at once.

At 3.30 A. M. (June 3) the *Merrimac* stood in. It was still clear moonlight and the ship got well up to the entrance before firing began. The cliffs were illuminated with flashes of guns and musketry of an intensity which boded ill for the brave crew, whose escape under such a hail appeared impossible.[1]

The idea had been to so steer that the bow of the *Merrimac* should take the shoal which lies on the east side of the channel just before reaching the Estrella battery. This she was to do by holding a perfectly straight course about N. E., which was the direction in entering of the first reach of the channel. The channel there turned due north, so that on the bows taking the ground, the ship would naturally lie athwart the tide now running flood and the stern would be swept against the opposite bank. The contingency of the stern's not taking the ground (which it appeared from the chart it would certainly do) was to be met by having a stern anchor which was to be let go in any case.

As is well known, the *Merrimac* failed to reach her proper point through the cutting of the steering gear by shot. She thus drifted, before sinking, to a point within the entrance where the channel was deep and comparatively broad, and where her presence offered no serious obstacle to entry or departure.

The firing gradually died away, the customary silence of the night fell over batteries and fleet, and all waited until dawn for the result. A steam cutter of the *New York*, one of the picket launches for the night, under Ensign Powell, had been ordered to wait close at hand to pick up any who might succeed in escaping from the ship by the catamaran carried for the purpose. She did not return, but was seen in the morning close under the land, just west of the harbor entrance, undergoing a severe musketry fire. Her brave young commander had stuck to his post until broad

[1] The firing from opposite sides of the narrow channel not unnaturally caused a number of casualties among the Spanish soldiers; a private stating to one of Hobson's men that fourteen had been killed and thirty-seven wounded. (Hobson, *The Sinking of the Merrimac*, 160.)

daylight with the hope of rescuing some of the party, and only left when to stay longer would clearly be a useless sacrifice.

The masts of the *Merrimac* could be seen, very evidently so far up channel and so much in line with it as to show that her



mission had not been completely successful, but how far short of being so could not at the moment be known. The natural question uppermost in every one's mind was the fate of her heroic crew. This was settled by the coming out at 3 P. M. of the Spanish tug *Colón* with a flag of truce. She was met by the *Vixen*,

and Captain Bustamante, chief of staff to Admiral Cervera, came aboard the flag-ship. He brought a most kindly note from the admiral announcing the safety of her crew and expressing his admiration of their conduct.[1]

Admiral Cervera had himself made the rescue, coming down the bay in his steam barge and finding Hobson and his crew in the water, clinging to the catamaran, prepared to attempt the capture of any boat which should approach. This bold design was, however, thwarted by the presence with Cervera of an armed force which could not be resisted, and the little party, shivering with cold from their long immersion, was taken on board the *Reina Mercedes*, moored in the reach between Socapa and Smith Key, and where they met with every courtesy and kind treatment which could be offered by gallant and chivalrous men.[2]

Admiral Cervera telegraphed to the Spanish minister of marine:

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *June* 3, 1898.

Early this morning a battle-ship and merchant steamer tried to force harbor entrance. Destroyers and scouts which are at mouth of harbor opened fire, followed by *Reina Mercedes* and batteries of Socapa where guns of said vessel have been mounted. Merchant steamer was sunk; battle-ship repulsed. A lieutenant and six sailors taken prisoners. No casualties on our side from hostile fire; slight injuries to installations of 2.95-inch guns of destroyers.[3]

[1] This letter unfortunately disappeared, so that the text cannot be given. It remains, however, sufficiently in memory for me to say that Admiral Sampson was deeply touched by its noble and chivalrous tone. Captain Bustamante remained aboard some little time answering Sampson's questions regarding the prisoners and awaiting the preparation of packages to go to them. He smilingly remarked during the conversation, "You have made it much more difficult for us to come out." He was the foremost torpedo expert of the Spanish service. He was a handsome man of much dignity, was universally esteemed, and when he died of a wound received ashore July 2 was regretted by Spaniard and American alike.

[2] Later in the day, the prisoners, by orders of General Linares (who had general command), were transferred to the Morro, much to the regret of the Spanish naval officers, who throughout were kindness itself. The kindly captain of the *Reina Mercedes*, Emilio J. de Acosta y Eyermann, who had treated the captives with the utmost kindness and consideration, was unfortunately killed in the bombardment by the fleet, three days later. The reader is referred to Hobson's excellent account in his *Sinking of the Merrimac* for complete details of his gallant attempt, and later experiences while a prisoner.

[3] *Documents*, 100.

Admiral Sampson telegraphed the navy department:

Succeeded in sinking auxiliary *Merrimac* in the channel of Santiago de Cuba to-day, 4 A. M., June 3. This was carried out most gallantly under the command Naval Constructor Hobson and seven men. By flag of truce from the Spanish admiral Cervera, sent in recognition of their bravery, am informed all are prisoners of war, two slightly wounded. Request authority to arrange exchange, if possible, between these and prisoners Atlanta. Beg troops move with all possible celerity; of paramount importance. Six ships Spanish squadron in the harbor of Santiago unable to avoid being captured or destroyed.

Sampson sent the same day the following despatch:

No. 113.] U. S. FLAG-SHIP *New York*, 1ST RATE,
OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, CUBA, *June* 3, 1898.

SIR: Permit me to call your especial attention to the brave conduct of Assistant Naval Constructor Hobson. As stated in a recent telegram before coming here, I decided to make the harbor entrance secure against the possibility of egress of the Spanish ships by obstructing the narrow part of the entrance by sinking a collier at that point. Upon calling upon Mr. Hobson for his professional opinion as to a sure method of sinking the ship, he manifested a most lively interest in the problem. After several days' consideration he presented a solution which he considered would ensure the immediate sinking of the ship when she had reached the desired point in the channel. This plan we prepared for before we reached Santiago. This plan included ten electric torpedoes on the outside of the ship, each of 78 pounds of gunpowder, sinking the ship partially before going in, cutting the sea valves, and opening the cargo ports. The plan contemplated a crew of only seven men and Mr. Hobson, who begged that it might be entrusted to him. The anchor chains were ranged upon deck for both the anchors, forward and aft, the plan including the anchoring of the ship almost automatically.

As soon as I reached Santiago and had the collier to work upon, the details were commenced and diligently prosecuted, hoping to complete them in one day, as the moon and tide served best the first night after our arrival. Notwithstanding every effort, the hour of 4 o'clock in the morning arrived and the preparations were scarcely completed. After a careful inspection of the final preparations I was forced to relinquish the plan for that morning, as dawn was breaking. Mr. Hobson begged to try it at all hazards.

This morning proved more propitious, as a prompt start could be made. Nothing could have been more gallantly executed. We waited impatiently after the firing by the Spaniards had ceased. When they

did not reappear from the harbor at 6 o'clock I feared they had all perished. A steam launch, which had been sent in charge of Naval Cadet Powell to rescue the men, appeared at this time, coming out under a persistent fire from the batteries, but brought none of the crew. A careful inspection of the harbor from this ship showed that the *Merrimac* had been sunk in the channel somewhat farther in than had been intended.

This afternoon the chief of staff of Admiral Cervera came out under a flag of truce with a letter from the admiral extolling the bravery of the crew in an unusual manner.

I cannot myself too earnestly express my appreciation of the conduct of Mr. Hobson and his gallant crew. I venture to say that a more brave and daring thing has not been done since Cushing blew up the *Albemarle*.

Referring to the inspiring letter which you addressed to the officers at the beginning of the war, I am sure you will offer a suitable professional reward to Mr. Hobson and his companions.

I must add that Commander J. M. Miller relinquished his command with the very greatest reluctance, believing he should retain his command under all circumstances. He was, however, finally convinced that the attempt of another person to carry out the multitude of details which had been in preparation by Mr. Hobson might endanger its proper execution. I therefore took the liberty to relieve him for this reason only. There were hundreds of volunteers in the squadron who were anxious to participate. There were 150 from the *Iowa*, nearly as many from this ship, and large numbers from all the other ships, officers and men alike.

Very respectfully,

W. T. Sampson,
Rear-Admiral, U. S. N.,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force,
North Atlantic Station.

The Secretary of the Navy,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

There has, of course, been criticism of this attempt to close the harbor in this manner and later events made it fortunate that it was not so closed, but from the point of view of the time it was wise. Our army's first objective was Havana; Santiago only assumed importance by the presence of this squadron; it was expected (and Admiral Sampson was so informed) that Cervera was shortly to be re-enforced by the *Carlos V* and *Pelayo;* there was always imminent the danger of loss of one or more

battle-ships by torpedo-boat attack; the season of hurricanes was approaching, when the fleet might be driven from its post; the escape of the squadron inside was thus (until Sampson's unprecedented use of battle-ships' search-lights) always possible. Had the attempt with the *Merrimac* been successful, it would have been as securely bottled up as if in the docks of Liverpool, and the whole of the American fleet (practically) would have been available for any other purposes then deemed advisable. That, from the point of view of the moment, it was wise, was to have marked support six years later, when in 1904 the Japanese made heroic efforts at Port Arthur to neutralize in the same way the Russian fleet in Port Arthur. It was sound strategy.

Toward midnight the *Mayflower* left for Key West, via Mole St. Nicolas, taking the following telegrams:

To the secretary of the navy:

Succeeded in sinking auxiliary *Merrimac* in the channel of Santiago de Cuba to-day, 4 A. M., June 3. This was carried out most gallantly under the command Naval Constructor Hobson and seven men. By flag of truce from the Spanish admiral Cervera, sent in recognition of their bravery, am informed all are prisoners of war, two slightly wounded. Request authority to arrange exchange, if possible, between these and prisoners Atlanta. Beg troops move with all possible celerity; of paramount importance. Six ships Spanish squadron in the harbor of Santiago unable to avoid being captured or destroyed.

Some observations made to-day by a reliable Cuban, in accordance with my instructions, makes four Spanish armored vessels and two Spanish torpedo-destroyers in Santiago at that time. Repairs and more coal needed by them.

Have received reliable information from Cuban officers the Spanish force in this vicinity of Santiago consists of 7,000 men, entrenched in Juraguacito and Daiquiri; 5,000 men in Santiago de Cuba; in Morro de Cuba, 400 men; at other points in the bay, 100 men, with small rapid-fire guns and submarine mines at various points. With superior force and insurgent force, which is ready, though mostly needing arms, Santiago de Cuba must fall, with ships in port, which cannot be entered against obstructions and mines.

To Commodore Watson, commanding off Havana:

Channel to Santiago obstructed by auxiliary *Merrimac* this morning; all Spanish ships inside. I am sending *Mayflower* to Key West for repairs and *Dolphin* for blockade. I will return north side as soon as I learn intentions of army.

CHAPTER XV

THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO

On June 2 an order was issued which divided the fleet present into two squadrons. This also defined Sampson's views as to action in general, and more specifically in regard to conduct should the Spanish squadron emerge. It covered the conduct of commanding officers on the eventful 3d of July, a month later.

U. S. Flag-Ship *New York*, 1st Rate,
Off Santiago de Cuba, *June* 2, 1898.

The fleet off Santiago de Cuba will be organized during the operations against that port and the Spanish squadron as follows:

First squadron (under the personal command of the commander-in-chief).—*New York, Iowa, Oregon, New Orleans, Mayflower, Porter.*

Second squadron (Commodore Schley).—*Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead, Vixen.*

Vessels joining subsequently will be assigned by the commander-in-chief. The vessels will blockade Santiago de Cuba closely, keeping about 6 miles from the Morro in the daytime, and closing in at night, the lighter vessels well inshore. The first squadron will blockade on the east side of the port, and the second squadron on the west side. If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore in the channel. It is not considered that the shore batteries are of sufficient power to do any material injury to battleships.

In smooth weather the vessels will coal on station. If withdrawn to coal elsewhere, or for other duty, the blockading vessels on either side will cover the angle thus left vacant.

DAY AND NIGHT FORMATION

[To accompany order of battle, dated June 2, 1898]

U. S. FLAG-SHIP *New York*, 1ST RATE,
OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *June* 2, 1898.



(The distance was changed later to four miles.)

Early in the morning of Friday, June 3, the scout *St. Louis*, the armored auxiliary *Yankee*, and the collier *Justin* arrived, the *St. Louis* bringing the following telegrams, the first dated June 1, the others June 2:

General Shafter wires expects to start from Tampa, Fla., on June 4 with 18,000 or 20,000 men, including ten batteries of artillery and some cavalry. Commodore Remey will attend to convoy.

Spanish torpedo-destroyer *Terror* is reported greatly damaged at San Juan, Puerto Rico. It is suggested you have her carefully watched by a sufficient force to prevent possible interference with convoy in transit.

Cable house is reported at the point of Cape Cruz, Cuba, presumably near the water, and a branch from the loop connecting Manza-

nillo to Santiago de Cuba comes ashore there, also a branch from the cable connecting Cienfuegos to Santiago. This report is from a person who states he helped to lay the cable on the south side of Cuba. The *Resolute* sailed May 31, Mole, Hayti, *en route* to squadron.

The United States consul at Kingston, Jamaica, telegraphs June 1: Am informed that *Purissima Concepcion* (a Cuban mail steamer) going Cape Cruz, west of Santiago, and will coast inside keys, making either Manzanillo, Trinidad, Cienfuegos, or go direct to Batabanó. Has objected to colonial government.

On June 4 was issued the following:

The *Texas*, *Massachusetts*, *Iowa*, and the *Oregon* will take positions 4,000 yards from Estrella Point and opposite the entrance to the port of Santiago in the order named from west to east in such position as to be able to observe the wreck of the *Merrimac* and will fire upon any parties which may be seen working about it. If the fire be opened by the batteries it will be returned and an endeavor made to destroy them.

The senior officer of the above-named ships will have charge of carrying out these instructions.

In case of opening fire upon the batteries, the *Brooklyn*, *Marblehead*, and the *Vixen* will take an enfilading position 4,000 yards to the westward of the entrance and well inshore, and the *New York*, *New Orleans*, and the *Yankee* a similar position to the eastward and will engage the batteries at the same time with the battle-ships.

Firing directly upon Morro Castle will be avoided, as our men from the *Merrimac* are confined there.

The battle-ships will take the above positions when signalled to do so by the commander-in-chief and will occupy them until signalled to withdraw, when blockading stations will be resumed.

Next day, June 5, an order of battle was issued to engage the batteries on Monday morning, June 6, at 7 o'clock. The men were to be given their breakfast at 5.30, and the divisions to be ready to form at 6 o'clock.

On the same day, the *Resolute* arrived from Norfolk, Va., with fifty-six mines. She had touched St. Nicolas Mole and brought telegrams directing that vessels sent there for the purpose of telegraphing should await reply unless the admiral should have directed otherwise, as it took but half an hour for Washington to communicate with that point. The *St. Louis*

was despatched thither with telegrams informing the navy department that the ships had enough men; requesting that fresh provisions be sent by the *Harvard*, *St. Paul*, and *Yale* whenever they should leave the northern ports, and also asking to be informed at once when the army expedition should sail, and its numbers. Commodore Remey at Key West was directed to send 4- and 5-inch rapid-fire ammunition, and the dynamite cruiser *Vesuvius;* and also to have the battalion of marines ready to embark in the *Resolute*, which left this same day for Key West.

In accord with the order of the day before, the fleet at 6.30 A. M., June 6, formed in two columns and stood in. At 7.41 the flag-ship opened fire, which was followed by the other ships, the opening distance being about 6,000 yards, but gradually approaching until the flag-ship was within about 1,900 yards of the Morro, within which distance it was difficult to elevate the guns against the battery on the cliffs, some 200 feet high. General firing was discontinued at 8.05, but a slow and deliberate fire was kept up until 9.40. The batteries had long before ceased to return the fire. At 10.08 signal was made to resume blockading stations.[1]

The attack developed the weakness of the batteries; it seemed apparent they could easily be carried by a force ashore, supported by the fleet. This caused Sampson the same day to send the following telegram:

Bombarded forts at Santiago to-day, 7.30 to 10 A. M., June 6, and have silenced works quickly without injury of any kind, though stationary within 2,000 yards. If 10,000 men were here, city and

[1] The following is Admiral Cervera's report of the action to the Spanish minister of marine:

"SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *June* 6, 1898.

"Hostile squadron, 10 ships strong, has bombarded this harbor for three hours, being answered by batteries at mouth of harbor, among which are guns of *Reina Mercedes*. Our casualties: Killed, executive officer *Reina Mercedes* and 5 other (sailors); wounded, Ensign Molins and 11 other (sailors), and 5 bruised. Army has 1 dead; wounded, a colonel of artillery, 4 officers, and 17 privates. I do not know loss of enemy. *Reina Mercedes* has suffered much. *Vizcaya* received two shells, *Furor* one shell (in the) bunker without serious injury. Works of defence have suffered slight injuries of no military importance. Subsequently hostile fleet bombarded other points on coast." (*Documents*, 101.)

fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration demands immediate army movement. If delayed, city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from fleet.

This last, in the circumstances of despair which Cervera described in his *Documents,* was that which the Spanish admiral should have attempted. There were available in his squadron forty 6- and 5.5-inch rapid-fire guns; forty-eight from 4.7-inch to 6-pounders, and seventy-six 1-pounder and machine guns, enough to have established an excellent defence both by sea and land. No particular difficulties had been experienced in placing on the Socapa and Punta Gorda the four 6.3-inch guns of the *Reina Mercedes.* There were some 2,000 men of the ships' companies accustomed to the movement of heavy weights who could have been used for the emplacement of the guns, and a large percentage of these were fitted to serve them after they should be in position. Such a use of these ships' guns would have made of Santiago a fortified place of no mean character, which would have made attack by land a matter of most serious difficulty; would have forced the American fleet to have kept beyond range by day, and have prevented the near use of search-lights. Large possibilities were involved in such procedure, such as the escape by night of some of the ships themselves although without armament.

Such an effort at fortification might, and no doubt would, have been in vain, so far as the capture of Santiago was concerned, even through the want of food, which, though the extent of this want was unknown to the American commander, was already becoming serious. But notwithstanding, it would have been better to have attempted it rather than to have remained passive and allow Cervera's squadron to go to the certain destruction which its admiral foresaw a sortie by day must bring. But Spanish energy and initiative were not equal to the effort.

The status of the Spanish governmental mind at this moment is exemplified by the following amazing telegram from the minister of war, Correa, to Governor-General Blanco:

MADRID, *June* 3, 1898.

Very serious situation in Philippines compels us to send there ships and re-enforcements of troops as early as possible. To be able to cope

with hostile squadron at Manila it will be indispensable to send an equally strong fleet there. At present only two war-ships there and one of them I believe cannot pass through canal. The only thing we can do is to send all the ships of Cervera's squadron that can get out of Santiago. But before deciding, the government wishes to know your opinion as to effect the withdrawal of Cervera's fleet might produce in Cuba. This movement would be only temporary, and as soon as object is attained in Philippines the squadron would return to Cuba without loss of time and strongly re-enforced.[1]

To this Blanco replied:

HAVANA, *June* 4, 1898.

I would be failing in my duty if I concealed from your Excellency that departure of Cervera's squadron at this time would be of fatal effect on public opinion. Doubt whether the situation that would surely result could be controlled. Volunteers already much exercised over inadequacy Cervera's squadron, and only kept up from one moment to another by hope arrival second squadron. Would rise in body upon learning that instead of re-enforcements the few ships here are withdrawing. The repression would necessarily be bloody. Attitude of army in that case doubtful. Loss of island certain, in view of horrible conflagration it would kindle here.[2]

Nothing could show more clearly the incapacity of the Spanish authorities. To suggest that Cervera's squadron, blockaded already, as was well known to its government, by Sampson's powerful force, should be ordered, without provisions, without even enough coal to fill its bunkers, across the Atlantic and thence to the Philippines, to dispose of Admiral Dewey's squadron and return without loss of time to Cuba, is one of the most amazing propositions ever made by a minister of state. It illustrates painfully the want of practicality of the Spanish authorities, such as would not be believed were there not the surest documentary evidence. But had Santiago been fortified, as was possible; had Cervera's ships escaped, as might then have been possible; had they returned to Spain and rearmed, as might have been possible, Spain would have had a fleet in being which would have deferred peace and might have saved to her the Philippines.

[1] Cervera, *Documents*, 100.

[2] *Ibid.*, 100.

Sampson, after the failure of the *Merrimac*, had in view at no time any other action than obtaining possession of the batteries at the entrance, and once obtained, of taking up the mines understood to exist and going into the bay with the fleet. The channel, in any case, was one of extreme difficulty for the large ships of Sampson's fleet, all of which except the *Texas* much exceeded in size and draft of water the ships of Cervera's squadron. It was at its narrower parts little more than three breadths of a battle-ship such as the *Indiana*, and with an angle off the Estrella battery at its narrowest point making necessary a change of course of twenty-five degrees. To attempt to force the squadron in until the mines should be removed was madness. Even if there had been no mines, and no disturbing infantry or rapid-fire small guns on the flanks of the entrance, there was great danger of one of the ships grounding and thus entirely blocking the channel to the rest. Had the first ship not grounded in the smoke and excitement of action, the second might have done so, leaving a single ship to cope unsupported with the six vessels inside. The misfortune of such a situation need not be dwelt upon. With the mines removed, however, and the adjacent heights occupied, this was a risk to be taken. But with mines still in place, known to have been placed under the superintendence of the best mine expert of the Spanish navy,[1] it was an impossible proposition both to Sampson and the navy department.

At 10.30 P. M., June 6, the *St. Louis* arrived from St. Nicolas Mole with telegrams from Washington approving Sampson's action in regard to the *Merrimac* and her crew and stating that every attention would be given to his recommendation regarding action by the army. He was informed that a Spanish lieutenant, a sergeant, and six privates had been sent to Key West for exchange for Hobson and his party; and also that the British steamer *Twickenham* with 4,000 tons of coal, consigned to the Spanish consul, had been refused discharge at Martinique and had sailed for Jamaica.

The important step was now taken of securing Guantánamo Bay, one of the finest of Cuban harbors, which, as mentioned, was only forty miles east of Santiago, as a base, by despatching

[1] Captain Bustamante, chief of staff to Cervera.

at midnight of June 6 the *Marblehead* and *Yankee*. The lower part of the bay was wholly undefended from naval attack except by a battery of smooth-bore guns in an ancient fort midway up the bay, and by a small gun-boat, the *Sandoval*, commanded by

an energetic and capable lieutenant, Don Pablo Scandella, which was armed with one Nordenfelt and one Hotchkiss gun of 57 mm. Four miles from the lower part of the bay was Fort Toro, mounting a half dozen antique smooth-bore bronze guns. The fort commanded the narrow passage (known to be mined)

leading to the village of Caimanera, the port of Guantánamo, a town of some 8,000 inhabitants twelve miles inland and the centre of the sugar and coffee industry of eastern Cuba. There was here a Spanish division of 6,000 men under General Pareja, completely isolated by the insurgents from communication with Santiago.

The *Marblehead* and *Yankee*, with orders to take and hold the lower bay for the accommodation of our ships, but not to attempt to enter the upper shallow bay, for which we had no use, arrived at daylight of the 7th and found the *St. Louis*, which had been sent ahead, prepared to sweep for the cables leading east and west from the small cable-house on Fisherman's Point on the east side of the bay near the entrance.[1]

A guard in the block-house here was driven off, and the *Sandoval*, which had boldly stood down and opened fire, was driven for refuge up the bay. The cables were cut by the *St. Louis* in both directions, and the *Marblehead* and *Yankee* at 5 P. M. left for the fleet off Santiago. Before leaving, Commander McCalla opened relations with General Perez, commanding the insurgents, who were in some force on the west side of the bay and who had complete control of the region between Guantánamo and Santiago. On the 9th, Commander McCalla was sent to Guantánamo with orders to take charge, and thenceforward the bay was held, in the words of General Pareja, in a letter to General Linares at Santiago of June 10, 1898, "as if for a harbor of rest, they having anchored as if in one of their own ports."[2]

From now on, Guantánamo was the general base of the fleet on the south side of Cuba. While an occasional collier served to coal some of the ships off Santiago, the *New York*, for example, coaling only at sea during the blockade of Cervera's

[1] For the previous effort of the *St. Louis*, see *supra*.

[2] This letter (in full in Appendix, *Report of the Bureau of Navigation*, 1898, 451) gives a melancholy account of the condition of the Spanish forces. The general says: "I continue serving out half-rations of everything, and in that way I expect to reach only the end of the month, above all in bread, as I have no flour of any kind and no way of getting any." His situation was one of such complete isolation that he knew nothing of events at Manila or at Santiago until after hostilities had ceased.

squadron, most of the ships were sent from time to time to Guantánamo, leaving their station off Santiago one day and returning the next.

On June 7 was issued by the admiral the following memorandum (No. 13):

After careful consideration of the various schemes of maintaining an effective blockade of Santiago de Cuba at night, which have been advanced, I have decided upon the following, which will be maintained until further orders:

The weather permitting, three (3) picket launches, detailed from the ships of the squadron each evening, will occupy positions one mile from the Morro, one to the eastward, one to the westward, and one south of the harbor entrance. On a circle drawn with a radius of two miles from the Morro will be stationed three vessels, the *Vixen* to the westward, from one-half mile to one mile from the shore, the *Suwanee* south of Morro, and the *Dolphin* to the eastward, between one-half mile and one mile from the shore. The remaining vessels will retain the positions already occupied; but they will take especial care to keep within a four-mile circle.

All vessels may turn their engines whenever desirable, to keep them in readiness for immediate use, and while so doing, may turn in a small circle, but without losing proper bearing or distance.

The signal for an enemy will be two (2) red Very lights fired in rapid succession. If the enemy is a torpedo-boat, these two red lights will be followed by a green light.

I again call attention to the absolute necessity of a close blockade of this port—especially at night and in bad weather. In the daytime, if clear, the distance shall not be greater than six miles. At night, or in thick weather, not more than *four* miles. The end to be attained justifies the risk of torpedo attack, and that risk must be taken. The escape of the Spanish vessels at this juncture would be a serious blow to our prestige, and to a speedy end of the war.

Attention is called to the provisional signals established by General Order No. 9.

On this same date the collier *Kingtor* arrived bringing the following despatch from St. Nicolas Mole, dated at Washington, June 6:

The prisoners of war at Atlanta are First Lieutenant Pina Giner Gastaminza, Sixth Battalion, Lower Peninsula, seven second lieuten-

ants, a sergeant, and nine privates. You are authorized to make such arrangements with Admiral Cervera as may be necessary to secure our officer and men now prisoners at Santiago.

A flag of truce was sent in during the afternoon (after 4 P. M.) with propositions to the Spanish authorities based upon this telegram. Sampson's letter was as follows:

U. S. FLAG-SHIP *New York, June 7,* 1898.

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, *Spanish Squadron of Instruction, Santiago de Cuba.*

DEAR SIR: Following a suggestion made during my interview with your chief of staff on June 3, I have communicated with my government and have obtained the requisite authority to offer the following special exchange of prisoners, which I now have the honor to transmit to you.

For Mr. Hobson and his seven men I will exchange First Lieutenant Pina Giner Gastaminza, of the Sixth Battalion, Lower Peninsula, one second lieutenant of the Spanish army (name not known), one sergeant, and five private soldiers.

I am aware that it is unusual to arrange any exchange of officers except grade for grade. First Lieutenant Gastaminza is, according to our organization, of the same grade as Mr. Hobson; but for the second lieutenant whom I offer in exchange there is no corresponding officer among your prisoners. All of Mr. Hobson's men, however, are rated men, corresponding to non-commissioned officers, and as I am able to offer only one sergeant of the Spanish army, the only way appears to be to equalize grades by offering for these seven men one commissioned officer, one non-commissioned officer, and five privates.

I hope this proposition will be acceptable to your Excellency.

Should this exchange be effected, the Spanish prisoners will be delivered at Havana or at Santiago de Cuba, as you may elect, and I will receive the American prisoners at this place.

With assurances of my highest consideration, I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully yours,

W. T. SAMPSON,
United States Navy,
Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Force,
N. A. Station.

On June 8 the armed yacht *Gloucester,* Lieutenant-Commander Wainwright, and the collier *Abarenda* arrived. The latter brought the following despatch from St. Nicolas Mole:

WASHINGTON, *June* 6.

The U. S. consul St. Thomas states 500 tons of coal belonging to the government on dock and 1,000 tons in lighters. Coal may be obtained at short notice. No change at Puerto Rico. Thirty-five thousand troops of all kinds, many well drilled. Fortifications strengthened daily. Inform Allen Greely says cable from Guantánamo was working Sunday night. The army expects to leave Wednesday. The U. S. consul Kingston, Jamaica, instructed, invite attention of the British authorities to the fact that the French authorities forbade the delivery of *Twickenham's* coal to the Spanish consul at Martinique. *Celtic* leaves New York this week for Santiago 300,000 pounds fresh provisions the squadron. Issue this vessel such orders as you deem necessary, directing when empty to return to New York for further supplies.

The following copies of telegrams received by Commodore Remey, bearing upon the subject of the army expedition to Santiago, were brought by the *Gloucester:*

WASHINGTON, *June* 1.—Notify Watson when convoy is about to start and direct to scour blockaded coast most diligently to prevent interference by Spanish gun-vessels with our convoy.

June 1.—Deliver following to Captain H. C. Taylor [of the *Indiana*], commander of convoy: The following scheme has been discussed somewhat but what action the war department proposes to take, if any, is unknown. Railroad bridge over San Juan River about two nautical miles east of Morro of Santiago de Cuba, and probably sheltered from its fire, is close to the sea, spans a deep ravine, and its possession would facilitate the operation of our army; but it is said to be mined and guarded by about thirty Spanish soldiers. It has been suggested to send a detachment of troops some hours before the main body to land daybreak near bridge and carry by surprise, holding position until supported from the main body. The landing near bridge is said to be good for boats, and water in the vicinity good for light vessels, though we have not absolute knowledge on these points. If the attempt is to be made by the army it will probably ask you to assist the landing with the boats of your convoy and to cover the attempt with some of your small vessels, which may be done exercising due caution, but the department has declined to use the seamen of the fleet to make the attack on shore. If the attempt is to be made send a vessel ahead to inform the commander-in-chief of naval force on N. A. station.

June 1.—Inform commanding officer of convoy, *New York Herald* June 1 says that there are in the bay of Port Nipe, Cuba, gun-vessels *Jorge Juan* and *Ligera;* there are others in other coast ports. Keep a lookout for them.

June 2.—General Shafter wires war department, June 1, he was progressing rapidly with loading transports and expects to be able to start Saturday morning. Some American troops to join from Mobile, making in all about 18,000 or 20,000 men. He does not state the number of transports. Inform Captain Taylor, co-operate with army, adding such vessels to the convoy as you see fit.

You are directed to prevent any press boat leaving Key West to accompany the expedition about to leave Tampa. If necessary you will place marine guard on board to insure compliance. You will also give the commander of convoy an order, directing him, if any such boats succeed in accompanying the fleet, to take possession of and compel them to remain in his company throughout the voyage and until such time as the senior officer present off Santiago de Cuba shall direct release.

Tampa, *June* 1.—Boat capacity of transports average about 110 persons. No steam launches. General Shafter informed me that two large steam lighters are to be taken along. Gun-boats here have steam launches and four boats each. Convoy ships should bring all their boats. Navy expected to assist. Army will not embark before Sunday [the 5th].

Memorandum from Commodore Remey: The *Annapolis, Helena, Castine,* and *Hornet* have been at Tampa several days. The commanding officer of the *Annapolis* has had instructions about organizing the transport fleet. When all are ready the fleet will proceed to a rendezvous to westward of Dry Tortugas. Information will be received here when the fleet is to arrive off Tortugas. The following vessels will then proceed to the rendezvous, and the commanding officer of the *Indiana* will take charge, viz.: *Indiana, Detroit, Bancroft, Vesuvius, Osceola, Wompatuck, Wasp, Scorpion,* and *Manning.* The *Eagle* has gone with despatches to Commodore Watson. She has orders to report to commanding officer of convoy for duty. This will make fourteen vessels in the convoy—all ready June 4. It is not known yet what day the transports will be ready to start. The *Indiana* has six or seven divers at work, which will continue until the fleet is ready to move. It is thought she will then be in good condition. The *Minneapolis* was to have gone with convoy but will not be ready in time.

The following letter, dated June 6, was received from the United States consul at Kingston, Jamaica:

The department of state having been informed that a steamer of the French line, a sister ship of the *Lafayette*, was bringing over a cargo of Canet quick-firing guns, directed me to report the arrival of such vessel at this port. I have accordingly just reported the arrival of the *Versailles*, which comes from Coruña via St. Thomas, with 128 passengers and 1,000 tons cargo. Up to the sending of this letter I have been unable to ascertain contents of her cargo, but I take opportunity to notify you of these facts for such use as you may deem proper. The vessel leaves here to-morrow morning at 8 o'clock, clearing for her regular port of Vera Cruz. [A similar despatch was received the day before from Washington, which advised also watching the vicinity of the Isle of Pines and Cape Cruz for this steamer.]

The *Yankee* was sent into St. Nicolas Mole with the following despatches to the secretary of the navy, the first of which, after announcing the occupation of Guantánamo Bay, continued:

The crew of cable steamer *Adria* spent several days searching for Jamaica cable from Santiago and destroyed second cable, *St. Louis* having cut first. But the crew of the *Adria* has refused to do any more work on grounds that work required of them is illegal. Therefore cable from Santiago to Cienfuegos has not been cut but all communication between Cuba and outside world has been cut off. As there is some doubt that both Jamaica cables have been cut, suggest that department make inquiry into this subject. I suggest, further, that as the crew of the *Adria* has failed in their contract they should not receive compensation after the time at which they refused to do duty. As soon as possible I hope to have communication by telegraph between Guantánamo and the United States through French cables and will inform the department as soon as it has been established. Under these circumstances again I urge upon the department to expedite arrival of troops for Santiago de Cuba, the difficulty of blockading the Spanish ships daily increasing, and as dark and stormy nights approach difficulty must be increased greatly. Army should be here now. The Spanish force on north side of Cuba is insignificant absolutely and can offer no impediment whatever. One cruiser could look after the whole. *Yankee* will wait until 1 for answers. The *Marblehead* will remain at Guantánamo.

Request that you send *Vesuvius* at once to Santiago.

During the forenoon of the 8th the *Vixen* was sent in near the harbor entrance to meet a Spanish flag of truce, which brought Admiral Cervera's reply to Admiral Sampson's letter of the 7th regarding an exchange of prisoners, stating that he could not act, as Hobson and his men had been turned over to General Linares, and that the latter had reported the case to General Blanco at Havana, to whom the matter should be referred. Sampson thus requested the navy department to deal with the governor-general as the quickest course.[1]

On June 8 was issued memorandum No. 14, which was to have so decisive an effect upon Admiral Cervera's course of action:

During the dark hours of the night search-lights will be used as follows:

The *Iowa*, *Oregon*, and the *Massachusetts* will take turns of two hours each, *i. e.*, from dark to 8 P. M., from 8 P. M. to 10 P. M., etc., in keeping one search-light directly on the harbor entrance, maintaining carefully during that time their blockading positions. Should a vessel's lights fail, the next in order will at once take up the duty.

The picket launch and vidette, stationed south of the Morro, will move to one side or the other sufficiently to get clear of the beam of light.

The vessels on each flank, the *Brooklyn* and the *Texas* on the western side, the *New York* and *New Orleans* on the eastern side, will take two-hour turns in using one search-light from time to time on the coast line, swinging it toward the Morro, but avoiding the illumination of the flanking videttes on the inside line. The light should never be turned off more than five minutes at a time. From time to time the horizon outside will be swept.

Attention is called to bad and careless handling of search-lights. Last night some of the lights were kept high in the air, and were again swept rapidly from side to side. Under such circumstances a search-light is worse than useless.

The beams must be directed to the horizon, and must be moved very steadily and slowly. Not less than three minutes should be employed in sweeping through an arc of 90 degrees.

The best way to discover a torpedo-boat is by its smoke, and even this will not be seen unless the light is very well handled.

The first night's trial was unsuccessful; the intentions of the admiral were not clearly understood; the lights were used fit-

[1] Nothing came of this; as will be seen, Hobson was exchanged July 6, for some prisoners taken by General Shafter's force.

fully and also interfered with by those of other ships, which kept on searching the shore line as usual; complaints, too, were made by the officers commanding the larger videttes that they were so illuminated by these casual lights that the fire of the infantry ashore was drawn upon them, and that they were thus not able to stay as close inshore as desired. The admiral, ignoring all objections, issued a peremptory order which left no doubt as to his own intentions. Personal directions were given at the same time to the captains of the ships not employed on search-light duty to refrain from using their lights, and to the commanding officers of the videttes to remain in position out of the beam instead of patrolling as they had been doing. The order was as follows:

> The use of the search-lights during the dark hours of last night clearly indicates that the lights can be used with the greatest efficiency if sufficient care is taken for this purpose. It is absolutely necessary that the beam of light should be held steadily up the channel into the harbor.
>
> Under these circumstances it is believed to be practically impossible for a vessel to escape detection in any attempt to come out. I therefore enjoin the commanding officers of the *Iowa*, the *Oregon*, and the *Massachusetts* to move forward into their positions, not more than two miles from the entrance, with the entrance bearing north by east; the *Iowa* arriving first—at 7.30, and will place her light squarely up the entrance into the harbor and hold it steadily, except during the time required to change from one search-light to another, as may be required. At the end of two hours from 7.30 P. M. she will be relieved by the *Oregon*, and in turn she will be relieved by the *Massachusetts*, each of these vessels going back to her blockading position —three miles from the entrance.
>
> It is most important that the lights should be held as nearly stationary as possible, and that no discrimination be left to the person manipulating the light. It is believed that this method of using the search-light will prove to be all that is necessary or advantageous in blockading the harbor.

This order was among the most important of the war; to it more than to any other one circumstance is due the capture of the Spanish squadron. It made it, in the opinion of the Spanish commander, out of the question for the ships to leave the harbor at night with the entrance lighted so brilliantly

that it was impossible for any movement to be made in it which would not be noticed. This action removed, too, any fear whatever of torpedo attack. Up to this time the moon had done good service, but it was now on the wane; the darkness at times made by the heavy cloud masses of the trades without the moon was intense, and there should have been no difficulty in a torpedo-boat sortie, had not the search-light been thus used. The moon to this time had been looked upon as an excellent friend; hereafter it was not only of no importance but rather the subject of objurgation, the search-light differentiating its path so much more brilliantly without it. The torpedo-boat henceforth was entirely ignored as a danger.

The situation in Santiago harbor shows the opportuneness of Sampson's action, which put an entirely new face upon what at this moment was there under discussion:

On the 8th day of June the admiral convened in his cabin the captains of the squadron to hear their opinions relative to the situation of said squadron. Being requested to express their opinions, they did so in the following order and manner:

Bustamante, taking into account all the circumstances of the existence of provisions, error in superiority of hostile forces, etc., is of opinion that the squadron should take advantage of the present dark of the moon and resolutely effect the sortie, and as the situation of the hostile fleet at night and the difficulties of the sortie make it impossible for the squadron to go out in a body, the sortie should be effected as follows: The torpedo-boat destroyers should go out first, shaping their course to the south and passing at their utmost speed by the *Texas* and the three large battle-ships.

Shortly after, the *Colón,* the fastest of the four ships, should go out with a west-south-westerly course, heading straight for the *Brooklyn,* whose position is usually in that wing of the blockading line. Then should follow the *Teresa* to the east-south-east, and finally the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo.* He believes that this would create confusion in the hostile fleet and permit us to save at least 50 per cent of our squadron, which solution, in his opinion, is vastly preferable to that other solution which he foresees and which he does not wish to admit as possible, namely, of the fleet being compelled to surrender from lack of provisions.

He is also of opinion that the squadron should prepare for this step by resting a few days, especially the destroyers, upon whose crews such severe demands are being made night after night that it is a wonder they withstand the fatigues of their service. He also deems it

of advantage from every point of view (one of them being to wear out the enemy) to keep firing, especially on the search-lights, which explore the vicinity of the harbor entrance during the hours of darkness.[1] And finally, not being conversant with the means adopted by the admiral, he is of opinion that, before attempting the extreme step which he suggests, the government should be given an accurate idea of the very serious situation of the squadron. In view of the manner in which the ships would go out, he believes that the point of rendezvous should be Havana rather than San Juan, which latter point he would prefer if the squadron went out in a body.

Captain Concas is of opinion that in case one of the rapid cruisers, *Brooklyn* or *New York*, should at any time disappear, the sortie should be attempted immediately; if not it should be attempted about the time of the new moon; but in that event with the whole squadron united and all the ships following the same course provided the nucleus of hostile forces is stationed, as at the present time, 5 or 6 miles from the harbor entrance.

The second in command of the squadron, the captains of the *Colón*, *Oquendo*, and *Vizcaya*, and the commander of the first torpedo-boat division, in view of the impunity with which the blockading fleet approaches to within a mile of the harbor entrance, counting on the inadequate defences of the harbor, and in view of the present conditions of the harbor, the sortie having been rendered more difficult by the position of the *Merrimac*, so that it would require a certain length of time to effect it, thus giving the enemy an opportunity to concentrate still superior forces off the entrance, even if they should not discover the going out of the first ship that undertook the sortie, are of opinion that the sortie should not be attempted as long as the present situation continues, and in the meantime every military means should be used to re-enforce the defences at the harbor entrance, so as to guard against an attack of torpedo-boats and small craft which might appear in the entrance protected by one or more battle-ships, the squadron in this harbor making the best possible resistance, keeping in front of it the greater part of the hostile naval forces, this being the most important service the squadron can render toward the general defence of the island.

They also deem it expedient to shelter the torpedo-boat destroyers, not only to permit them to rest their crews, but to prevent their being boarded by a *coup de main* in a night attack by small craft.[2]

[1] This council was held on the day of issuance of Sampson's order; the search-lights previous to the order were, as just mentioned, used at random and were of but slight service.

[2] Signed by José de Paredes, Juan B. Lazaga, Victor M. Concas, Emilio Diaz Moreu, Antonio Eulate, Fernando Villaamil, Joaquin Bustamante.

Much surprise was expressed in the American squadron at the fact that the search-light ships were not fired upon. The following correspondence between Admiral Cervera and General Linares explains this. Cervera writes, June 11:

Honored Sir: Last evening I made personal observation from the high battery of the Socapa on the position of the hostile squadron and have come to the conclusion that it will be absolutely impossible for the squadron under my command to go out without being seen, taking advantage of the darkness of the night, as long as the coast defences do not succeed in removing the hostile ships to a greater distance, as they constantly illuminate the whole harbor entrance with their electric search-lights.

Santiago de Cuba, *June* 11, 1898.
Yours, etc., Pascual Cervera.

General Linares replied to this:

Honored Sir: Since you made personal observations last night on the position of the hostile squadron, and have come to the conclusion that it will be absolutely impossible for your squadron to leave the harbor without being seen by the enemy, as long as the coast defences do not succeed in removing the hostile ships to a greater distance, as they constantly illuminate the whole harbor entrance with their search-lights, I beg that you will advise me whether you deem the fire of the 6.3-inch Hontoria guns, which have the longest range of all the guns installed in the coast batteries, suitable for the purpose stated, so that I may give the necessary instructions to the captain of the high battery of the Socapa.

But as it is not advisable to cause unnecessary alarm in the city and to waste ammunition, nor to let our enemies see how limited are our means of defence and attack in case we should not succeed in facilitating the sortie of the squadron, I beg to represent to your Excellency, in order that you may take this fact into account, if you deem proper, that the rays of the search-lights are clearly seen over the city, and it would therefore be necessary to add to the distance at which the United States vessels are usually stationed at least the distance which separates the city of Santiago from the coast, namely, 4.35 or 4.97 miles, the total being the distance to which the squadron would have to retreat in order that its search-lights may no longer illuminate the harbor entrance.

Arsenio Linares.

Santiago de Cuba, *June* 11, 1898.

The admiral's energy and decision in the short time in which he had been before Santiago well deserved the eulogium of the head of the navy department. He says:

> Sampson lifted a heavy burden upon his shoulders when he assumed command at Santiago. He sank the *Merrimac*, occupied Guantánamo Bay for use as a coaling base, organized his command and assigned his vessels in the two squadrons into which he divided it. He prepared and promulgated plans for the naval battle that was sure to come, supervised the movements of the more than a hundred vessels within the range of his command, and was charged with the blockade of the whole Cuban coast, with co-operation with the army, and with the landing of its troops. His correspondence with the fleet and with the department was large and constant. No other naval officer had such an engrossing variety of duties. On the 2d of June he issued his general order providing for the most thorough precautions to prevent Cervera's escape and for battling and destroying his fleet in case he attempted to escape. Under it our fleet line was kept in an enclosing semicircle day and night before the harbor closely vigilant. Every night the faithful search-light guarded against the enemy's escape or torpedo attack. Under the following clause of that order: "If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore," the later famous battle of July 3 was actually fought, and the great victory won in accordance with the plan of the commander-in-chief, to whom is due the credit that is always given to the man on whom is the responsibility of the command and of the preparation of the plans for execution by those under him.[1]

[1] Long, *The New American Navy*, I, 7, 8.

CHAPTER XVI

THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO: THE ARMY MOVEMENT

On June 9 at 1 P. M., the *Dolphin* arrived from Mole St. Nicolas with a surprising telegram, dated Key West, June 8:

Tuesday, 9 P. M., 15 nautical miles north, one-half east Bahia de Cadiz light, *Eagle* sighted north-north-west. Signals exchanged among them. Pursued about 3 nautical miles without bringing vessels in sight. At 9.45 P. M. sighted stern light armored cruiser N. ½ E. Showed private signal twice. Armored cruiser flashed truck light. Protected vessel, two torpedo-destroyers, fleet formation answered. *Eagle* scouted abreast until character Spanish vessels was ascertained. Communicated immediately with *Lebanon*, at Piédras Cay, suggesting to her captain to send this news to fleet off Havana. *Eagle* then proceeded with all despatch to Key West. One deep-sea torpedo-vessel chased *Eagle* for a short time. Except stern light and occasional signal, four vessels total darkness. *Panther* left last night to join *Yosemite*, off Havana, for convoy. *Nashville*, with Watson, left here about same time; supposed they know the news. *Resolute* confirms it.

This extraordinary incident which held back the Fifteenth Army Corps a week was the natural result of the difficulties of the sea at night. It is impossible to judge the size of a ship, even if made out, and the sighting of ships at all is uncertain beyond the comprehension of those not accustomed to sea life, and even to many who are, as the following well illustrates. In the early morning of the next day (June 10), the *Yankee*, a 7,000-ton ship, arrived from Mole St. Nicolas, where she had gone with despatches. Her captain, one of the ablest and most competent men of the navy, on coming aboard reported that he had sighted eight or possibly nine ships which seemed to him to be of a suspicious character. One was a battle-ship with a single mast such as the *Indiana's*. He had seen flashes which he at first

thought were those of guns and he supposed them to be firing at him. He later concluded they were signalling with the search-lights. At from 7 to 8 A. M. the ships sighted arrived. They were five. One, the armed yacht *Scorpion*, which had one mast, was the supposed battle-ship. The others were the *Yosemite*, *Panther* (a transport with the marine battalion aboard), the *Armeria*, a light-house supply steamer with ammunition, and the *Supply*, a store-ship. These ships, the *Scorpion*, *Armeria*, and *Supply* in one squadron and the *Yosemite* and *Panther* in another, had met and had stood west together after rounding Cape Maysi (the eastern extremity of Cuba). They had sighted the *Yankee* and had fired at her, as she did not make her night signal, mistaking her for a torpedo-boat. In the melée the *Panther* had run into the stern of the *Scorpion*, rolling up her steel taff-rail in a most extraordinary shape, and narrowly escaping sinking her. Commander Marix, of the *Scorpion*, on reporting aboard the flag-ship stated that he had sighted the British cruiser *Talbot* the previous morning standing east. The mystery of the four ships was in Sampson's mind at once solved. He sent for the *Scorpion's* log-book, and working back to the date and time of sighting the four ships reported by the *Eagle* it was clear that they were the *Talbot* (very similar in appearance to the Spanish armored cruisers) and the *Scorpion* and her two consorts.[1]

The *Yankee* had brought the following despatch supplementing the previous report:

WASHINGTON, *June* 8.—The Spanish armored cruiser first-class, torpedo-destroyers are reported by *Eagle* and *Resolute* yesterday and last night and therefore the army expedition is stopped temporarily; convoy is distributed to scour the strait and re-enforce the blockade of Cuba; send two of your fastest armored vessels to search through

[1] The writer, on his request, was kindly furnished by the British Admiralty with a copy of the *Talbot's* log of that date. This showed that she unquestionably was one of the ships sighted. It is not extraordinary that the *Eagle's* signals were not answered. Eyes must be fixed in the direction of these at the moment, to discover them. The fact is recalled that the *Dolphin*, bearing important despatches, had steamed through the supposed position of the fleet in Nicolas Channel, in search of the admiral; had gone 165 miles east, signalling at short intervals, and then returning, only found the fleet, covering miles of sea, next evening, having steamed 390 miles.

Nicolas Channel, . . . at Key West and thence re-enforce convoy *to we* mean to start this as soon as convoy is strong enough, the delay being only temporary. Are you sure all four of Spanish armored cruisers are at Santiago? Six hundred marines *Panther* started for you last evening convoyed by *Yosemite.*[1]

The admiral at once sent the *Yankee* back to St. Nicolas Mole with the word:

Have no confidence in the report of *Eagle* as to nationality or character of the vessels, and consider very unwise to suspend operations on this account, but even if it is found correct there is sufficient force to furnish convoy. Armored vessel was probably *Talbot,* which was sighted Thursday 9 A. M. by the *Scorpion* standing to the east. Am confident no large ship could have escaped from here; am endeavoring to obtain information from Santiago as to what vessels are inside to-day; delay seems to me most unfortunate. Marine battalion arrived this morning and will land at Guantánamo to-day.

On the same day that the above was sent, Sampson received the following:

WASHINGTON, *June* 9.—It is expected that two armored vessels despatching to re-enforce convoy will arrive Sunday morning, June 12, at Key West and will be coaled immediately. Commodore Remey is ordered to have convoy ready for sea at the same time; the army will be notified and expedition get away without reference to Spanish.

WASHINGTON, *June* 9.—The *Vesuvius* is now seeing through design stranger. Shall send to Santiago as soon as possible.

The admiral took no action toward diverting any of the ships off Santiago for the search mentioned, being convinced that the department would accept the views of his telegram, but although sure of the presence in Santiago of all the Spanish ships, from reports of the various insurgent officers of the vicinity, who had come aboard the flag-ship, he took at once steps to satisfy the authorities at Washington that all of Cervera's ships were still

[1] This telegram is given as it was deciphered. As sent, it began "Spanish armored cruiser, Spanish second class cruiser, Spanish torpedo boat destroyer." The words omitted as undecipherable were "then to coal." The first words of the next line were: "for we mean to start this expedition."

at Santiago. He thus sent Lieutenant Victor Blue, of the *Suwanee*, who gallantly volunteered for the duty, and, being landed June 11 at Aserraderos, the day after the receipt of the telegram expressing the doubt in Washington, at once proceeded, loyally aided by the Cuban general Rabi, on his perilous journey.

On June 11 the *St. Louis* arrived with the British steamer *Twickenham*, which she had captured off Jamaica, with a cargo of coal consigned to the Spanish squadron. The *Twickenham* with the fleet mail was sent to Key West as prize, and the *St. Louis* to Mole St. Nicolas with the following despatches for Washington:

The following is a résumé of a letter from General Garcia to Miles, which I send thus as the only means of its reaching him. Miles's letter received through Colonel Hernandez on June 6. Garcia regards his wishes and suggestions as orders, and will immediately take measures to concentrate forces at the point indicated, but cannot do so as early as desired on account of his expedition to Port Banes, Cuba, but he will march without delay. All his subordinates are ordered to assist to disembark the United States troops and to place themselves under orders. Santiago well fortified with advanced entrenchments, but he believes positions for artillery can be taken as Miles desires, approximately, 12,000 regulars and 3,000 militia, between Santiago and Guantánamo. He has sent forces in order to prevent aid getting to Santiago from Holguin. Repeats every assurance of good will and desire to second plans.

The vessels seen by the *Eagle* were the *Armeria*, *Scorpion*, and *Supply*. They were in just that position at time named. The number is unimportant, as the *Yankee*, coming from Mole, Hayti, Thursday at 11 P. M., mistook the five vessels arriving yesterday for eight or nine vessels under convoy battle-ship. In the morning the battleship resolved itself into the *Scorpion*. General Rabi at Aserraderos with 500 men; Garcia expected there to-day.

I understand that *Restormel* has been released and only cargo condemned. I protest in the name of captors against this decision. The vessel clearly is a prize as not only as carrying contraband of war but as carrying coal to assist definite military operation. If a neutral is released under such circumstances he can undertake at any time with impunity the service of enemy. The *St. Louis* has captured *Twickenham* under similar circumstances.

The manner of the employment of the search-light on the harbor entrance was still unsatisfactory, and the admiral issued the following memorandum on this date:

Until further orders the battle-ships *Iowa*, *Oregon*, and the *Massachusetts* will employ their search-lights in the manner so successfully employed during the last two nights. Care will be taken, however, to go in close enough to make the light wholly effective for the purpose desired. The picket boats report that the lights at times are too weak because of the distance of the ships. The lights will be employed from 7.30 till daylight as follows:

The sequence of ships will be *Iowa*, *Oregon*, *Massachusetts*. To-night, June 11, the *Massachusetts* will begin at 7.30 and continue until 9.30, the *Iowa* from 9.30 to 11.30, the *Oregon* from 11.30 to 1.30, the *Massachusetts* from 1.30 to 3.30, and the *Iowa* from 3.30 to daylight.

On June 12 the *Iowa* will begin at 7.30, on June 13 the *Oregon*, and on June 14 the *Massachusetts* again, and so on.

The vessel using the light shall keep the entrance of the harbor bearing north by east. The instructions of my memorandum No. 15 of June 10, 1898, will be followed.

Regard must be had for the state of the atmosphere. If it is hazy an effective illumination of the harbor entrance will require a closer approach.

The following note was now received from Mr. Sylvester Scovel, correspondent of the *New York World:*

Yesterday the captain of H. M. S. *Pallas* at Port Antonio received cipher despatch from admiral of fleet at Port Royal, Jamaica, announcing as fact that Spanish fleet actually has left for this side of Atlantic. *Pallas* commander ordered shorten crew's shore leave to six hours and be in constant readiness put to sea. Also, as you probably know, 26,000 troops sailed from Tampa Wednesday noon for Santiago; twelve regiments regulars, sixteen of volunteers, four troops cavalry, two batteries heavy artillery, four light artillery, battalion of engineers.

A telegram, dated Kingston, Jamaica, June 9, was enclosed in Mr. Scovel's note:

Merriwether [correspondent] wishes repeated you following news cable published here: "LONDON, *June* 9.—Washington correspondent *Daily Chronicle*, with approval General Greely, cables follow-

ing. The army sailed from Tampa noon to-day, Wednesday. Force numbers 27,000 men, composed of infantry, cavalry, artillery corps. Infantry consists 28 regiments, 16 regular, 12 volunteers; total infantry force 21,600 men; in addition there are battalion engineers, 5 squadrons cavalry, 4 batteries light artillery, 2 batteries heavy. General Shafter chief command. Force convoyed by battle-ship *Indiana*, gun-boat . . . with *Bancroft* as General Shafter's floating home. The transports are due Santiago Friday night or Saturday morning and landing will be attempted Saturday."

In the afternoon of June 12 the torpedo-boat *Porter* arrived from Guantánamo bringing a report from Commander McCalla, written the same morning, that

Yesterday afternoon a scouting party of one sergeant and two privates from the marine camp were killed and their remains mutilated by a party of regular Spanish soldiery or guerillas in their employ.

The names of those killed are Sergeant Smith, Privates Dunphy and McColgan. Dr. Gibbs was killed about 1 A. M. this morning in the camp; and Corporal Glass accidentally shot himself through the hand.

2. It is possible that Dr. Gibbs may have been killed accidentally by one of our own men during the fire which took place about that time. . . .

4. I venture to suggest for your consideration the practicability of re-enforcing Colonel Huntington with 100 marines from the fleet, with such tents and camp gear as may be on the ships. . . .

Happily the report of mutilations was incorrect, the apparent mutilation being the result of the upsetting, after long flight, of the slender projectile used in the modern type of rifle.[1]

The camp occupied by the marines on what is now known as McCalla Hill, so named from the officer in command of the American forces in the bay, was in a faulty position, being commanded by a ridge some 1,200 yards distant, scattered over which, in the thick and almost impenetrable brush, were some 300 Spanish infantry. These opened a desultory fire on the afternoon of the 11th, killing, as mentioned, Privates McColgan and Dunphy on outpost duty.

[1] This projectile, at moderate ranges, makes a very small wound, which if not at once fatal, easily heals. If, however, it does not strike head foremost but enters the body crosswise it may take an erratic course, making a terrible mutilation. The report was soon corrected.

About 1 A. M. Acting Assistant Surgeon John Blair Gibbs was killed, a loss much mourned. On the morning of the 12th Sergeant C. H. Smith was killed and Corporal Glass and Privates McGowan and Dalton wounded. The camp was then moved to the west side of the hill under the crest, but Sergeant-Major Henry Good, a most excellent man, was killed during the night of the 12th. The Spanish fire was continued at long range during the 13th and 14th without further damage; but on this last day a force under Captain Elliott[1] of 160 men of Companies "C and D," commanded by Captain Spicer and First Lieutenant Lucas, and 50 Cubans under Lieutenant-Colonel Tomas, was sent against the enemy. Colonel Laborde of the Cuban army was also present, but without command. The final objective was the Cuzco well, some six miles distant, and the only water supply on the east side of Guantánamo Bay; this destroyed, occupancy of the region in any force was impossible. The despatch-boat *Dolphin* was sent along shore to assist with her fire, and an outpost of fifty men of Company A, under Second Lieutenant Magill, later, of his own motion, came to the aid of the main body, being attracted by the heavy fire to which it was subjected. Action began at 11 A. M., resulting by 3 P. M., after a steady advance over an extraordinarily difficult and rugged region, thickly covered with brush, in a complete rout of the Spanish forces with a loss to these of some sixty men killed and wounded, and two officers and eighteen men prisoners. The well and a heliograph outfit were destroyed, and the American force back in camp at 8 P. M. with one man wounded and twelve overcome by the heat. While destroying the well the Cubans, placed up the valley from which the enemy retreated, began a hot fight with a force not yet dislodged, and lost two killed and two wounded, killing five of the enemy; two other Cubans were wounded earlier in the advance.[2]

From henceforward the eastern side of the bay was wholly deserted by the enemy. While the east was thus freed of Spanish troops, small detachments came down at times from Caimanera on the west and annoyed boats which went close inshore.

[1] Now major-general and commandant of the marine corps.
[2] Report of Captain G. F. Elliott.

The large force of 6,000 men under General Pareja was thenceforth passive. His instructions had been to hold Guantánamo until the last moment. These were founded upon the idea that the bay would be used as an army base, as had been done by the English in 1741, whence the army would advance overland upon Santiago. Such a view, though held by some in Washington, was entirely foreign to Admiral Sampson's mind, which favored always direct and immediate attack. After the action at Cuzco, Pareja established fifty-three more block-houses between Caimanera and Guantánamo, a distance of twelve miles. He entrenched strong positions at Dos Caminos and Caimanera and threw up extensive works at the town of Guantánamo; all to ward off an attack never for a moment contemplated, nor which under ordinary strategic operations could have been. When Santiago should fall, he would naturally have to yield with it. It was there, where he could have given effective support, that he should have been. At Guantánamo, absolutely isolated and wholly without information of any kind, this very considerable army was as ineffective as if in Spain.

From now on Guantánamo Bay was the general base of the fleet for coaling and repairs, the *Vulcan*, repair steamer, soon being added to the command and rendering most efficient service.

The warlike operations of the vicinity, except for a reconnaissance in force ten days later, of the west shore of the bay, which developed the fact of the total withdrawal thence of Spanish troops, were ended by an attack on June 15 on the small and antiquated fort commanding the approach to Caimanera, by the *Texas*, sent to Guantánamo for the purpose, aided by the *Marblehead* and *Suwanee*. The chief result of this attack, the fort itself offering no real resistance, was to bring to the surface two heavy contact mines, one being picked up by the starboard screw of the *Marblehead*, the other broken adrift by the propeller of the *Texas*, the explosion of which would have destroyed or greatly injured these ships. Search had been made for mines on the 11th by a steam launch with grapnels, but none had been discovered. In the interval of fifty-one days since their placing on April 25 the marine growth had been sufficient

to prevent the effective working of the exterior levers, the striking of which should have caused their detonation.[1]

On June 13, the *St. Paul* arrived from New York and the *Vesuvius* from scouting in the Old Bahama Channel, and at 11 A. M. came the *St. Louis* with the following despatches:

WASHINGTON, *June* 10.—On account of the army expedition it is most essential to know positively if all of Cervera's armored vessels are actually at Santiago de Cuba. Inform the department as soon as possible.

After you have a suitable base on shore could we authorize to allow the repair and operation of the French cable between your base and Mole, Hayti? Inform Colonel Greeley if this is done.

About 15,000 tons of coal in colliers have recently been despatched to Santiago de Cuba. About 5,000 now loading on collier *Alexander*. Where do you want it?

The department considers you should have a cruiser off San Juan, Puerto Rico, to observe the port.

June 11.—May 14 Mr. ———— says that innavigable harbor Guantánamo [the upper part of the bay] protected seventeen mine

[1] The following from Captain McCalla, written February 11, 1902, is valuable as explaining the situation at this point:

". . . I was very pleased while at Havana to recognize the exertions of the 1,000 Cuban troops stationed about three sides of the Spanish force of 7,000 in Guantánamo; and to pay Vieta and the Cubans under General Perez their deserved compliment in capturing every courier sent by land and one by water, fifteen in all, who were endeavoring to establish communication between the Spanish in Guantánamo and those in Santiago, after the 7th day of June, 1898, when all cable communication between Guantánamo and the outside world was severed.

"Immediately prior to the cutting of the cables here, the Spanish general Pareja had received instructions to hold Guantánamo to the last moment. This was because of the fact that the Spanish senior officers could not have anticipated, before the arrival of our army before Santiago, that we should land at Daiquiri. They all expected that the expedition would establish a base here at Guantánamo Bay, and march overland to Santiago, via Guantánamo City, as the English had done a century and a half ago. As Pareja never received any instructions other than to hold Guantánamo, he was entirely averse to giving up his position, being entirely ignorant of what was taking place outside of his immediate command. I am told, however, that had the naval force here in Guantánamo pushed him in any way he would have marched with his whole force upon Santiago. This indicates the wisdom of the naval policy in Guantánamo Bay. What Pareja did after the action near the well of Cuzco, was to establish fifty-three more block-houses between Caimanera and Guantánamo; to entrench a strong position at Dos Caminos at the junction of the road from Baracoa, and one on the west side

fields floating about two metres below surface. Conversation overheard at Philadelphia states Morro cliffs Santiago were so mined as to be blown at will toward our vessels that may be passing in the channel. This seems improbable and probably impracticable.

June 12.—Army expedition starts this afternoon from Tampa, Fla., for Santiago de Cuba.

Sampson, however, had already, as mentioned, acted upon the navy department's wishes and was able on June 15 to give a definite and wholly satisfactory reply to its inquiry regarding Cervera's squadron, in a telegram which he sent to St. Nicolas Mole by the *St. Louis:*

Lieutenant Blue has just returned after a detour of seventy miles, to observe inside Santiago harbor; reports Spanish squadron all there. Spanish made vigorous attack on Guantánamo camp. An outpost of four marines killed and their bodies were most barbarously mutilated. Surgeon Gibbs killed, apparently accidentally by our own men.[1]

of the Bay of Joa leading to Guantánamo City; to entrench a strong position behind the town of Caimanera; and to build extensive works and trenches about the city of Guantánamo; because he was always expecting to be attacked by the force from Guantánamo Bay.

"A Spanish colonel offered to take 250 cavalry and make an attempt to open communication with Santiago; but Pareja said that that was too small a force to make the attempt. He appears to have been torn by conflicting desires, the natural one perhaps to use his whole force in an effort to open communication with Santiago; the other to hold Guantánamo in obedience to his last instructions. Now much has been said about the condition of the Spanish troops; but the truth is that while the civilians were starving in Guantánamo the Spanish officers were well fed; and the troops were not yet out of provisions, although they had been without quinine for weeks and fifteen or twenty of them were dying every day. On the 17th of July, 1898, the Spanish soldiers were still receiving one small box of sardines every other day. I mention this to show that the Spanish army hereabouts would still have been able to make the march to Santiago, between thirty and forty miles distant, over a road which was said by Vieta to be a good one when the subject of the movement of our army from Guantánamo Bay was discussed.

"When one knows what the Cuban soldiers really accomplished about Guantánamo, the praise they deserve for holding 7,000 Spanish troops from Shafter's rear must continually increase. . . ." It should be said that Commander McCalla was mistaken in regard to the distance from Guantánamo to Santiago by land. It was nearer double the greater of the distances mentioned.

[1] The report of mutilation was fortunately soon to be corrected.

The story of Blue's adventurous journey (which he was to repeat on June 25) is best told by his own report, made through his commanding officer.

SIR: In obedience to your verbal order of the 11th instant, I left the ship off Aserraderos Point[1] and proceeded to the camp of the insurgent forces about one mile inland, finding General Rabi in command. On explaining to him that I was under orders from you to proceed to a good point of observation near the bay of Santiago de Cuba for the purpose of observing unmistakably the enemy's fleet, he gladly furnished me with a trustworthy guide and a good mule. In company with the guide, Major Francisco H. Masaba y Reyes, I left the camp about 10.30 A. M. of the 11th instant, and taking generally a northerly course, arrived late in the afternoon at a Cuban outpost, about fifteen or twenty miles to the northward and westward of Santiago. The commander of this outpost furnished me with three additional guides to take me through the Spanish lines. After going through the Spanish lines and travelling an hour after nightfall, the guides concluded that it was dangerous to proceed any farther until next morning, whereupon we camped at the house of a Cuban sympathizer. The next morning we proceeded about twelve miles farther to a point on a hilltop a little to the westward of the north end of the bay and about three miles distant from it. From this point I had an almost unobstructed view of the entire bay except the part south of Smith Cay. In the bay I counted five large vessels that were unmistakably men-of-war. Three of these answered the descriptions of vessels of Admiral Cervera's squadron. One could not be seen sufficiently well to describe definitely anything more about her than that she was a large vessel and had one smoke-pipe. The fifth was a large white vessel anchored near the city and was said by the Cubans to be old and useless. Another large vessel was anchored near the city, but whether a man-of-war or merchant vessel I was unable to make out on account of the poor background.

Anchored near the city were also three smaller men-of-war, one of about 1,500 tons displacement, one of about 800, and the last was what I made out to be a small gun-boat.

Near the entrance to the bay was a vessel under way which, judging from her relative dimensions, I took to be a destroyer. Two other vessels resembled torpedo-boats, but I am unable to state positively their character.

Two launches and a larger vessel were in the channel near the position of the *Merrimac*.

The relative positions of all these vessels were included in my sketch which I submitted to you and the admiral immediately after my return.

[1] Eighteen nautical miles west of Santiago.

I remained at the place of observation about an hour and a half and then started back on the return trip. I was fully satisfied from my own knowledge that the vessels I saw were those of Cervera's squadron.

The point of observation was in plain view of a Spanish garrison about 1,000 to 1,200 yards away. On our return, Cuban sympathizers informed us that the road we passed over the day before was occupied by the Spanish troops. This necessitated our taking another route. Different people along the road would inform us how to proceed to keep clear of the Spaniards.

On the 11th considerable firing could be heard at various places along the route, and the smoke at Spanish camps could occasionally be seen a mile or two away.

I arrived at the headquarters of General Rabi on the night of the 12th instant, and joined the ship off Aserraderos Point the next morning.[1]

On this day was issued to the ships of the fleet the first of a series of daily bulletins giving a résumé of events as known aboard the flag-ship, which was naturally the centre of news. Few who have not undergone the experience can appreciate the monotony and isolation felt by the crews of the blockading fleet. Though near to one another, the ships, but for signals sent, and but for what is in actual sight, are separated worlds. To wearily look day after day at the Santiago cliffs, to know that important things were happening of which they could know nothing, was a trying situation. The bulletins printed and distributed daily by one of the smaller vessels from now on were a great relief to all and did much toward the contentment of officers and men. Soon all the printing paper of the flag-ship was exhausted and scraps of every sort were used. Recourse was finally had to a quantity of Spanish telegraph forms which had been found and seized, the backs of which fortunately were plain, and the bulletins were printed upon them until a supply of paper was received from the United States.

The *Vesuvius*, for which several urgent requests had been made, the last on the 13th itself, was sent in the same night and fired three shells loaded with 200 pounds of gun-cotton, which were returned by two shots from Socapa. Her arma-

[1] Lieutenant Blue wore his uniform and side arms to avoid any question of being treated as a spy if captured.

ment enabled these three to be fired quickly in succession; the reloading and firing again required more time than the admiral thought advisable to keep her in so exposed a position, so that on no night were more than this number fired. These shells exploded with terrific shocks and had at least the effect of causing the withdrawal of the torpedo-boat destroyers, which were lying behind the Socapa, near Smith Key, further into the harbor, one of them barely escaping destruction. Thenceforward the *Vesuvius* kept up nearly nightly practice. That more damage was not done was certainly not the fault of her able commander, Pillsbury, or of want of efficiency in the shells. The batteries were small marks and a hit was largely a matter of chance. Her firing was ineffective in the sense that a 13-inch shell from the fleet might be ineffective; that is, it might not happen to strike just at the point desired.[1]

The testimony of the Spanish themselves is the best tribute to her work. Says one Spanish officer:

> One of the projectiles which fell on the northern slope of Socapa tore up trees right and left for a distance of about twenty metres. From a certain distance, as I could see the day I went to the *Mercedes*, it looked as though a road had been opened across the mountain. Another which fell a short distance from the one just referred to, made an excavation not very deep but very wide; I was told that it would hold twenty horses. . . . Still another dropped in the water, but close to one of the destroyers, which was violently shaken, as also the *Mercedes*, anchored at a short distance.[2]

On June 14, just after daylight, the *New Orleans* was directed to engage alone the western (Socapa) battery, being selected by the admiral on account of her very effective battery of 6-inch guns, which were 50 calibres in length and with the latest

[1] The writer was in the habit of occupying the chart-room near the foremast of the *New York*, at night. When the first shell was fired by the *Vesuvius* he was lying asleep upon the transom. He was awakened by a heavy thud against the ear upon which he was lying. This thud had come through the earth and water (at the point the ship was lying nearly a mile deep), a distance of about three miles. If the energy thus transmitted was so great, the shock to those near by must have been of a tremendous character.

[2] Muller y Tejeiro, *Battles and Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba*, 82; Translation, Office of Naval Intelligence. 1899.

Elswick mounts, from which establishment the ship had only just been received.[1]

Commander Folger took his ship, in the coolest manner, within 2,000 yards of the battery, and opened vigorously. The battery during his firing did not reply, but when after twenty minutes the ship was ordered to withdraw and the well-merited signal "Well done" was hoisted from the flag-ship, the battery opened with a sustained fire, the shells bursting over and around the *New Orleans* with a frequency which appeared to the onlookers to make at least some damage a certainty. The ship offered an admirable mark, but though in easy range for a considerable period, was not struck.

Authority was now received from the navy department to allow the Austrian armored cruiser, *Maria Theresa*, to enter blockaded ports, with a warning as to the similarity of the Austrian and Spanish flags, a similarity which, as will be seen later, caused a somewhat serious misunderstanding.[2]

Orders were received from Washington to convoy a French cable ship from St. Nicolas Mole to Guantánamo Bay and aid in the re-establishment of the cable service, to be operated by a French staff under the censorship of the chief army signal officer at that point, Colonel Allen.

On the 15th the admiral found it necessary to issue a memorandum on account of insufficient care in maintaining blockading positions, the close maintenance of which, it must be said, was a matter of much difficulty. A tidal current of from one to two miles, and sometimes more, swept along shore. A close attention to bearings and a not infrequent use of the engines were thus necessary to hold the places assigned. A certain latitude had to be allowed to prevent the too frequent use of steam, but instances occurred of ships drifting nearly hull down from the

[1] Built by Elswick for the Brazilian government and purchased from the latter. The accidental breaking of the ship's steam steering gear a few days after the action noted, made it necessary to send the *New Orleans* to Key West for repairs. She left June 28 and was thus unfortunately absent from the battle of July 3.

[2] Though no record can be found of a memorandum to the fleet regarding the expected arrival, it is difficult to suppose that it could have been overlooked.

flag-ship, which, though with all care taken, was perhaps itself not always wholly blameless. As even under normal conditions the line of blockade was fully eight miles long, it can well be understood how greatly was increased the difficulty of signalling, difficult as this was with every ship in place, over such an extended line. The memorandum read:

The commander-in-chief desires again to call the attention of the commanding officers to the positions occupied by the blockading fleet, especially during the daytime, and it is now directed that all ships keep within a distance to the entrance of Santiago of four miles, and this distance must not be exceeded.

2. If the vessel is coaling, or is otherwise restricted in her movements, she must nevertheless keep within this distance.

3. If, at any time, the flag-ship makes signal which is not visible to any vessel, such vessel must at once approach the flag-ship or repeating vessel, to a point where she can read the signal.

4. Disregard of the directions which have already been given on this head has led to endless confusion. Many times, during the day, the fleet is so scattered that it would be perfectly possible for the enemy to come out of the harbor and meet with very little opposition.

5. The commander-in-chief hopes that strict attention will be given this order.

On the 16th action against the batteries was taken in accord with a battle order of the preceding day. The batteries were soon silenced and after firing half an hour, apparently with great accuracy, the squadron resumed blockading stations, the batteries remaining silent.

Though evidently weak, the batteries were always a danger to the battle-ships lighting the entrance at night; they were not regarded as in any sense an obstacle to entering the harbor, the only obstacle being, as already said, the mines, to the use of which the narrow channel lent itself so effectively. But the bombardments, besides the chance of injury to the guns of the batteries, or to the ships inside, near which fell many of the projectiles, fired necessarily at a high elevation, gave a confidence and coolness to the men which no ordinary target-firing could give. It served a good purpose later.

On the 16th the torpedo-boat *Porter* communicated with La Sigua (near Bacanao, a little east of Daiquiri) and brought

on board the flag-ship the Cuban general Castillo and colonel Veraunes. They reported some 600 Cubans near La Sigua, some of whom needed arms, and all needed provisions. Two hundred and eighty rifles and equipments were sent from the fleet, and provisions for one week from the flag-ship.

General Rabi with several officers also came from Aserraderos, announcing the expected arrival there of General Garcia with 3,000 men, leaving behind him 4,000 to observe the Spanish force of over 8,000 at Holguin. Rabi reported Garcia's force now well armed and supplied through the successful landing by the *Florida*, at Banes, the 1st of June, of 7,800 rifles with a million and a half of cartridges and a large quantity of stores and provisions. Rabi also brought the report that General Pando was *en route* to Santiago by way of Manzanillo, with a considerable force. In consequence of General Castillo's visit the following memorandum (No. 21) was issued:

> Vessels will observe in passing Bacanao (about half-way between Santiago and Guantánamo) if a fire be shown and a Cuban flag hoisted; if so, they should communicate. This signal is arranged with General Castillo's forces.

Early in the morning of June 17 a reconnaissance of Cabañas Bay was attempted with the idea of utilizing it as a landing-place for an attack upon the western side of the harbor entrance. The bay is a beautiful little bottle-shaped pocket of water, a miniature of so many of the Cuban harbors. The force consisted of two steam cutters, one from the *New York* in charge of Naval Cadet Powell, the other from the *Massachusetts* in charge of Naval Cadet Hart, both under command of Lieutenant Harlow, executive officer of the *Vixen*. The cutters at 3.30 left the picket line where they had been stationed during the night and reporting alongside the *Vixen* took on board Lieutenant Harlow, and started into the bay at 4.45. Almost immediately after passing the small ancient fort at the entrance, they were fired upon so heavily and at such short range that they were obliged to retreat. The *Texas* and *Vixen* going in to the support of the cutters and opening a vigorous fire at short range, dispersed the enemy. Much of the firing was, on account of

the narrowness of the entrance, from within fifty yards. The two cutters were struck seventeen times; the smoke-pipe of the *New York's* cutter had in it seven shot holes, but, extraordinary to say, no one was injured. The attempt, though unsuccessful, deserves high praise for the coolness and courage shown by all aboard. Lieutenant Harlow praised particularly the conduct of young Powell and Hart, Coxswain O'Donnell, and Seaman Blom.

On June 17 the following telegrams were received via St. Nicolas Mole:

KEY WEST, *June* 14th.—Army to leave Dry Tortugas, Fla., on June 15th, morning. Two or more first-class torpedo-boats and *Resolute* with ammunition accompanying expedition. Vessels with provisions for three months sent from New York.

WASHINGTON, *June* 14th.—From very reliable source is learned that five small Spanish unprotected vessels and one armed transport at San Juan, Puerto Rico. No more army supplies. Are nearly out of provisions. Twenty-two thousand tons of coal there and only three hours' supply of shell at their forts, but would be well not to trust too much statement about shell. Department advises you blockade at once cruiser and transport at San Juan, and prevent escape. Is *Terror* one of them? Our army and convoy are leaving Tampa, Fla.

June 14th.—Department attaches utmost importance to maintain full strength of the blockade of Cuba and desires you send there at once some auxiliaries and other cruisers, unless you can't possibly spare them. This matter is very important, in view of probably hostile report Austrian vessel.

June 15th.—The American consul, Kingston, Jamaica, telegraphs: "Spanish troops and battery removing from Manzanillo to Cienfuegos, coasting vessels carrying on Saturday weekly." If the Spanish foresee defeat at Santiago they may attempt to withdraw part of the garrison and field artillery by above route.

June 15th.—The Spanish general Pando, chief of operations, left Havana to-day for Santiago de Cuba. He will probably go by rail to the south coast and thence by small coastwise steamer inside reef and key to Manzanillo, Cuba. More clothing goes to you by *Newark* and *Yale*, to sail shortly.

June 15th.—Universal horror barbarous mutilation American dead. American people watching your operations anxiously but with greatest confidence. Having troops soon relieve. Kindly acknowledge.

June 15th.—The American consul at Kingston, Jamaica, sends the following: Will you permit me to urge unobserved blockade well-armed auxiliary to cover channel key leading to Manzanillo, Cuba, and channel westward of Isle of Pines, West Indies. At least eight vessels preparing to take cargo of provisions for Cuba. *Purissima Concepcion* gets the British flag but questions granting clearance referred to London, England. Strenuously working for the principle involved. The vessel comparatively unimportant consideration.

The following telegram was sent via Mole St. Nicolas by the *Scorpion:*

Bombarded the batteries on June 16th for forty-three minutes; firing very accurate; the batteries were silenced completely. Fleet not injured. We are providing Cubans as far as possible with clothing, food, arms. These and supplies of all kinds are much needed by fleet. Cubans much assistance at Guantánamo, where everything is now reported quiet. Intercepted letter from Guantánamo to Spanish commanding army officer at Santiago reports there is only a small quantity food not more than sufficient for this month half rations. Deserter from the *Reina Mercedes* states *Merrimac* does not block up channel, she is too far in the harbor. There is no possibility, however, of anything coming out without our knowledge; a battle-ship is every night at a distance of one mile from entrance, illuminating the channel most clearly. I again urge earnestly army move with all possible celerity. Fine weather may end any day.

On June 18 Sampson sent a telegram:

Recommend that Assistant Naval Constructor Hobson be advanced five numbers in his corps for gallantry. I would recommend him for more had effort succeeded, but he carried vessel beyond point arranged, leaving free egress for vessels, and the failure of the effort must be taken into consideration.

The flag-ship left the blockade and went to Guantánamo Bay, forty miles distant, to look into affairs and for the purpose of observing the Spanish positions at the several points along the coast. A close look was taken at Daiquiri (their last post to the eastward) for the purpose of possibly using it for landing

a part of the expected army. The ship returned to the blockade in the afternoon, being at Guantánamo about an hour, and having anchored for the first time since leaving Key West reef, on May 30.

On June 19 the following despatches were received via St. Nicolas Mole:

From Commodore Watson:

On 14th sent Captain Ludlow in *Maple* under flag of truce with full power to negotiate exchange of Hobson and the seven petty officers. Chief of staff answered by letter that after reference to Madrid captain-general will communicate by flag of truce. Ludlow will, if possible, have exchange made as desired and soon. Commodore Remey will be advised immediately an agreement is reached.

June 16.—Spanish steamer *Purissima Concepcion*, recently ostensibly transferred to the British flag, will leave about June 16 from Kingston, Jamaica, for Manzanillo, Cuba, or Batabanó, Cuba, with supplies. Capture vessel if possible if you have code.

June 16.—The American consul at Vera Cruz, Mexico, telegraphs the Spanish steamer *Villaverde* sailed June 17 from Vera Cruz, Mexico, cleared for San Domingo City, San Domingo, took two boxes of rifles, thirty men, and two guns.

WASHINGTON, *June* 17.—Convoy consists of the *Indiana*, *Detroit*, *Bancroft*, *Helena*, *Annapolis*, *Wasp*, *Eagle*, *Hornet Osceola*, *Manning*, and torpedo-boat *Ericsson*. As soon as possible after their arrival you will send every vessel that can be spared from the operations at Santiago to re-enforce the blockade, which is suffering for want of vessels. It is the intention of the president to establish blockade to cover the ports of Cuba [from] Batabanó to Cape Cruz, as soon as can be maintained effectively. Notify the department what date will be ready with your force to enforce it in order the proclamation may be issued. Department depends upon you solely from that time for the blockade, but you may entrust to Commodore Howell particular disposition of the vessels on any part of the blockade that you order.

June 18.—Detail *Iowa*, *Oregon*, and *Brooklyn* full of coal and ammunition. They will be sent to coast of Spain in the event of Cadiz division passing Suez, Egypt, and *Harvard*, *Yale*, *Yosemite*, *Dixie* same service. If, in your opinion, these armored vessels are not in repair to make the above-mentioned cruise, which should you recommend?

The following telegrams were sent:

Cienfuegos blockaded already by *Yankee*, Cape Cruz and vicinity by *Dixie;* when some of the light-draft vessels promised according to your letter of June 6 arrive they will be sent to cruise in the vicinity of Manzanillo, Cuba, and Isle of Pines. The president may declare immediately the blockade of the whole southern coast. *St. Paul* and *Yosemite* are on the way to blockade San Juan, P. R. Will send back to north coast of Cuba all vessels constituting convoy as soon as they arrive; a part will go by Cape Maysi and part Cape San Antonio so as to temporarily blockade the whole coast of Cuba. Rifles enough. Request 500,000 rounds of Springfield rifle ammunition, 45 calibre. All foreign cables have been cut by Goodrich, last one on 18th. Recommend that isolation be made complete between Key West and Havana. Any communication sure to furnish Blanco information.

The admiral was mistaken in supposing all the cables cut. There was one more to Jamaica than was supposed. It escaped being grappled through the great depth of water, and there was thus, during the whole period of the war, no time in which the beleaguered force at Santiago was not in touch with Spain by way of Jamaica.

The chief of staff went in the *Vixen* on the 19th to Aserraderos (fifteen miles west), to examine the points where it might be possible to land troops, and to see General Calixto Garcia. He returned, bringing the general and several officers of his staff to the flag-ship. General Garcia corroborated the report of General Rabi as to the disposition of his forces, excepting that he had brought with him 4,000 men instead of 3,000 as mentioned by Rabi, leaving the latter number to observe the Spanish force at Holguin.

Garcia made a most favorable impression. He was a large, kindly-faced man, with an extraordinary deep vertical furrow in the forehead made by a pistol bullet in an attempted suicide while captured and in prison. He inspired much confidence in Sampson, who was usually slow to make up his mind to such trust. The general unfortunately suffered much from the motion of the ship, and during most of his stay aboard, which would have been prolonged but for this, was lying stretched upon a sofa in the cabin. Sampson mentioned the possibility

of an attack by the Spaniards upon Garcia's force. Lifting himself at once upon his elbow Garcia replied with great impressiveness, "The Spaniards never attack; they never attack," giving in this one short statement the true reason of their failure to re-establish their authority in Cuba.

Next day, June 20, the army expedition arrived. The story of the combined movement of the succeeding fortnight belongs to another chapter. In the meantime affairs in the broad field of naval events in the Atlantic which, while focussed at Santiago, covered the whole of the Cuban coast and were now about to reach out toward Spain and the East. The following series of telegrams is thus given here as bearing intimately upon what was soon to come, and in order not to break the continuity of the story later.

Telegraphic communication having now, as mentioned, been established at Guantánamo, telegrams were sent through that point, thus saving a hundred miles of steaming each way.

The following was received from Key West:

Captain-general states Spanish government refuses to exchange prisoners.

WATSON.

From Washington:

The U. S. consul Guadeloupe states Norwegian steamer *Marie*, Martin, master, 1,256 tons, has one ordinary smoke-stack, two masts, black, 3,000 tons of coal, arrived to-day consigned Spanish consul; is out of order; alleged cause stoppage believe seeking further instructions. Destination unknown. The U. S. consul at Kingston, Jamaica, reports *Hungarian* for Puerto Rico.

You are authorized to ascertain from the Spanish authorities at Santiago whether Hobson with his men are imprisoned in the Morro or other fort exposed to your fire, and if so inform Cervera and commanding army officer he shall be held responsible by the government (U. S.) for the personal safety of our officers and men above mentioned, and that you hold equal number Spanish prisoners subject to same treatment.

When the Spanish give up hope at Santiago they may attempt to escape via Manzanillo, Cuba, as understood here they receive supplies now via Manzanillo.

It is proposed to proclaim the blockade on the south side from Cape Cruz to Cape Frances. When will you be ready?

From Commodore Remey at Key West:

Armeria arrived—request you send all cruisers, auxiliaries, and despatch-vessels you can dispense with for the blockade.

The telegram from Washington regarding readiness to extend the blockade was replied to on June 23:

I have sent to their blockading stations via Cape Antonio the *Castine, Eagle, Wasp;* via Cape Maysi, the *Dolphin, Annapolis, Bancroft, Hornet, Manning, Wompatuck.* I am holding on southern blockade the *Helena* and *Osceola* and retaining temporarily at Santiago the *Detroit, Indiana,* and torpedo-boats.

But while the navy department was making its inquiry it was telegraphing a request of the war department for convoy for returning transports. To this Sampson demurred. He telegraphed:

Such convoys will occur frequently and so reduce the available ships for blockade as to make it quite impossible to maintain strict blockade of the whole of Cuba. Vessels running blockade are smaller in size but greatly increased in number. I request most urgently such vessels as the *Newark, Prairie, Columbia,* and *Minneapolis* be sent here for duty with the blockade.

Another telegram of the same day reported:

Under flag of truce I learned to-day Hobson and his men all well and now confined in the city of Santiago at a distance of four miles from Morro.

The following was received:

The following received from correspondent abroad: "Steamer *Montserrat* loading at Cadiz for Cuba; considerable coal going from Cadiz presumably to Canary Islands; Spanish fleet at Cartagena, Spain;

movement probably made to satisfy people." This information probably reliable. The French steamer *Versailles* at Kingston, Jamaica, receiving pistols and cartridges, is bound to St. Thomas to Corunna, Spain, probably expects touch at Puerto Rico. It is reported from Cardiff, Wales, Spanish steamer, under convoy cruiser, is due about June 23 at Cuba. Commodore Watson has been informed.

Next day came further intimation of demand for convoy:

Have received definite information an expedition about 25,000 men to be directed soon to Puerto Rico, and as you will be probably called upon for co-operation and more or less convoy it, it is desirable that you telegraph if you shall need any more coal and supplies accumulated to the east, and if so in what place and what quantity.

The following, received June 24, again expresses the navy department's anxiety regarding the blockade:

The U. S. consul at Kingston, Jamaica, says that under-secretary of the Captain-General of Cuba, Spanish naval officer Virgilio Lopez Chaves, came aboard *Adula* with, it is supposed, $250,000 to purchase provisions to be taken to Manzanillo for Cervera. Chaves is going to Manzanillo to negotiate with Masso; extensive preparations being made for shipping provisions to Cuba.

Reports constantly received of provisions reaching Spanish forces via southern ports of Cuba and of preparations in Mexico and Jamaica to forward further supplies; therefore the department desires greatly to keep all blockade effective, to establish blockade from Cape Cruz to Cape Frances. When shall you be ready for the latter to be proclaimed?

This was answered on June 25:

The *Detroit*, *Hornet*, and *Yankton* ordered to proceed for the blockade between Cape Cruz and Cape Frances. The *Helena* and *Osceola* will sail immediately after coaling.

On this day a force was sent by Commander McCalla to determine whether the enemy still occupied the extremities of Punta del Jicacal in Guantánamo Bay. This force, which was under Colonel Huntington, U. S. M. C., consisted of two companies of marines and two-thirds of the force of Cubans under Colonel Thomas, in all about 240 men.

The landing flotilla consisted of boats from the various ships, towed by the steam launches of the *Helena*, *Annapolis*, and *Bancroft*, which left their ships at 2 A. M. for the marine camp, under the command of Commander Eaton. The *Eagle* took station for the night off Jicacal Point, and at 4 A. M. the *Marblehead* and *Helena* moved into position close to the beach to south and westward of highlands of Jicacal Point, to cover the landing. The boats advanced in three columns and the troops were landed quietly and quickly, and a thorough reconnaissance was made of the point. The enemy was not seen. The men re-embarked about 8.

A picket line of Spaniards was seen from the ships, one or two men at a time, across the dry lagoon a couple of miles to north and westward.

The *Marblehead* then proceeded to the channel between Jicacal and Cayo del Hospital to drag for mines. Four mines were found and successfully raised, making thirteen mines in all raised in the channel.

The navy department in a telegram received June 25 returned to the subject of the blockade:

> The department finds blockade of some parts is very weak; Bahia Honda, Mariel, and Cabañas have only *Hamilton;* Matanzas and Cardenas only *Pompey* and *Mangrove;* no monitor off Havana. You must strengthen blockade or claim not effective enough will be made from abroad.

On June 25 came the word:

> Have the *Oregon*, *Yosemite*, *Iowa*, *Yankee*, and *Dixie* full of coal and ammunition and hold them for speedy orders the coast of Spain. Camara's fleet was sighted off Pantellaria Island, Mediterranean, standing to the east. Spanish collier passed Suez, Egypt, bound for Perim Island, India. Department expects to send you from Commodore Howell more vessels to replace any cruiser that may be taken from you for Spain and East.

This was accented by another telegram, directing that the colliers *Abarenda*, *Scindia*, and *Alexander* should be sent north whether empty or not, and if either should not be with the fleet, to send the largest and fastest present. "They go with our squadron

to Spain and to the East." The loss of these was to be made good by the *Lebanon*, on her way to Guantánamo carrying 1,200 tons of coal and towing a schooner with 3,000. All three of the colliers mentioned were at Guantánamo and were despatched, though the *Alexander* had discharged but 400 tons of a large cargo. Replying to an inquiry Sampson telegraphed that he had no changes to recommend in the ships proposed to be sent to Spain, but advised that the *Iowa* should certainly be docked before proceeding on such a cruise. He added to this telegram that after careful examination, the reported mutilation of bodies at Guantánamo was a mistake, the apparent mutilation being due to the bullets. He ended: "I withdraw the charge that the bodies of these men had been mutilated."

Sampson was concerned as to the immediate loss, in the crisis which was now imminent, of so many ships, and particularly as to the withdrawal of two of the heaviest battle-ships. While confident that what remained were ample, should all be present, to deal with Cervera's squadron, the frequent withdrawals for coaling, and the possibility of break-downs which could not be foreseen, might prevent the absolute annihilation to which he confidently looked, should Cervera come out. He thus telegraphed on the next day (June 26):

As the department may not fully understand the situation here, I send the following: Nine vessels of convoying squadron are coaling at Guantánamo, the *New York* off Santiago, and the others must be coaled. *Yankee* is at Cienfuegos. The *Dixie* is at Cape Cruz. The *Helena* and *Hornet* left yesterday for these stations. The *Detroit* and Aux. No. 440 follow. The *St. Paul* and *Yosemite* are at San Juan, Puerto Rico. In smooth water ships can coal off Santiago with some difficulty. I regard it essential not to reduce this force too much for some few days in view of the fact that the weather may compel us to coal at Guantánamo. Channel was not obstructed by *Merrimac* and we must be prepared to meet the Spanish fleet if they attempt to escape. I am preparing torpedo attack in order to hasten their destruction. Regret to resort to this method because of its difficulties and small chance of success, torpedo-boats being subject to small arms and rapid-fire guns from the shore for a long distance. I should not do this were present force to be kept here, as it now ensures a capture which I believe will terminate the war. Shall ships named, the *Oregon*, *Yankee*, etc., be collected here for the proposed move.

Not only did the order propose taking away two of the most important elements of the battle force off Santiago, but it swept away the possibilities of the efficient blockade for which the department had been so insistent. Following close, too, upon the heels of the former telegram came the following despatch, June 26, remarkable in that the sale mentioned was impossible unless followed by most serious complications with Chile; it called for still another fast and well-armed ship:

Have learned, May 25th, armored cruiser *O'Higgins* sold to Spain; therefore add *Brooklyn* to ships kept coaled and prepared to go to Spain and to the East.

Sampson's protest, mild as it was, had its effect. On June 28 came:

You are authorized to detain the *Oregon* and the *Iowa* until the other armored vessels are coaled fully, so as to be able to hold out position at Santiago de Cuba, but you will hurry this to the utmost possible as the department desires to get these vessels to the East via Spain. Watson with *Newark* leaves to-day to join you to command division for Spain. Assemble at same time *Yosemite, Dixie,* and *Yankee* and coal them for same service.

This was followed by a telegram directing to utilize this period in seeing that ships designated for Commodore Watson were provisioned for four months. Sampson had received the day before a telegram from Commodore Watson stating that he had transferred his broad pennant from the *Montgomery* to the *Newark* on June 26, and would leave June 30 for Santiago. Watson had already received his orders to command the detached force in a telegram from Washington of June 26, which read:

As soon as Sampson gives the order, you shall sail with the *Iowa* and the *Oregon,* the *Newark, Yosemite, Yankee,* and *Dixie* for St. Michael, Azores, for orders, *en route* to Tangiers, Morocco. Colliers ordered to join you Saint Michael. If they have not arrived when you have reached there, leave a cruiser to convoy them and to follow. Shift your flag to *Iowa.*

This, of which a copy had been sent to Sampson, was accompanied by another telegram, stating that Commodore Howell

had been ordered to report with the northern patrol squadron, which in some degree would compensate for the vessels to be withdrawn from the blockade for the Eastern expedition. The telegram directed that Howell's ships be distributed upon the blockade, and that the commodore take over the command which had been held by Watson. Steps were at once taken to carry out the instructions of the navy department as fully as possible.

In the meantime numerous reports came from Washington of vessels preparing to run the blockade; among them even one was mentioned from New York—the steamer *Ardenbru*, which sailed June 28, with a large cargo of jerked beef, for Kingston, Jamaica, but with Cuba as its probable destination.

Telegrams came June 29, both from Washington and Jamaica, that the British steamer *Adula* would leave next day for Santiago and Guantánamo, ostensibly to bring back refugees, but undoubtedly carrying an important Spanish mission. The question of the blockade became more and more urgent. Word came that several light-draft steamers and small torpedo-boats were being sent to Key West for service in the intricate waters about the Isle of Pines and Batabanó. "Would it not be well," said a Washington telegram of June 29, "to designate a senior officer for the whole ground Cienfuegos to Cape Frances?" The consul at Martinique reported a steamer flying the British flag, but with a Spanish crew and carrying coal and provisions, had attempted to supply the two Spanish ships, but that the governor had refused to permit it to be done. Reports came also from Venezuela via Washington, June 29, saying:

> Urgent. According to telegram of June 28, the American minister to Venezuela states have reason for thinking the Spanish fleet expected in this vicinity and that provisions and coal to be taken at small island off Curaçao; a great many telegrams passing between the Spanish minister, Madrid, and the Spanish consul at Curaçao, look as if Cervera might be contemplating sortie.

Following this was another telegram stating the loading of a vessel in a Venezuelan port with provisions, "undoubtedly for Spanish fleet, Cuba or Puerto Rico. The American minister may prevent sailing."

In the light of later knowledge we know that Cervera had no intention of going southward, and that the suppositions, though very natural, were foundationless.

It was, however, clear that Cuba was being fairly constantly supplied. Word came from Washington on June 29:

General Garcia received letter that states the French ship, 2,000,000 rations, had just arrived June 21 at Nuevitas, the port of Puerto Principe; a tow-boat is running constantly from Nuevitas to Gibara, Cuba, the port of Holguin; why not capture any vessels running from Nuevitas to Gibara and destroy Spanish shipping in these ports? The Norwegian bark *Mizpah* leaves to-day from Barbados for Puerto Rico Island, probable destination San Juan, Puerto Rico.

Also:

Telegram of June 29 from U. S. minister to Honduras states Spanish transport *Guillermo* coaled at Belize, Honduras, yesterday; thence to Jamaica and Cuba with provisions; sixteen knots; has thirty Spanish refugees aboard.

On July 1:

The war department gives the following information: during week ending June 29 six vessels brought supplies to Cuba, namely, *Cristina* and schooner to Cienfuegos; *Purissima Concepcion* at Casilda; *Arturo* and *Alberto* to Batabanó; government reserving all supplies for troops so army will have enough for two months. They are expecting *Santo Domingo* and *Montevideo* which left last week for return with loads of provisions consigned to Blanco.

However, the admiral was conscious of having done all that could be done with his very limited resources, and even at the moment the navy department was pressing in the question of Watson's departure, saying in a telegram of July 1:

The prospective advance of Camara to the East makes it much to be desired Watson's squadron should commence to move. Telegraph when you can send it, having regard to your necessities at Santiago. His cruisers and armored vessels should be full of coal. The department does not wish to weaken you, but diversion favorable for Dewey by operations positive is necessary.

APPENDIX A

SHIPS IN COMMISSION DURING THE WAR

Asiatic Station

ADMIRAL GEORGE DEWEY, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

SHIP	COMMANDERS	DATE ATTACHED[1]
Baltimore	Captain N. M. Dyer	From beginning
Boston	Captain Frank Wildes	" "
Brutus	Lieutenant V. L. Cottman	Aug. 4
Charleston	Captain Henry Glass	June 30
Concord	Commander Asa Walker	From beginning
McCulloch	Captain D. B. Hodgson, R.C.S.	" "
Monadnock	Captain W. H. Whiting	Aug. 16
Monocacy	Commander O. W. Farenholt	From beginning
Monterey	Commander E. H. C. Leutze	Aug. 4
Nanshan	Lieutenant W. B. Hodges	From beginning
Nero	Commander Charles Belknap	Aug. 16
Olympia	*Captain C. V. Gridley †Captain B. P. Lamberton (May 25)	From beginning
Petrel	Commander E. P. Wood	" "
Raleigh	Captain J. B. Coghlan	" "
Zafiro	Lieutenant W. McLean	" "

The * signifies that the officer in question was, subsequently, relieved by †. Date in parentheses shows date of relief.

Pacific Station

REAR-ADMIRAL J. N. MILLER, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

SHIP	COMMANDERS	DATE ATTACHED
Albatross	*Lieutenant-Commander J. F. Moser †Lieut.-Com. C. K. Curtis (July 14) ‡Lieut.-Com. J. F. Moser (Aug. 1)	From beginning
Bennington	*Commander H. E. Nichols †Lieut.-Com. J. F. Moser (July 14) ‡Commander E. D. Taussig (Aug. 1).	" "
Corwin	Captain W. J. Herring, R.C.S.	" "
Grant	Captain J. A. Slamm, R.C.S.	" "
Perry	Captain W. J. Kilgore, R.C.S	" "
Rush	Captain W. H. Roberts, R.C.S.	" "
Mohican	Commander G. M. Book	" "
Monadnock	Captain W. H. Whiting	" "

[1] The Dates, generally, are those of arrival at station for service.

SHIP	COMMANDERS	DATE ATTACHED
Monterey[1]	*Captain C. E. Clark	From beginning
	†Lieut.-Com. J. W. Carlin (March 15)	
	‡Commander E. H. C. Leutze	
Philadelphia	Captain G. H. Wadleigh	July 8
Wheeling	Commander Uriel Sebree	From beginning

The * signifies that officer in question was, later on, relieved by †, and then † by ‡. Date in parentheses shows date of relief.

North Atlantic Station

REAR-ADMIRAL WILLIAM T. SAMPSON, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

COMMODORE JOHN A. HOWELL.

(Rear-Admiral August 10, 1898.) In independent command of *Northern Patrol Squadron* from April 20 to July 1. Commanding *First Squadron, North Atlantic Fleet*, from July 1.

COMMODORE GEORGE C. REMEY

Commanding *Naval Base*, Key West, from May 7.

COMMODORE JOHN C. WATSON

Commanding *Blockading Squadron* from May 6 to June 21; *First Squadron, North Atlantic Fleet*, from June 21 to June 27; *Eastern Squadron* from July 7 to September 20, 1898.

COMMODORE WINFIELD S. SCHLEY

(Rear-Admiral August 10, 1898.) Commanding *Flying Squadron* to May 24 independently, then under Commander-in-Chief; commanding *Second Squadron, North Atlantic Fleet*, from June 21 to close of hostilities.

SHIP	COMMANDERS	DATE ATTACHED
Abarenda	Lieutenant-Commander W. H. Buford	June 7
Alexander	Commander W. T. Burwell	June 19
Amphitrite	Captain C. J. Barclay	From beginning
Annapolis	Commander J. J. Hunker	April 25
Apache	Lieutenant G. C. Hanus	Aug. 4
Armeria	Commander L. C. Logan	June 4
Accomac	*Ensign W. S. Crosley	From beginning
	†Boatswain J. W. Angus (May 6)	
Badger	Commander A. S. Snow	July 1
Bancroft	Commander R. Clover	May 8
Brooklyn	Captain F. A. Cook	May 24
Cæsar	Lieutenant-Commander A. B. Speyers	June 7
Calumet	First Lieutenant W. H. Cushing, R.C.S.	July 21
Castine	Commander R. M. Berry	From beginning
Celtic	Commander H. B. Mansfield	June 18
Cincinnati	Captain C. M. Chester	From beginning
Columbia	Captain J. H. Sands	July 1
Cushing	Lieutenant Albert Gleaves	From beginning
Detroit	Commander J. H. Dayton	" "
Dixie	Commander C. H. Davis	May 6

[1] *Monterey* was detached June 7; *Monadnock* June 23, and sent to Asia.

SHIP	COMMANDERS	DATE ATTACHED
Dolphin	Commander H. W. Lyon	From beginning
Dorothea	*Lieut.-Commander W. J. Barnette †Lieut.-Com. N. T. Houston (Aug. 19)	July 1
Dupont	Lieutenant S. S. Wood	From beginning
Eagle	Lieutenant W. H. H. Southerland	" "
Ericsson	Lieutenant N. R. Usher	" "
Fern	*Lieut.-Commander W. S. Cowles †Lieut.-Com. H. Winslow (April 27)	" "
Fish Hawk	Lieut.-Commander F. H. Delano	July 25
Foote	Lieutenant Wm. L. Rodgers	From beginning
Frolic	Commander E. H. Gheen	July 31
Glacier	Commander J. P. Merrell	July 22
Gloucester	Lieutenant-Commander R. Wainwright	June 3
Gwin	Lieutenant C. S. Williams	July 8
Hamilton	Captain W. D. Roath, R.C.S.	May 1
Hannibal	Commander H. G. O. Colby	July 1
Harvard	Captain C. S. Cotton	April 30
Hawk	Lieutenant J. Hood	From beginning
Helena	Commander W. T. Swinburne	" "
Hist	Lieutenant Lucien Young	June 24
Hornet	Lieutenant J. M. Helm	April 22
Hudson	First Lieut. F. H. Newcomb, R.C.S.	May 1
Indiana	Captain H. C. Taylor	From beginning
Iowa	Captain R. D. Evans	" "
Justin	*Commander G. E. Ide †Commander W. L. Field (July 10)	June 2
Lancaster	Commander Thomas Perry	May 31
Lebanon	Lieutenant-Commander C. T. Forse	May 26
Leonidas	Commander W. I. Moore	June 11
Leyden	*Boatswain J. W. Angus †Ensign W. S. Crosley (May 6)	From beginning
Machias	*Commander J. F. Merry †Commander W. W. Mead (June 27)	" "
Manning	Captain F. M. Munger, R.C.S.	May 7
Mangrove	*Lieut.-Commander W. H. Everett †Lieut-.Com. D. D. V. Stuart (June 7)	From beginning
Maple	Lieutenant-Commander W. Kellogg	May 15
Marblehead	Captain B. H. McCalla	From beginning
Marietta	Commander F. M. Symonds	" "
Mayflower	Commander M. R. S. Mackenzie	" "
Massachusetts	Captain F. J. Higginson	" "
McKee	Lieutenant C. M. Knepper	July 25
McLane	First Lieut. W. E. Reynolds, R.C.S.	From beginning
Merrimac	Commander J. M. Miller	May 5
Miantonomoh	Captain M. L. Johnson	May 5
Minneapolis	Captain T. F. Jewell	From beginning
Montgomery	Commander G. A. Converse	" "
Morrill	Captain H. D. Smith, R.C.S.	April 26
Morris	Lieutenant C. E. Fox	July 12

SHIP	COMMANDERS	DATE ATTACHED
Nashville	Commander Washburn Maynard	From beginning
Newark	*Captain A. S. Barker †Captain C. F. Goodrich (Aug. 8)	June 25
New Orleans	Captain W. M. Folger	May 8
Newport	Commander B. F. Tilley	From beginning
New York	Captain French E. Chadwick	" "
Niagara	*Commander G. A. Bicknell †Lieut.-Com. E. S. Prime (May 30)	May 3
Oneida	Lieutenant W. G. Miller	June 2
Oregon	*Captain C. E. Clark †Captain A. S. Barker (Aug. 6)	May 26 (arrival Key West)
Osceola	Lieutenant J. L. Purcell	April 27
Panther	Commander G. C. Reiter	April 30
Peoria	Lieutenant T. W. Ryan	June 21
Piscataqua	Lieutenant-Commander N. E. Niles	July 21
Pompey	Commander J. M. Miller	June 7
Porter	Lieutenant J. C. Fremont	
Potomac	Lieutenant G. P. Blow	July 13
Powhatan	Lieutenant F. M. Russell	June 11
Prairie	Commander G. J. Train	May 18
Princeton	Commander C. H. West	July 27
Puritan	*Captain P. F. Harrington †Captain Fred'k Rodgers (June 18)	From beginning
Resolute	Commander J. G. Eaton	" "
Rodgers	Lieutenant J. L. Jayne	" "
St. Louis	Captain C. F. Goodrich (Newark, Aug. 8)	April 30
St. Paul	Captain C. D. Sigsbee	May 5
San Francisco	Captain R. P. Leary	May 2
Saturn	*Commander S. W. Very †Commander G. A. Bicknell (June 4)	From beginning
Scindia	Commander E. W. Watson	June 10
Scorpion	Lieut.-Commander Adolph Marix	May 24
Sioux	Ensign W. R. Gherardi	May 1
Siren	Lieutenant J. M. Robinson	July 25
Solace	Commander A. Dunlap	May 11
Southery	Commander Walton Goodwin	July 1
Sterling	Commander R. E. Impey	May 24
Stranger	Lieutenant G. L. Dyer	July 21
Supply	Lieutenant-Commander R. R. Ingersoll	May 26
Suwanee	Lieutenant-Commander D. Delehanty	May 15
Sylvia	Lieutenant G. H. Peters	Aug. 2
Talbot	Lieutenant W. R. Shoemaker	July 10
Tecumseh	Lieutenant G. R. Evans	April 23
Terror	Captain Nicoll Ludlow	From beginning
Texas	Captain J. W. Philip	" "
Topeka	Commander W. S. Cowles	July 6
Uncas	Lieutenant F. R. Brainard	April 23
Vesuvius	Lieutenant-Commander J. E. Pillsbury	From beginning
Vicksburg	Commander A. B. H. Lillie	From beginning

SHIP	COMMANDERS	DATE ATTACHED
Viking	Lieutenant-Commander J. C. Wilson	July 22
Vixen	Lieutenant A. Sharp, Jr.	May 12
Vulcan	Lieutenant-Commander I. Harris	July 1
Wasp	Lieutenant A. Ward	May 1
Wilmington	Commander C. C. Todd	From beginning
Windom	Captain S. E. Maguire, R.C.S.	May 5
Winslow	Lieutenant J. B. Bernadou	" "
Wompatuck	Lieutenant C. W. Jungen	April 26
Woodbury	Captain H. B. Rodgers, R.C.S.	May 8
Yale	Captain W. C. Wise	May 2
Yankee	Commander W. H. Brownson	May 12
Yankton	Lieutenant-Commander J. D. Adams	June 25
Yosemite	Commander W. H. Emory	May 17

The * signifies that the officer in questson was, subsequently, relieved by †. Date in parentheses shows the date of relief.

NOTE.—The *Brooklyn* (flag-ship), *Columbia*, *Massachusetts*, *Minneapolis*, and *Texas* (from the beginning of the war), the *Merrimac* (from April 9 to April 29), the *New Orleans* (from May 8), the *Scorpion* and *Sterling* (from May 1), the *Saturn* (from April 21 to April 29) were in the Flying Squadron under command of Commodore Schley which came under the command of Admiral Sampson May 24. The *San Francisco* (flag-ship), *Prairie*, *Dixie*, *Yankee*, *Yosemite*, *Columbia*, *Badger*, and *Southery*, were in the Northern Patrol Squadron, under command of Commodore Howell; the *Yankee* was detached to the North Atlantic Fleet on May 29, the *Yosemite* on May 30, the *Dixie* on June 13. Commodore Howell's squadron became part of the North Atlantic fleet on July 1.

The *Katahdin* (ram), Captain G. F. F. Wilde, was part of the Flying Squadron until April 16, and was thereafter on detached service. The *St. Louis*, *St. Paul*, *Harvard*, and *Yale* were, later in the war, much on detached service in connection with the transport of prisoners and troops.

AUXILIARY NAVAL FORCE

REAR-ADMIRAL HENRY ERBEN (RETIRED) IN CHARGE.

Headquarters Ashore at New York.

Aileen	Lieutenant A. Gartley.
Arctic	Lieutenant G. C. Stout.
Catskill (monitor)	Lieutenant M. E. Hall.
Choctaw	Lieutenant W. O. Hulme.
Elfrida	Lieutenant M. A. Orlopp.
Enquirer	Lieutenant W. H. Stayton.
Free Lance	Lieutenant T. C. Zerega.
Huntress	Lieutenant Felton Parker.
Inca	Lieutenant W. E. McKay.
Jason (monitor)	Lieutenant H. F. Fickbohm.
Lehigh (monitor)	Lieutenant R. G. Peck.
Montauk (monitor)	Lieutenant L. L. Reamey.
Nahant (monitor)	Lieutenant C. S. Richman.
Nantucket (monitor)	Lieutenant C. B. T. Moore.
Passaic (monitor)	Lieutenant F. H. Sherman.
Restless	Lieutenant A. H. Day.
Wyandotte (monitor)	Licutenant T. I. Madge.

VESSELS PURCHASED BY THE UNITED STATES

NAME BEFORE PURCHASE	RENAMED	DATE OF PURCHASE	PREVIOUS OWNERS
Columbia	Wasp	Mar. 26, 1898	J. H. Ladew.
Alicia	Hornet	Apr. 6, 1898	Henry M. Flagler.
Almy	Eagle	Apr. 2, 1898	Frederick Gallatin.
Hermione	Hawk	"	Henry L. Pierce estate.
D. C. Ivans	Nezinscot	Mar. 25, 1898	Moran & Co.
P. H. Wise	Sioux	Mar. 26, 1898	"
Winthrop	Osceola	Mar. 31, 1898	Staples Coal Co.
El Toro	Accomac	Mar. 26, 1898	Southern Pacific Line.
Wilmot	Potomac	Apr. 14, 1898	Ocean Towing and Wrecking Co.
Edward Luckenback	Tecumseh	Apr. 2, 1898	Luckenback & Co.
Walter A. Luckenback	Uncas	"	"
Atlas	Wampatuck	Apr. 4, 1898	Standard Oil Co.
Josephine	Vixen	Apr. 9, 1898	P. A. B. Widener.
Mayflower	Mayflower	Mar. 19, 1898	Ogden Goelet estate.
Sovereign	Scorpion	Apr. 7, 1898	M. C. D. Borden.
Creole	Solace	"	Cromwell S. S. Line.
Diogenes	Topeka	Apr. 2, 1898	Thames Iron Works (London).
(Not named)	Manly	Apr. 13, 1898	Chas. R. Flint.
"	Somers	Mar. 26, 1898	Schichau Works, Elbing, Germany.
Saturn	Saturn	Apr. 2, 1898	The Boston Towboat Co.
Lebanon	Lebanon	Apr. 6, 1898	Philadelphia and Reading R. R. Co.
El Norte	Yankee	"	Southern Pacific Co.
El Rio	Dixie	Apr. 15, 1898	"
El Sol	Prairie	Apr. 6, 1898	"
El Sud	Yosemite	"	"
Nictheroy	Buffalo	July 11, 1898	Brazilian Government.
Amazonas	New Orleans	Mar. 16, 1898	"
Almirante Abru	Albany	"	"
Merrimac	Merrimac	Apr. 12, 1898	Hogan Line.
Niagara	Niagara	Apr. 11, 1898	Ward Line S. S. Co.
Sterling	Sterling	Apr. 16, 1898	Black Diamond Transportation Co.
Enterprise	Modoc	Apr. 29, 1898	American Towing Co.
No. 18	No. 18	Apr. 18, 1898	Philadelphia Transportation and Lightering Co.
Nashan	Nashan	Apr. 6, 1898	Frank Smythe.
Zafiro	Zafiro	Apr. 9, 1898	China and Manila S. S. Co.
Alice	Alice	Mar. 26, 1898	John M. Worth.
St. Paul	St. Paul	Chartered.	International Navigation Co.
St. Louis	St. Louis		"
New York	Harvard		"
Paris	Yale		"
C. G. Coyle	Choctaw	Apr. 19, 1898	W. G. Coyle.
Penwood	Powhatan	Apr. 8, 1898	Walsh & Doran.
Fearless	Iroquois	Apr. 18, 1898	J. D. Spreckels Bros. Co.
Vigilant	Vigilant	Apr. 19, 1898	"
Active	Active	Apr. 18, 1898	"
Hercules	Hercules	Apr. 26, 1898	Standard Oil Co.
Southery	Southery	Apr. 16, 1898	Edward Luckenback.
Venezuela	Panther	Apr. 19, 1898	Red D Line S. S. Co.
Yumuri	Badger	"	Ward Line S. S. Co.
Yorktown	Resolute	Apr. 21, 1898	Old Dominion S. S. Co.
T. P. Fowler	Mohawk	Apr. 23, 1898	Cornell Steamboat Co.
Thespia	Hist	Apr. 22, 1898	Davis Dows, Jr.
Restless	Restless	"	Hiram W. Sidley.
Illawara	Oneida	May 31, 1898	Eugene Tompkins.

VESSELS PURCHASED BY THE UNITED STATES

NAME BEFORE PURCHASE	RENAMED	DATE OF PURCHASE	PREVIOUS OWNERS
Viking	Viking	Apr. 22, 1898	Horace A. Hutchins.
Chatham	Vulcan	May 2, 1898	Merchants and Miners' Line.
Penelope	Yankton	May 20, 1898	H. E. Converse.
Right Arm	Pontiac	Apr. 23, 1898	Merritt & Chapman.
Philadelphia	Peoria	May 23, 1898	Philadelphia Pilot Association.
Corsair	Gloucester	Apr. 23, 1898	Pierpont Morgan.
Menemsha	Iris	May 25, 1898	Miami Steamship Co.
Free Lance	Free Lance	.....	F. Augustus Schermerhorn.
John Dwight	Pawnee	May 6, 1898	Geo. T. Moon.
Justin	Justin	Apr. 23, 1898	Bowring & Archibald.
Hortense	Takoma	Apr. 30, 1898	O'Connor & Smoot.
Aileen	Aileen	May 2, 1898	Richard Stevens.
Scindia	Scindia	May 12, 1898	Henderson Bros.
Comanche	Frolic	May 28, 1898	H. M. Hanna.
Illinois	Supply	Apr. 30, 1898	International Navigation Co.
Kingston	Cæsar	Apr. 21, 1898	John Holman & Sons.
Dorothea	Dorothea	May 21, 1898	Thos. McKean Estate.
Gov. Russell	Gov. Russell	May 11, 1898	City of Boston.
East Boston	East Boston	June 2, 1898	"
W. H. Brown	Piscataqua	May 11, 1898	W. H. Brown.
J. D. Jones	Apache	May 24, 1898	Merritt & Chapman Wrecking Co.
Celtic King	Celtic	May 14, 1898	Federal Line (London)
Rhætia	Cassius	May 24, 1898	William Lamb.
A. W. Booth	Massasoit	Apr. 25, 1898	Moran Towing Co.
Joseph Holland	Hannibal	Apr. 16, 1898	Francis Stanley Holland (London).
No. 3 (ice boat)	Arctic	May 21, 1898	City of Philadelphia (leased).
Atala	Alexander	Apr. 25, 1898	New Star Blue Line Steamers (London).
Eliz. Holland	Leonidas	Apr. 16, 1898	Francis Stanley Holland (London).
Harlech	Pompey	Apr. 19, 1898	Jas. & Chas. Harrison (London).
Abarenda	Abarenda	May 5, 1898	J. Graham.
(Not known)	Scipio	"	Geo. P. Walford.
Peter Jebsen	Brutus	June 3, 1898	L. F. Chapman & Co.
No. 55	Water Barge No. 1	May 25, 1898	Standard Oil Co.
Whitgift	Nero	June 30, 1898	McCondray & Co.
Norse King	Rainbow	June 29, 1898	Thomas Ronaldson.
Enquirer	Enquirer	"	W. J. Conners.
Inca	Inca	June 13, 1898	Frank B. McQuesten.
Huntress	Huntress	June 7, 1898	F. C. Fowler.
Stranger	Stranger	June 9, 1898	Mrs. Mary Lewis.
Kate Jones	Seminole	June 6, 1898	Boston Towboat Co.
Bristol	Cheyenne	July 8, 1898	J. J. Cummings.
Eugenia	Siren	June 9, 1898	J. G. Cassatt.
Elfrida	Elfrida	June 15, 1898	Dr. Seward Webb.
No. 295	Sylph	June —, 1898	John Roach & Co.
Shearwater	Shearwater	May 9, 1898	Henry R. Wolcott.
Sylvia	Sylvia	June 13, 1898	Edward M. Brown.
Hercules	Chickasaw	June 25, 1898	M. Revel.
Confidence	Waban	"	"
Kanawha	Kanawha	June 7, 1898	John P. Duncan.
Pedro	Hector	June —, 1898	(Prize.)
Port Chalmers	Glacier	July —, 1898	Federal Line (London).
Titania	Marcellus	June 13, 1898	William Lamb.
Culgoa	(Not on file)	June 4, 1898	G. F. Walford (chartered only).
Lucilene	Arethusa	Aug. 12, 1898	Thos. S. Hopkins.

MERCHANT-SHIPS CONVERTED INTO AUXILIARY CRUISERS

NAME	SPEED IN KNOTS	INDICATED HORSE-POWER	BUNKER CAPACITY	LENGTH	BREADTH	MEAN DRAFT	DISPLACEMENT	BATTERIES		COMPLEMENT		FIRST COMMISSION IN U. S. NAVY
								MAIN	SECONDARY	OFFICERS	MEN	
			Tons	*Ft. In.*	*Ft. In.*	*Ft. In.*	*Tons*					
Badger	16	3,200	836	326 6	42 0	18 6	4,784	6 5″ R. F. G.	6 3-pdr.	19	216	Apr. 22, 1898
Buffalo	14.5	3,600	1,000	380 6	48 0	22 0	6,888	2 5″ R. F. G. 4 4″ R. F. G.	2 6-mm Colt. 6 6-pdr.	17	280	.....
Dixie	16	3,800	1,371	389 2	48 0	19 11	6,114	10 6″ R. F. G.	6 6-pdr. 2 Colt	14	167	Apr. 19, 1898
Harvard	21.8	20,600	2,656	527 6	63 2	23 0	13,000	8 5″ R. F. G.	8 6-pdr.	26	381	.....
Panther	13	.....	475	310 0	40 0	18 2½	4,260	6 5″ R. F. G. 2 4″ R. F. G.	6 3-pdr. 1 Colt 1 3″ field	13	185	Apr. 22, 1898
Prairie	14.5	3,800	1,000	390 6	46 10	22 0	6,872	10 6″ R. F. G.	6 6-pdr. R. F. 2 Colt	18	267	Apr. 14, 1898
St. Louis	22	20,000	2,677	535 6	63 0	25 0	14,910	4 5″ R. F. G.	8 6-pdr.	....	....	.....
St. Paul	22	20,000	2,677	535 6	63 0	25 0	14,910	6 5″ R. F. G.	8 6 pdr. 6 3-pdr.	24	357	Apr. 20, 1898
Yale	21.8	20,600	2,656	527 6	63 2	23 0	13,000	8 5″ R. F. G.	4 3-pdr. 4 6-pdr.	25	381	.....
Yankee	14.5	3,800	1,000	380 6	48 0	22 0	6,888	10 5″ R. F. G.	6 6-pdr. 2 Colt	15	267	Apr. 14, 1898
Yosemite	16	3,800	1,371	389 2	48 0	20 1	6,179	10 5″ R. F. G.	6 6-pdr. 2 Colt	18	267	Apr. 13, 1898

CONVERTED YACHTS

NAME	DISPLACEMENT	SPEED IN KNOTS	INDICATED HORSE-POWER	BUNKER CAPACITY	BATTERY	COMPLEMENT		FIRST COMMISSION IN U. S. NAVY
						OFFICERS	MEN	
	Tons			*Tons*				
Aileen	192	14	500	45	1 3-pdr. 2 6-mm 2 1-pdr.	3	30	May 14, 1898
Buccaneer	.....	.....	.....	...	.....	...	..	.....
Dorothea	594	15	1,558	90	4 6-pdr. 2 3-pdr. 4 1-pdr.	6	63	June 1, 1898
Eagle	434	15.5	*850	85	4 6-pdr. 2 Colts	4	60	Mar. 26, 1898
Elfrida	173	10.5	*200	23	2 37-mm	4	15	June 30, 1898
Enquirer	136	20	1,035	18	2 1-pdr.	4	14	June 22, 1898
Free Lance	197	16.5	800	22	2 Gatlings	2	18	May 11, 1898
Frolic	607	11	550	100	2 3-pdr. 2 47-mm. R. C. 4 6-pdr.	7	37	July 6, 1898
Gloucester	786	17	2,000	120	4 3-pdr. 2 Colts	9	85	May 20, 1898
Hawk	375	14.5	1,000	70	2 6-pdr. 2 1-pdr. 2 Colts	4	46	Apr. 5, 1898
Hist	472	14.5	*500	60	1 3-pdr. 4 1-pdr. 1 Colt	6	50	May 13, 1898
Hornet	425	15	*800	65	3 6-pdr. 2 1-pdr. 2 6-mm. Colts 2 37-mm. R. C.	4	51	Apr. 12, 1898
Huntress	81.76	14	.....	17	2 Colts	4	16	July 1, 1898
Kanawha	175	14	.....	20	1 3-pdr. 3 1-pdr. 2 6-mm. Colts	3	22	July 26, 1898
Inca	.....	14	400	25	1 1-pdr. 1 Gatling	3	18	Aug. 1, 1898
Mayflower	2,690	16.8	4,700	584	2 5″ R. F. G. 12 6-pdr. 2 6-mm. Colts	..	..	.....
Oneida	150	12	350	20	1 6-pdr. 4 1-pdr. 1 6-mm. Gatling	2	22	Apr. 30, 1898
Restless	137	12	*500	16	6 6-pdr. 2 6-mm. Colts	3	30	May 14, 1898
Scorpion	850	17.85	2,800	200	6 6-pdr. 2 6-mm. Colts	8	103	Apr. 11, 1898
Shearwater	.....	.....	.....	...	3 3-pdr.	...	..	.....
Siren	315	13	.....	45	1 3-pdr. 3 1-pdr.	5	37	June 24, 1898
Stranger	546	14	.....	50	1 14-pdr. 2 6-pdr. 2 1-pdr.	8	49	June 30, 1898
Sylph	152	15	550	47	6 6-pdr. 2 3-pdr.	..	..	.....

* Nominal horse-power.

CONVERTED YACHTS

NAME	DISPLACEMENT	SPEED IN KNOTS	INDICATED HORSE-POWER	BUNKER CAPACITY	BATTERY	COMPLEMENT		FIRST COMMISSION IN U. S. NAVY
						OFFICERS	MEN	
	Tons			*Tons*				
Sylvia.....	302	9	.....	60	3 3-pdr..... 1 1-pdr..... 2 6-mm. Colts	5	31	June 29, 1898
Viking.....	218	11.75	420	40	1 3-pdr..... 3 6-mm. Colts	3	40	May 11, 1898
Vixen.....	806	16	1,250	190	4 6-pdr..... 4 1-pdr.....	6	76	Apr. 11, 1898
Wasp.....	630	16.5	1,800	108	4 6-pdf..... 2 Colts.....	4	51	Apr. 11, 1898
Yankton...	975	14	750	170	6 3-pdr..... 2 Colts.....	8	70	May 16, 1898

CONVERTED TUG-BOATS

NAME	DISPLACEMENT	SPEED IN KNOTS	INDICATED HORSE-POWER	BUNKER CAPACITY	BATTERY	COMPLEMENT		FIRST COMMISSION IN U. S. NAVY
						OFFICERS	MEN	
	Tons			*Tons*				
Accomac	187	10	250	35	1 6-pdr. R. F. 1 6-mm. Colt 1 Gatling	1	11	Apr. 2, 1898
Active	296	12	600	80	2 3″ B. L. R. 2 37-mm. R.C.	..	21	July 6, 1898
Alice	356	10	250	15	2 6-pdr. R. F.	...	..	Apr. 6, 1898
Apache	650	10	550	120	2 4″ R. F. 2 3-pdr. R. F. 2 Gatling	4	44	June 11, 1898
Cheyenne	.....	11	.....	...	.....	...	..	.....
Chickasaw	.....	10	.....	20	1 3″ B. L. R.	...	..	.....
Choctaw	.....	10	188	70	1 3-pdr. R. F. 1 1-pdr. R. F. 1 37-mm. R.C.	2	..	Apr. 19, 1898
Hercules	198	12	.....	40	1 3-pdr. 1 1-pdr. R. F. 1 37-mm. R.C.	1	..	.....
Iroquois	702	13.25	1,000	205	4 3″ B. L. R. 1 Gatling 2 37-mm. R.C.	..	37	July 6, 1898
Massasoit	202	.....	.....	34	1 1-pdr.	3	..	June 21, 1898
Modoc	240	10	.....	40	.....	...	7	.....
Mohawk	420	12	400	32	.....	...	..	Apr. 23, 1898
Nezinscot	156	10	400	40	1 6-pdr. 1 Colt	2	13	Apr. 2, 1898
Osceola	571	14	.....	150	2 6-pdr. 1 47-mm. 1 Gatling	3	27	.....
Pawnee	275	10	*250	16	.....	...	..	Apr. 27, 1898
Piscataqua	631	14	1,600	300	2 9-pdr. 2 37-mm. R.C.	5	32	June 18, 1898
Pontiac	401	10.5	425	45	2 6-pdr. 1 1-pdr.	..	..	Apr. 2, 1898
Potomac	677	18	2,000	260	2 6-pdr. 2 1-pdr.	2	31	Apr. 5, 1898
Powhatan	194	13	397	57	1 3-pdr. 1 37-mm.	..	..	.....
Seminole	.....	.....	.....	42	1 3-pdr. 2 6-mm. Colt.	3	16	July 23, 1898
Sioux	155	10	290	45	1 6-pdr. 1 Colt	1	3	Apr. 9, 1898
Takoma	.....	12	.....	30	1 6-pdr.	...	22	.....
Tecumseh	214	11	*500	40	1 1-pdr. 1 Gatling	2	13	Apr. 6, 1898
Uncas	441	12	*750	120	1 37-mm. R.C. 1 Gatling	2	26	Apr. 6, 1898
Vigilant	300	12	450	75	2 3″ B. L. R. 1 Gatling 2 47-mm. R.C.	2	30	Apr. 6, 1898
Waban	.....	.....	.....	...	1 3″ B. L. R.	...	..	.....
Wompatuck	462	13	650	130	1 3-pdr. 1 Gatling	2	30	Apr. 6, 1898

* Nominal horse-power.

APPENDIX B

TABLE SHOWING STATIONS OF REGULAR TROOPS PREVIOUS TO THE WAR, AND THEIR ASSIGNMENTS ON MOBILIZATION

TROOPS	FROM	TO
First U. S. Cavalry	Kansas, Arizona, Oklahoma, and Illinois	Chickamauga Park.
Second U. S. Cavalry	New Mexico, Colorado, and Kansas	"
Third U. S. Cavalry	Vermont and Missouri	"
Sixth U. S. Cavalry	Virginia, Kansas, and Nebraska	"
Ninth U. S. Cavalry	Nebraska, Utah, and Wyoming	"
Tenth U. S. Cavalry	Montana	"
Light Battery E, First U. S. Artillery.	District of Columbia	"
Light Battery K, First U. S. Artillery.	Texas	"
Light Battery A, Second U. S. Artillery.	Illinois	"
Light Battery F, Second U. S. Artillery.	Rhode Island	"
Light Battery C, Third U. S. Artillery.	California	"
Light Battery F, Third U. S. Artillery.	"	"
Light Battery B, Fourth U. S. Artillery.	Louisiana	"
Light Battery F, Fourth U. S. Artillery.	Virginia	"
Light Battery D, Fifth U. S. Artillery.	New York	"
Light Battery F, Fifth U. S. Artillery.	Georgia	"
First U. S. Infantry	California	New Orleans, La.
Second U. S. Infantry	Montana and North Dakota	Chickamauga Park.
Third U. S. Infantry	Minnesota	Mobile, Ala.
Fourth U. S. Infantry	Illinois	Tampa, Fla.
Fifth U. S. Infantry	Georgia	"
Sixth U. S. Infantry	Kentucky	"
Seventh U. S. Infantry	Colorado	Chickamauga Park.
Eighth U. S. Infantry	Wyoming	"
Ninth U. S. Infantry	New York	Tampa, Fla.
Tenth U. S. Infantry	Oklahoma	"
Eleventh U. S. Infantry	Missouri and Arkansas	Mobile, Ala.
Twelfth U. S. Infantry	Nebraska	Chickamauga Park.
Thirteenth U. S. Infantry	New York	Tampa, Fla.
Sixteenth U. S. Infantry	Idaho and Washington	Chickamauga Park.
Seventeenth U. S. Infantry	Ohio	Tampa, Fla.
Eighteenth U. S. Infantry	Texas	New Orleans, La.
Nineteenth U. S. Infantry	Michigan	Mobile, Ala.
Twentieth U. S. Infantry	Kansas	"
Twenty-first U. S. Infantry	New York	Tampa, Fla.
Twenty-second U. S. Infantry	Nebraska	"
Twenty-third U. S. Infantry	Texas	New Orleans, La.
Twenty-fourth U. S. Infantry	Utah	Chickamauga Park.
Twenty-fifth U. S. Infantry	Montana	"
Company E, Engineers	West Point	Tampa, Fla.

APPENDIX C

FLYING SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP *Brooklyn*,
OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *May* 30, 1898.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the squadron sailed from Key West on the morning of the 19th instant for Cienfuegos, Cuba, in obedience to orders from Rear-Admiral Sampson. In company with the flag-ship were the *Massachusetts*, *Texas*, and *Scorpion*. En route, passed the *Marblehead*, *Nashville*, and *Wasp*, communicating with the last-named vessel. Off Cape San Antonio communicated with the *Cincinnati* and *Vesuvius*, scouting.

2. On the morning of the 22d instant the squadron stood in for the entrance of Cienfuegos Harbor to reconnoitre, and later in the day passed the entrance twice close in. As I had heard the firing of guns on the previous afternoon in the direction of the port, and as there was considerable smoke observed in the harbor, I was led to believe that the Spanish squadron might have arrived there. That day the *Dupont* joined me with dispatches from Admiral Sampson, directing that the blockade of Cienfuegos be preserved and that the *Scorpion* be sent to communicate with the *Minneapolis* and *Harvard*, off Santiago. Also on this day the *Iowa* joined the squadron.

3. A line of blockade was established about 4 miles offshore, and at night an inshore line was maintained, consisting variously of the *Scorpion*, *Dupont*, and *Castine*, the last-named vessel arriving on the 23d, convoying the *Merrimac*.

4. Also, on the 23d instant, the *Hawk* arrived with dispatches from Admiral Sampson, directing me to move eastward with the squadron to Santiago, if satisfied that the enemy's vessels were not in Cienfuegos. Not being satisfied at this time that they were not there, I held my position, being further strengthened in my opinion by the fact that I was informed by the captain of the British steamer *Adula*, that when he left Kingston a cablegram had been received, on the Thursday preceding my arrival off Cienfuegos, stating that the Spanish squadron had sailed from Santiago.

5. The *Iowa*, *Castine*, and *Dupont* took coal from the collier on that day, the *Iowa* particularly needing coal, as she had sailed from Key West to join this squadron before completely coaling, and consequently was considerably short.

6. On the 24th instant the *Marblehead*, *Vixen*, and *Eagle* joined the squadron, and the *Marblehead* and *Eagle* were immediately sent to com-

municate with the insurgents to the westward of Cienfuegos, and to furnish them with ammunition, clothing, and dynamite. Upon Commander McCalla's return, in the course of the afternoon, he reported to me that he had obtained information that the Spanish squadron was not in Cienfuegos. Dispatches were at once sent by the *Dupont* to Admiral Sampson and to Commodore Remey for the department indicating that this squadron would move toward Santiago de Cuba.

7. Great difficulty has been experienced in coaling the *Texas*, on account of her projecting sponsons, in any seaway whatever, and only under the most favorable conditions can she go alongside a collier. In anything more unfavorable than absolutely smooth water there is great danger of injury either to the *Texas* herself or to the collier. In this connection the advantage of a tumblehome to the side is very marked, insuring great freedom from accidents due to projections on the ship's side.

8. After dark on the evening of the 24th, the squadron stood to sea, to the eastward, with the *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, *Iowa*, and the *Texas* in column natural order; the *Marblehead*, *Vixen*, and *Eagle* on the outer flank and the collier inshore of the battle-ships. The *Castine* was left at Cienfuegos to notify the *Scorpion* on her return, should she not be sighted by us, to proceed to Key West in company.

9. The run to Santiago was marked by rain and rough weather to such an extent that the *Eagle* was unable to keep up a speed of 7.5 to 8.5 knots and fell behind so much as to seriously delay the squadron, which was forced to slow to a speed of from 4 to 5 knots for her to regain and hold her position. As this rough head sea continued with no apparent prospect of abating, and as the *Eagle's* coal supply was becoming dangerously low, she was sent to Port Antonio, Jamaica, for coal, with directions to make the best of her way back to Key West.

10. On arriving off Santiago de Cuba, the collier *Merrimac* was disabled by the breaking of her intermediate pressure valve stem and the cracking of the stuffing box. This served as a further embarrassment to the squadron and a source of considerable anxiety, as, with the weather conditions that had prevailed since leaving Cienfuegos, it appeared absolutely necessary to abandon the position off Santiago and seek a place where the vessels could be coaled and the collier's machinery repaired.

11. Off Santiago the *St. Paul*, *Yale*, and *Minneapolis* were sighted and communicated with. The *Minneapolis* reported that she only had sufficient coal to reach Key West, and that her machinery was in bad condition. The coal supply of the other two scouts was also much reduced. Arrangements were at once made whereby the *Yale* was to tow the collier, and, as the prospect did not seem favorable for replenishing the meagre coal supply of the other vessels, the squadron stood to the westward, towing the collier. The operation of taking the col-

lier in tow proved to be quite difficult, owing to the size and weight of the two ships and the repeated parting of the tow lines. Finally, however, after twenty-four hours' unremitting exertions, the collier's chain cable was gotten to the *Yale* and the squadron proceeded. The *St. Paul* was ordered to remain off Santiago until her coal supply would no longer permit of further delay.

12. After standing to the westward for about three hours, or about twenty-five miles, the conditions became less unfavorable and the squadron stopped. The *Texas* and *Marblehead* were sent alongside the collier, whose injury had been temporarily repaired, and coaled during the night.

13. Inasmuch as it was known that, in case the Spanish squadron had reached Santiago, Admiral Sampson was able to block any movement of the enemy through the Bahama Channel, my intention in standing to the westward was, should it become necessary, to bar any effort of the enemy to reach Havana by a dash through the Yucatan Passage.

14. On the 28th instant continued coaling the *Texas* and *Marblehead*, and later the *Vixen*. In the afternoon, having managed to get sufficient coal into these vessels to enable them to remain with the squadron, shaped course for Santiago, off which port we arrived about dusk. Established an inner picket line consisting of the *Vixen* and *Marblehead*, the remainder of the squadron lying to off the entrance of the port, about four or five miles out.

15. The next morning, 29th instant, steamed in to examine the entrance to the harbor, and sighted the *Cristóbal Colón* apparently moored, head and stern, across the western channel around Cay Smith; also one of the vessels of the *Vizcaya* or *Infanta Maria Teresa* class moored in the eastern channel, and two small torpedo-boats. Later in the day made out the military tops of a third vessel farther up the harbor.

16. A close blockade of the harbor has been maintained, and no vessels have entered or left since our arrival. Yesterday morning H. M. S. *Indefatigable* came up to the line of blockade and made signal "Request permission to communicate with the commodore," which was of course granted. A boarding officer came on board the flag-ship with a letter from the commanding officer, Capt. L. A. Primrose, requesting permission for his vessel to pass the line of blockade in order to communicate with H. M. consul at this port. My reply was that there could not be the slightest objection to his doing so. Instead, however, of availing himself of the permission the *Indefatigable* at once steamed off in the direction from whence she came, signalling "No harm done for courtesy." It may have been that his learning that the Spanish fleet was in this port was of more importance than H. M. consul, and he may have desired first to communicate with his government from Jamaica.